1 /* acl.c - routines to parse and check acl's */
3 /* This work is part of OpenLDAP Software <http://www.openldap.org/>.
5 * Copyright 1998-2005 The OpenLDAP Foundation.
8 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
9 * modification, are permitted only as authorized by the OpenLDAP
12 * A copy of this license is available in the file LICENSE in the
13 * top-level directory of the distribution or, alternatively, at
14 * <http://www.OpenLDAP.org/license.html>.
16 /* Portions Copyright (c) 1995 Regents of the University of Michigan.
17 * All rights reserved.
19 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms are permitted
20 * provided that this notice is preserved and that due credit is given
21 * to the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor. The name of the University
22 * may not be used to endorse or promote products derived from this
23 * software without specific prior written permission. This software
24 * is provided ``as is'' without express or implied warranty.
32 #include <ac/socket.h>
33 #include <ac/string.h>
40 #define ACL_BUF_SIZE 1024 /* use most appropriate size */
46 aci_bv_entry = BER_BVC("entry"),
47 aci_bv_children = BER_BVC("children"),
48 aci_bv_onelevel = BER_BVC("onelevel"),
49 aci_bv_subtree = BER_BVC("subtree"),
50 aci_bv_br_entry = BER_BVC("[entry]"),
51 aci_bv_br_all = BER_BVC("[all]"),
52 aci_bv_access_id = BER_BVC("access-id"),
54 aci_bv_anonymous = BER_BVC("anonymous"),
56 aci_bv_public = BER_BVC("public"),
57 aci_bv_users = BER_BVC("users"),
58 aci_bv_self = BER_BVC("self"),
59 aci_bv_dnattr = BER_BVC("dnattr"),
60 aci_bv_group = BER_BVC("group"),
61 aci_bv_role = BER_BVC("role"),
62 aci_bv_set = BER_BVC("set"),
63 aci_bv_set_ref = BER_BVC("set-ref"),
64 aci_bv_grant = BER_BVC("grant"),
65 aci_bv_deny = BER_BVC("deny"),
67 aci_bv_ip_eq = BER_BVC("IP="),
69 aci_bv_path_eq = BER_BVC("PATH="),
71 aci_bv_dirsep = BER_BVC(LDAP_DIRSEP),
73 #endif /* LDAP_PF_LOCAL */
75 aci_bv_group_class = BER_BVC(SLAPD_GROUP_CLASS),
76 aci_bv_group_attr = BER_BVC(SLAPD_GROUP_ATTR),
77 aci_bv_role_class = BER_BVC(SLAPD_ROLE_CLASS),
78 aci_bv_role_attr = BER_BVC(SLAPD_ROLE_ATTR),
79 aci_bv_set_attr = BER_BVC(SLAPD_ACI_SET_ATTR);
81 typedef enum slap_aci_scope_t {
82 SLAP_ACI_SCOPE_ENTRY = 0x1,
83 SLAP_ACI_SCOPE_CHILDREN = 0x2,
84 SLAP_ACI_SCOPE_SUBTREE = ( SLAP_ACI_SCOPE_ENTRY | SLAP_ACI_SCOPE_CHILDREN )
87 static AccessControl * slap_acl_get(
88 AccessControl *ac, int *count,
89 Operation *op, Entry *e,
90 AttributeDescription *desc,
92 int nmatch, regmatch_t *matches,
93 AccessControlState *state );
95 static slap_control_t slap_acl_mask(
96 AccessControl *ac, slap_mask_t *mask,
97 Operation *op, Entry *e,
98 AttributeDescription *desc,
103 AccessControlState *state );
105 #ifdef SLAPD_ACI_ENABLED
107 Operation *op, Entry *e,
108 AttributeDescription *desc,
113 slap_access_t *grant,
115 slap_aci_scope_t scope);
116 #endif /* SLAPD_ACI_ENABLED */
118 static int regex_matches(
119 struct berval *pat, char *str, char *buf,
120 int nmatch, regmatch_t *matches);
121 static int string_expand(
122 struct berval *newbuf, struct berval *pattern,
123 char *match, int nmatch, regmatch_t *matches);
125 typedef struct AciSetCookie {
130 SLAP_SET_GATHER aci_set_gather;
131 SLAP_SET_GATHER aci_set_gather2;
132 static int aci_match_set ( struct berval *subj, Operation *op,
133 Entry *e, int setref );
136 * access_allowed - check whether op->o_ndn is allowed the requested access
137 * to entry e, attribute attr, value val. if val is null, access to
138 * the whole attribute is assumed (all values).
140 * This routine loops through all access controls and calls
141 * slap_acl_mask() on each applicable access control.
142 * The loop exits when a definitive answer is reached or
143 * or no more controls remain.
150 * - can be legally called with op == NULL
151 * - can be legally called with op->o_bd == NULL
154 #ifdef SLAP_OVERLAY_ACCESS
156 slap_access_always_allowed(
159 AttributeDescription *desc,
161 slap_access_t access,
162 AccessControlState *state,
165 assert( maskp != NULL );
167 ACL_PRIV_SET( *maskp, ACL_ACCESS2PRIV( access ) );
176 AttributeDescription *desc,
178 slap_access_t access,
179 AccessControlState *state,
184 AccessControl *a = NULL;
187 char accessmaskbuf[ACCESSMASK_MAXLEN];
190 slap_control_t control;
191 slap_access_t access_level;
193 regmatch_t matches[MAXREMATCHES];
194 int st_same_attr = 0;
196 assert( op != NULL );
198 assert( desc != NULL );
199 assert( maskp != NULL );
201 access_level = ACL_LEVEL( access );
202 attr = desc->ad_cname.bv_val;
204 assert( attr != NULL );
206 /* grant database root access */
207 if ( be_isroot( op ) ) {
208 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= root access granted\n", 0, 0, 0 );
209 mask = ACL_LVL_MANAGE;
214 * no-user-modification operational attributes are ignored
215 * by ACL_WRITE checking as any found here are not provided
218 if ( access_level >= ACL_WRITE && is_at_no_user_mod( desc->ad_type )
219 && desc != slap_schema.si_ad_entry
220 && desc != slap_schema.si_ad_children )
222 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "NoUserMod Operational attribute:"
223 " %s access granted\n",
228 /* use backend default access if no backend acls */
229 if ( op->o_bd->be_acl == NULL ) {
232 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
233 "=> slap_access_allowed: backend default %s "
234 "access %s to \"%s\"\n",
235 access2str( access ),
236 op->o_bd->be_dfltaccess >= access_level ? "granted" : "denied",
237 op->o_dn.bv_val ? op->o_dn.bv_val : "(anonymous)" );
238 ret = op->o_bd->be_dfltaccess >= access_level;
240 mask = ACL_PRIV_LEVEL;
241 for ( i = ACL_NONE; i <= op->o_bd->be_dfltaccess; i++ ) {
242 ACL_PRIV_SET( mask, ACL_ACCESS2PRIV( i ) );
251 if ( st_same_attr ) {
252 assert( state->as_vd_acl != NULL );
254 a = state->as_vd_acl;
255 count = state->as_vd_acl_count;
256 if ( !ACL_IS_INVALID( state->as_vd_acl_mask ) ) {
257 mask = state->as_vd_acl_mask;
258 AC_MEMCPY( matches, state->as_vd_acl_matches, sizeof(matches) );
263 if ( state ) state->as_vi_acl = NULL;
265 ACL_PRIV_ASSIGN( mask, *maskp );
267 memset( matches, '\0', sizeof( matches ) );
270 while ( ( a = slap_acl_get( a, &count, op, e, desc, val,
271 MAXREMATCHES, matches, state ) ) != NULL )
275 for ( i = 0; i < MAXREMATCHES && matches[i].rm_so > 0; i++ ) {
276 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "=> match[%d]: %d %d ", i,
277 (int)matches[i].rm_so, (int)matches[i].rm_eo );
278 if ( matches[i].rm_so <= matches[0].rm_eo ) {
280 for ( n = matches[i].rm_so; n < matches[i].rm_eo; n++ ) {
281 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "%c", e->e_ndn[n], 0, 0 );
284 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ARGS, "\n", 0, 0, 0 );
288 if ( state->as_vi_acl == a &&
289 ( state->as_recorded & ACL_STATE_RECORDED_NV ) )
291 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
292 "=> slap_access_allowed: result from state (%s)\n",
294 ret = state->as_result;
297 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
298 "=> slap_access_allowed: no res from state (%s)\n",
304 control = slap_acl_mask( a, &mask, op,
305 e, desc, val, MAXREMATCHES, matches, count, state );
307 if ( control != ACL_BREAK ) {
311 memset( matches, '\0', sizeof( matches ) );
314 if ( ACL_IS_INVALID( mask ) ) {
315 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
316 "=> slap_access_allowed: \"%s\" (%s) invalid!\n",
318 ACL_PRIV_ASSIGN( mask, *maskp );
320 } else if ( control == ACL_BREAK ) {
321 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
322 "=> slap_access_allowed: no more rules\n", 0, 0, 0 );
327 ret = ACL_GRANT( mask, access );
329 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
330 "=> slap_access_allowed: %s access %s by %s\n",
331 access2str( access ), ret ? "granted" : "denied",
332 accessmask2str( mask, accessmaskbuf, 1 ) );
335 ACL_PRIV_ASSIGN( *maskp, mask );
343 AttributeDescription *desc,
345 slap_access_t access,
346 AccessControlState *state,
353 * NOTE: control gets here if FIXME
354 * if an appropriate backend cannot be selected for the operation,
355 * we assume that the frontend should handle this
356 * FIXME: should select_backend() take care of this,
357 * and return frontendDB instead of NULL? maybe for some value
362 op->o_bd = select_backend( &op->o_req_ndn, 0, 0 );
363 if ( op->o_bd == NULL ) {
364 op->o_bd = frontendDB;
366 rc = slap_access_allowed( op, e, desc, val, access, state, maskp );
376 AttributeDescription *desc,
378 slap_access_t access,
379 AccessControlState *state,
383 AccessControl *a = NULL;
387 char accessmaskbuf[ACCESSMASK_MAXLEN];
390 slap_access_t access_level;
392 int st_same_attr = 0;
393 static AccessControlState state_init = ACL_STATE_INIT;
396 assert( desc != NULL );
398 access_level = ACL_LEVEL( access );
400 assert( access_level > ACL_NONE );
403 if ( maskp ) ACL_INVALIDATE( *maskp );
405 attr = desc->ad_cname.bv_val;
407 assert( attr != NULL );
409 if ( op && op->o_is_auth_check &&
410 ( access_level == ACL_SEARCH || access_level == ACL_READ ) )
416 if ( state->as_vd_ad == desc ) {
417 if ( state->as_recorded ) {
418 if ( ( state->as_recorded & ACL_STATE_RECORDED_NV ) &&
421 return state->as_result;
423 } else if ( ( state->as_recorded & ACL_STATE_RECORDED_VD ) &&
424 val != NULL && state->as_vd_acl == NULL )
426 return state->as_result;
434 state->as_vd_ad = desc;
437 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
438 "=> access_allowed: %s access to \"%s\" \"%s\" requested\n",
439 access2str( access ), e->e_dn, attr );
446 if ( op->o_bd == NULL ) {
447 op->o_bd = LDAP_STAILQ_FIRST( &backendDB );
452 * FIXME: experimental; use first backend rules
453 * iff there is no global_acl (ITS#3100) */
454 if ( frontendDB->be_acl != NULL ) {
455 op->o_bd = frontendDB;
457 #endif /* LDAP_DEVEL */
459 assert( op->o_bd != NULL );
461 /* this is enforced in backend_add() */
462 if ( op->o_bd->bd_info->bi_access_allowed ) {
463 /* delegate to backend */
464 ret = op->o_bd->bd_info->bi_access_allowed( op, e,
465 desc, val, access, state, &mask );
468 BackendDB *be_orig = op->o_bd;
470 /* use default (but pass through frontend
471 * for global ACL overlays) */
472 op->o_bd = frontendDB;
473 ret = frontendDB->bd_info->bi_access_allowed( op, e,
474 desc, val, access, state, &mask );
479 if ( ACL_IS_INVALID( mask ) ) {
480 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
481 "=> access_allowed: \"%s\" (%s) invalid!\n",
486 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
487 "=> access_allowed: no more rules\n", 0, 0, 0 );
493 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
494 "=> access_allowed: %s access %s by %s\n",
495 access2str( access ), ret ? "granted" : "denied",
496 accessmask2str( mask, accessmaskbuf, 1 ) );
499 if ( state != NULL ) {
500 /* If not value-dependent, save ACL in case of more attrs */
501 if ( !( state->as_recorded & ACL_STATE_RECORDED_VD ) ) {
502 state->as_vi_acl = a;
503 state->as_result = ret;
505 state->as_recorded |= ACL_STATE_RECORDED;
507 if ( be_null ) op->o_bd = NULL;
508 if ( maskp ) ACL_PRIV_ASSIGN( *maskp, mask );
512 #else /* !SLAP_OVERLAY_ACCESS */
518 AttributeDescription *desc,
520 slap_access_t access,
521 AccessControlState *state,
526 AccessControl *a = NULL;
531 char accessmaskbuf[ACCESSMASK_MAXLEN];
534 slap_control_t control;
535 slap_access_t access_level;
537 regmatch_t matches[MAXREMATCHES];
538 int st_same_attr = 0;
539 static AccessControlState state_init = ACL_STATE_INIT;
542 assert( desc != NULL );
544 access_level = ACL_LEVEL( access );
546 assert( access_level > ACL_NONE );
547 if ( maskp ) ACL_INVALIDATE( *maskp );
549 attr = desc->ad_cname.bv_val;
551 assert( attr != NULL );
553 if ( op && op->o_is_auth_check &&
554 ( access_level == ACL_SEARCH || access_level == ACL_READ ) )
560 if ( state->as_vd_ad == desc ) {
561 if ( state->as_recorded ) {
562 if ( ( state->as_recorded & ACL_STATE_RECORDED_NV ) &&
565 return state->as_result;
567 } else if ( ( state->as_recorded & ACL_STATE_RECORDED_VD ) &&
568 val != NULL && state->as_vd_acl == NULL )
570 return state->as_result;
578 state->as_vd_ad=desc;
581 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
582 "=> access_allowed: %s access to \"%s\" \"%s\" requested\n",
583 access2str( access ), e->e_dn, attr );
592 be = LDAP_STAILQ_FIRST(&backendDB);
596 * FIXME: experimental; use first backend rules
597 * iff there is no global_acl (ITS#3100) */
598 if ( frontendDB->be_acl == NULL )
604 assert( be != NULL );
606 /* grant database root access */
607 if ( be_isroot( op ) ) {
608 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= root access granted\n", 0, 0, 0 );
610 mask = ACL_LVL_MANAGE;
617 * no-user-modification operational attributes are ignored
618 * by ACL_WRITE checking as any found here are not provided
621 if ( access_level >= ACL_WRITE && is_at_no_user_mod( desc->ad_type )
622 && desc != slap_schema.si_ad_entry
623 && desc != slap_schema.si_ad_children )
625 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "NoUserMod Operational attribute:"
626 " %s access granted\n",
631 /* use backend default access if no backend acls */
632 if ( be->be_acl == NULL ) {
633 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
634 "=> access_allowed: backend default %s "
635 "access %s to \"%s\"\n",
636 access2str( access ),
637 be->be_dfltaccess >= access_level ? "granted" : "denied",
638 op->o_dn.bv_val ? op->o_dn.bv_val : "(anonymous)" );
639 ret = be->be_dfltaccess >= access_level;
644 mask = ACL_PRIV_LEVEL;
645 for ( i = ACL_NONE; i <= be->be_dfltaccess; i++ ) {
646 mask |= ACL_ACCESS2PRIV( i );
653 /* be is always non-NULL */
654 /* use global default access if no global acls */
655 } else if ( be == NULL && frontendDB->be_acl == NULL ) {
656 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
657 "=> access_allowed: global default %s access %s to \"%s\"\n",
658 access2str( access ),
659 frontendDB->be_dfltaccess >= access_level ?
660 "granted" : "denied", op->o_dn.bv_val );
661 ret = frontendDB->be_dfltaccess >= access_level;
666 mask = ACL_PRIV_LEVEL;
667 for ( i = ACL_NONE; i <= global_default_access; i++ ) {
668 mask |= ACL_ACCESS2PRIV( i );
679 if ( st_same_attr ) {
680 assert( state->as_vd_acl != NULL );
682 a = state->as_vd_acl;
683 count = state->as_vd_acl_count;
684 if ( !ACL_IS_INVALID( state->as_vd_acl_mask ) ) {
685 mask = state->as_vd_acl_mask;
686 AC_MEMCPY( matches, state->as_vd_acl_matches, sizeof(matches) );
691 if ( state ) state->as_vi_acl = NULL;
695 memset( matches, '\0', sizeof(matches) );
698 while ( ( a = slap_acl_get( a, &count, op, e, desc, val,
699 MAXREMATCHES, matches, state ) ) != NULL )
703 for ( i = 0; i < MAXREMATCHES && matches[i].rm_so > 0; i++ ) {
704 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "=> match[%d]: %d %d ", i,
705 (int)matches[i].rm_so, (int)matches[i].rm_eo );
706 if ( matches[i].rm_so <= matches[0].rm_eo ) {
708 for ( n = matches[i].rm_so; n < matches[i].rm_eo; n++ ) {
709 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "%c", e->e_ndn[n], 0, 0 );
712 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ARGS, "\n", 0, 0, 0 );
716 if ( state->as_vi_acl == a &&
717 ( state->as_recorded & ACL_STATE_RECORDED_NV ) )
719 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
720 "access_allowed: result from state (%s)\n",
722 ret = state->as_result;
725 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
726 "access_allowed: no res from state (%s)\n",
732 control = slap_acl_mask( a, &mask, op,
733 e, desc, val, MAXREMATCHES, matches, count, state );
735 if ( control != ACL_BREAK ) {
739 memset( matches, '\0', sizeof(matches) );
742 if ( ACL_IS_INVALID( mask ) ) {
743 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
744 "=> access_allowed: \"%s\" (%s) invalid!\n",
748 } else if ( control == ACL_BREAK ) {
749 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
750 "=> access_allowed: no more rules\n", 0, 0, 0 );
755 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
756 "=> access_allowed: %s access %s by %s\n",
757 access2str( access ),
758 ACL_GRANT(mask, access) ? "granted" : "denied",
759 accessmask2str( mask, accessmaskbuf, 1 ) );
761 ret = ACL_GRANT(mask, access);
764 if ( state != NULL ) {
765 /* If not value-dependent, save ACL in case of more attrs */
766 if ( !( state->as_recorded & ACL_STATE_RECORDED_VD ) ) {
767 state->as_vi_acl = a;
768 state->as_result = ret;
770 state->as_recorded |= ACL_STATE_RECORDED;
772 if ( be_null ) op->o_bd = NULL;
773 if ( maskp ) *maskp = mask;
777 #endif /* SLAP_OVERLAY_ACCESS */
780 * slap_acl_get - return the acl applicable to entry e, attribute
781 * attr. the acl returned is suitable for use in subsequent calls to
782 * acl_access_allowed().
785 static AccessControl *
791 AttributeDescription *desc,
795 AccessControlState *state )
802 assert( count != NULL );
803 assert( desc != NULL );
805 attr = desc->ad_cname.bv_val;
807 assert( attr != NULL );
810 if( op->o_bd == NULL ) {
811 a = frontendDB->be_acl;
813 a = op->o_bd->be_acl;
824 dnlen = e->e_nname.bv_len;
826 for ( ; a != NULL; a = a->acl_next ) {
829 if ( a->acl_dn_pat.bv_len || ( a->acl_dn_style != ACL_STYLE_REGEX )) {
830 if ( a->acl_dn_style == ACL_STYLE_REGEX ) {
831 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "=> dnpat: [%d] %s nsub: %d\n",
832 *count, a->acl_dn_pat.bv_val, (int) a->acl_dn_re.re_nsub );
833 if (regexec(&a->acl_dn_re, e->e_ndn, nmatch, matches, 0))
837 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "=> dn: [%d] %s\n",
838 *count, a->acl_dn_pat.bv_val, 0 );
839 patlen = a->acl_dn_pat.bv_len;
840 if ( dnlen < patlen )
843 if ( a->acl_dn_style == ACL_STYLE_BASE ) {
844 /* base dn -- entire object DN must match */
845 if ( dnlen != patlen )
848 } else if ( a->acl_dn_style == ACL_STYLE_ONE ) {
849 int rdnlen = -1, sep = 0;
851 if ( dnlen <= patlen )
855 if ( !DN_SEPARATOR( e->e_ndn[dnlen - patlen - 1] ) )
860 rdnlen = dn_rdnlen( NULL, &e->e_nname );
861 if ( rdnlen != dnlen - patlen - sep )
864 } else if ( a->acl_dn_style == ACL_STYLE_SUBTREE ) {
865 if ( dnlen > patlen && !DN_SEPARATOR( e->e_ndn[dnlen - patlen - 1] ) )
868 } else if ( a->acl_dn_style == ACL_STYLE_CHILDREN ) {
869 if ( dnlen <= patlen )
871 if ( !DN_SEPARATOR( e->e_ndn[dnlen - patlen - 1] ) )
875 if ( strcmp( a->acl_dn_pat.bv_val, e->e_ndn + dnlen - patlen ) != 0 )
879 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "=> acl_get: [%d] matched\n",
883 if ( a->acl_attrs && !ad_inlist( desc, a->acl_attrs ) ) {
884 matches[0].rm_so = matches[0].rm_eo = -1;
888 /* Is this ACL only for a specific value? */
889 if ( a->acl_attrval.bv_len ) {
894 if( state && !( state->as_recorded & ACL_STATE_RECORDED_VD )) {
895 state->as_recorded |= ACL_STATE_RECORDED_VD;
896 state->as_vd_acl = a;
897 state->as_vd_acl_count = *count;
898 state->as_vd_access = a->acl_access;
899 state->as_vd_access_count = 1;
900 ACL_INVALIDATE( state->as_vd_acl_mask );
903 if ( a->acl_attrval_style == ACL_STYLE_REGEX ) {
904 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
905 "acl_get: valpat %s\n",
906 a->acl_attrval.bv_val, 0, 0 );
907 if ( regexec( &a->acl_attrval_re, val->bv_val, 0, NULL, 0 ) )
915 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
917 a->acl_attrval.bv_val, 0, 0 );
919 if ( a->acl_attrs[0].an_desc->ad_type->sat_syntax != slap_schema.si_syn_distinguishedName ) {
920 if (value_match( &match, desc,
921 /* desc->ad_type->sat_equality */ a->acl_attrval_mr, 0,
922 val, &a->acl_attrval, &text ) != LDAP_SUCCESS ||
929 patlen = a->acl_attrval.bv_len;
930 vdnlen = val->bv_len;
932 if ( vdnlen < patlen )
935 if ( a->acl_attrval_style == ACL_STYLE_BASE ) {
936 if ( vdnlen > patlen )
939 } else if ( a->acl_attrval_style == ACL_STYLE_ONE ) {
942 if ( !DN_SEPARATOR( val->bv_val[vdnlen - patlen - 1] ) )
945 rdnlen = dn_rdnlen( NULL, val );
946 if ( rdnlen != vdnlen - patlen - 1 )
949 } else if ( a->acl_attrval_style == ACL_STYLE_SUBTREE ) {
950 if ( vdnlen > patlen && !DN_SEPARATOR( val->bv_val[vdnlen - patlen - 1] ) )
953 } else if ( a->acl_attrval_style == ACL_STYLE_CHILDREN ) {
954 if ( vdnlen <= patlen )
957 if ( !DN_SEPARATOR( val->bv_val[vdnlen - patlen - 1] ) )
961 if ( strcmp( a->acl_attrval.bv_val, val->bv_val + vdnlen - patlen ))
967 if ( a->acl_filter != NULL ) {
968 ber_int_t rc = test_filter( NULL, e, a->acl_filter );
969 if ( rc != LDAP_COMPARE_TRUE ) {
974 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "=> acl_get: [%d] attr %s\n",
979 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= acl_get: done.\n", 0, 0, 0 );
991 struct berval *opndn )
994 * if access applies to the entry itself, and the
995 * user is bound as somebody in the same namespace as
996 * the entry, OR the given dn matches the dn pattern
999 * NOTE: styles "anonymous", "users" and "self"
1000 * have been moved to enum slap_style_t, whose
1001 * value is set in a_dn_style; however, the string
1002 * is maintaned in a_dn_pat.
1004 if ( b->a_style == ACL_STYLE_ANONYMOUS ) {
1005 if ( !BER_BVISEMPTY( opndn ) ) {
1009 } else if ( b->a_style == ACL_STYLE_USERS ) {
1010 if ( BER_BVISEMPTY( opndn ) ) {
1014 } else if ( b->a_style == ACL_STYLE_SELF ) {
1015 struct berval ndn, selfndn;
1018 if ( BER_BVISEMPTY( opndn ) || BER_BVISNULL( &e->e_nname ) ) {
1022 level = b->a_self_level;
1030 selfndn = e->e_nname;
1033 for ( ; level > 0; level-- ) {
1034 if ( BER_BVISEMPTY( &ndn ) ) {
1037 dnParent( &ndn, &ndn );
1040 if ( BER_BVISEMPTY( &ndn ) || !dn_match( &ndn, &selfndn ) )
1045 } else if ( b->a_style == ACL_STYLE_REGEX ) {
1046 if ( !ber_bvccmp( &b->a_pat, '*' ) ) {
1048 regmatch_t tmp_matches[2],
1049 *tmp_matchesp = tmp_matches;
1053 switch ( a->acl_dn_style ) {
1054 case ACL_STYLE_REGEX:
1055 if ( !BER_BVISNULL( &a->acl_dn_pat ) ) {
1056 tmp_matchesp = matches;
1057 tmp_nmatch = nmatch;
1060 /* FALLTHRU: applies also to ACL_STYLE_REGEX when pattern is "*" */
1062 case ACL_STYLE_BASE:
1063 tmp_matches[0].rm_so = 0;
1064 tmp_matches[0].rm_eo = e->e_nname.bv_len;
1069 case ACL_STYLE_SUBTREE:
1070 case ACL_STYLE_CHILDREN:
1071 tmp_matches[0].rm_so = 0;
1072 tmp_matches[0].rm_eo = e->e_nname.bv_len;
1073 tmp_matches[1].rm_so = e->e_nname.bv_len - a->acl_dn_pat.bv_len;
1074 tmp_matches[1].rm_eo = e->e_nname.bv_len;
1088 if ( !regex_matches( &b->a_pat, opndn->bv_val,
1089 e->e_ndn, tmp_nmatch, tmp_matchesp ) )
1097 ber_len_t patlen, odnlen;
1100 if ( e->e_dn == NULL )
1103 if ( b->a_expand ) {
1105 char buf[ACL_BUF_SIZE];
1108 regmatch_t tmp_matches[2],
1109 *tmp_matchesp = tmp_matches;
1113 bv.bv_len = sizeof( buf ) - 1;
1116 switch ( a->acl_dn_style ) {
1117 case ACL_STYLE_REGEX:
1118 if ( !BER_BVISNULL( &a->acl_dn_pat ) ) {
1119 tmp_matchesp = matches;
1120 tmp_nmatch = nmatch;
1123 /* FALLTHRU: applies also to ACL_STYLE_REGEX when pattern is "*" */
1125 case ACL_STYLE_BASE:
1126 tmp_matches[0].rm_so = 0;
1127 tmp_matches[0].rm_eo = e->e_nname.bv_len;
1132 case ACL_STYLE_SUBTREE:
1133 case ACL_STYLE_CHILDREN:
1134 tmp_matches[0].rm_so = 0;
1135 tmp_matches[0].rm_eo = e->e_nname.bv_len;
1136 tmp_matches[1].rm_so = e->e_nname.bv_len - a->acl_dn_pat.bv_len;
1137 tmp_matches[1].rm_eo = e->e_nname.bv_len;
1151 if ( string_expand( &bv, &b->a_pat,
1153 tmp_nmatch, tmp_matchesp ) )
1158 if ( dnNormalize(0, NULL, NULL, &bv,
1159 &pat, op->o_tmpmemctx )
1162 /* did not expand to a valid dn */
1170 patlen = pat.bv_len;
1171 odnlen = opndn->bv_len;
1172 if ( odnlen < patlen ) {
1173 goto dn_match_cleanup;
1177 if ( b->a_style == ACL_STYLE_BASE ) {
1178 /* base dn -- entire object DN must match */
1179 if ( odnlen != patlen ) {
1180 goto dn_match_cleanup;
1183 } else if ( b->a_style == ACL_STYLE_ONE ) {
1186 if ( odnlen <= patlen ) {
1187 goto dn_match_cleanup;
1190 if ( !DN_SEPARATOR( opndn->bv_val[odnlen - patlen - 1] ) ) {
1191 goto dn_match_cleanup;
1194 rdnlen = dn_rdnlen( NULL, opndn );
1195 if ( rdnlen != odnlen - patlen - 1 ) {
1196 goto dn_match_cleanup;
1199 } else if ( b->a_style == ACL_STYLE_SUBTREE ) {
1200 if ( odnlen > patlen && !DN_SEPARATOR( opndn->bv_val[odnlen - patlen - 1] ) ) {
1201 goto dn_match_cleanup;
1204 } else if ( b->a_style == ACL_STYLE_CHILDREN ) {
1205 if ( odnlen <= patlen ) {
1206 goto dn_match_cleanup;
1209 if ( !DN_SEPARATOR( opndn->bv_val[odnlen - patlen - 1] ) ) {
1210 goto dn_match_cleanup;
1213 } else if ( b->a_style == ACL_STYLE_LEVEL ) {
1217 if ( odnlen <= patlen ) {
1218 goto dn_match_cleanup;
1221 if ( level > 0 && !DN_SEPARATOR( opndn->bv_val[odnlen - patlen - 1] ) )
1223 goto dn_match_cleanup;
1228 for ( ; level > 0; level-- ) {
1229 if ( BER_BVISEMPTY( &ndn ) ) {
1230 goto dn_match_cleanup;
1232 dnParent( &ndn, &ndn );
1233 if ( ndn.bv_len < patlen ) {
1234 goto dn_match_cleanup;
1238 if ( ndn.bv_len != patlen ) {
1239 goto dn_match_cleanup;
1243 got_match = !strcmp( pat.bv_val, &opndn->bv_val[ odnlen - patlen ] );
1246 if ( pat.bv_val != b->a_pat.bv_val ) {
1247 slap_sl_free( pat.bv_val, op->o_tmpmemctx );
1259 * Record value-dependent access control state
1261 #define ACL_RECORD_VALUE_STATE do { \
1262 if( state && !( state->as_recorded & ACL_STATE_RECORDED_VD )) { \
1263 state->as_recorded |= ACL_STATE_RECORDED_VD; \
1264 state->as_vd_acl = a; \
1265 AC_MEMCPY( state->as_vd_acl_matches, matches, \
1266 sizeof( state->as_vd_acl_matches )) ; \
1267 state->as_vd_acl_count = count; \
1268 state->as_vd_access = b; \
1269 state->as_vd_access_count = i; \
1281 regmatch_t *matches,
1283 AccessControlState *state,
1284 slap_dn_access *bdn,
1285 struct berval *opndn )
1291 const char *attr = bdn->a_at->ad_cname.bv_val;
1293 assert( attr != NULL );
1295 if ( BER_BVISEMPTY( opndn ) ) {
1299 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= check a_dn_at: %s\n", attr, 0, 0 );
1302 /* see if asker is listed in dnattr */
1303 for ( at = attrs_find( e->e_attrs, bdn->a_at );
1305 at = attrs_find( at->a_next, bdn->a_at ) )
1307 if ( value_find_ex( bdn->a_at,
1308 SLAP_MR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_NORMALIZED_MATCH |
1309 SLAP_MR_ASSERTED_VALUE_NORMALIZED_MATCH,
1311 &bv, op->o_tmpmemctx ) == 0 )
1320 /* have a dnattr match. if this is a self clause then
1321 * the target must also match the op dn.
1323 if ( bdn->a_self ) {
1324 /* check if the target is an attribute. */
1325 if ( val == NULL ) return 1;
1327 /* target is attribute, check if the attribute value
1330 rc = value_match( &match, bdn->a_at,
1331 bdn->a_at->ad_type->sat_equality, 0,
1333 /* on match error or no match, fail the ACL clause */
1334 if ( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS || match != 0 )
1339 /* no dnattr match, check if this is a self clause */
1340 if ( ! bdn->a_self )
1343 ACL_RECORD_VALUE_STATE;
1345 /* this is a self clause, check if the target is an
1351 /* target is attribute, check if the attribute value
1354 rc = value_match( &match, bdn->a_at,
1355 bdn->a_at->ad_type->sat_equality, 0,
1358 /* on match error or no match, fail the ACL clause */
1359 if ( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS || match != 0 )
1368 * slap_acl_mask - modifies mask based upon the given acl and the
1369 * requested access to entry e, attribute attr, value val. if val
1370 * is null, access to the whole attribute is assumed (all values).
1372 * returns 0 access NOT allowed
1376 static slap_control_t
1382 AttributeDescription *desc,
1385 regmatch_t *matches,
1387 AccessControlState *state )
1392 char accessmaskbuf[ACCESSMASK_MAXLEN];
1393 #if !defined( SLAP_DYNACL ) && defined( SLAPD_ACI_ENABLED )
1394 char accessmaskbuf1[ACCESSMASK_MAXLEN];
1395 #endif /* !SLAP_DYNACL && SLAPD_ACI_ENABLED */
1398 slap_mask_t a2pmask = ACL_ACCESS2PRIV( *mask );
1400 assert( a != NULL );
1401 assert( mask != NULL );
1402 assert( desc != NULL );
1404 attr = desc->ad_cname.bv_val;
1406 assert( attr != NULL );
1408 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
1409 "=> acl_mask: access to entry \"%s\", attr \"%s\" requested\n",
1412 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
1413 "=> acl_mask: to %s by \"%s\", (%s) \n",
1414 val ? "value" : "all values",
1415 op->o_ndn.bv_val ? op->o_ndn.bv_val : "",
1416 accessmask2str( *mask, accessmaskbuf, 1 ) );
1419 if( state && ( state->as_recorded & ACL_STATE_RECORDED_VD )
1420 && state->as_vd_acl == a )
1422 b = state->as_vd_access;
1423 i = state->as_vd_access_count;
1430 for ( ; b != NULL; b = b->a_next, i++ ) {
1431 slap_mask_t oldmask, modmask;
1433 ACL_INVALIDATE( modmask );
1435 /* AND <who> clauses */
1436 if ( !BER_BVISEMPTY( &b->a_dn_pat ) ) {
1437 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= check a_dn_pat: %s\n",
1438 b->a_dn_pat.bv_val, 0, 0);
1440 * if access applies to the entry itself, and the
1441 * user is bound as somebody in the same namespace as
1442 * the entry, OR the given dn matches the dn pattern
1445 * NOTE: styles "anonymous", "users" and "self"
1446 * have been moved to enum slap_style_t, whose
1447 * value is set in a_dn_style; however, the string
1448 * is maintaned in a_dn_pat.
1451 if ( acl_mask_dn( op, e, a, nmatch, matches,
1452 &b->a_dn, &op->o_ndn ) )
1458 if ( !BER_BVISEMPTY( &b->a_realdn_pat ) ) {
1461 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= check a_realdn_pat: %s\n",
1462 b->a_realdn_pat.bv_val, 0, 0);
1464 * if access applies to the entry itself, and the
1465 * user is bound as somebody in the same namespace as
1466 * the entry, OR the given dn matches the dn pattern
1469 * NOTE: styles "anonymous", "users" and "self"
1470 * have been moved to enum slap_style_t, whose
1471 * value is set in a_dn_style; however, the string
1472 * is maintaned in a_dn_pat.
1475 if ( op->o_conn && !BER_BVISNULL( &op->o_conn->c_ndn ) )
1477 ndn = op->o_conn->c_ndn;
1482 if ( acl_mask_dn( op, e, a, nmatch, matches,
1483 &b->a_realdn, &ndn ) )
1489 if ( !BER_BVISEMPTY( &b->a_sockurl_pat ) ) {
1490 if ( ! op->o_conn->c_listener ) {
1493 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= check a_sockurl_pat: %s\n",
1494 b->a_sockurl_pat.bv_val, 0, 0 );
1496 if ( !ber_bvccmp( &b->a_sockurl_pat, '*' ) ) {
1497 if ( b->a_sockurl_style == ACL_STYLE_REGEX) {
1498 if (!regex_matches( &b->a_sockurl_pat, op->o_conn->c_listener_url.bv_val,
1499 e->e_ndn, nmatch, matches ) )
1504 } else if ( b->a_sockurl_style == ACL_STYLE_EXPAND ) {
1506 char buf[ACL_BUF_SIZE];
1508 bv.bv_len = sizeof( buf ) - 1;
1510 if ( string_expand( &bv, &b->a_sockurl_pat,
1511 e->e_ndn, nmatch, matches ) )
1516 if ( ber_bvstrcasecmp( &bv, &op->o_conn->c_listener_url ) != 0 )
1522 if ( ber_bvstrcasecmp( &b->a_sockurl_pat, &op->o_conn->c_listener_url ) != 0 )
1530 if ( !BER_BVISEMPTY( &b->a_domain_pat ) ) {
1531 if ( !op->o_conn->c_peer_domain.bv_val ) {
1534 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= check a_domain_pat: %s\n",
1535 b->a_domain_pat.bv_val, 0, 0 );
1536 if ( !ber_bvccmp( &b->a_domain_pat, '*' ) ) {
1537 if ( b->a_domain_style == ACL_STYLE_REGEX) {
1538 if (!regex_matches( &b->a_domain_pat, op->o_conn->c_peer_domain.bv_val,
1539 e->e_ndn, nmatch, matches ) )
1544 char buf[ACL_BUF_SIZE];
1546 struct berval cmp = op->o_conn->c_peer_domain;
1547 struct berval pat = b->a_domain_pat;
1549 if ( b->a_domain_expand ) {
1552 bv.bv_len = sizeof(buf) - 1;
1555 if ( string_expand(&bv, &b->a_domain_pat,
1556 e->e_ndn, nmatch, matches) )
1563 if ( b->a_domain_style == ACL_STYLE_SUBTREE ) {
1564 int offset = cmp.bv_len - pat.bv_len;
1569 if ( offset == 1 || ( offset > 1 && cmp.bv_val[ offset - 1 ] != '.' ) ) {
1573 /* trim the domain */
1574 cmp.bv_val = &cmp.bv_val[ offset ];
1575 cmp.bv_len -= offset;
1578 if ( ber_bvstrcasecmp( &pat, &cmp ) != 0 ) {
1585 if ( !BER_BVISEMPTY( &b->a_peername_pat ) ) {
1586 if ( !op->o_conn->c_peer_name.bv_val ) {
1589 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= check a_peername_path: %s\n",
1590 b->a_peername_pat.bv_val, 0, 0 );
1591 if ( !ber_bvccmp( &b->a_peername_pat, '*' ) ) {
1592 if ( b->a_peername_style == ACL_STYLE_REGEX ) {
1593 if (!regex_matches( &b->a_peername_pat, op->o_conn->c_peer_name.bv_val,
1594 e->e_ndn, nmatch, matches ) )
1600 /* try exact match */
1601 if ( b->a_peername_style == ACL_STYLE_BASE ) {
1602 if ( ber_bvstrcasecmp( &b->a_peername_pat, &op->o_conn->c_peer_name ) != 0 ) {
1606 } else if ( b->a_peername_style == ACL_STYLE_EXPAND ) {
1608 char buf[ACL_BUF_SIZE];
1610 bv.bv_len = sizeof( buf ) - 1;
1612 if ( string_expand( &bv, &b->a_peername_pat,
1613 e->e_ndn, nmatch, matches ) )
1618 if ( ber_bvstrcasecmp( &bv, &op->o_conn->c_peer_name ) != 0 ) {
1622 /* extract IP and try exact match */
1623 } else if ( b->a_peername_style == ACL_STYLE_IP ) {
1625 char buf[] = "255.255.255.255";
1628 int port_number = -1;
1630 if ( strncasecmp( op->o_conn->c_peer_name.bv_val,
1631 aci_bv_ip_eq.bv_val, aci_bv_ip_eq.bv_len ) != 0 )
1634 ip.bv_val = op->o_conn->c_peer_name.bv_val + aci_bv_ip_eq.bv_len;
1635 ip.bv_len = op->o_conn->c_peer_name.bv_len - aci_bv_ip_eq.bv_len;
1637 port = strrchr( ip.bv_val, ':' );
1641 ip.bv_len = port - ip.bv_val;
1643 port_number = strtol( port, &next, 10 );
1644 if ( next[0] != '\0' )
1648 /* the port check can be anticipated here */
1649 if ( b->a_peername_port != -1 && port_number != b->a_peername_port )
1652 /* address longer than expected? */
1653 if ( ip.bv_len >= sizeof(buf) )
1656 AC_MEMCPY( buf, ip.bv_val, ip.bv_len );
1657 buf[ ip.bv_len ] = '\0';
1659 addr = inet_addr( buf );
1661 /* unable to convert? */
1662 if ( addr == (unsigned long)(-1) )
1665 if ( (addr & b->a_peername_mask) != b->a_peername_addr )
1668 #ifdef LDAP_PF_LOCAL
1669 /* extract path and try exact match */
1670 } else if ( b->a_peername_style == ACL_STYLE_PATH ) {
1673 if ( strncmp( op->o_conn->c_peer_name.bv_val,
1674 aci_bv_path_eq.bv_val, aci_bv_path_eq.bv_len ) != 0 )
1677 path.bv_val = op->o_conn->c_peer_name.bv_val + aci_bv_path_eq.bv_len;
1678 path.bv_len = op->o_conn->c_peer_name.bv_len - aci_bv_path_eq.bv_len;
1680 if ( ber_bvcmp( &b->a_peername_pat, &path ) != 0 )
1683 #endif /* LDAP_PF_LOCAL */
1685 /* exact match (very unlikely...) */
1686 } else if ( ber_bvcmp( &op->o_conn->c_peer_name, &b->a_peername_pat ) != 0 ) {
1693 if ( !BER_BVISEMPTY( &b->a_sockname_pat ) ) {
1694 if ( BER_BVISNULL( &op->o_conn->c_sock_name ) ) {
1697 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= check a_sockname_path: %s\n",
1698 b->a_sockname_pat.bv_val, 0, 0 );
1699 if ( !ber_bvccmp( &b->a_sockname_pat, '*' ) ) {
1700 if ( b->a_sockname_style == ACL_STYLE_REGEX) {
1701 if (!regex_matches( &b->a_sockname_pat, op->o_conn->c_sock_name.bv_val,
1702 e->e_ndn, nmatch, matches ) )
1707 } else if ( b->a_sockname_style == ACL_STYLE_EXPAND ) {
1709 char buf[ACL_BUF_SIZE];
1711 bv.bv_len = sizeof( buf ) - 1;
1713 if ( string_expand( &bv, &b->a_sockname_pat,
1714 e->e_ndn, nmatch, matches ) )
1719 if ( ber_bvstrcasecmp( &bv, &op->o_conn->c_sock_name ) != 0 ) {
1724 if ( ber_bvstrcasecmp( &b->a_sockname_pat, &op->o_conn->c_sock_name ) != 0 ) {
1731 if ( b->a_dn_at != NULL ) {
1732 if ( acl_mask_dnattr( op, e, val, a, b, i,
1733 matches, count, state,
1734 &b->a_dn, &op->o_ndn ) )
1740 if ( b->a_realdn_at != NULL ) {
1743 if ( op->o_conn && !BER_BVISNULL( &op->o_conn->c_ndn ) )
1745 ndn = op->o_conn->c_ndn;
1750 if ( acl_mask_dnattr( op, e, val, a, b, i,
1751 matches, count, state,
1752 &b->a_realdn, &ndn ) )
1758 if ( !BER_BVISEMPTY( &b->a_group_pat ) ) {
1760 struct berval ndn = BER_BVNULL;
1763 if ( op->o_ndn.bv_len == 0 ) {
1767 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= check a_group_pat: %s\n",
1768 b->a_group_pat.bv_val, 0, 0 );
1770 /* b->a_group is an unexpanded entry name, expanded it should be an
1771 * entry with objectclass group* and we test to see if odn is one of
1772 * the values in the attribute group
1774 /* see if asker is listed in dnattr */
1775 if ( b->a_group_style == ACL_STYLE_EXPAND ) {
1776 char buf[ACL_BUF_SIZE];
1778 regmatch_t tmp_matches[2],
1779 *tmp_matchesp = tmp_matches;
1781 bv.bv_len = sizeof(buf) - 1;
1786 switch ( a->acl_dn_style ) {
1787 case ACL_STYLE_REGEX:
1788 if ( !BER_BVISNULL( &a->acl_dn_pat ) ) {
1789 tmp_matchesp = matches;
1790 tmp_nmatch = nmatch;
1794 /* FALLTHRU: applies also to ACL_STYLE_REGEX when pattern is "*" */
1795 case ACL_STYLE_BASE:
1796 tmp_matches[0].rm_so = 0;
1797 tmp_matches[0].rm_eo = e->e_nname.bv_len;
1802 case ACL_STYLE_SUBTREE:
1803 case ACL_STYLE_CHILDREN:
1804 tmp_matches[0].rm_so = 0;
1805 tmp_matches[0].rm_eo = e->e_nname.bv_len;
1806 tmp_matches[1].rm_so = e->e_nname.bv_len - a->acl_dn_pat.bv_len;
1807 tmp_matches[1].rm_eo = e->e_nname.bv_len;
1821 if ( string_expand( &bv, &b->a_group_pat,
1823 tmp_nmatch, tmp_matchesp ) )
1828 if ( dnNormalize( 0, NULL, NULL, &bv, &ndn,
1829 op->o_tmpmemctx ) != LDAP_SUCCESS )
1831 /* did not expand to a valid dn */
1838 bv = b->a_group_pat;
1841 rc = backend_group( op, e, &bv, &op->o_ndn,
1842 b->a_group_oc, b->a_group_at );
1845 slap_sl_free( ndn.bv_val, op->o_tmpmemctx );
1853 if ( !BER_BVISEMPTY( &b->a_set_pat ) ) {
1855 char buf[ACL_BUF_SIZE];
1857 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= check a_set_pat: %s\n",
1858 b->a_set_pat.bv_val, 0, 0 );
1860 if ( b->a_set_style == ACL_STYLE_EXPAND ) {
1862 regmatch_t tmp_matches[2],
1863 *tmp_matchesp = tmp_matches;
1866 bv.bv_len = sizeof( buf ) - 1;
1871 switch ( a->acl_dn_style ) {
1872 case ACL_STYLE_REGEX:
1873 if ( !BER_BVISNULL( &a->acl_dn_pat ) ) {
1874 tmp_matchesp = matches;
1875 tmp_nmatch = nmatch;
1879 /* FALLTHRU: applies also to ACL_STYLE_REGEX when pattern is "*" */
1880 case ACL_STYLE_BASE:
1881 tmp_matches[0].rm_so = 0;
1882 tmp_matches[0].rm_eo = e->e_nname.bv_len;
1887 case ACL_STYLE_SUBTREE:
1888 case ACL_STYLE_CHILDREN:
1889 tmp_matches[0].rm_so = 0;
1890 tmp_matches[0].rm_eo = e->e_nname.bv_len;
1891 tmp_matches[1].rm_so = e->e_nname.bv_len - a->acl_dn_pat.bv_len;
1892 tmp_matches[1].rm_eo = e->e_nname.bv_len;
1906 if ( string_expand( &bv, &b->a_set_pat,
1908 tmp_nmatch, tmp_matchesp ) )
1917 if ( aci_match_set( &bv, op, e, 0 ) == 0 ) {
1922 if ( b->a_authz.sai_ssf ) {
1923 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= check a_authz.sai_ssf: ACL %u > OP %u\n",
1924 b->a_authz.sai_ssf, op->o_ssf, 0 );
1925 if ( b->a_authz.sai_ssf > op->o_ssf ) {
1930 if ( b->a_authz.sai_transport_ssf ) {
1931 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
1932 "<= check a_authz.sai_transport_ssf: ACL %u > OP %u\n",
1933 b->a_authz.sai_transport_ssf, op->o_transport_ssf, 0 );
1934 if ( b->a_authz.sai_transport_ssf > op->o_transport_ssf ) {
1939 if ( b->a_authz.sai_tls_ssf ) {
1940 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
1941 "<= check a_authz.sai_tls_ssf: ACL %u > OP %u\n",
1942 b->a_authz.sai_tls_ssf, op->o_tls_ssf, 0 );
1943 if ( b->a_authz.sai_tls_ssf > op->o_tls_ssf ) {
1948 if ( b->a_authz.sai_sasl_ssf ) {
1949 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
1950 "<= check a_authz.sai_sasl_ssf: ACL %u > OP %u\n",
1951 b->a_authz.sai_sasl_ssf, op->o_sasl_ssf, 0 );
1952 if ( b->a_authz.sai_sasl_ssf > op->o_sasl_ssf ) {
1958 if ( b->a_dynacl ) {
1960 slap_access_t tgrant, tdeny;
1962 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= check a_dynacl\n",
1965 /* this case works different from the others above.
1966 * since aci's themselves give permissions, we need
1967 * to first check b->a_access_mask, the ACL's access level.
1969 if ( BER_BVISEMPTY( &e->e_nname ) ) {
1970 /* no ACIs in the root DSE */
1974 /* first check if the right being requested
1975 * is allowed by the ACL clause.
1977 if ( ! ACL_PRIV_ISSET( b->a_access_mask, a2pmask ) ) {
1981 /* start out with nothing granted, nothing denied */
1985 for ( da = b->a_dynacl; da; da = da->da_next ) {
1986 slap_access_t grant,
1992 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, " <= check a_dynacl: %s\n",
1993 da->da_name, 0, 0 );
1995 (void)( *da->da_mask )( da->da_private, op, e, desc, val, nmatch, matches, &grant, &deny );
2001 /* remove anything that the ACL clause does not allow */
2002 tgrant &= b->a_access_mask & ACL_PRIV_MASK;
2003 tdeny &= ACL_PRIV_MASK;
2005 /* see if we have anything to contribute */
2006 if( ACL_IS_INVALID(tgrant) && ACL_IS_INVALID(tdeny) ) {
2010 /* this could be improved by changing slap_acl_mask so that it can deal with
2011 * by clauses that return grant/deny pairs. Right now, it does either
2012 * additive or subtractive rights, but not both at the same time. So,
2013 * we need to combine the grant/deny pair into a single rights mask in
2014 * a smart way: if either grant or deny is "empty", then we use the
2015 * opposite as is, otherwise we remove any denied rights from the grant
2016 * rights mask and construct an additive mask.
2018 if (ACL_IS_INVALID(tdeny)) {
2019 modmask = tgrant | ACL_PRIV_ADDITIVE;
2021 } else if (ACL_IS_INVALID(tgrant)) {
2022 modmask = tdeny | ACL_PRIV_SUBSTRACTIVE;
2025 modmask = (tgrant & ~tdeny) | ACL_PRIV_ADDITIVE;
2029 #else /* !SLAP_DYNACL */
2031 #ifdef SLAPD_ACI_ENABLED
2032 if ( b->a_aci_at != NULL ) {
2034 slap_access_t grant, deny, tgrant, tdeny;
2035 struct berval parent_ndn;
2036 BerVarray bvals = NULL;
2039 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, " <= check a_aci_at: %s\n",
2040 b->a_aci_at->ad_cname.bv_val, 0, 0 );
2042 /* this case works different from the others above.
2043 * since aci's themselves give permissions, we need
2044 * to first check b->a_access_mask, the ACL's access level.
2047 if ( BER_BVISEMPTY( &e->e_nname ) ) {
2048 /* no ACIs in the root DSE */
2052 /* first check if the right being requested
2053 * is allowed by the ACL clause.
2055 if ( ! ACL_GRANT( b->a_access_mask, *mask ) ) {
2058 /* start out with nothing granted, nothing denied */
2062 /* get the aci attribute */
2063 at = attr_find( e->e_attrs, b->a_aci_at );
2066 /* FIXME: this breaks acl caching;
2067 * see also ACL_RECORD_VALUE_STATE below */
2068 ACL_RECORD_VALUE_STATE;
2070 /* the aci is an multi-valued attribute. The
2071 * rights are determined by OR'ing the individual
2072 * rights given by the acis.
2074 for ( i = 0; !BER_BVISNULL( &at->a_nvals[i] ); i++ ) {
2079 &grant, &deny, SLAP_ACI_SCOPE_ENTRY ) != 0 )
2085 Debug(LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= aci_mask grant %s deny %s\n",
2086 accessmask2str(tgrant, accessmaskbuf, 1),
2087 accessmask2str(tdeny, accessmaskbuf1, 1), 0);
2090 /* If the entry level aci didn't contain anything valid for the
2091 * current operation, climb up the tree and evaluate the
2092 * acis with scope set to subtree
2094 if ( (tgrant == ACL_PRIV_NONE) && (tdeny == ACL_PRIV_NONE) ) {
2095 dnParent( &e->e_nname, &parent_ndn );
2096 while ( !BER_BVISEMPTY( &parent_ndn ) ) {
2097 Debug(LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "checking ACI of %s\n", parent_ndn.bv_val, 0, 0);
2098 ret = backend_attribute(op, NULL, &parent_ndn, b->a_aci_at, &bvals, ACL_AUTH);
2106 for ( i = 0; !BER_BVISNULL( &bvals[i] ); i++ ) {
2108 /* FIXME: this breaks acl caching;
2109 * see also ACL_RECORD_VALUE_STATE above */
2110 ACL_RECORD_VALUE_STATE;
2112 if ( aci_mask( op, e, desc, val, &bvals[i],
2114 &grant, &deny, SLAP_ACI_SCOPE_CHILDREN ) != 0 )
2118 /* evaluation stops as soon as either a "deny" or a
2119 * "grant" directive matches.
2121 if( (tgrant != ACL_PRIV_NONE) || (tdeny != ACL_PRIV_NONE) ){
2125 Debug(LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= aci_mask grant %s deny %s\n",
2126 accessmask2str(tgrant, accessmaskbuf, 1),
2127 accessmask2str(tdeny, accessmaskbuf1, 1), 0);
2131 case LDAP_NO_SUCH_ATTRIBUTE:
2132 /* just go on if the aci-Attribute is not present in
2135 Debug(LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "no such attribute\n", 0, 0, 0);
2139 case LDAP_NO_SUCH_OBJECT:
2140 /* We have reached the base object */
2141 Debug(LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "no such object\n", 0, 0, 0);
2152 dnParent( &parent_ndn, &parent_ndn );
2157 /* remove anything that the ACL clause does not allow */
2158 tgrant &= b->a_access_mask & ACL_PRIV_MASK;
2159 tdeny &= ACL_PRIV_MASK;
2161 /* see if we have anything to contribute */
2162 if( ACL_IS_INVALID(tgrant) && ACL_IS_INVALID(tdeny) ) {
2166 /* this could be improved by changing slap_acl_mask so that it can deal with
2167 * by clauses that return grant/deny pairs. Right now, it does either
2168 * additive or subtractive rights, but not both at the same time. So,
2169 * we need to combine the grant/deny pair into a single rights mask in
2170 * a smart way: if either grant or deny is "empty", then we use the
2171 * opposite as is, otherwise we remove any denied rights from the grant
2172 * rights mask and construct an additive mask.
2174 if (ACL_IS_INVALID(tdeny)) {
2175 modmask = tgrant | ACL_PRIV_ADDITIVE;
2177 } else if (ACL_IS_INVALID(tgrant)) {
2178 modmask = tdeny | ACL_PRIV_SUBSTRACTIVE;
2181 modmask = (tgrant & ~tdeny) | ACL_PRIV_ADDITIVE;
2185 #endif /* SLAPD_ACI_ENABLED */
2186 #endif /* !SLAP_DYNACL */
2188 modmask = b->a_access_mask;
2191 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
2192 "<= acl_mask: [%d] applying %s (%s)\n",
2193 i, accessmask2str( modmask, accessmaskbuf, 1 ),
2194 b->a_type == ACL_CONTINUE
2196 : b->a_type == ACL_BREAK
2202 if( ACL_IS_ADDITIVE(modmask) ) {
2204 ACL_PRIV_SET( *mask, modmask );
2207 ACL_PRIV_CLR( *mask, ~ACL_PRIV_MASK );
2209 } else if( ACL_IS_SUBTRACTIVE(modmask) ) {
2210 /* substract privs */
2211 ACL_PRIV_CLR( *mask, modmask );
2214 ACL_PRIV_CLR( *mask, ~ACL_PRIV_MASK );
2223 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
2224 "<= acl_mask: [%d] mask: %s\n",
2225 i, accessmask2str(*mask, accessmaskbuf, 1), 0 );
2227 if( b->a_type == ACL_CONTINUE ) {
2230 } else if ( b->a_type == ACL_BREAK ) {
2238 /* implicit "by * none" clause */
2241 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
2242 "<= acl_mask: no more <who> clauses, returning %s (stop)\n",
2243 accessmask2str(*mask, accessmaskbuf, 1), 0, 0 );
2248 * acl_check_modlist - check access control on the given entry to see if
2249 * it allows the given modifications by the user associated with op.
2250 * returns 1 if mods allowed ok
2251 * 0 mods not allowed
2258 Modifications *mlist
2262 AccessControlState state = ACL_STATE_INIT;
2265 int ret = 1; /* default is access allowed */
2269 be = LDAP_STAILQ_FIRST(&backendDB);
2273 assert( be != NULL );
2275 /* short circuit root database access */
2276 if ( be_isroot( op ) ) {
2277 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
2278 "<= acl_access_allowed: granted to database root\n",
2283 /* use backend default access if no backend acls */
2284 if( op->o_bd != NULL && op->o_bd->be_acl == NULL ) {
2285 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
2286 "=> access_allowed: backend default %s access %s to \"%s\"\n",
2287 access2str( ACL_WRITE ),
2288 op->o_bd->be_dfltaccess >= ACL_WRITE
2289 ? "granted" : "denied",
2291 ret = (op->o_bd->be_dfltaccess >= ACL_WRITE);
2295 for ( ; mlist != NULL; mlist = mlist->sml_next ) {
2297 * Internal mods are ignored by ACL_WRITE checking
2299 if ( mlist->sml_flags & SLAP_MOD_INTERNAL ) {
2300 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "acl: internal mod %s:"
2301 " modify access granted\n",
2302 mlist->sml_desc->ad_cname.bv_val, 0, 0 );
2307 * no-user-modification operational attributes are ignored
2308 * by ACL_WRITE checking as any found here are not provided
2311 if ( is_at_no_user_mod( mlist->sml_desc->ad_type ) ) {
2312 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "acl: no-user-mod %s:"
2313 " modify access granted\n",
2314 mlist->sml_desc->ad_cname.bv_val, 0, 0 );
2318 switch ( mlist->sml_op ) {
2319 case LDAP_MOD_REPLACE:
2321 * We must check both permission to delete the whole
2322 * attribute and permission to add the specific attributes.
2323 * This prevents abuse from selfwriters.
2325 if ( ! access_allowed( op, e,
2326 mlist->sml_desc, NULL, ACL_WDEL, &state ) )
2332 if ( mlist->sml_values == NULL ) break;
2334 /* fall thru to check value to add */
2337 assert( mlist->sml_values != NULL );
2339 for ( bv = mlist->sml_nvalues
2340 ? mlist->sml_nvalues : mlist->sml_values;
2341 bv->bv_val != NULL; bv++ )
2343 if ( ! access_allowed( op, e,
2344 mlist->sml_desc, bv, ACL_WADD, &state ) )
2352 case LDAP_MOD_DELETE:
2353 if ( mlist->sml_values == NULL ) {
2354 if ( ! access_allowed( op, e,
2355 mlist->sml_desc, NULL, ACL_WDEL, NULL ) )
2362 for ( bv = mlist->sml_nvalues
2363 ? mlist->sml_nvalues : mlist->sml_values;
2364 bv->bv_val != NULL; bv++ )
2366 if ( ! access_allowed( op, e,
2367 mlist->sml_desc, bv, ACL_WDEL, &state ) )
2375 case SLAP_MOD_SOFTADD:
2376 /* allow adding attribute via modrdn thru */
2388 if (be_null) op->o_bd = NULL;
2394 struct berval *list,
2407 while ( len >= 0 && --ix >= 0 ) {
2408 while ( --len >= 0 && *p++ != sep )
2411 while ( len >= 0 && *p == ' ' ) {
2424 while ( --len >= 0 && *p != sep ) {
2428 while ( bv->bv_len > 0 && *--p == ' ' ) {
2435 typedef struct aci_set_gather_t {
2441 aci_set_cb_gather( Operation *op, SlapReply *rs )
2443 aci_set_gather_t *p = (aci_set_gather_t *)op->o_callback->sc_private;
2445 if ( rs->sr_type == REP_SEARCH ) {
2446 BerValue bvals[ 2 ];
2447 BerVarray bvalsp = NULL;
2450 for ( j = 0; !BER_BVISNULL( &rs->sr_attrs[ j ].an_name ); j++ ) {
2451 AttributeDescription *desc = rs->sr_attrs[ j ].an_desc;
2453 if ( desc == slap_schema.si_ad_entryDN ) {
2455 bvals[ 0 ] = rs->sr_entry->e_nname;
2456 BER_BVZERO( &bvals[ 1 ] );
2461 a = attr_find( rs->sr_entry->e_attrs, desc );
2465 for ( i = 0; !BER_BVISNULL( &a->a_nvals[ i ] ); i++ )
2468 bvalsp = a->a_nvals;
2474 p->bvals = slap_set_join( p->cookie, p->bvals,
2475 ( '|' | SLAP_SET_RREF ), bvalsp );
2479 assert( rs->sr_type == REP_RESULT );
2486 aci_set_gather( SetCookie *cookie, struct berval *name, AttributeDescription *desc )
2488 AciSetCookie *cp = (AciSetCookie *)cookie;
2490 LDAPURLDesc *ludp = NULL;
2491 Operation op2 = { 0 };
2492 SlapReply rs = {REP_RESULT};
2493 AttributeName anlist[ 2 ], *anlistp = NULL;
2495 slap_callback cb = { NULL, aci_set_cb_gather, NULL, NULL };
2496 aci_set_gather_t p = { 0 };
2497 const char *text = NULL;
2498 static struct berval defaultFilter_bv = BER_BVC( "(objectClass=*)" );
2500 /* this routine needs to return the bervals instead of
2501 * plain strings, since syntax is not known. It should
2502 * also return the syntax or some "comparison cookie".
2504 if ( strncasecmp( name->bv_val, "ldap:///", STRLENOF( "ldap:///" ) ) != 0 ) {
2505 return aci_set_gather2( cookie, name, desc );
2508 rc = ldap_url_parse( name->bv_val, &ludp );
2509 if ( rc != LDAP_URL_SUCCESS ) {
2510 rc = LDAP_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
2514 if ( ( ludp->lud_host && ludp->lud_host[0] ) || ludp->lud_exts )
2516 /* host part must be empty */
2517 /* extensions parts must be empty */
2518 rc = LDAP_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
2522 /* Grab the searchbase and see if an appropriate database can be found */
2523 ber_str2bv( ludp->lud_dn, 0, 0, &op2.o_req_dn );
2524 rc = dnNormalize( 0, NULL, NULL, &op2.o_req_dn,
2525 &op2.o_req_ndn, cp->op->o_tmpmemctx );
2526 BER_BVZERO( &op2.o_req_dn );
2527 if ( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
2531 op2.o_bd = select_backend( &op2.o_req_ndn, 0, 1 );
2532 if ( ( op2.o_bd == NULL ) || ( op2.o_bd->be_search == NULL ) ) {
2533 rc = LDAP_NO_SUCH_OBJECT;
2537 /* Grab the filter */
2538 if ( ludp->lud_filter ) {
2539 ber_str2bv_x( ludp->lud_filter, 0, 0, &op2.ors_filterstr,
2540 cp->op->o_tmpmemctx );
2543 op2.ors_filterstr = defaultFilter_bv;
2546 op2.ors_filter = str2filter_x( cp->op, op2.ors_filterstr.bv_val );
2547 if ( op2.ors_filter == NULL ) {
2548 rc = LDAP_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
2552 /* Grab the scope */
2553 op2.ors_scope = ludp->lud_scope;
2555 /* Grap the attributes */
2556 if ( ludp->lud_attrs ) {
2557 for ( ; ludp->lud_attrs[ nattrs ]; nattrs++ )
2560 anlistp = slap_sl_malloc( sizeof( AttributeName ) * ( nattrs + 2 ),
2561 cp->op->o_tmpmemctx );
2563 for ( ; ludp->lud_attrs[ nattrs ]; nattrs++ ) {
2564 ber_str2bv( ludp->lud_attrs[ nattrs ], 0, 0, &anlistp[ nattrs ].an_name );
2565 anlistp[ nattrs ].an_desc = NULL;
2566 rc = slap_bv2ad( &anlistp[ nattrs ].an_name,
2567 &anlistp[ nattrs ].an_desc, &text );
2568 if ( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
2577 anlistp[ nattrs ].an_name = desc->ad_cname;
2578 anlistp[ nattrs ].an_desc = desc;
2580 BER_BVZERO( &anlistp[ nattrs + 1 ].an_name );
2584 op2.o_hdr = cp->op->o_hdr;
2585 op2.o_tag = LDAP_REQ_SEARCH;
2586 op2.o_ndn = op2.o_bd->be_rootndn;
2587 op2.o_callback = &cb;
2588 op2.o_time = slap_get_time();
2589 op2.o_do_not_cache = 1;
2590 op2.o_is_auth_check = 0;
2591 ber_dupbv_x( &op2.o_req_dn, &op2.o_req_ndn, cp->op->o_tmpmemctx );
2592 op2.ors_slimit = SLAP_NO_LIMIT;
2593 op2.ors_tlimit = SLAP_NO_LIMIT;
2594 op2.ors_attrs = anlistp;
2595 op2.ors_attrsonly = 0;
2596 op2.o_private = cp->op->o_private;
2600 rc = op2.o_bd->be_search( &op2, &rs );
2606 if ( op2.ors_filter ) {
2607 filter_free_x( cp->op, op2.ors_filter );
2609 if ( !BER_BVISNULL( &op2.o_req_ndn ) ) {
2610 slap_sl_free( op2.o_req_ndn.bv_val, cp->op->o_tmpmemctx );
2612 if ( !BER_BVISNULL( &op2.o_req_dn ) ) {
2613 slap_sl_free( op2.o_req_dn.bv_val, cp->op->o_tmpmemctx );
2616 ldap_free_urldesc( ludp );
2618 if ( anlistp && anlistp != anlist ) {
2619 slap_sl_free( anlistp, cp->op->o_tmpmemctx );
2626 aci_set_gather2( SetCookie *cookie, struct berval *name, AttributeDescription *desc )
2628 AciSetCookie *cp = (AciSetCookie *)cookie;
2629 BerVarray bvals = NULL;
2633 /* this routine needs to return the bervals instead of
2634 * plain strings, since syntax is not known. It should
2635 * also return the syntax or some "comparison cookie".
2637 rc = dnNormalize( 0, NULL, NULL, name, &ndn, cp->op->o_tmpmemctx );
2638 if ( rc == LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
2639 if ( desc == slap_schema.si_ad_entryDN ) {
2640 bvals = (BerVarray)slap_sl_malloc( sizeof( BerValue ) * 2,
2641 cp->op->o_tmpmemctx );
2643 BER_BVZERO( &bvals[ 1 ] );
2647 backend_attribute( cp->op,
2648 cp->e, &ndn, desc, &bvals, ACL_NONE );
2651 if ( !BER_BVISNULL( &ndn ) ) {
2652 slap_sl_free( ndn.bv_val, cp->op->o_tmpmemctx );
2661 struct berval *subj,
2667 struct berval set = BER_BVNULL;
2669 AciSetCookie cookie;
2671 if ( setref == 0 ) {
2672 ber_dupbv_x( &set, subj, op->o_tmpmemctx );
2675 struct berval subjdn, ndn = BER_BVNULL;
2676 struct berval setat;
2679 AttributeDescription *desc = NULL;
2681 /* format of string is "entry/setAttrName" */
2682 if ( aci_get_part( subj, 0, '/', &subjdn ) < 0 ) {
2686 if ( aci_get_part( subj, 1, '/', &setat ) < 0 ) {
2687 setat = aci_bv_set_attr;
2691 * NOTE: dnNormalize honors the ber_len field
2692 * as the length of the dn to be normalized
2694 if ( slap_bv2ad( &setat, &desc, &text ) == LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
2695 if ( dnNormalize( 0, NULL, NULL, &subjdn, &ndn, op->o_tmpmemctx ) == LDAP_SUCCESS )
2697 backend_attribute( op, e, &ndn, desc, &bvals, ACL_NONE );
2698 if ( bvals != NULL && !BER_BVISNULL( &bvals[0] ) ) {
2702 BER_BVZERO( &bvals[0] );
2703 for ( i = 1; !BER_BVISNULL( &bvals[i] ); i++ )
2705 bvals[0].bv_val = bvals[i-1].bv_val;
2706 BER_BVZERO( &bvals[i-1] );
2708 ber_bvarray_free_x( bvals, op->o_tmpmemctx );
2709 slap_sl_free( ndn.bv_val, op->o_tmpmemctx );
2714 if ( !BER_BVISNULL( &set ) ) {
2717 rc = ( slap_set_filter( aci_set_gather, (SetCookie *)&cookie, &set,
2718 &op->o_ndn, &e->e_nname, NULL ) > 0 );
2719 slap_sl_free( set.bv_val, op->o_tmpmemctx );
2725 #ifdef SLAPD_ACI_ENABLED
2727 aci_list_map_rights(
2728 struct berval *list )
2735 for (i = 0; aci_get_part(list, i, ',', &bv) >= 0; i++) {
2738 switch (*bv.bv_val) {
2740 ACL_PRIV_SET(mask, ACL_PRIV_COMPARE);
2743 /* **** NOTE: draft-ietf-ldapext-aci-model-0.3.txt defines
2744 * the right 's' to mean "set", but in the examples states
2745 * that the right 's' means "search". The latter definition
2748 ACL_PRIV_SET(mask, ACL_PRIV_SEARCH);
2751 ACL_PRIV_SET(mask, ACL_PRIV_READ);
2754 ACL_PRIV_SET(mask, ACL_PRIV_WRITE);
2757 /* **** NOTE: draft-ietf-ldapext-aci-model-0.3.txt does not
2758 * define any equivalent to the AUTH right, so I've just used
2761 ACL_PRIV_SET(mask, ACL_PRIV_AUTH);
2773 struct berval *list,
2774 const struct berval *attr,
2775 struct berval *val )
2777 struct berval bv, left, right;
2780 for (i = 0; aci_get_part(list, i, ',', &bv) >= 0; i++) {
2781 if (aci_get_part(&bv, 0, '=', &left) < 0
2782 || aci_get_part(&bv, 1, '=', &right) < 0)
2784 if (ber_bvstrcasecmp(attr, &bv) == 0)
2786 } else if (val == NULL) {
2787 if (ber_bvstrcasecmp(attr, &left) == 0)
2790 if (ber_bvstrcasecmp(attr, &left) == 0) {
2791 /* this is experimental code that implements a
2792 * simple (prefix) match of the attribute value.
2793 * the ACI draft does not provide for aci's that
2794 * apply to specific values, but it would be
2795 * nice to have. If the <attr> part of an aci's
2796 * rights list is of the form <attr>=<value>,
2797 * that means the aci applies only to attrs with
2798 * the given value. Furthermore, if the attr is
2799 * of the form <attr>=<value>*, then <value> is
2800 * treated as a prefix, and the aci applies to
2801 * any value with that prefix.
2803 * Ideally, this would allow r.e. matches.
2805 if (aci_get_part(&right, 0, '*', &left) < 0
2806 || right.bv_len <= left.bv_len)
2808 if (ber_bvstrcasecmp(val, &right) == 0)
2810 } else if (val->bv_len >= left.bv_len) {
2811 if (strncasecmp( val->bv_val, left.bv_val, left.bv_len ) == 0)
2820 static slap_access_t
2821 aci_list_get_attr_rights(
2822 struct berval *list,
2823 const struct berval *attr,
2824 struct berval *val )
2830 /* loop through each rights/attr pair, skip first part (action) */
2832 for (i = 1; aci_get_part(list, i + 1, ';', &bv) >= 0; i += 2) {
2833 if (aci_list_has_attr(&bv, attr, val) == 0)
2835 if (aci_get_part(list, i, ';', &bv) < 0)
2837 mask |= aci_list_map_rights(&bv);
2843 aci_list_get_rights(
2844 struct berval *list,
2845 const struct berval *attr,
2847 slap_access_t *grant,
2848 slap_access_t *deny )
2850 struct berval perm, actn;
2851 slap_access_t *mask;
2854 if (attr == NULL || attr->bv_len == 0
2855 || ber_bvstrcasecmp( attr, &aci_bv_entry ) == 0) {
2856 attr = &aci_bv_br_entry;
2862 /* loop through each permissions clause */
2863 for (i = 0; aci_get_part(list, i, '$', &perm) >= 0; i++) {
2864 if (aci_get_part(&perm, 0, ';', &actn) < 0)
2866 if (ber_bvstrcasecmp( &aci_bv_grant, &actn ) == 0) {
2868 } else if (ber_bvstrcasecmp( &aci_bv_deny, &actn ) == 0) {
2875 *mask |= aci_list_get_attr_rights(&perm, attr, val);
2876 *mask |= aci_list_get_attr_rights(&perm, &aci_bv_br_all, NULL);
2883 struct berval *subj,
2884 struct berval *defgrpoc,
2885 struct berval *defgrpat,
2892 struct berval subjdn;
2893 struct berval grpoc;
2894 struct berval grpat;
2895 ObjectClass *grp_oc = NULL;
2896 AttributeDescription *grp_ad = NULL;
2900 /* format of string is "group/objectClassValue/groupAttrName" */
2901 if (aci_get_part(subj, 0, '/', &subjdn) < 0) {
2905 if (aci_get_part(subj, 1, '/', &grpoc) < 0) {
2909 if (aci_get_part(subj, 2, '/', &grpat) < 0) {
2913 rc = slap_bv2ad( &grpat, &grp_ad, &text );
2914 if( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
2920 grp_oc = oc_bvfind( &grpoc );
2922 if (grp_oc != NULL && grp_ad != NULL ) {
2923 char buf[ACL_BUF_SIZE];
2924 struct berval bv, ndn;
2925 bv.bv_len = sizeof( buf ) - 1;
2926 bv.bv_val = (char *)&buf;
2927 if ( string_expand(&bv, &subjdn,
2928 e->e_ndn, nmatch, matches) )
2933 if ( dnNormalize( 0, NULL, NULL, &bv, &ndn, op->o_tmpmemctx ) == LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
2934 rc = ( backend_group( op, e, &ndn, &op->o_ndn,
2935 grp_oc, grp_ad ) == 0 );
2936 slap_sl_free( ndn.bv_val, op->o_tmpmemctx );
2948 AttributeDescription *desc,
2952 regmatch_t *matches,
2953 slap_access_t *grant,
2954 slap_access_t *deny,
2955 slap_aci_scope_t asserted_scope
2958 struct berval bv, scope, perms, type, sdn;
2962 assert( !BER_BVISNULL( &desc->ad_cname ) );
2964 /* parse an aci of the form:
2965 oid # scope # action;rights;attr;rights;attr
2966 $ action;rights;attr;rights;attr # type # subject
2968 [NOTE: the following comment is very outdated,
2969 as the draft version it refers to (Ando, 2004-11-20)].
2971 See draft-ietf-ldapext-aci-model-04.txt section 9.1 for
2972 a full description of the format for this attribute.
2973 Differences: "this" in the draft is "self" here, and
2974 "self" and "public" is in the position of type.
2976 <scope> = {entry|children|subtree}
2977 <type> = {public|users|access-id|subtree|onelevel|children|
2978 self|dnattr|group|role|set|set-ref}
2980 This routine now supports scope={ENTRY,CHILDREN}
2982 - ENTRY applies to "entry" and "subtree";
2983 - CHILDREN aplies to "children" and "subtree"
2986 /* check that the aci has all 5 components */
2987 if ( aci_get_part( aci, 4, '#', NULL ) < 0 ) {
2991 /* check that the aci family is supported */
2992 if ( aci_get_part( aci, 0, '#', &bv ) < 0 ) {
2996 /* check that the scope matches */
2997 if ( aci_get_part( aci, 1, '#', &scope ) < 0 ) {
3001 /* note: scope can be either ENTRY or CHILDREN;
3002 * they respectively match "entry" and "children" in bv
3003 * both match "subtree" */
3004 switch ( asserted_scope ) {
3005 case SLAP_ACI_SCOPE_ENTRY:
3006 if ( ber_bvstrcasecmp( &scope, &aci_bv_entry ) != 0
3007 && ber_bvstrcasecmp( &scope, &aci_bv_subtree ) != 0 )
3013 case SLAP_ACI_SCOPE_CHILDREN:
3014 if ( ber_bvstrcasecmp( &scope, &aci_bv_children ) != 0
3015 && ber_bvstrcasecmp( &scope, &aci_bv_subtree ) != 0 )
3025 /* get the list of permissions clauses, bail if empty */
3026 if ( aci_get_part( aci, 2, '#', &perms ) <= 0 ) {
3030 /* check if any permissions allow desired access */
3031 if ( aci_list_get_rights( &perms, &desc->ad_cname, val, grant, deny ) == 0 ) {
3035 /* see if we have a DN match */
3036 if ( aci_get_part( aci, 3, '#', &type ) < 0 ) {
3040 /* see if we have a public (i.e. anonymous) access */
3041 if ( ber_bvstrcasecmp( &aci_bv_public, &type ) == 0 ) {
3045 /* otherwise require an identity */
3046 if ( BER_BVISNULL( &op->o_ndn ) || BER_BVISEMPTY( &op->o_ndn ) ) {
3050 /* see if we have a users access */
3051 if ( ber_bvstrcasecmp( &aci_bv_users, &type ) == 0 ) {
3055 /* NOTE: this may fail if a DN contains a valid '#' (unescaped);
3056 * just grab all the berval up to its end (ITS#3303).
3057 * NOTE: the problem could be solved by providing the DN with
3058 * the embedded '#' encoded as hexpairs: "cn=Foo#Bar" would
3059 * become "cn=Foo\23Bar" and be safely used by aci_mask(). */
3061 if ( aci_get_part( aci, 4, '#', &sdn ) < 0 ) {
3065 sdn.bv_val = type.bv_val + type.bv_len + STRLENOF( "#" );
3066 sdn.bv_len = aci->bv_len - ( sdn.bv_val - aci->bv_val );
3068 if ( ber_bvstrcasecmp( &aci_bv_access_id, &type ) == 0 ) {
3071 rc = dnNormalize( 0, NULL, NULL, &sdn, &ndn, op->o_tmpmemctx );
3072 if ( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
3076 if ( dn_match( &op->o_ndn, &ndn ) ) {
3079 slap_sl_free( ndn.bv_val, op->o_tmpmemctx );
3083 } else if ( ber_bvstrcasecmp( &aci_bv_subtree, &type ) == 0 ) {
3086 rc = dnNormalize( 0, NULL, NULL, &sdn, &ndn, op->o_tmpmemctx );
3087 if ( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
3091 if ( dnIsSuffix( &op->o_ndn, &ndn ) ) {
3094 slap_sl_free( ndn.bv_val, op->o_tmpmemctx );
3098 } else if ( ber_bvstrcasecmp( &aci_bv_onelevel, &type ) == 0 ) {
3099 struct berval ndn, pndn;
3101 rc = dnNormalize( 0, NULL, NULL, &sdn, &ndn, op->o_tmpmemctx );
3102 if ( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
3106 dnParent( &ndn, &pndn );
3108 if ( dn_match( &op->o_ndn, &pndn ) ) {
3111 slap_sl_free( ndn.bv_val, op->o_tmpmemctx );
3115 } else if ( ber_bvstrcasecmp( &aci_bv_children, &type ) == 0 ) {
3118 rc = dnNormalize( 0, NULL, NULL, &sdn, &ndn, op->o_tmpmemctx );
3119 if ( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
3123 if ( !dn_match( &op->o_ndn, &ndn )
3124 && dnIsSuffix( &op->o_ndn, &ndn ) )
3128 slap_sl_free( ndn.bv_val, op->o_tmpmemctx );
3132 } else if ( ber_bvstrcasecmp( &aci_bv_self, &type ) == 0 ) {
3133 if ( dn_match( &op->o_ndn, &e->e_nname ) ) {
3137 } else if ( ber_bvstrcasecmp( &aci_bv_dnattr, &type ) == 0 ) {
3139 AttributeDescription *ad = NULL;
3142 rc = slap_bv2ad( &sdn, &ad, &text );
3144 if( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
3150 for ( at = attrs_find( e->e_attrs, ad );
3152 at = attrs_find( at->a_next, ad ) )
3154 if ( value_find_ex( ad,
3155 SLAP_MR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_NORMALIZED_MATCH |
3156 SLAP_MR_ASSERTED_VALUE_NORMALIZED_MATCH,
3158 &op->o_ndn, op->o_tmpmemctx ) == 0 )
3167 } else if ( ber_bvstrcasecmp( &aci_bv_group, &type ) == 0 ) {
3168 if ( aci_group_member( &sdn, &aci_bv_group_class,
3169 &aci_bv_group_attr, op, e, nmatch, matches ) )
3174 } else if ( ber_bvstrcasecmp( &aci_bv_role, &type ) == 0 ) {
3175 if ( aci_group_member( &sdn, &aci_bv_role_class,
3176 &aci_bv_role_attr, op, e, nmatch, matches ) )
3181 } else if ( ber_bvstrcasecmp( &aci_bv_set, &type ) == 0 ) {
3182 if ( aci_match_set( &sdn, op, e, 0 ) ) {
3186 } else if ( ber_bvstrcasecmp( &aci_bv_set_ref, &type ) == 0 ) {
3187 if ( aci_match_set( &sdn, op, e, 1 ) ) {
3197 * FIXME: there is a silly dependence that makes it difficult
3198 * to move ACIs in a run-time loadable module under the "dynacl"
3199 * umbrella, because sets share some helpers with ACIs.
3202 dynacl_aci_parse( const char *fname, int lineno, slap_style_t sty, const char *right, void **privp )
3204 AttributeDescription *ad = NULL;
3205 const char *text = NULL;
3207 if ( sty != ACL_STYLE_REGEX && sty != ACL_STYLE_BASE ) {
3208 fprintf( stderr, "%s: line %d: "
3209 "inappropriate style \"%s\" in \"aci\" by clause\n",
3210 fname, lineno, style_strings[sty] );
3214 if ( right != NULL && *right != '\0' ) {
3215 if ( slap_str2ad( right, &ad, &text ) != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
3217 "%s: line %d: aci \"%s\": %s\n",
3218 fname, lineno, right, text );
3223 ad = slap_schema.si_ad_aci;
3226 if ( !is_at_syntax( ad->ad_type, SLAPD_ACI_SYNTAX) ) {
3227 fprintf( stderr, "%s: line %d: "
3228 "aci \"%s\": inappropriate syntax: %s\n",
3229 fname, lineno, right,
3230 ad->ad_type->sat_syntax_oid );
3234 *privp = (void *)ad;
3240 dynacl_aci_unparse( void *priv, struct berval *bv )
3242 AttributeDescription *ad = ( AttributeDescription * )priv;
3245 assert( ad != NULL );
3247 bv->bv_val = ch_malloc( STRLENOF(" aci=") + ad->ad_cname.bv_len + 1 );
3248 ptr = lutil_strcopy( bv->bv_val, " aci=" );
3249 ptr = lutil_strcopy( ptr, ad->ad_cname.bv_val );
3250 bv->bv_len = ptr - bv->bv_val;
3261 AttributeDescription *desc,
3264 regmatch_t *matches,
3265 slap_access_t *grantp,
3266 slap_access_t *denyp )
3268 AttributeDescription *ad = ( AttributeDescription * )priv;
3270 slap_access_t tgrant, tdeny, grant, deny;
3272 char accessmaskbuf[ACCESSMASK_MAXLEN];
3273 char accessmaskbuf1[ACCESSMASK_MAXLEN];
3274 #endif /* LDAP_DEBUG */
3276 /* start out with nothing granted, nothing denied */
3280 /* get the aci attribute */
3281 at = attr_find( e->e_attrs, ad );
3285 /* the aci is an multi-valued attribute. The
3286 * rights are determined by OR'ing the individual
3287 * rights given by the acis.
3289 for ( i = 0; !BER_BVISNULL( &at->a_nvals[i] ); i++ ) {
3290 if ( aci_mask( op, e, desc, val, &at->a_nvals[i],
3291 nmatch, matches, &grant, &deny,
3292 SLAP_ACI_SCOPE_ENTRY ) != 0 )
3299 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= aci_mask grant %s deny %s\n",
3300 accessmask2str( tgrant, accessmaskbuf, 1 ),
3301 accessmask2str( tdeny, accessmaskbuf1, 1 ), 0 );
3304 /* If the entry level aci didn't contain anything valid for the
3305 * current operation, climb up the tree and evaluate the
3306 * acis with scope set to subtree
3308 if ( tgrant == ACL_PRIV_NONE && tdeny == ACL_PRIV_NONE ) {
3309 struct berval parent_ndn;
3312 /* to solve the chicken'n'egg problem of accessing
3313 * the OpenLDAPaci attribute, the direct access
3314 * to the entry's attribute is unchecked; however,
3315 * further accesses to OpenLDAPaci values in the
3316 * ancestors occur through backend_attribute(), i.e.
3317 * with the identity of the operation, requiring
3318 * further access checking. For uniformity, this
3319 * makes further requests occur as the rootdn, if
3320 * any, i.e. searching for the OpenLDAPaci attribute
3321 * is considered an internal search. If this is not
3322 * acceptable, then the same check needs be performed
3323 * when accessing the entry's attribute. */
3324 Operation op2 = *op;
3326 if ( !BER_BVISNULL( &op->o_bd->be_rootndn ) ) {
3327 op2.o_dn = op->o_bd->be_rootdn;
3328 op2.o_ndn = op->o_bd->be_rootndn;
3332 dnParent( &e->e_nname, &parent_ndn );
3333 while ( !BER_BVISEMPTY( &parent_ndn ) ){
3335 BerVarray bvals = NULL;
3338 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "checking ACI of \"%s\"\n", parent_ndn.bv_val, 0, 0 );
3339 ret = backend_attribute( &op2, NULL, &parent_ndn, ad, &bvals, ACL_AUTH );
3348 for ( i = 0; !BER_BVISNULL( &bvals[i] ); i++) {
3349 if ( aci_mask( op, e, desc, val,
3353 SLAP_ACI_SCOPE_CHILDREN ) != 0 )
3357 /* evaluation stops as soon as either a "deny" or a
3358 * "grant" directive matches.
3360 if ( tgrant != ACL_PRIV_NONE || tdeny != ACL_PRIV_NONE ) {
3364 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= aci_mask grant %s deny %s\n",
3365 accessmask2str( tgrant, accessmaskbuf, 1 ),
3366 accessmask2str( tdeny, accessmaskbuf1, 1 ), 0 );
3370 case LDAP_NO_SUCH_ATTRIBUTE:
3371 /* just go on if the aci-Attribute is not present in
3374 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "no such attribute\n", 0, 0, 0 );
3378 case LDAP_NO_SUCH_OBJECT:
3379 /* We have reached the base object */
3380 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "no such object\n", 0, 0, 0 );
3392 dnParent( &parent_ndn, &parent_ndn );
3402 /* need to register this at some point */
3403 static slap_dynacl_t dynacl_aci = {
3413 #endif /* SLAP_DYNACL */
3415 #endif /* SLAPD_ACI_ENABLED */
3420 * dynamic ACL infrastructure
3422 static slap_dynacl_t *da_list = NULL;
3425 slap_dynacl_register( slap_dynacl_t *da )
3429 for ( tmp = da_list; tmp; tmp = tmp->da_next ) {
3430 if ( strcasecmp( da->da_name, tmp->da_name ) == 0 ) {
3435 if ( tmp != NULL ) {
3439 if ( da->da_mask == NULL ) {
3443 da->da_private = NULL;
3444 da->da_next = da_list;
3450 static slap_dynacl_t *
3451 slap_dynacl_next( slap_dynacl_t *da )
3460 slap_dynacl_get( const char *name )
3464 for ( da = slap_dynacl_next( NULL ); da; da = slap_dynacl_next( da ) ) {
3465 if ( strcasecmp( da->da_name, name ) == 0 ) {
3472 #endif /* SLAP_DYNACL */
3479 slap_dynacl_t *known_dynacl[] = {
3480 #ifdef SLAPD_ACI_ENABLED
3482 #endif /* SLAPD_ACI_ENABLED */
3486 for ( i = 0; known_dynacl[ i ]; i++ ) {
3487 rc = slap_dynacl_register( known_dynacl[ i ] );
3492 #endif /* SLAP_DYNACL */
3503 regmatch_t *matches)
3511 bv->bv_val[0] = '\0';
3512 bv->bv_len--; /* leave space for lone $ */
3515 for ( dp = bv->bv_val, sp = pat->bv_val; size < bv->bv_len &&
3516 sp < pat->bv_val + pat->bv_len ; sp++ )
3518 /* did we previously see a $ */
3520 if ( flag == 1 && *sp == '$' ) {
3525 } else if ( flag == 1 && *sp == '{' /*'}'*/) {
3528 } else if ( *sp >= '0' && *sp <= '9' ) {
3536 for ( sp++; *sp != '\0' && *sp != /*'{'*/ '}'; sp++ ) {
3537 if ( *sp >= '0' && *sp <= '9' ) {
3538 n = 10*n + ( *sp - '0' );
3542 if ( *sp != /*'{'*/ '}' ) {
3548 if ( n >= nmatch ) {
3554 i = matches[n].rm_so;
3555 l = matches[n].rm_eo;
3556 for ( ; size < bv->bv_len && i < l; size++, i++ ) {
3574 /* must have ended with a single $ */
3582 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, "=> string_expand: pattern: %.*s\n", (int)pat->bv_len, pat->bv_val, 0 );
3583 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, "=> string_expand: expanded: %s\n", bv->bv_val, 0, 0 );
3590 struct berval *pat, /* pattern to expand and match against */
3591 char *str, /* string to match against pattern */
3592 char *buf, /* buffer with $N expansion variables */
3593 int nmatch, /* size of the matches array */
3594 regmatch_t *matches /* offsets in buffer for $N expansion variables */
3598 char newbuf[ACL_BUF_SIZE];
3602 bv.bv_len = sizeof( newbuf ) - 1;
3609 string_expand( &bv, pat, buf, nmatch, matches );
3610 rc = regcomp( &re, newbuf, REG_EXTENDED|REG_ICASE );
3612 char error[ACL_BUF_SIZE];
3613 regerror( rc, &re, error, sizeof( error ) );
3615 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE,
3616 "compile( \"%s\", \"%s\") failed %s\n",
3617 pat->bv_val, str, error );
3621 rc = regexec( &re, str, 0, NULL, 0 );
3624 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE,
3625 "=> regex_matches: string: %s\n", str, 0, 0 );
3626 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE,
3627 "=> regex_matches: rc: %d %s\n",
3628 rc, !rc ? "matches" : "no matches", 0 );