1 INTERNET-DRAFT Editor: R. Harrison
2 draft-ietf-ldapbis-authmeth-14.txt Novell, Inc.
3 Obsoletes: 2829, 2830 February, 2005
4 Intended Category: Draft Standard
12 LDAP: Authentication Methods
14 Connection Level Security Mechanisms
18 By submitting this Internet-Draft, I accept the provisions of
19 Section 4 of RFC 3667. By submitting this Internet-Draft, I certify
20 that any applicable patent or other IPR claims of which I am aware
21 have been disclosed, and any of which I become aware will be
22 disclosed, in accordance with RFC 3668.
24 This document is intended to be, after appropriate review and
25 revision, submitted to the RFC Editor as a Standard Track document.
26 Distribution of this memo is unlimited. Technical discussion of
27 this document will take place on the IETF LDAP Revision Working
28 Group mailing list <ietf-ldapbis@OpenLDAP.org>. Please send
29 editorial comments directly to the author
30 <roger_harrison@novell.com>.
32 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
33 Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
34 other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
37 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six
38 months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents
39 at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as
40 reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
42 The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
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45 The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
46 http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
50 Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). All Rights Reserved.
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59 This document describes authentication methods and connection level
60 security mechanisms of the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
63 This document details establishment of TLS (Transport Layer
64 Security) using the StartTLS operation.
66 This document details the simple Bind authentication method
67 including anonymous, unauthenticated, and plain-text password
68 mechanisms and the SASL (Simple Authentication and Security Layer)
69 Bind authentication method including DIGEST-MD5 and EXTERNAL
72 This document discusses various authentication and authorization
73 states through which a connection to an LDAP server may pass and the
74 actions that trigger these state changes.
78 1. Introduction.....................................................3
79 1.1. Relationship to Other Documents................................5
80 1.2. Conventions....................................................5
81 2. Implementation Requirements......................................6
82 3. StartTLS Operation...............................................7
83 3.1. Sequencing of the StartTLS Operation...........................7
84 3.1.1. StartTLS Request ............................................7
85 3.1.2. StartTLS Response............................................8
86 3.1.3. TLS Version Negotiation......................................8
87 3.1.4. Client Certificate...........................................8
88 3.1.5. Discovery of Resultant Security Level........................8
89 3.1.6. Server Identity Check........................................9
90 3.1.7. Refresh of Server Capabilities Information...................9
91 3.2. Effects of TLS on a Client's Authorization Identity...........10
92 3.3. TLS Ciphersuites..............................................10
93 3.3.1. TLS Ciphersuites Recommendations............................10
94 4. Associations....................................................11
95 4.1. Anonymous Association on Unbound Connections..................11
96 4.2. Anonymous Association After Failed Bind.......................12
97 4.3. Invalidated Associations......................................12
98 5. Bind Operation..................................................12
99 5.1. Simple Authentication Choice..................................12
100 5.2. SASL Authentication Choice....................................12
101 6. Anonymous Authentication Mechanism of Simple Bind...............13
102 7. Unauthenticated Authentication Mechanism of Simple Bind.........13
103 8. Simple Authentication Mechanism of Simple Bind .................13
104 9. SASL Protocol Profile...........................................14
105 9.1. SASL Service Name for LDAP....................................14
106 9.2. SASL Authentication Initiation and Protocol Exchange..........14
107 9.3. Octet Where Negotiated Security Mechanisms Take Effect........15
108 9.4. Determination of Supported SASL Mechanisms....................15
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115 9.5. Rules for Using SASL Layers...................................16
116 9.6 Support for Multiple Authentications...........................16
117 9.7. SASL Authorization Identities.................................16
118 10. SASL DIGEST-MD5 Authentication Mechanism.......................17
119 11. SASL EXTERNAL Authentication Mechanism.........................17
120 11.1. Implicit Assertion...........................................18
121 11.2. Explicit Assertion...........................................18
122 12. Security Considerations........................................18
123 12.1. General LDAP Security Considerations.........................18
124 12.1.1. Password-related Security Considerations...................19
125 12.2. StartTLS Security Considerations.............................20
126 12.3. Unauthenticated Mechanism Security Considerations............20
127 12.4. Simple Mechanism Security Considerations.....................21
128 12.5. SASL DIGEST-MD5 Mechanism Security Considerations............21
129 12.6. Related Security Considerations..............................21
130 13. IANA Considerations............................................21
131 Acknowledgments....................................................21
132 Normative References...............................................21
133 Informative References.............................................23
134 Author's Address...................................................23
135 Appendix A. Association State Transition Tables....................23
136 A.1. Association States............................................23
137 A.2. Actions that Affect Association State.........................24
138 A.3. Association State Transition Table............................24
139 Appendix B. Authentication and Authorization Concepts..............25
140 B.1. Access Control Policy.........................................25
141 B.2. Access Control Factors........................................25
142 B.3. Authentication, Credentials, Identity.........................25
143 B.4. Authorization Identity........................................25
144 Appendix C. RFC 2829 Change History................................26
145 Appendix D. RFC 2830 Change History................................30
146 Appendix E. RFC 2251 Change History................................30
147 Appendix F. Change History to Combined Document....................31
148 Intellectual Property Rights.......................................45
153 The Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) [Roadmap] is a
154 powerful protocol for accessing directories. It offers means of
155 searching, retrieving and manipulating directory content, and ways
156 to access a rich set of security functions.
158 It is vital that these security functions be interoperable among all
159 LDAP clients and servers on the Internet; therefore there has to be
160 a minimum subset of security functions that is common to all
161 implementations that claim LDAP conformance.
163 Basic threats to an LDAP directory service include:
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172 (1) Unauthorized access to directory data via data-retrieval
175 (2) Unauthorized access to directory data by monitoring others'
178 (3) Unauthorized access to reusable client authentication
179 information by monitoring others' access.
181 (4) Unauthorized modification of directory data.
183 (5) Unauthorized modification of configuration information,
185 (6) Denial of Service: Use of resources (commonly in excess) in a
186 manner intended to deny service to others.
188 (7) Spoofing: Tricking a user or client into believing that
189 information came from the directory when in fact it did not,
190 either by modifying data in transit or misdirecting the client's
191 connection. Tricking a user or client into sending privileged
192 information to a hostile entity that appears to be the directory
193 server but is not. Tricking a directory server into believing
194 that information came from a particular client when in fact it
195 came from a hostile entity.
197 (8) Hijacking: An attacker seizes control of an established protocol
200 Threats (1), (4), (5), (6), (7) are (8) are active attacks. Threats
201 (2) and (3) are passive attacks.
203 Threats (1), (4), (5) and (6) are due to hostile clients. Threats
204 (2), (3), (7) and (8) are due to hostile agents on the path between
205 client and server or hostile agents posing as a server, e.g. IP
208 LDAP offers the following security mechanisms:
210 (1) Authentication by means of the Bind operation. The Bind
211 operation provides a simple method which supports anonymous,
212 unauthenticated, and authenticated-with-password mechanisms, and
213 the Secure Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) method which
214 supports a wide variety of authentication mechanisms,
216 (2) Mechanisms to support vendor-specific access control facilities
217 (LDAP does not offer a standard access control facility)
219 (3) Data integrity protection by means of security layers in TLS or
222 (4) Data confidentiality protection by means of security layers in
223 TLS or SASL mechanisms,
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231 (5) Server resource usage limitation by means of administrative
232 limits configured on the server, and
234 (6) Server authentication by means of the TLS protocol or SASL
237 LDAP may also be protected by means outside the LDAP protocol, e.g.
238 with IP-level security [RFC2401].
240 At the moment, imposition of access controls is done by means
241 outside the scope of LDAP.
243 Considering the above requirements, experience has shown that simply
244 allowing implementations to pick and choose among the possible
245 alternatives is not a strategy that leads to interoperability. In
246 the absence of mandates, clients will continue to be written that do
247 not support any security function supported by the server, or worse,
248 they will support only clear text passwords that provide inadequate
249 security for most circumstances.
251 It is desirable to allow clients to authenticate using a variety of
252 mechanisms including mechanisms where identities are represented as
253 distinguished names [X.501] [Models] in string form [LDAPDN] or are
254 used in different systems (e.g. user name in string form). Because
255 some authentication mechanisms transmit credentials in plain text
256 form and/or do not provide data security services, it is necessary
257 to ensure secure interoperability by identifying a mandatory-to-
258 implement mechanism for establishing transport-layer security
261 The set of security mechanisms provided in LDAP and described in
262 this document is intended to meet the security needs for a wide
263 range of deployment scenarios and still provide a high degree of
264 interoperability among various LDAP implementations and deployments.
265 Appendix B contains example deployment scenarios that list the
266 mechanisms that might be used to achieve a reasonable level of
267 security in various circumstances.
269 1.1. Relationship to Other Documents
271 This document is an integral part of the LDAP Technical
272 Specification [Roadmap].
274 This document obsoletes RFC 2829.
276 Sections 2 and 4 of RFC 2830 are obsoleted by [Protocol]. The
277 remainder of RFC 2830 is obsoleted by this document.
282 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
283 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
284 document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
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291 The term "user" represents any human or application entity which is
292 accessing the directory using a directory client. A directory
293 client (or client) is also known as a directory user agent (DUA).
295 The term "transport connection" refers to the underlying transport
296 services used to carry the protocol exchange, as well as
297 associations established by these services.
299 The term "TLS layer" refers to TLS services used in providing
300 security services, as well as associations established by these
303 The term "SASL layer" refers to SASL services used in providing
304 security services, as well as associations established by these
307 The term "LDAP message layer" refers to the LDAP Message (PDU)
308 services used in providing directory services, as well as
309 associations established by these services.
311 The term "association" refers to the association that exists between
312 the transport connection and its current authorization state. As a
313 shorthand, an association with an authorization state of <state> can
314 be referred to as a "<state> association", e.g. an association with
315 an anonymous authorization state is an anonymous association.
317 In general, security terms in this document are used consistently
318 with the definitions provided in [RFC2828]. In addition, several
319 terms and concepts relating to security, authentication, and
320 authorization are presented in Appendix C of this document. While
321 the formal definition of these terms and concepts is outside the
322 scope of this document, an understanding of them is prerequisite to
323 understanding much of the material in this document. Readers who are
324 unfamiliar with security-related concepts are encouraged to review
325 Appendix C before reading the remainder of this document.
327 2. Implementation Requirements
329 LDAP server implementations MUST support the anonymous
330 authentication mechanism of simple bind (section 6).
332 LDAP implementations that support any authentication mechanism other
333 than the anonymous authentication mechanism of simple bind MUST
334 support the DIGEST-MD5 [DIGEST-MD5] mechanism of SASL bind (section
335 10). DIGEST-MD5 is a reasonably strong authentication mechanism
336 that provides (mandatory-to-implement) data security (data integrity
337 and data confidentiality) services.
339 LDAP implementations SHOULD support the simple (DN and password)
340 authentication mechanism of simple bind (section 8).
341 Implementations that support this authentication mechanism MUST be
342 capable of protecting using TLS as established by the StartTLS
343 operation (section 3), SHOULD disallow the use of this
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349 authentication mechanism by default when suitable data security
350 services are not in place, and MAY provide other suitable data
351 security services for use with this authentication mechanism.
353 Implementations MAY support additional authentication mechanisms.
354 Some of these mechanisms are discussed below.
356 LDAP server implementations SHOULD support client assertion of
357 authorization identity via the SASL EXTERNAL mechanism (sections
360 LDAP server implementations SHOULD support the StartTLS operation
361 (section 3), and server implementations that do support the StartTLS
362 operation MUST support the TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
365 3. StartTLS Operation
367 The Start Transport Layer Security (StartTLS) operation defined in
368 section 4.14 of [Protocol] provides the ability to establish TLS
369 [TLS] on an LDAP connection.
371 The goals of using the TLS [TLS] protocol with LDAP are to ensure
372 data confidentiality and integrity, and to optionally provide for
373 authentication. TLS expressly provides these capabilities, although
374 the authentication services of TLS are available to LDAP only in
375 combination with the SASL EXTERNAL authentication method (see
376 section 11), and then only if the SASL EXTERNAL implementation
377 chooses to make use of the TLS credentials.
379 3.1. Sequencing of the StartTLS Operation
381 This section describes the overall procedures clients and servers
382 must follow for TLS establishment. These procedures take into
383 consideration various aspects of the association including discovery
384 of resultant security level and assertion of the client's
385 authorization identity.
387 3.1.1. StartTLS Request
389 A client may send the StartTLS extended request at any time after
390 establishing an LDAP connection, except:
392 - when TLS is currently established on the connection,
393 - when a multi-stage SASL negotiation is in progress on the
395 - when it has not yet received responses for all operation
396 requests previously issued on the connection.
398 As described in [Protocol] Section 4.14.2.2, a (detected) violation
399 of any of these requirements results in a return of the
400 operationsError resultCode.
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408 Client implementers should ensure that they strictly follow these
409 operation sequencing requirements to prevent interoperability
410 issues. Operational experience has shown that violating these
411 requirements causes interoperability issues because there are race
412 conditions that prevent servers from detecting some violations of
413 these requirements due to server hardware speed, network latencies,
416 There is no general requirement that the client have or have not
417 already performed a Bind operation (section 4) before sending a
418 StartTLS operation request.
420 3.1.2. StartTLS Response
422 The server will return an extended response with the resultCode of
423 success if it is willing and able to negotiate TLS.
425 It will return a resultCode other than success (as documented in
426 [Protocol] section 4.13.2.2) if it is unwilling or unable to do so.
427 The state of the association is unaffected if a non-success
428 resultCode is returned.
430 In the successful case, the client (which has ceased to transfer
431 LDAP requests on the connection) MUST either begin a TLS negotiation
432 or close the connection. The client will send PDUs in the TLS Record
433 Protocol directly over the underlying transport connection to the
434 server during TLS negotiation.
436 3.1.3. TLS Version Negotiation
438 Negotiating the version of TLS to be used is a part of the TLS
439 Handshake Protocol [TLS]. Please refer to that document for details.
441 3.1.4. Client Certificate
443 If an LDAP server requests a client to provide its certificate
444 during TLS negotiation and the client does not present a suitable
445 certificate (e.g. one that can be validated), the server may use a
446 local security policy to determine whether to successfully complete
449 If a client that has provided a suitable certificate subsequently
450 binds using the SASL EXTERNAL authentication mechanism (section 9),
451 information in the certificate may be used by the server to
452 establish the client's authorization identity.
454 3.1.5. Discovery of Resultant Security Level
456 After a TLS layer is established on a transport connection, both
457 parties are to individually decide whether or not to continue based
458 on the security level achieved. The procedure for ascertaining the
459 TLS layer's security level is implementation dependent.
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467 If the client or server decides that the security level is not high
468 enough for it to continue, it SHOULD gracefully remove the TLS
469 connection immediately after the TLS negotiation has completed (see
470 [Protocol] section 4.13.3.1 and section 3.2.3 below). The client
471 may then close the transport connection, attempt to StartTLS again,
472 send an unbind request, or send any other LDAP request.
474 3.1.6. Server Identity Check
476 The client MUST check its understanding of the server's hostname
477 against the server's identity as presented in the server's
478 Certificate message in order to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks.
480 Matching is performed according to these rules:
482 - The client MUST use the server name provided by the user (or
483 other trusted entity) as the value to compare against the server
484 name as expressed in the server's certificate. A hostname
485 derived from user input is to be considered provided by the user
486 only if derived in a secure fashion (e.g., DNSSEC).
488 - If a subjectAltName extension of type dNSName is present in the
489 certificate, it SHOULD be used as the source of the server's
492 - The string values to be compared MUST be prepared according to
493 the rules described in [Matching].
495 - The "*" wildcard character is allowed. If present, it applies
496 only to the left-most name component.
498 For example, *.bar.com would match a.bar.com and b.bar.com, but
499 it would not match a.x.bar.com nor would it match bar.com. If
500 more than one identity of a given type is present in the
501 certificate (e.g. more than one dNSName name), a match with any
502 one of the set is considered acceptable.
504 If the hostname does not match the dNSName-based identity in the
505 certificate per the above check, user-oriented clients SHOULD either
506 notify the user (clients may give the user the opportunity to
507 continue with the LDAP session in this case) or close the transport
508 connection and indicate that the server's identity is suspect.
509 Automated clients SHOULD close the connection and then return
510 and/or log an error indicating that the server's identity is suspect.
512 Beyond the server identity checks described in this section, clients
513 SHOULD be prepared to do further checking to ensure that the server
514 is authorized to provide the service it is requested to provide. The
515 client may need to make use of local policy information in making
518 3.1.7. Refresh of Server Capabilities Information
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526 Upon installing a TLS layer, the client SHOULD discard or refresh
527 all information about the server it obtained prior to the initiation
528 of the TLS negotiation and not obtained through secure mechanisms.
529 This protects against man-in-the-middle attacks that may have
530 altered any server capabilities information retrieved prior to TLS
533 The server may advertise different capabilities after installing a
534 TLS layer. In particular, the value of supportedSASLMechanisms may
535 be different after a TLS layer has been installed (specifically, the
536 EXTERNAL and PLAIN [PLAIN] mechanisms are likely to be listed only
537 after a TLS layer has been installed).
539 3.2. Effects of TLS on a Client's Authorization Identity
541 The decision to keep or invalidate the established state of the
542 association (section 4.3) after TLS layer installation or removal is
543 a matter of local server policy.
545 3.3. TLS Ciphersuites
547 Several issues should be considered when selecting TLS ciphersuites
548 that are appropriate for use in a given circumstance. These issues
549 include the following:
551 - The ciphersuite's ability to provide adequate confidentiality
552 protection for passwords and other data sent over the transport
553 connection. Client and server implementers should recognize that
554 some TLS ciphersuites provide no confidentiality protection
555 while other ciphersuites that do provide confidentiality
556 protection may be vulnerable to being cracked using brute force
557 methods, especially in light of ever-increasing CPU speeds that
558 reduce the time needed to successfully mount such attacks.
560 - Client and server implementers should carefully consider the
561 value of the password or data being protected versus the level
562 of confidentially protection provided by the ciphersuite to
563 ensure that the level of protection afforded by the ciphersuite
566 - The ciphersuite's vulnerability (or lack thereof) to man-in-the-
567 middle attacks. Ciphersuites vulnerable to man-in-the-middle
568 attacks SHOULD NOT be used to protect passwords or sensitive
569 data, unless the network configuration is such that the danger
570 of a man-in-the-middle attack is tolerable.
572 3.3.1. TLS Ciphersuites Recommendations
574 [[TODO: Kurt will have someone from security to look at this and
575 will propose how to handle discussion of specific TLS ciphersuites
578 As of the writing of this document, the following recommendations
579 regarding TLS ciphersuites are applicable. Because circumstances are
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585 constantly changing, this list must not be considered exhaustive,
586 but is hoped that it will serve as a useful starting point for
589 The following ciphersuites defined in [TLS] MUST NOT be used for
590 confidentiality protection of passwords or data:
592 TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL
593 TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5
594 TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA
596 The following ciphersuites defined in [TLS] can be cracked easily
597 (less than a day of CPU time on a standard CPU in 2000) and are NOT
598 RECOMMENDED for use in confidentiality protection of passwords or
601 TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5
602 TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5
603 TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA
604 TLS_DH_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA
605 TLS_DH_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA
606 TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA
607 TLS_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA
608 TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5
609 TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA
611 The following ciphersuites are vulnerable to man-in-the-middle
614 TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5
615 TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5
616 TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA
617 TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA
618 TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
622 Every LDAP connection has an associated authorization state referred
623 to as the "association". The Bind operation defined in section 4.2
624 of [Protocol] and discussed further in section 5 below allows
625 information to be exchanged between the client and server to change
626 the authorization state of the association.
628 4.1. Anonymous Association on Unbound Connections
630 Prior to the successful completion of a Bind operation and during
631 any subsequent authentication exchange, the association has an
632 anonymous authorization state. Among other things this implies that
633 the client need not send a Bind Request in the first PDU of the LDAP
634 message layer. The client may send any operation request prior to
635 binding, and the server MUST treat it as if it had been performed
636 after an anonymous bind operation (section 6). This association
637 state is sometimes referred to as an implied anonymous bind.
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644 4.2. Anonymous Association After Failed Bind
646 Upon receipt of a Bind request, the association is moved to an
647 anonymous state and only upon successful completion of the
648 authentication exchange (and the Bind operation) is the association
649 moved to an authenticated state. Thus, a failed Bind operation
650 produces an anonymous association.
652 4.3. Invalidated Associations
654 The server may move the association to an invalidated state at any
655 time, e.g. if an established security layer between the client and
656 server has unexpectedly failed or been compromised. While the LDAP
657 session has an invalidated association, the server may reject any
658 operation request other than Bind, Unbind, and StartTLS by
659 responding with a resultCode of strongerAuthRequired to indicate
660 that the server requires stronger authentication before it will
661 attempt to perform the requested operation. In practice, this means
662 that the client needs to bind to(re)establish a suitably strong
663 authorization state on the association before the server will
664 attempt to perform the requested operation.
668 The Bind operation ([Protocol] section 4.2) allows authentication
669 information to be exchanged between the client and server to
670 establish a new authorization state on the association.
672 The Bind request typically specifies the desired authentication
673 identity. Some Bind mechanisms also allow the client to specify the
674 authorization identity. If the authorization identity is not
675 specified, the server derives it from the authentication identity in
676 an implementation-specific manner.
678 If the authorization identity is specified the server MUST verify
679 that the client's authentication identity is permitted to assume
680 (e.g. proxy for) the asserted authorization identity. The server
681 MUST reject the Bind operation with an invalidCredentials resultCode
682 in the Bind response if the client is not so authorized.
684 5.1. Simple Authentication Choice
686 The simple authentication choice of the Bind Operation provides
687 three authentication mechanisms:
689 1. An anonymous authentication mechanism (section 6),
691 2. An unauthenticated authentication mechanism (section 7), and
693 3. A simple authentication mechanism using credentials consisting
694 of a name (in the form of an LDAP distinguished name [LDAPDN])
695 and a password (section 8).
697 5.2. SASL Authentication Choice
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704 The sasl authentication choice of the Bind Operation provides
705 facilities for using any SASL mechanism (sections 9-11) including
706 authentication mechanisms and other services (e.g. data security
709 6. Anonymous Authentication Mechanism of Simple Bind
711 An LDAP client may use the anonymous authentication mechanism of the
712 simple Bind choice to explicitly establish an anonymous association
713 by sending a Bind request with a name value of zero length and
714 specifying the simple authentication choice containing a password
715 value of zero length.
717 7. Unauthenticated Authentication Mechanism of Simple Bind
719 An LDAP client may use the unauthenticated authentication mechanism
720 of the simple Bind choice to establish an anonymous association by
721 sending a Bind request with a name value, a distinguished name in
722 LDAP string form [LDAPDN] of non-zero length, and specifying the the
723 simple authentication choice containing a password value of zero
726 Unauthenticated binds can have significant security issues (see
727 section 12.3). Servers SHOULD by default reject unauthenticated bind
728 requests with a resultCode of invalidCredentials, and clients may
729 need to actively detect situations where they would unintentionally
730 make an unauthenticated bind request.
732 8. Simple Authentication Mechanism of Simple Bind
734 An LDAP client may use the simple authentication mechanism of the
735 simple Bind choice to establish an authenticated association by
736 sending a Bind request with a name value, a distinguished name in
737 LDAP string form [LDAPDN] of non-zero length, and specifying the
738 simple authentication choice containing an OCTET STRING password
739 value of non-zero length.
741 Servers that map the DN sent in the bind request to a directory
742 entry with an associated set of one or more passwords used with this
743 mechanism will compare the presented password to that set of
744 passwords. The presented password is considered valid if it matches
745 any member of this set.
747 A resultCode of invalidDNSyntax indicates that the DN sent in the
748 name value is syntactically invalid. A resultCode of
749 invalidCredentials indicates that the DN is syntactically correct
750 but not valid for purposes of authentication, or the password is not
751 valid for the DN, or the server otherwise considers the credentials
752 to be invalidA resultCode of success indicates that the credentials
753 are valid and the server is willing to provide service to the entity
754 these credentials identify.
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762 Server behavior is undefined for bind requests specifying the simple
763 authentication mechanism with a zero-length name value and a
764 password value of non-zero length.
766 The simple authentication mechanism of simple bind is not suitable
767 for authentication in environments where there is no network or
768 transport layer confidentiality.x
770 9. SASL Protocol Profile
772 LDAP allows authentication via any SASL mechanism [SASL]. As LDAP
773 includes native anonymous and simple (plain text) authentication
774 methods, the ANONYMOUS [ANONYMOUS] and PLAIN [PLAIN] SASL mechanisms
775 are typically not used with LDAP.
777 Each protocol that utilizes SASL services is required to supply
778 certain information profiling the way they are exposed through the
779 protocol ([SASL] section 5). This section explains how each of these
780 profiling requirements are met by LDAP.
782 9.1. SASL Service Name for LDAP
784 The SASL service name for LDAP is "ldap", which has been registered
785 with the IANA as a SASL service name.
787 9.2. SASL Authentication Initiation and Protocol Exchange
789 SASL authentication is initiated via an LDAP Bind request
790 ([Protocol] section 4.2) with the following parameters:
793 - The AuthenticationChoice is sasl.
794 - The mechanism element of the SaslCredentials sequence contains
795 the value of the desired SASL mechanism.
796 - The optional credentials field of the SaslCredentials sequence
797 may be used to provide an initial client response for
798 mechanisms that are defined to have the client send data first
799 (see [SASL] sections 5 and 5.1).
801 In general, a SASL authentication protocol exchange consists of a
802 series of server challenges and client responses, the contents of
803 which are specific to and defined by the SASL mechanism. Thus for
804 some SASL authentication mechanisms, it may be necessary for the
805 client to respond to one or more server challenges by invoking the
806 Bind operation multiple times. A challenge is indicated by the
807 server sending a BindResponse PDU with the resultCode set to
808 saslBindInProgress. This indicates that the server requires the
809 client to send a new BindRequest PDU with the same sasl mechanism to
810 continue the authentication process.
812 To LDAP message layer, these challenges and responses are opaque
813 binary tokens of arbitrary length. LDAP servers use the
814 serverSaslCreds field, an OCTET STRING, in a BindResponse PDU
815 message to transmit each challenge. LDAP clients use the credentials
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821 field, an OCTET STRING, in the SaslCredentials sequence of a
822 BindRequest PDU message to transmit each response. Note that unlike
823 some Internet protocols where SASL is used, LDAP is not text based,
824 thus no Base64 transformations are performed on these challenge and
827 Clients sending a BindRequest with the sasl choice selected SHOULD
828 send an zero-length value in the name field. Servers receiving a
829 bind request with the sasl choice selected SHALL ignore any value in
832 A client may abort a SASL bind negotiation by sending a BindRequest
833 with a different value in the mechanism field of SaslCredentials, or
834 an AuthenticationChoice other than sasl.
836 If the client sends a BindRequest with the sasl mechanism field as
837 an empty string, the server MUST return a BindResponse with a
838 resultCode of authMethodNotSupported. This will allow the client to
839 abort a negotiation if it wishes to try again with the same SASL
843 The server indicates completion of the SASL challenge-response
844 exchange by responding with a BindResponse in which the resultCode
845 is not saslBindInProgress (either success or another error
848 The serverSaslCreds field in the BindResponse can be used to include
849 an optional challenge with a success notification for mechanisms
850 which are defined to have the server send additional data along with
851 the indication of successful completion. If a server does not intend
852 to send a challenge value in a BindResponse message, the server
853 SHALL omit the serverSaslCreds field (rather than including the
854 field with a zero-length value).
856 9.3. Octet Where Negotiated Security Mechanisms Take Effect
858 SASL layers take effect following the transmission by the server and
859 reception by the client of the final successful BindResponse in the
862 Once a SASL layer providing data integrity or confidentiality
863 services takes effect, the layer remains in effect until a new layer
864 is installed (i.e. at the first octet following the final
865 BindResponse of the bind operation that caused the new layer to take
866 effect). Thus, an established SASL layer is not affected by a
867 failed or non-SASL Bind.
869 9.4. Determination of Supported SASL Mechanisms
871 Clients may determine the SASL mechanisms a server supports by
872 reading the supportedSASLMechanisms attribute from the root DSE
873 (DSA-Specific Entry) ([Models] section 5.1). The values of this
874 attribute, if any, list the mechanisms the server supports in the
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880 current LDAP session state. LDAP servers SHOULD allow a client with
881 an anonymous association to retrieve the supportedSASLMechanisms
882 attribute of the root DSE.
884 Because SASL mechanisms provide critical security functions, clients
885 and servers should be configurable to specify what mechanisms are
886 acceptable and allow only those mechanisms to be used. Both clients
887 and servers must confirm that the negotiated security level meets
888 their requirements before proceeding to use the connection.
890 9.5. Rules for Using SASL Layers
892 If a SASL layer is installed, the client SHOULD discard information
893 about the server it obtained prior to the initiation of the SASL
894 negotiation and not obtained through secure mechanisms.
896 If a lower level security layer (such as TLS) is installed, any SASL
897 layer SHALL be layered on top of such security layers regardless of
898 the order of their negotiation. In all other respects, the SASL
899 layer and other security layers act independently, e.g. if both a
900 TLS layer and a SASL layer are in effect then removing the SASL
901 layer does not affect the continuing service of the TLS layer and
904 9.6 Support for Multiple Authentications
906 LDAP supports multiple SASL authentications as defined in [SASL]
909 9.7. SASL Authorization Identities
911 Some SASL mechanisms allow clients to request a desired
912 authorization identity for the association. The decision to allow or
913 disallow the current authentication identity to have access to the
914 requested authorization identity is a matter of local policy ([SASL]
915 section 4.2). The authorization identity is a string of UTF-8
916 [RFC3629] encoded [Unicode] characters corresponding to the
917 following ABNF [RFC2234] grammar:
919 authzId ::= dnAuthzId / uAuthzId
921 DNCOLON ::= %x64 %x6e %x3a ; "dn:"
922 UCOLON ::= %x75 %x3a ; "u:"
924 ; distinguished-name-based authz id.
925 dnAuthzId ::= DNCOLON distinguishedName
927 ; unspecified authorization id, UTF-8 encoded.
928 uAuthzId ::= UCOLON userid
929 userid ::= *UTF8 ; syntax unspecified
931 where the <distinguishedName> production is defined in section 3 of
932 [LDAPDN] and the <UTF8> production is defined in section 1.3 of
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940 In order to support additional specific authorization identity
941 forms, future updates to this specification may add new choices
942 supporting other forms of the authzId production.
944 The dnAuthzId choice is used to assert authorization identities in
945 the form of a distinguished name to be matched in accordance with
946 the distinguishedNameMatch matching rule [Syntaxes]. There is no
947 requirement that the asserted distinguishedName value be that of an
948 entry in the directory.
950 The uAuthzId choice allows clients to assert an authorization
951 identity that is not in distinguished name form. The format of
952 userid is defined as only a sequence of UTF-8 [RFC3629] encoded
953 [Unicode] characters, and any further interpretation is a local
954 matter. For example, the userid could identify a user of a specific
955 directory service, be a login name, or be an email address. A
956 uAuthzId SHOULD NOT be assumed to be globally unique. To compare
957 uAuthzID values, each uAuthzID value MUST be prepared using
958 [SASLPrep] and then the two values are compared octet-wise.
960 10. SASL DIGEST-MD5 Authentication Mechanism
962 The SASL DIGEST-MD5 mechanism [DIGEST-MD5] provides client
963 authentication with protection against passive eavesdropping attacks
964 but does not provide protection against man-in-the-middle attacks.
965 DIGEST-MD5 also provides data integrity and data confidentiality
968 Support for subsequent authentication ([DIGEST-MD5] section 2.2) is
969 OPTIONAL in clients and servers.
971 Implementers must take care to ensure that they maintain the
972 semantics of the DIGEST-MD5 specification even when handling data
973 that has different semantics in the LDAP protocol.
974 For example, the SASL DIGEST-MD5 authentication mechanism utilizes
975 realm and username values ([DIGEST-MD5] section 2.1) which are
976 syntactically simple strings and semantically simple realm and
977 username values. These values are not LDAP DNs, and there is no
978 requirement that they be represented or treated as such. Username
979 and realm values that look like LDAP DNs in form, e.g. <cn=bob,
980 dc=example,dc=com>, are syntactically allowed, however DIGEST-MD5
981 treats them as simple strings for comparison purposes. To illustrate
982 further, the two DNs <cn=Bob,dc=example,dc=com> (upper case "B") and
983 <cn=bob,dc=example,dc=com> (lower case "b") are equivalent when
984 being compared semantically as LDAP DNs because the cn attribute is
985 defined to be case insensitive, however the two values are not
986 equivalent if they represent username values in DIGEST-MD5 because
987 [SASLPrep] semantics are used by DIGEST-MD5.
989 11. SASL EXTERNAL Authentication Mechanism
991 A client can use the SASL EXTERNAL [SASL] mechanism to request the
992 LDAP server to authenticate and establish a resulting authorization
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998 identity using security credentials exchanged by a lower security
999 layer (such as by TLS authentication or IP-level security
1002 The authorization identity used to determine the resulting
1003 association is derived from the security credentials in an
1004 implementation-specific manner. If the client's authentication
1005 credentials have not been established at a lower security layer, the
1006 SASL EXTERNAL bind MUST fail with a resultCode of
1007 inappropriateAuthentication. Although this situation has the effect
1008 of leaving the association in an anonymous state (section 5), the
1009 state of any installed security layer is unaffected.
1011 A client may either request that its authorization identity be
1012 automatically derived from its authentication credentials exchanged
1013 at a lower security layer or it may explicitly provide an
1014 authorization identity desired for the association. The former is
1015 known as an implicit assertion, and the latter as an explicit
1018 11.1. Implicit Assertion
1020 An implicit authorization identity assertion is performed by
1021 invoking a Bind request of the SASL form using the EXTERNAL
1022 mechanism name that does not include the optional credentials field
1023 (found within the SaslCredentials sequence in the BindRequest). The
1024 server will derive the client's authorization identity from the
1025 authentication identity supplied by a security layer (e.g., a public
1026 key certificate used during TLS layer installation) according to
1027 local policy. The underlying mechanics of how this is accomplished
1028 are implementation specific.
1030 11.2. Explicit Assertion
1032 An explicit authorization identity assertion is performed by
1033 invoking a Bind request of the SASL form using the EXTERNAL
1034 mechanism name that includes the credentials field (found within the
1035 SaslCredentials sequence in the BindRequest). The value of the
1036 credentials field, an octet string, is the asserted authorization
1037 identity and MUST be constructed as documented in section 9.7.
1039 12. Security Considerations
1041 Security issues are discussed throughout this document. The
1042 unsurprising conclusion is that security is an integral and
1043 necessary part of LDAP. This section discusses a number of LDAP-
1044 related security considerations.
1046 12.1. General LDAP Security Considerations
1048 LDAP itself provides no security or protection from accessing or
1049 updating the directory by other means than through the LDAP
1050 protocol, e.g. from inspection by database administrators. Access
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1057 control SHOULD always be applied when reading sensitive information
1058 or updating directory information.
1060 Servers can minimize denial of service attacks by providing the
1061 ability to configure and enforce administrative limits on
1062 operations, timing out idle connections and returning the
1063 unwillingToPerform resultCode rather than performing computationally
1064 expensive operations requested by unauthorized clients.
1066 A connection on which the client has not established connection
1067 integrity and privacy services (e.g via StartTLS, IPSec or a
1068 suitable SASL mechanism) is subject to man-in-the-middle attacks to
1069 view and modify information in transit. Client and server
1070 implementors SHOULD take measures to protect confidential data in
1071 the LDAP session from these attacks by using data protection
1072 services as discussed in this document. Clients and servers should
1073 provide the ability to be configured to require these protections.
1074 A resultCode of confidentialityRequired indicates that the server
1075 requires establishment of (stronger) data confidentiality protection
1076 in order to perform the requested operation.
1078 12.1.1. Password-related Security Considerations
1080 LDAP allows multi-valued password attributes. In systems where
1081 entries are expected to have one and only one password,
1082 administrative controls should be provided to enforce this behavior.
1084 The use of clear text passwords and other unprotected authentication
1085 credentials is strongly discouraged over open networks when the
1086 underlying transport service cannot guarantee confidentiality. LDAP
1087 implementations SHOULD NOT support authentication methods using
1088 cleartext passwords and other unprotected authentication credentials
1089 unless the data on the connection is protected using TLS or other
1090 data confidentiality and data integrity protection.
1092 The transmission of passwords in the clear--typically for
1093 authentication or modification--poses a significant security risk.
1094 This risk can be avoided by using SASL authentication [SASL]
1095 mechanisms that do not transmit passwords in the clear or by
1096 negotiating transport or session layer data confidentiality services
1097 before transmitting password values.
1099 To mitigate the security risks associated with the transfer of
1100 passwords, a server implementation that supports any password-based
1101 authentication mechanism that transmits passwords in the clear MUST
1102 support a policy mechanism that at the time of authentication or
1103 password modification, requires:
1105 A TLS layer has been successfully installed.
1109 Some other data confidentiality mechanism that protects the
1110 password value from snooping has been provided.
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1119 The server returns a resultCode of confidentialityRequired for
1120 the operation (i.e. simple bind with password value, SASL bind
1121 transmitting a password value in the clear, add or modify
1122 including a userPassword value, etc.), even if the password
1125 12.2. StartTLS Security Considerations
1127 All security gained via use of the StartTLS operation is gained by
1128 the use of TLS itself. The StartTLS operation, on its own, does not
1129 provide any additional security.
1131 The level of security provided though the use of TLS depends
1132 directly on both the quality of the TLS implementation used and the
1133 style of usage of that implementation. Additionally, a man-in-the-
1134 middle attacker can remove the StartTLS extended operation from the
1135 supportedExtension attribute of the root DSE. Both parties SHOULD
1136 independently ascertain and consent to the security level achieved
1137 once TLS is established and before beginning use of the TLS
1138 connection. For example, the security level of the TLS layer might
1139 have been negotiated down to plaintext.
1141 Clients SHOULD by default either warn the user when the security
1142 level achieved does not provide an acceptable level of data
1143 confidentiality and/or data integrity protection, or be configured
1144 to refuse to proceed without an acceptable level of security.
1146 Server implementors SHOULD allow server administrators to elect
1147 whether and when data confidentiality and integrity are required, as
1148 well as elect whether authentication of the client during the TLS
1149 handshake is required.
1151 Implementers should be aware of and understand TLS security
1152 considerations as discussed in the TLS specification [TLS].
1154 12.3. Unauthenticated Mechanism Security Considerations
1156 Operational experience shows that clients can (and frequently do)
1157 misuse the unauthenticated authentication mechanism of simple bind
1158 (see section 7). For example, a client program might make a
1159 decision to grant access to non-directory information on the basis
1160 of completing a successful bind operation. LDAP server
1161 implementations may return a success response to an unauthenticated
1162 bind request thus leaving the client with the impression that the
1163 server has successfully authenticated the identity represented by
1164 the user name when in reality, an anonymous association has been
1165 established. Clients that use the results from a simple bind
1166 operation to make authorization decisions should actively detect
1167 unauthenticated bind requests (by verifying that the supplied
1168 password is not empty) and react appropriately.
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1175 12.4. Simple Mechanism Security Considerations
1177 The simple authentication mechanism of simple bind discloses the
1178 password to the server, which is an inherent security risk. There
1179 are other mechanisms such as DIGEST-MD5 that do not disclose
1182 12.5. SASL DIGEST-MD5 Mechanism Security Considerations
1184 The SASL DIGEST-MD5 mechanism is prone to the qop substitution
1185 attack, as discussed in 3.6 of [DIGEST-MD5]. The qop substitution
1186 attack can be mitigated (as discussed in 3.6 of [DIGEST-MD5]).
1188 The SASL DIGEST-MD5 mechanism [DIGEST-MD5] provides client
1189 authentication with protection against passive eavesdropping attacks
1190 but does not provide protection against man-in-the-middle attacks.
1192 Implementers should be aware of and understand DIGEST-MD5 security
1193 considerations as discussed in the DIGEST-MD5 specification [DIGEST-
1196 12.6. Related Security Considerations
1198 Additional security considerations relating to the various
1199 authentication methods and mechanisms discussed in this document
1200 apply and can be found in [SASL], [SASLPrep], [StringPrep] and
1203 13. IANA Considerations
1205 The following IANA considerations apply to this document:
1207 It is requested that the IANA update the LDAP Protocol Mechanism
1208 registry to indicate that this document and [Protocol] provide the
1209 definitive technical specification for the StartTLS
1210 (1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.20037) extended operation.
1212 [[TODO: add any missing IANA Considerations.]]
1216 This document combines information originally contained in RFC 2829
1217 and RFC 2830. The editor acknowledges the work of Harald Tveit
1218 Alvestrand, Jeff Hodges, Tim Howes, Steve Kille, RL "Bob" Morgan ,
1219 and Mark Wahl, each of whom authored one or more of these documents.
1221 This document is based upon input of the IETF LDAP Revision working
1222 group. The contributions and suggestions made by its members in
1223 shaping the contents and technical accuracy of this document is
1224 greatly appreciated.
1226 Normative References
1230 Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 21]
1232 Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005
1234 [[Note to the RFC Editor: please replace the citation tags used in
1235 referencing Internet-Drafts with tags of the form RFCnnnn.]]
1237 [RFC2234] Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for
1238 Syntax Specifications: ABNF", RFC 2234, November 1997.
1240 [DIGEST-MD5] Leach, P. C. Newman, and A. Melnikov, "Using Digest
1241 Authentication as a SASL Mechanism", draft-ietf-sasl-
1242 rfc2831bis-xx.txt, a work in progress.
1244 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key Words for use in RFCs to Indicate
1245 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
1247 [LDAPDN] Zeilenga, Kurt D. (editor), "LDAP: String
1248 Representation of Distinguished Names", draft-ietf-
1249 ldapbis-dn-xx.txt, a work in progress.
1251 [Matching] Hoffman, Paul and Steve Hanna, "Matching Text Strings
1252 in PKIX Certificates", draft-hoffman-pkix-stringmatch-
1253 xx.txt, a work in progress.
1255 [Models] Zeilenga, Kurt D. (editor), "LDAP: Directory
1256 Information Models", draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-xx.txt,
1259 [Protocol] Sermersheim, J., "LDAP: The Protocol", draft-ietf-
1260 ldapbis-protocol-xx.txt, a work in progress.
1262 [Roadmap] K. Zeilenga, "LDAP: Technical Specification Road Map",
1263 draft-ietf-ldapbis-roadmap-xx.txt, a work in progress.
1265 [SASL] Melnikov, A. (editor), "Simple Authentication and
1266 Security Layer (SASL)", draft-ietf-sasl-rfc2222bis-
1267 xx.txt, a work in progress.
1269 [SASLPrep] Zeilenga, K., "Stringprep profile for user names and
1270 passwords", draft-ietf-sasl-saslprep-xx.txt, (a work in
1273 [StringPrep] M. Blanchet, "Preparation of Internationalized Strings
1274 ('stringprep')", draft-hoffman-rfc3454bis-xx.txt, a
1277 [Syntaxes] Legg, S. (editor), "LDAP: Syntaxes and Matching Rules",
1278 draft-ietf-ldapbis-syntaxes-xx.txt, a work in progress.
1280 [TLS] Dierks, T. and C. Allen. "The TLS Protocol Version
1281 1.1", draft-ietf-tls-rfc2246-bis-xx.txt, a work in
1284 [RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
1285 10646", RFC 3629, STD 63, November 2003.
1289 Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 22]
1291 Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005
1293 [Unicode] The Unicode Consortium, "The Unicode Standard, Version
1294 3.2.0" is defined by "The Unicode Standard, Version
1295 3.0" (Reading, MA, Addison-Wesley, 2000. ISBN 0-201-
1296 61633-5), as amended by the "Unicode Standard Annex
1298 (http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr27/) and by the
1299 "Unicode Standard Annex #28: Unicode 3.2"
1300 (http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr28/).
1302 Informative References
1304 [ANONYMOUS] Zeilenga, K.,"Anonymous SASL Mechanism", draft-
1305 zeilenga-sasl-anon-xx.txt, a work in progress.
1307 [RFC2828] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary", RFC 2828, May
1310 [PLAIN] Zeilenga, K.,"Plain SASL Mechanism", draft-zeilenga-
1311 sasl-plain-xx.txt, a work in progress.
1313 [RFC2401] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture for
1314 the Internet Protocol", RFC 2401, November 1998.
1320 1800 S. Novell Place
1324 roger_harrison@novell.com
1326 Appendix A. Association State Transition Tables
1328 This section provides a state transition table to represent a state
1329 diagram for the various authentication states through which an
1330 association may pass during the course of its existence and the
1331 actions that cause these changes in state.
1333 This section is based entirely on information found in this document
1334 and other documents that are part of the LDAP Technical
1335 Specification [Roadmap]. As such, it is strictly informational in
1338 A.1. Association States
1340 The following table lists the valid association states and provides
1341 a description of each state. The ID for each state is used in the
1342 state transition table in section A.3.
1344 ID Association State Description
1345 -- --------------------------------------------------------------
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1353 no Authentication ID is associated with the LDAP connection
1354 no Authorization ID is in force
1356 Authentication ID = I
1357 Authorization ID = X
1360 A.2. Actions that Affect Association State
1362 The following table lists the actions that can affect the
1363 authentication and authorization state of an association. The ID for
1364 each action is used in the state transition table in section A.3.
1367 -- --------------------------------------------------------------
1368 A1 Client bind request fails
1369 A2 Client successfully performs anonymous simple bind or
1370 unauthenticated simple bind
1371 A3 Client successfully binds producing an authentication ID of I.
1372 Authentication ID I maps to authorization ID X. Depending on
1373 the bind mechanism and associated parameters authorization ID X
1374 was either derived from authentication ID I or was explicitly
1375 requested as part of the bind operation.
1376 A4 Client StartTLS request fails
1377 A5 Client StartTLS request succeeds
1378 A6 Client or Server: graceful TLS layer removal
1379 A7 Server decides to invalidate current association state
1381 A.3. Association State Transition Table
1383 The Association table below lists the the actions that could affect
1384 the authorization state of an association and the resulting state of
1385 an association after a given action occurs.
1387 S1, the initial state for the state machine described in this table,
1388 is the association state when an LDAP connection is initially
1393 ---------------- --------------- -------------------------------
1395 A2 S1 Sections 6 and 7
1397 A4 no change [Protocol] section 4.14.2.2
1398 A5 no change or S3* [Protocol] section 4.14.2.1
1399 A6 no change or S3* [Protocol] section 4.14.3.1
1402 * The server may invalidate the association after installing or
1403 removing a TLS layer (section 3.2).
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1411 Appendix B. Authentication and Authorization Concepts
1413 This appendix defines basic terms, concepts, and interrelationships
1414 regarding authentication, authorization, credentials, and identity.
1415 These concepts are used in describing how various security
1416 approaches are utilized in client authentication and authorization.
1418 B.1. Access Control Policy
1420 An access control policy is a set of rules defining the protection
1421 of resources, generally in terms of the capabilities of persons or
1422 other entities accessing those resources. Security objects and
1423 mechanisms, such as those described here, enable the expression of
1424 access control policies and their enforcement.
1426 B.2. Access Control Factors
1428 A request, when it is being processed by a server, may be associated
1429 with a wide variety of security-related factors (section 4.2 of
1430 [Protocol]). The server uses these factors to determine whether and
1431 how to process the request. These are called access control factors
1432 (ACFs). They might include source IP address, encryption strength,
1433 the type of operation being requested, time of day, etc. Some
1434 factors may be specific to the request itself, others may be
1435 associated with the connection via which the request is transmitted,
1436 others (e.g. time of day) may be "environmental".
1438 Access control policies are expressed in terms of access control
1439 factors. E.g., a request having ACFs i,j,k can perform operation Y
1440 on resource Z. The set of ACFs that a server makes available for
1441 such expressions is implementation-specific.
1443 B.3. Authentication, Credentials, Identity
1445 Authentication credentials are the evidence supplied by one party to
1446 another, asserting the identity of the supplying party (e.g. a user)
1447 who is attempting to establish a new association state with the
1448 other party (typically a server). Authentication is the process of
1449 generating, transmitting, and verifying these credentials and thus
1450 the identity they assert. An authentication identity is the name
1451 presented in a credential.
1453 There are many forms of authentication credentials -- the form used
1454 depends upon the particular authentication mechanism negotiated by
1455 the parties. For example: X.509 certificates, Kerberos tickets,
1456 simple identity and password pairs. Note that an authentication
1457 mechanism may constrain the form of authentication identities used
1460 B.4. Authorization Identity
1462 An authorization identity is one kind of access control factor. It
1463 is the name of the user or other entity that requests that
1464 operations be performed. Access control policies are often expressed
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1471 in terms of authorization identities; e.g., entity X can perform
1472 operation Y on resource Z.
1474 The authorization identity bound to an association is often exactly
1475 the same as the authentication identity presented by the client, but
1476 it may be different. SASL allows clients to specify an authorization
1477 identity distinct from the authentication identity asserted by the
1478 client's credentials. This permits agents such as proxy servers to
1479 authenticate using their own credentials, yet request the access
1480 privileges of the identity for which they are proxying [SASL]. Also,
1481 the form of authentication identity supplied by a service like TLS
1482 may not correspond to the authorization identities used to express a
1483 server's access control policy, requiring a server-specific mapping
1484 to be done. The method by which a server composes and validates an
1485 authorization identity from the authentication credentials supplied
1486 by a client is performed in an implementation-specific manner.
1488 Appendix C. RFC 2829 Change History
1490 This appendix lists the changes made to the text of RFC 2829 in
1491 preparing this document.
1493 C.0. General Editorial Changes
1496 - Changed other instances of the term LDAP to LDAP where v3 of the
1497 protocol is implied. Also made all references to LDAP use the
1500 - Miscellaneous grammatical changes to improve readability.
1502 - Made capitalization in section headings consistent.
1506 - Changed title to reflect inclusion of material from RFC 2830 and
1509 C.1. Changes to Section 1
1513 - Moved conventions used in document to a separate section.
1515 C.2. Changes to Section 2
1519 - Moved section to an appendix.
1521 C.3. Changes to Section 3
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1530 - Moved section to an appendix.
1532 C.4 Changes to Section 4
1536 - Changed "Distinguished Name" to "LDAP distinguished name".
1538 C.5. Changes to Section 5
1542 - Added the following sentence: "Servers SHOULD NOT allow clients
1543 with anonymous authentication to modify directory entries or
1544 access sensitive information in directory entries."
1546 C.5.1. Changes to Section 5.1
1550 - Replaced the text describing the procedure for performing an
1551 anonymous bind (protocol) with a reference to section 4.2 of RFC
1552 2251 (the protocol spec).
1556 - Brought text describing procedure for performing an anonymous
1557 bind from section 4.2 of RFC 2251 bis. This text will be
1558 removed from the draft standard version of that document.
1560 C.6. Changes to Section 6.
1564 Reorganized text in section 6.1 as follows:
1566 1. Added a new section (6.1) titled "Simple Authentication" and
1567 moved one of two introductory paragraphs for section 6 into
1568 section 6.1. Added sentences to the paragraph indicating:
1570 a. simple authentication is not suitable for environments where
1571 confidentiality is not available.
1573 b. LDAP implementations SHOULD NOT support simple
1574 authentication unless confidentiality and data integrity
1575 mechanisms are in force.
1577 2. Moved first paragraph of section 6 (beginning with "LDAP
1578 implementations MUST support authentication with a password...")
1579 to section on Digest Authentication (Now section 6.2).
1581 C.6.1. Changes to Section 6.1.
1583 Version -00 Renamed section to 6.2
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1587 Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005
1590 - Added sentence from original section 6 indicating that the
1591 DIGEST-MD5 SASL mechanism is required for all conforming LDAP
1594 C.6.2. Changes to Section 6.2
1598 - Renamed section to 6.3
1600 - Reworded first paragraph to remove reference to user and the
1601 userPassword password attribute Made the first paragraph more
1602 general by simply saying that if a directory supports simple
1603 authentication that the simple bind operation MAY performed
1604 following negotiation of a TLS ciphersuite that supports
1607 - Replaced "the name of the user's entry" with "a DN" since not
1608 all bind operations are performed on behalf of a "user."
1610 - Added Section 6.3.1 heading just prior to paragraph 5.
1612 - Paragraph 5: replaced "The server" with "DSAs that map the DN
1613 sent in the bind request to a directory entry with a
1614 userPassword attribute."
1616 C.6.3. Changes to section 6.3.
1620 - Renamed to section 6.4.
1622 C.7. Changes to section 7.
1626 C.7.1. Changes to section 7.1.
1630 - Clarified the entity issuing a certificate by moving the phrase
1631 "to have issued the certificate" immediately after
1632 "Certification Authority."
1634 C.8. Changes to section 8.
1638 - Removed the first paragraph because simple authentication is
1639 covered explicitly in section 6.
1641 - Added section 8.1. heading just prior to second paragraph.
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1646 Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005
1648 - Added section 8.2. heading just prior to third paragraph.
1650 - Added section 8.3. heading just prior to fourth paragraph.
1654 - Moved entire section 8 of RFC 2829 into section 3.4 (Using SASL
1655 for Other Security Services) to bring material on SASL
1656 mechanisms together into one location.
1658 C.9. Changes to section 9.
1662 - Paragraph 2: changed "EXTERNAL mechanism" to "EXTERNAL SASL
1665 - Added section 9.1. heading.
1667 - Modified a comment in the ABNF from "unspecified userid" to
1668 "unspecified authz id".
1670 - Deleted sentence, "A utf8string is defined to be the UTF-8
1671 encoding of one or more ISO 10646 characters," because it is
1674 - Added section 9.1.1. heading.
1676 - Added section 9.1.2. heading.
1680 - Moved entire section 9 to become section 3.5 so that it would be
1681 with other SASL material.
1683 C.10. Changes to Section 10.
1687 - Updated reference to cracking from a week of CPU time in 1997 to
1688 be a day of CPU time in 2000.
1690 - Added text: "These ciphersuites are NOT RECOMMENDED for use...
1691 and server implementers SHOULD" to sentence just prior the
1692 second list of ciphersuites.
1694 - Added text: "and MAY support other ciphersuites offering
1695 equivalent or better protection," to the last paragraph of the
1698 C.11. Changes to Section 11.
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1705 Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005
1707 - Moved to section 3.6 to be with other SASL material.
1709 C.12. Changes to Section 12.
1713 - Inserted new section 12 that specifies when SASL protections
1714 begin following SASL negotiation, etc. The original section 12
1715 is renumbered to become section 13.
1719 - Moved to section 3.7 to be with other SASL material.
1721 C.13. Changes to Section 13 (original section 12).
1725 Appendix D. RFC 2830 Change History
1727 This appendix lists the changes made to the text of RFC 2830 in
1728 preparing this document.
1730 D.0. General Editorial Changes
1732 - Material showing the PDUs for the StartTLS response was broken
1733 out into a new section.
1735 - The wording of the definition of the StartTLS request and
1736 StartTLS response was changed to make them parallel. NO changes
1737 were made to the ASN.1 definition or the associated values of
1740 - A separate section heading for graceful TLS closure was added
1741 for parallelism with section on abrupt TLS closure.
1743 Appendix E. RFC 2251 Change History
1745 This appendix lists the changes made to the text of RFC 2251 in
1746 preparing this document.
1748 E.0. General Editorial Changes
1750 - All material from section 4.2 of RFC 2251 was moved into this
1753 - A new section was created for the Bind Request
1755 - Section 4.2.1 of RFC 2251 (Sequencing Bind Request) was moved
1756 after the section on the Bind Response for parallelism with the
1757 presentation of the StartTLS operations. The section was also
1758 subdivided to explicitly call out the various effects being
1759 described within it.
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1766 - All SASL profile information from RFC 2829 was brought within
1767 the discussion of the Bind operation (primarily sections 4.4 -
1770 Appendix F. Change History to Combined Document
1772 F.1. Changes for draft-ldap-bis-authmeth-02
1776 - Added references to other LDAP standard documents, to sections
1777 within the document, and fixed broken references.
1779 - General editorial changes--punctuation, spelling, formatting,
1784 - Added glossary of terms and added sub-section headings
1788 - Clarified security mechanisms 3, 4, & 5 and brought language in
1789 line with IETF security glossary.
1793 - Brought language in requirement (3) in line with security
1796 - Clarified that information fetched prior to initiation of TLS
1797 negotiation must be discarded
1799 -Clarified that information fetched prior to initiation of SASL
1800 negotiation must be discarded
1802 - Rewrote paragraph on SASL negotiation requirements to clarify
1807 - Added stipulation that sasl choice allows for any SASL mechanism
1808 not prohibited by this document. (Resolved conflict between this
1809 statement and one that prohibited use of ANONYMOUS and PLAIN
1814 - Added a.x.bar.com to wildcard matching example on hostname check.
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1825 - Added Association State Transition Tables to show the various
1826 states through which an association may pass along with the
1827 actions and decisions required to traverse from state to state.
1831 - Brought security terminology in line with IETF security glossary
1832 throughout the appendix.
1834 F.2. Changes for draft-ldapbis-authmeth-03
1838 - Added introductory notes and changed title of document and
1839 references to conform to WG chair suggestions for the overall
1840 technical specification.
1842 - Several issues--H.13, H.14, H.16, H.17--were resolved without
1843 requiring changes to the document.
1847 - Removed reference to /etc/passwd file and associated text.
1851 - Removed sections 4.1, 4.2 and parts of section 4.3. This
1852 information was being duplicated in the protocol specification
1853 and will now reside there permanently.
1856 - changed words, "not recommended" to "strongly discouraged"
1860 - Based on ldapbis WG discussion at IETF52 two sentences were
1861 added indicating that clients SHOULD NOT send a DN value when
1862 binding with the sasl choice and servers SHALL ignore any value
1863 received in this circumstance.
1868 - Generalized the language of this section to not refer to any
1869 specific password attribute or to refer to the directory entry
1874 - Added security consideration regarding misuse of unauthenticated
1877 - Added security consideration requiring access control to be
1878 applied only to authenticated users and recommending it be
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1882 Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005
1884 applied when reading sensitive information or updating directory
1887 F.3. Changes for draft-ldapbis-authmeth-04
1891 - Changed references to use [RFCnnnn] format wherever possible.
1892 (References to works in progress still use [name] format.)
1893 - Various edits to correct typos and bring field names, etc. in
1894 line with specification in [Protocol] draft.
1896 - Several issues--H.13, H.14, H.16, H.17--were resolved without
1897 requiring changes to the document.
1901 - Changed ABNF grammar to use productions that are like those in
1906 - Removed sections 5.1, 5.2, and 5.4 that will be added to
1907 [Protocol]. Renumbered sections to accommodate this change.
1912 - Reviewed Association State table for completeness and accuracy.
1913 Renumbered actions A3, , and A5 to be A5, A3, and A4
1914 respectively. Re-ordered several lines in the table to ensure
1915 that actions are in ascending order (makes analyzing the table
1916 much more logical). Added action A2 to several states where it
1917 was missing and valid. Added actions A7 and A8 placeholders to
1918 states S1, S2, S4 and S5 pending resolution of issue H.28.
1922 - Modified security consideration (originally added in -03)
1923 requiring access control to be applied only to authenticated
1924 users. This seems nonsensical because anonymous users may have
1925 access control applied to limit permissible actions.
1929 - Verified all normative references and moved informative
1930 references to a new section 14.
1932 F.4. Changes for draft-ldapbis-authmeth-05
1936 - General editory changes to fix punctuation, spelling, line
1939 Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 33]
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1943 - Verified and updated intra- and inter-document references
1945 - Document-wide review for proper usage of RFC 2119 keywords with
1946 several changes to correct improper usage.
1949 - Updated to match current contents of documents. This was needed
1950 due to movement of material on Bind and StartTLS operations to
1951 [Protocol] in this revision.
1955 - Renamed section to "Rationale for LDAP Security Mechanisms" and
1956 removed text that did not support this theme. Part of the
1957 motivation for this change was to remove the implication of the
1958 previous section title, "Required Security Mechanisms", and
1959 other text found in the section that everything in the section
1962 - Information from several removed paragraphs that describe
1963 deployment scenarios will be added Appendix A in the next
1964 revision of the draft.
1967 - Paragraph beginning, " If TLS is negotiated, the client MUST
1968 discard all information..." was moved to section 5.1.7 and
1969 integrated with related material there.
1971 - Paragraph beginning, "If a SASL security layer is negotiated..."
1972 was moved to section 4.2
1976 - Changed wording of first paragraph to clarify meaning.
1979 - Added paragraph from section 3 of -04 beginning, "If a SASL
1980 security layer is negotiated..."
1983 - Renamed to "Other SASL Mechanisms" and completely rewrote the
1984 section (one sentence) to generalize the treatment of SASL
1985 mechanisms not explicitly mentioned in this document.
1989 - Added paragraph beginning, "The dnAuthzID choice allows client
1990 applications..." to clarify whether DN form authorization
1991 identities have to also have a corresponding directory entry.
1992 This change was based on editor's perception of WG consensus.
1994 - Made minor clarifying edits in the paragraph beginning, "The
1995 uAuthzID choice allows for compatibility..."
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2000 Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005
2004 - Made minor clarifying edits in the last paragraph of the
2009 - Wording from section 3 paragraph beginning " If TLS is
2010 negotiated, the client MUST discard all information..." was
2011 moved to this section and integrated with existing text.
2015 - Changed usage of "TLS connection" to "TLS session" throughout.
2017 - Removed empty section 5.2.1 and renumbered sections it had
2018 previously contained.
2022 - Added introductory paragraph at beginning of section.
2026 - Changed term "data privacy" to "data confidentiality" to be
2027 consistent with usage in rest of document.
2031 - Changed first paragraph to require implementations that
2032 implement *password-based* authentication to implement and
2033 support DIGEST-MD5 SASL authentication.
2037 - First paragraph: changed "session encryption" to "session
2038 confidentiality protection" to be consistent with usage in rest
2043 - Began changes to incorporate information on deployment scenarios
2044 removed from section 3.
2046 F.5. Changes for draft-ldapbis-authmeth-06
2050 - Combined Section 2 (Introduction) and Section 3 (Motivation) and
2051 moved Introduction to section 1. All following sections numbers
2052 were decremented by one as result.
2054 - Edits to fix typos, I-D nits, etc.
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2059 Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005
2061 - Opened several new issues in Appendix G based on feedback from
2062 WG. Some of these have been resolved. Others require further
2067 - Added additional example of spoofing under threat (7).
2071 - Changed definition of "association" and added terms,
2072 "connection" and "TLS connection" to bring usage in line with
2077 - Clarified sentence stating that the client MUST NOT use derived
2082 - Began edits to association state table to clarify meaning of
2083 various states and actions.
2085 - Added action A9 to cover abandoned bind operation and added
2086 appropriate transitions to the state transition table to
2091 - Replaced first paragraph to clarify that the "DIGEST-MD5" SASL
2092 mechanism is required to implement.
2096 - Rewrote the section to make the advice more applicable over the
2097 long term, i.e. more "timeless." The intent of content in the
2098 original section was preserved.
2102 - Added a clarifying example to the consideration regarding misuse
2103 of unauthenticated access.
2105 F.6. Changes for draft-ldapbis-authmeth-07
2109 - Updated external and internal references to accommodate changes
2112 - Opened several new issues in Appendix G based on feedback from
2113 WG. Some of these have been resolved. Others require further
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2118 Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005
2123 - Rewrote much of section 3.3 to meet the SASL profile
2124 requirements of draft-ietf-sasl-rfc2222bis-xx.txt section 5.
2126 - Changed treatement of SASL ANONYMOUS and PLAIN mechanisms to
2127 bring in line with WG consensus.
2131 - Note to implementers in section 4.1.1 based on operational
2134 - Clarification on client continuing by performing a StartTLS with
2135 TLS already established in section 4.1.4.
2137 - Moved verification of mapping of client's authentication ID to
2138 asserted authorization ID to apply only to explicit assertion.
2139 The local policy in place for implicit assertion is adequate.
2143 - Removed most of section 7.2 as the information is now covered
2144 adequately via the new SASL profile in section 3.3. Added note
2145 to implementors regarding the treatment of username and realm
2146 values in DIGEST-MD5.
2148 - Section 7.3. Minor clarifications in wording.
2150 - Section 7.3.1. Clarification that a match of the presented value
2151 to any member of the set of stored passwords constitutes a
2152 successful authentication.
2154 F.7. Changes for draft-ldapbis-authmeth-08
2158 - Changed usage from LDAPv3 to LDAP for usage consistency across
2159 LDAP technical specification.
2161 - Fixed a number of usage nits for consistency and to bring doc in
2162 conformance with publication guidelines.
2166 - Significant cleanup and rewording of abstract based on WG
2171 - New definition of user.
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2180 - Added 1.5 sentences at end of introductory paragraph indicating
2181 the effect of the Bind op on the association.
2185 - Retitled section and clarified wording
2189 - Clarified that simple authentication choice provides three types
2190 of authentication: anonymous, unauthenticated, and simple
2195 - New wording clarifying when negotiated security mechanisms take
2200 - Changed requirement to discard information about server fetched
2201 prior to SASL negotiation from MUST to SHOULD to allow for
2202 information obtained through secure mechanisms.
2206 - Simplified wording of first paragraph based on suggestion from
2211 - Minor clarifications in wording.
2215 - Minor clarifications in wording in first sentence.
2216 - Explicitly called out that the DN value in the dnAuthzID form is
2217 to be matched using DN matching rules.
2218 - Called out that the uAuthzID MUST be prepared using SASLprep
2219 rules before being compared.
2220 - Clarified requirement on assuming global uniqueness by changing
2221 a "generally... MUST" wording to "SHOULD".
2225 - Simplified wording describing conditions when StartTLS cannot be
2227 - Simplified wording in note to implementers regarding race
2228 condition with outstanding LDAP operations on connection.
2232 - Removed section and moved relevant text to section 4.2.2.
2234 Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 38]
2236 Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005
2241 - Renumbered to 4.1.5.
2242 - Updated server identity check rules for server's name based on
2247 - Renumbered to 4.1.6
2248 - Changed requirement to discard information about server fetched
2249 prior to TLS negotion from MUST to SHOULD to allow for
2250 information obtained through secure mechanisms.
2254 - Clarified wording.
2255 - Added definition of anonymous and unauthenticated binds.
2259 - Added security consideration (moved from elsewhere) discouraging
2260 use of cleartext passwords on unprotected communication
2265 - Added an IANA consideration to update GSSAPI service name
2266 registry to point to [Roadmap] and [Authmeth]
2268 F.8. Changes for draft-ldapbis-authmeth-09
2272 - Updated section references within document
2273 - Changed reference tags to match other docs in LDAP TS
2274 - Used non-quoted names for all SASL mechanisms
2278 - Inspected keyword usage and removed several improper usages.
2280 - Removed sentence saying DIGEST-MD5 is LDAP's mandatory-to-
2281 implement mechanism. This is covered elsewhere in document.
2283 - Moved section 5, authentication state table, of -08 draft to
2284 section 8 of -09 and completely rewrote it.
2288 - Reworded sentence beginning, "It is also desirable to allow
2289 authentication methods to carry identities based on existing,
2290 non-LDAP DN-forms..."
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2295 Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005
2297 - Clarified relationship of this document to other documents in
2302 - Removed paragraph beginning,"If the client is configured to
2303 support multiple SASL mechanisms..." because the actions
2304 specified in the paragraph do not provide the protections
2305 indicated. Added a new paragraph indicating that clients and
2306 server should allow specification of acceptable mechanisms and
2307 only allow those mechanisms to be used.
2309 - Clarified independent behavior when TLS and SASL security layers
2310 are both in force (e.g. one being removed doesn't affect the
2315 - Moved most of section 4.2.2, Client Assertion of Authorization
2316 Identity, to sections 3.3.6, 3.3.6.1, and 3.3.6.2.
2320 - Moved some normative comments into text body.
2324 - Non success resultCode values are valid if server is *unwilling*
2325 or unable to negotiate TLS.
2329 - Rewrote entire section based on WG feedback.
2333 - Moved most of this section to 3.3.6 for better document flow.
2337 - Rewrote entire section based on WG feedback.
2341 - Moved imperative language regarding unauthenticated access from
2342 security considerations to here.
2346 - Added several paragraphs regarding the risks of transmitting
2347 passwords in the clear and requiring server implementations to
2348 provide a specific configuration that reduces these risks.
2352 Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 40]
2354 Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005
2357 - Added sentence describing protections provided by DIGEST-MD5
2359 - Changed DNs in exmple to be dc=example,dc=com.
2363 - Updated consideration on use of cleartext passwords to include
2364 other unprotected authentication credentials
2365 - Substantial rework of consideration on misuse of unauthenticated
2368 F.9. Changes for draft-ldapbis-authmeth-10
2370 - Reorganized content of sections 3-9 to improve document flow and
2372 - Resolved issue of effect of Start TLS and TLS closure on
2374 - Made numerous minor wording changes based on WG feedback.
2375 - Updated list of threats for Section 1.
2376 - Recommendation that servers should not support weaker TLS
2377 ciphersuites unless other protection is in place.
2378 - Moved authentication state table to appendix and relettered
2381 F.10. Changes for draft-ldapbis-authmeth-11
2385 - Many editorial changes throughout to clarify wording and better
2386 express intent, primarily based on suggestions from WG mail
2388 - More standard naming of authentication mechanisms throughout
2389 document, e.g. "Anonymous Authentication Mechanism of the Simple
2394 - Editorial changes to add clarity.
2395 - Moved section 2 of authmeth -09 into section 1
2399 - New section outlining implementation requirements.
2403 - Editorial clarification on need for following operation
2404 sequencing requirements.
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2413 Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005
2415 - New section added to describe use of client certificates with
2416 StartTLS. Incorporates material moved from other sections of
2420 - New section added to discuss associations. Related material was
2421 moved from various other sections of authmeth -09 and
2422 incorporated into this new section.
2426 - Added several paragraphs regarding transmission and derivation
2427 of authentication and authorization identities using the Bind
2432 - Clarified rules for determining valid credentials and situations
2433 where invalidCredentials result is to be returned.
2437 - Added three security considerations based on WG feedback.
2441 - Simplfied state tables by removing two unnecessary actions from
2442 the actions table, and removing the current state column of the
2443 state transition table. Updated references to authmeth and
2446 F.11. Changes for draft-ldapbis-authmeth-12
2450 - Changed refererences from Start TLS to StartTLS.
2451 - Removed Appendix B: Example Deployment Scenarios
2452 - Removed Appendix H as all issues listed in the appendix are now
2457 - Added implementation requirement that server implementations
2458 that SUPPORT StartTLS MUST support the
2459 TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA ciphersuite.
2463 - Added wording clarifying that a client's association is
2464 unaffected if a non-success resultCode is returned in the
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2472 Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005
2474 - Final paragraph of this section details requirements for
2475 serverSaslCreds field when no challenge value is sent.
2479 - Clarified language on uAuthzID usage.
2483 - Moved entire section into security considerations. New section
2485 - Reorganized security considerations by topic.
2486 - Added several security considerations based on WG feedback.
2490 - Moved section to become section 3.3.
2492 F.12. Changes for draft-ldapbis-authmeth-13
2496 - General edits for clarity and to remove errors.
2497 - Reworded definition of association (section 1.2) and reworked
2498 usage of association throughout document. Current semantics:
2499 every connection has an association with the same lifetime as
2500 the connection, and that association passes through various
2501 authorization states.
2502 - Made usage of data confidentiality consistent throughout
2506 - Reworded mechanisms 3 and 4 for more parallelism.
2507 - Changed language on rationale for required mechanisms from
2508 future to past tense.
2511 - Clarified that implementations may support any additional
2512 authentication mechanism, not just mechanisms associated with
2513 simple and SASL bind choices.
2516 - Moved paragraph explaining goals for using TLS with LDAP from
2517 security considerations to here.
2520 - Reworked text to better explain meaning of strongAuthRequired
2521 resultCode when for invalidated associations.
2524 - Clarified action when simple bind request has a DN with invalid
2529 Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 43]
2531 Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005
2533 - Added ability to configure and enforce administrative service
2534 limits as a way to protect against denial of service attacks.
2537 - Clarified that this security consideration relates to performing
2538 client authentication during the TLS handshake and not to
2539 subsequent SASL EXTERNAL authentication.
2542 - Updated tables by collapsing identical states and actions. Also
2543 added an invalidated association state and accompanying actions.
2547 F.13. Changes for draft-ldapbis-authmeth-14
2551 - Moved to standardized LDAP TS terms: transport connection, TLS
2552 layer, SASL layer, and LDAP message layer. Reworked usage of
2553 terminology throughout document to conform to latest usage.
2554 - Changed language on resultCode values to be less prescriptive
2555 and more descriptive.
2558 - Changed format and definitions of terms to parallel latest
2559 revision of [Protocol].
2562 - Updated implementation requirements for protecting LDAP simple
2563 bind mechanism to conform to WG consensus.
2566 - Moved last paragraph to security considerations and made
2567 generalized discussion of use of confidentialityRequired
2568 resultCode general for all data confidentiality services not
2572 ûRewrote last paragraph to clarify that SASL EXTERNAL is a
2573 client action when server uses certificate information to
2574 derive authorization ID.
2577 ûCollapsed three subsections into a single subsection. Removed
2578 text that implied that the TLS credentials were the only lower
2579 layer credentials that are used by SASL EXTERNAL in determining
2580 authentication ID and authorization ID.
2583 - Removed most of last paragraph that was redundant with
2584 implementation requirements in section 2.
2588 Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 44]
2590 Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005
2592 - Changed to SASL DIGEST-MD5 (was section 11 in -13 revision)
2595 - Changed to SASL EXTERNAL (was section 10 in -13 revision). Moved
2596 discussion of SASL authorization identities to Section 9.7.
2597 Clarified language around implicit and explicit assertion of
2598 authroization identities.
2601 - Further collapsed identical states and actions continuing work
2602 in previous revisions.
2604 Intellectual Property Rights
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2608 to pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described
2609 in this document or the extent to which any license under such
2610 rights might or might not be available; nor does it represent that
2611 it has made any independent effort to identify any such rights.
2612 Information on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC
2613 documents can be found in BCP 78 and BCP 79.
2615 Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any
2616 assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an
2617 attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use
2618 of such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
2619 specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository
2620 at http://www.ietf.org/ipr.
2622 The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
2623 copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
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2625 this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at ietf-
2628 Full Copyright Statement
2630 Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). This document is subject
2631 to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and
2632 except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights.
2634 This document and the information contained herein are provided on
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2647 Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 45]