1 /* acl.c - routines to parse and check acl's */
3 /* This work is part of OpenLDAP Software <http://www.openldap.org/>.
5 * Copyright 1998-2006 The OpenLDAP Foundation.
8 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
9 * modification, are permitted only as authorized by the OpenLDAP
12 * A copy of this license is available in the file LICENSE in the
13 * top-level directory of the distribution or, alternatively, at
14 * <http://www.OpenLDAP.org/license.html>.
16 /* Portions Copyright (c) 1995 Regents of the University of Michigan.
17 * All rights reserved.
19 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms are permitted
20 * provided that this notice is preserved and that due credit is given
21 * to the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor. The name of the University
22 * may not be used to endorse or promote products derived from this
23 * software without specific prior written permission. This software
24 * is provided ``as is'' without express or implied warranty.
32 #include <ac/socket.h>
33 #include <ac/string.h>
40 #define ACL_BUF_SIZE 1024 /* use most appropriate size */
42 static const struct berval acl_bv_ip_eq = BER_BVC( "IP=" );
44 static const struct berval acl_bv_path_eq = BER_BVC("PATH=");
45 #endif /* LDAP_PF_LOCAL */
47 static AccessControl * slap_acl_get(
48 AccessControl *ac, int *count,
49 Operation *op, Entry *e,
50 AttributeDescription *desc,
52 int nmatch, regmatch_t *matches,
53 AccessControlState *state );
55 static slap_control_t slap_acl_mask(
56 AccessControl *ac, slap_mask_t *mask,
57 Operation *op, Entry *e,
58 AttributeDescription *desc,
63 AccessControlState *state );
65 static int regex_matches(
66 struct berval *pat, char *str, char *buf,
67 int nmatch, regmatch_t *matches);
69 typedef struct AclSetCookie {
71 #define asc_op asc_cookie.set_op
75 SLAP_SET_GATHER acl_set_gather;
76 SLAP_SET_GATHER acl_set_gather2;
79 * access_allowed - check whether op->o_ndn is allowed the requested access
80 * to entry e, attribute attr, value val. if val is null, access to
81 * the whole attribute is assumed (all values).
83 * This routine loops through all access controls and calls
84 * slap_acl_mask() on each applicable access control.
85 * The loop exits when a definitive answer is reached or
86 * or no more controls remain.
93 * - can be legally called with op == NULL
94 * - can be legally called with op->o_bd == NULL
97 #ifdef SLAP_OVERLAY_ACCESS
99 slap_access_always_allowed(
102 AttributeDescription *desc,
104 slap_access_t access,
105 AccessControlState *state,
108 assert( maskp != NULL );
111 ACL_LVL_ASSIGN_MANAGE( *maskp );
120 AttributeDescription *desc,
122 slap_access_t access,
123 AccessControlState *state,
128 AccessControl *a = NULL;
131 char accessmaskbuf[ACCESSMASK_MAXLEN];
134 slap_control_t control;
135 slap_access_t access_level;
137 regmatch_t matches[MAXREMATCHES];
138 int st_same_attr = 0;
140 assert( op != NULL );
142 assert( desc != NULL );
143 assert( maskp != NULL );
145 access_level = ACL_LEVEL( access );
146 attr = desc->ad_cname.bv_val;
148 assert( attr != NULL );
152 /* grant database root access */
153 if ( be_isroot( op ) ) {
154 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= root access granted\n", 0, 0, 0 );
155 mask = ACL_LVL_MANAGE;
160 * no-user-modification operational attributes are ignored
161 * by ACL_WRITE checking as any found here are not provided
164 * NOTE: but they are not ignored for ACL_MANAGE, because
165 * if we get here it means a non-root user is trying to
166 * manage data, so we need to check its privileges.
168 if ( access_level == ACL_WRITE
169 && is_at_no_user_mod( desc->ad_type )
170 && desc != slap_schema.si_ad_entry
171 && desc != slap_schema.si_ad_children )
173 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "NoUserMod Operational attribute:"
174 " %s access granted\n",
179 /* use backend default access if no backend acls */
180 if ( op->o_bd->be_acl == NULL ) {
183 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
184 "=> slap_access_allowed: backend default %s "
185 "access %s to \"%s\"\n",
186 access2str( access ),
187 op->o_bd->be_dfltaccess >= access_level ? "granted" : "denied",
188 op->o_dn.bv_val ? op->o_dn.bv_val : "(anonymous)" );
189 ret = op->o_bd->be_dfltaccess >= access_level;
191 mask = ACL_PRIV_LEVEL;
192 for ( i = ACL_NONE; i <= op->o_bd->be_dfltaccess; i++ ) {
193 ACL_PRIV_SET( mask, ACL_ACCESS2PRIV( i ) );
202 if ( st_same_attr ) {
203 assert( state->as_vd_acl != NULL );
205 a = state->as_vd_acl;
206 count = state->as_vd_acl_count;
207 if ( !ACL_IS_INVALID( state->as_vd_acl_mask ) ) {
208 mask = state->as_vd_acl_mask;
209 AC_MEMCPY( matches, state->as_vd_acl_matches, sizeof(matches) );
214 if ( state ) state->as_vi_acl = NULL;
216 ACL_PRIV_ASSIGN( mask, *maskp );
218 memset( matches, '\0', sizeof( matches ) );
221 while ( ( a = slap_acl_get( a, &count, op, e, desc, val,
222 MAXREMATCHES, matches, state ) ) != NULL )
226 for ( i = 0; i < MAXREMATCHES && matches[i].rm_so > 0; i++ ) {
227 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "=> match[%d]: %d %d ", i,
228 (int)matches[i].rm_so, (int)matches[i].rm_eo );
229 if ( matches[i].rm_so <= matches[0].rm_eo ) {
231 for ( n = matches[i].rm_so; n < matches[i].rm_eo; n++ ) {
232 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "%c", e->e_ndn[n], 0, 0 );
235 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ARGS, "\n", 0, 0, 0 );
239 if ( state->as_vi_acl == a &&
240 ( state->as_recorded & ACL_STATE_RECORDED_NV ) )
242 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
243 "=> slap_access_allowed: result from state (%s)\n",
245 ret = state->as_result;
248 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
249 "=> slap_access_allowed: no res from state (%s)\n",
255 control = slap_acl_mask( a, &mask, op,
256 e, desc, val, MAXREMATCHES, matches, count, state );
258 if ( control != ACL_BREAK ) {
262 memset( matches, '\0', sizeof( matches ) );
265 if ( ACL_IS_INVALID( mask ) ) {
266 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
267 "=> slap_access_allowed: \"%s\" (%s) invalid!\n",
269 ACL_PRIV_ASSIGN( mask, *maskp );
271 } else if ( control == ACL_BREAK ) {
272 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
273 "=> slap_access_allowed: no more rules\n", 0, 0, 0 );
278 ret = ACL_GRANT( mask, access );
280 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
281 "=> slap_access_allowed: %s access %s by %s\n",
282 access2str( access ), ret ? "granted" : "denied",
283 accessmask2str( mask, accessmaskbuf, 1 ) );
286 ACL_PRIV_ASSIGN( *maskp, mask );
294 AttributeDescription *desc,
296 slap_access_t access,
297 AccessControlState *state,
304 * NOTE: control gets here if FIXME
305 * if an appropriate backend cannot be selected for the operation,
306 * we assume that the frontend should handle this
307 * FIXME: should select_backend() take care of this,
308 * and return frontendDB instead of NULL? maybe for some value
313 if ( op->o_bd == NULL ) {
314 op->o_bd = select_backend( &op->o_req_ndn, 0, 0 );
315 if ( op->o_bd == NULL )
316 op->o_bd = frontendDB;
318 rc = slap_access_allowed( op, e, desc, val, access, state, maskp );
328 AttributeDescription *desc,
330 slap_access_t access,
331 AccessControlState *state,
335 AccessControl *a = NULL;
339 char accessmaskbuf[ACCESSMASK_MAXLEN];
342 slap_access_t access_level;
344 int st_same_attr = 0;
345 static AccessControlState state_init = ACL_STATE_INIT;
348 assert( desc != NULL );
350 access_level = ACL_LEVEL( access );
352 assert( access_level > ACL_NONE );
355 if ( maskp ) ACL_INVALIDATE( *maskp );
357 attr = desc->ad_cname.bv_val;
359 assert( attr != NULL );
362 if ( op->o_is_auth_check &&
363 ( access_level == ACL_SEARCH || access_level == ACL_READ ) )
367 } else if ( get_manageDIT( op ) && access_level == ACL_WRITE &&
368 desc == slap_schema.si_ad_entry )
375 if ( state->as_vd_ad == desc ) {
376 if ( state->as_recorded ) {
377 if ( ( state->as_recorded & ACL_STATE_RECORDED_NV ) &&
380 return state->as_result;
382 } else if ( ( state->as_recorded & ACL_STATE_RECORDED_VD ) &&
383 val != NULL && state->as_vd_acl == NULL )
385 return state->as_result;
393 state->as_vd_ad = desc;
396 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
397 "=> access_allowed: %s access to \"%s\" \"%s\" requested\n",
398 access2str( access ), e->e_dn, attr );
405 if ( op->o_bd == NULL ) {
406 op->o_bd = LDAP_STAILQ_FIRST( &backendDB );
411 * FIXME: experimental; use first backend rules
412 * iff there is no global_acl (ITS#3100) */
413 if ( frontendDB->be_acl != NULL ) {
414 op->o_bd = frontendDB;
416 #endif /* LDAP_DEVEL */
418 assert( op->o_bd != NULL );
420 /* this is enforced in backend_add() */
421 if ( op->o_bd->bd_info->bi_access_allowed ) {
422 /* delegate to backend */
423 ret = op->o_bd->bd_info->bi_access_allowed( op, e,
424 desc, val, access, state, &mask );
427 /* use default (but pass through frontend
428 * for global ACL overlays) */
429 ret = frontendDB->bd_info->bi_access_allowed( op, e,
430 desc, val, access, state, &mask );
434 if ( ACL_IS_INVALID( mask ) ) {
435 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
436 "=> access_allowed: \"%s\" (%s) invalid!\n",
441 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
442 "=> access_allowed: no more rules\n", 0, 0, 0 );
448 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
449 "=> access_allowed: %s access %s by %s\n",
450 access2str( access ), ret ? "granted" : "denied",
451 accessmask2str( mask, accessmaskbuf, 1 ) );
454 if ( state != NULL ) {
455 /* If not value-dependent, save ACL in case of more attrs */
456 if ( !( state->as_recorded & ACL_STATE_RECORDED_VD ) ) {
457 state->as_vi_acl = a;
458 state->as_result = ret;
460 state->as_recorded |= ACL_STATE_RECORDED;
462 if ( be_null ) op->o_bd = NULL;
463 if ( maskp ) ACL_PRIV_ASSIGN( *maskp, mask );
467 #else /* !SLAP_OVERLAY_ACCESS */
473 AttributeDescription *desc,
475 slap_access_t access,
476 AccessControlState *state,
481 AccessControl *a = NULL;
486 char accessmaskbuf[ACCESSMASK_MAXLEN];
489 slap_control_t control;
490 slap_access_t access_level;
492 regmatch_t matches[MAXREMATCHES];
493 int st_same_attr = 0;
494 static AccessControlState state_init = ACL_STATE_INIT;
497 assert( desc != NULL );
499 access_level = ACL_LEVEL( access );
501 assert( access_level > ACL_NONE );
502 if ( maskp ) ACL_INVALIDATE( *maskp );
504 attr = desc->ad_cname.bv_val;
506 assert( attr != NULL );
509 if ( op->o_is_auth_check &&
510 ( access_level == ACL_SEARCH || access_level == ACL_READ ) )
514 } else if ( get_manageDIT( op ) && access_level == ACL_WRITE &&
515 desc == slap_schema.si_ad_entry )
522 if ( state->as_vd_ad == desc ) {
523 if ( state->as_recorded ) {
524 if ( ( state->as_recorded & ACL_STATE_RECORDED_NV ) &&
527 return state->as_result;
529 } else if ( ( state->as_recorded & ACL_STATE_RECORDED_VD ) &&
530 val != NULL && state->as_vd_acl == NULL )
532 return state->as_result;
540 state->as_vd_ad=desc;
543 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
544 "=> access_allowed: %s access to \"%s\" \"%s\" requested\n",
545 access2str( access ), e->e_dn, attr );
554 be = LDAP_STAILQ_FIRST(&backendDB);
558 * FIXME: experimental; use first backend rules
559 * iff there is no global_acl (ITS#3100) */
560 if ( frontendDB->be_acl == NULL )
566 assert( be != NULL );
568 /* grant database root access */
569 if ( be_isroot( op ) ) {
570 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= root access granted\n", 0, 0, 0 );
572 mask = ACL_LVL_MANAGE;
579 * no-user-modification operational attributes are ignored
580 * by ACL_WRITE checking as any found here are not provided
583 * NOTE: but they are not ignored for ACL_MANAGE, because
584 * if we get here it means a non-root user is trying to
585 * manage data, so we need to check its privileges.
587 if ( access_level == ACL_WRITE && is_at_no_user_mod( desc->ad_type )
588 && desc != slap_schema.si_ad_entry
589 && desc != slap_schema.si_ad_children )
591 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "NoUserMod Operational attribute:"
592 " %s access granted\n",
597 /* use backend default access if no backend acls */
598 if ( be->be_acl == NULL ) {
599 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
600 "=> access_allowed: backend default %s "
601 "access %s to \"%s\"\n",
602 access2str( access ),
603 be->be_dfltaccess >= access_level ? "granted" : "denied",
604 op->o_dn.bv_val ? op->o_dn.bv_val : "(anonymous)" );
605 ret = be->be_dfltaccess >= access_level;
610 mask = ACL_PRIV_LEVEL;
611 for ( i = ACL_NONE; i <= be->be_dfltaccess; i++ ) {
612 mask |= ACL_ACCESS2PRIV( i );
619 /* be is always non-NULL */
620 /* use global default access if no global acls */
621 } else if ( be == NULL && frontendDB->be_acl == NULL ) {
622 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
623 "=> access_allowed: global default %s access %s to \"%s\"\n",
624 access2str( access ),
625 frontendDB->be_dfltaccess >= access_level ?
626 "granted" : "denied", op->o_dn.bv_val );
627 ret = frontendDB->be_dfltaccess >= access_level;
632 mask = ACL_PRIV_LEVEL;
633 for ( i = ACL_NONE; i <= global_default_access; i++ ) {
634 mask |= ACL_ACCESS2PRIV( i );
645 if ( st_same_attr ) {
646 assert( state->as_vd_acl != NULL );
648 a = state->as_vd_acl;
649 count = state->as_vd_acl_count;
650 if ( !ACL_IS_INVALID( state->as_vd_acl_mask ) ) {
651 mask = state->as_vd_acl_mask;
652 AC_MEMCPY( matches, state->as_vd_acl_matches, sizeof(matches) );
657 if ( state ) state->as_vi_acl = NULL;
661 memset( matches, '\0', sizeof(matches) );
664 while ( ( a = slap_acl_get( a, &count, op, e, desc, val,
665 MAXREMATCHES, matches, state ) ) != NULL )
669 for ( i = 0; i < MAXREMATCHES && matches[i].rm_so > 0; i++ ) {
670 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "=> match[%d]: %d %d ", i,
671 (int)matches[i].rm_so, (int)matches[i].rm_eo );
672 if ( matches[i].rm_so <= matches[0].rm_eo ) {
674 for ( n = matches[i].rm_so; n < matches[i].rm_eo; n++ ) {
675 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "%c", e->e_ndn[n], 0, 0 );
678 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ARGS, "\n", 0, 0, 0 );
682 if ( state->as_vi_acl == a &&
683 ( state->as_recorded & ACL_STATE_RECORDED_NV ) )
685 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
686 "access_allowed: result from state (%s)\n",
688 ret = state->as_result;
691 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
692 "access_allowed: no res from state (%s)\n",
698 control = slap_acl_mask( a, &mask, op,
699 e, desc, val, MAXREMATCHES, matches, count, state );
701 if ( control != ACL_BREAK ) {
705 memset( matches, '\0', sizeof(matches) );
708 if ( ACL_IS_INVALID( mask ) ) {
709 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
710 "=> access_allowed: \"%s\" (%s) invalid!\n",
714 } else if ( control == ACL_BREAK ) {
715 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
716 "=> access_allowed: no more rules\n", 0, 0, 0 );
721 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
722 "=> access_allowed: %s access %s by %s\n",
723 access2str( access ),
724 ACL_GRANT(mask, access) ? "granted" : "denied",
725 accessmask2str( mask, accessmaskbuf, 1 ) );
727 ret = ACL_GRANT(mask, access);
730 if ( state != NULL ) {
731 /* If not value-dependent, save ACL in case of more attrs */
732 if ( !( state->as_recorded & ACL_STATE_RECORDED_VD ) ) {
733 state->as_vi_acl = a;
734 state->as_result = ret;
736 state->as_recorded |= ACL_STATE_RECORDED;
738 if ( be_null ) op->o_bd = NULL;
739 if ( maskp ) *maskp = mask;
743 #endif /* SLAP_OVERLAY_ACCESS */
746 * slap_acl_get - return the acl applicable to entry e, attribute
747 * attr. the acl returned is suitable for use in subsequent calls to
748 * acl_access_allowed().
751 static AccessControl *
757 AttributeDescription *desc,
761 AccessControlState *state )
768 assert( count != NULL );
769 assert( desc != NULL );
771 attr = desc->ad_cname.bv_val;
773 assert( attr != NULL );
776 if( op->o_bd == NULL ) {
777 a = frontendDB->be_acl;
779 a = op->o_bd->be_acl;
790 dnlen = e->e_nname.bv_len;
792 for ( ; a != NULL; a = a->acl_next ) {
795 if ( a->acl_dn_pat.bv_len || ( a->acl_dn_style != ACL_STYLE_REGEX )) {
796 if ( a->acl_dn_style == ACL_STYLE_REGEX ) {
797 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "=> dnpat: [%d] %s nsub: %d\n",
798 *count, a->acl_dn_pat.bv_val, (int) a->acl_dn_re.re_nsub );
799 if (regexec(&a->acl_dn_re, e->e_ndn, nmatch, matches, 0))
803 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "=> dn: [%d] %s\n",
804 *count, a->acl_dn_pat.bv_val, 0 );
805 patlen = a->acl_dn_pat.bv_len;
806 if ( dnlen < patlen )
809 if ( a->acl_dn_style == ACL_STYLE_BASE ) {
810 /* base dn -- entire object DN must match */
811 if ( dnlen != patlen )
814 } else if ( a->acl_dn_style == ACL_STYLE_ONE ) {
815 ber_len_t rdnlen = 0;
818 if ( dnlen <= patlen )
822 if ( !DN_SEPARATOR( e->e_ndn[dnlen - patlen - 1] ) )
827 rdnlen = dn_rdnlen( NULL, &e->e_nname );
828 if ( rdnlen != dnlen - patlen - sep )
831 } else if ( a->acl_dn_style == ACL_STYLE_SUBTREE ) {
832 if ( dnlen > patlen && !DN_SEPARATOR( e->e_ndn[dnlen - patlen - 1] ) )
835 } else if ( a->acl_dn_style == ACL_STYLE_CHILDREN ) {
836 if ( dnlen <= patlen )
838 if ( !DN_SEPARATOR( e->e_ndn[dnlen - patlen - 1] ) )
842 if ( strcmp( a->acl_dn_pat.bv_val, e->e_ndn + dnlen - patlen ) != 0 )
846 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "=> acl_get: [%d] matched\n",
850 if ( a->acl_attrs && !ad_inlist( desc, a->acl_attrs ) ) {
851 matches[0].rm_so = matches[0].rm_eo = -1;
855 /* Is this ACL only for a specific value? */
856 if ( a->acl_attrval.bv_len ) {
861 if( state && !( state->as_recorded & ACL_STATE_RECORDED_VD )) {
862 state->as_recorded |= ACL_STATE_RECORDED_VD;
863 state->as_vd_acl = a;
864 state->as_vd_acl_count = *count;
865 state->as_vd_access = a->acl_access;
866 state->as_vd_access_count = 1;
867 ACL_INVALIDATE( state->as_vd_acl_mask );
870 if ( a->acl_attrval_style == ACL_STYLE_REGEX ) {
871 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
872 "acl_get: valpat %s\n",
873 a->acl_attrval.bv_val, 0, 0 );
874 if ( regexec( &a->acl_attrval_re, val->bv_val, 0, NULL, 0 ) )
882 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
884 a->acl_attrval.bv_val, 0, 0 );
886 if ( a->acl_attrs[0].an_desc->ad_type->sat_syntax != slap_schema.si_syn_distinguishedName ) {
887 if (value_match( &match, desc,
888 a->acl_attrval_mr, 0,
889 val, &a->acl_attrval, &text ) != LDAP_SUCCESS ||
896 patlen = a->acl_attrval.bv_len;
897 vdnlen = val->bv_len;
899 if ( vdnlen < patlen )
902 if ( a->acl_attrval_style == ACL_STYLE_BASE ) {
903 if ( vdnlen > patlen )
906 } else if ( a->acl_attrval_style == ACL_STYLE_ONE ) {
907 ber_len_t rdnlen = 0;
909 if ( !DN_SEPARATOR( val->bv_val[vdnlen - patlen - 1] ) )
912 rdnlen = dn_rdnlen( NULL, val );
913 if ( rdnlen != vdnlen - patlen - 1 )
916 } else if ( a->acl_attrval_style == ACL_STYLE_SUBTREE ) {
917 if ( vdnlen > patlen && !DN_SEPARATOR( val->bv_val[vdnlen - patlen - 1] ) )
920 } else if ( a->acl_attrval_style == ACL_STYLE_CHILDREN ) {
921 if ( vdnlen <= patlen )
924 if ( !DN_SEPARATOR( val->bv_val[vdnlen - patlen - 1] ) )
928 if ( strcmp( a->acl_attrval.bv_val, val->bv_val + vdnlen - patlen ) )
934 if ( a->acl_filter != NULL ) {
935 ber_int_t rc = test_filter( NULL, e, a->acl_filter );
936 if ( rc != LDAP_COMPARE_TRUE ) {
941 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "=> acl_get: [%d] attr %s\n",
946 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= acl_get: done.\n", 0, 0, 0 );
951 * Record value-dependent access control state
953 #define ACL_RECORD_VALUE_STATE do { \
954 if( state && !( state->as_recorded & ACL_STATE_RECORDED_VD )) { \
955 state->as_recorded |= ACL_STATE_RECORDED_VD; \
956 state->as_vd_acl = a; \
957 AC_MEMCPY( state->as_vd_acl_matches, matches, \
958 sizeof( state->as_vd_acl_matches )) ; \
959 state->as_vd_acl_count = count; \
960 state->as_vd_access = b; \
961 state->as_vd_access_count = i; \
969 AttributeDescription *desc,
975 struct berval *opndn )
978 * if access applies to the entry itself, and the
979 * user is bound as somebody in the same namespace as
980 * the entry, OR the given dn matches the dn pattern
983 * NOTE: styles "anonymous", "users" and "self"
984 * have been moved to enum slap_style_t, whose
985 * value is set in a_dn_style; however, the string
986 * is maintained in a_dn_pat.
989 if ( bdn->a_style == ACL_STYLE_ANONYMOUS ) {
990 if ( !BER_BVISEMPTY( opndn ) ) {
994 } else if ( bdn->a_style == ACL_STYLE_USERS ) {
995 if ( BER_BVISEMPTY( opndn ) ) {
999 } else if ( bdn->a_style == ACL_STYLE_SELF ) {
1000 struct berval ndn, selfndn;
1003 if ( BER_BVISEMPTY( opndn ) || BER_BVISNULL( &e->e_nname ) ) {
1007 level = bdn->a_self_level;
1015 selfndn = e->e_nname;
1018 for ( ; level > 0; level-- ) {
1019 if ( BER_BVISEMPTY( &ndn ) ) {
1022 dnParent( &ndn, &ndn );
1025 if ( BER_BVISEMPTY( &ndn ) || !dn_match( &ndn, &selfndn ) )
1030 } else if ( bdn->a_style == ACL_STYLE_REGEX ) {
1031 if ( !ber_bvccmp( &bdn->a_pat, '*' ) ) {
1033 regmatch_t tmp_matches[2],
1034 *tmp_matchesp = tmp_matches;
1038 switch ( a->acl_dn_style ) {
1039 case ACL_STYLE_REGEX:
1040 if ( !BER_BVISNULL( &a->acl_dn_pat ) ) {
1041 tmp_matchesp = matches;
1042 tmp_nmatch = nmatch;
1045 /* FALLTHRU: applies also to ACL_STYLE_REGEX when pattern is "*" */
1047 case ACL_STYLE_BASE:
1048 tmp_matches[0].rm_so = 0;
1049 tmp_matches[0].rm_eo = e->e_nname.bv_len;
1054 case ACL_STYLE_SUBTREE:
1055 case ACL_STYLE_CHILDREN:
1056 tmp_matches[0].rm_so = 0;
1057 tmp_matches[0].rm_eo = e->e_nname.bv_len;
1058 tmp_matches[1].rm_so = e->e_nname.bv_len - a->acl_dn_pat.bv_len;
1059 tmp_matches[1].rm_eo = e->e_nname.bv_len;
1073 if ( !regex_matches( &bdn->a_pat, opndn->bv_val,
1074 e->e_ndn, tmp_nmatch, tmp_matchesp ) )
1082 ber_len_t patlen, odnlen;
1085 if ( e->e_dn == NULL )
1088 if ( bdn->a_expand ) {
1090 char buf[ACL_BUF_SIZE];
1093 regmatch_t tmp_matches[2],
1094 *tmp_matchesp = tmp_matches;
1098 bv.bv_len = sizeof( buf ) - 1;
1101 switch ( a->acl_dn_style ) {
1102 case ACL_STYLE_REGEX:
1103 if ( !BER_BVISNULL( &a->acl_dn_pat ) ) {
1104 tmp_matchesp = matches;
1105 tmp_nmatch = nmatch;
1108 /* FALLTHRU: applies also to ACL_STYLE_REGEX when pattern is "*" */
1110 case ACL_STYLE_BASE:
1111 tmp_matches[0].rm_so = 0;
1112 tmp_matches[0].rm_eo = e->e_nname.bv_len;
1117 case ACL_STYLE_SUBTREE:
1118 case ACL_STYLE_CHILDREN:
1119 tmp_matches[0].rm_so = 0;
1120 tmp_matches[0].rm_eo = e->e_nname.bv_len;
1121 tmp_matches[1].rm_so = e->e_nname.bv_len - a->acl_dn_pat.bv_len;
1122 tmp_matches[1].rm_eo = e->e_nname.bv_len;
1136 if ( acl_string_expand( &bv, &bdn->a_pat,
1138 tmp_nmatch, tmp_matchesp ) )
1143 if ( dnNormalize(0, NULL, NULL, &bv,
1144 &pat, op->o_tmpmemctx )
1147 /* did not expand to a valid dn */
1155 patlen = pat.bv_len;
1156 odnlen = opndn->bv_len;
1157 if ( odnlen < patlen ) {
1158 goto dn_match_cleanup;
1162 if ( bdn->a_style == ACL_STYLE_BASE ) {
1163 /* base dn -- entire object DN must match */
1164 if ( odnlen != patlen ) {
1165 goto dn_match_cleanup;
1168 } else if ( bdn->a_style == ACL_STYLE_ONE ) {
1169 ber_len_t rdnlen = 0;
1171 if ( odnlen <= patlen ) {
1172 goto dn_match_cleanup;
1175 if ( !DN_SEPARATOR( opndn->bv_val[odnlen - patlen - 1] ) ) {
1176 goto dn_match_cleanup;
1179 rdnlen = dn_rdnlen( NULL, opndn );
1180 if ( rdnlen - ( odnlen - patlen - 1 ) != 0 ) {
1181 goto dn_match_cleanup;
1184 } else if ( bdn->a_style == ACL_STYLE_SUBTREE ) {
1185 if ( odnlen > patlen && !DN_SEPARATOR( opndn->bv_val[odnlen - patlen - 1] ) ) {
1186 goto dn_match_cleanup;
1189 } else if ( bdn->a_style == ACL_STYLE_CHILDREN ) {
1190 if ( odnlen <= patlen ) {
1191 goto dn_match_cleanup;
1194 if ( !DN_SEPARATOR( opndn->bv_val[odnlen - patlen - 1] ) ) {
1195 goto dn_match_cleanup;
1198 } else if ( bdn->a_style == ACL_STYLE_LEVEL ) {
1199 int level = bdn->a_level;
1202 if ( odnlen <= patlen ) {
1203 goto dn_match_cleanup;
1206 if ( level > 0 && !DN_SEPARATOR( opndn->bv_val[odnlen - patlen - 1] ) )
1208 goto dn_match_cleanup;
1212 for ( ; level > 0; level-- ) {
1213 if ( BER_BVISEMPTY( &ndn ) ) {
1214 goto dn_match_cleanup;
1216 dnParent( &ndn, &ndn );
1217 if ( ndn.bv_len < patlen ) {
1218 goto dn_match_cleanup;
1222 if ( ndn.bv_len != patlen ) {
1223 goto dn_match_cleanup;
1227 got_match = !strcmp( pat.bv_val, &opndn->bv_val[ odnlen - patlen ] );
1230 if ( pat.bv_val != bdn->a_pat.bv_val ) {
1231 slap_sl_free( pat.bv_val, op->o_tmpmemctx );
1250 regmatch_t *matches,
1252 AccessControlState *state,
1253 slap_dn_access *bdn,
1254 struct berval *opndn )
1260 const char *attr = bdn->a_at->ad_cname.bv_val;
1262 assert( attr != NULL );
1264 if ( BER_BVISEMPTY( opndn ) ) {
1268 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= check a_dn_at: %s\n", attr, 0, 0 );
1271 /* see if asker is listed in dnattr */
1272 for ( at = attrs_find( e->e_attrs, bdn->a_at );
1274 at = attrs_find( at->a_next, bdn->a_at ) )
1276 if ( value_find_ex( bdn->a_at,
1277 SLAP_MR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_NORMALIZED_MATCH |
1278 SLAP_MR_ASSERTED_VALUE_NORMALIZED_MATCH,
1280 &bv, op->o_tmpmemctx ) == 0 )
1289 /* have a dnattr match. if this is a self clause then
1290 * the target must also match the op dn.
1292 if ( bdn->a_self ) {
1293 /* check if the target is an attribute. */
1294 if ( val == NULL ) return 1;
1296 /* target is attribute, check if the attribute value
1299 rc = value_match( &match, bdn->a_at,
1300 bdn->a_at->ad_type->sat_equality, 0,
1302 /* on match error or no match, fail the ACL clause */
1303 if ( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS || match != 0 )
1308 /* no dnattr match, check if this is a self clause */
1309 if ( ! bdn->a_self )
1312 ACL_RECORD_VALUE_STATE;
1314 /* this is a self clause, check if the target is an
1320 /* target is attribute, check if the attribute value
1323 rc = value_match( &match, bdn->a_at,
1324 bdn->a_at->ad_type->sat_equality, 0,
1327 /* on match error or no match, fail the ACL clause */
1328 if ( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS || match != 0 )
1337 * slap_acl_mask - modifies mask based upon the given acl and the
1338 * requested access to entry e, attribute attr, value val. if val
1339 * is null, access to the whole attribute is assumed (all values).
1341 * returns 0 access NOT allowed
1345 static slap_control_t
1351 AttributeDescription *desc,
1354 regmatch_t *matches,
1356 AccessControlState *state )
1361 char accessmaskbuf[ACCESSMASK_MAXLEN];
1364 slap_mask_t a2pmask = ACL_ACCESS2PRIV( *mask );
1366 assert( a != NULL );
1367 assert( mask != NULL );
1368 assert( desc != NULL );
1370 attr = desc->ad_cname.bv_val;
1372 assert( attr != NULL );
1374 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
1375 "=> acl_mask: access to entry \"%s\", attr \"%s\" requested\n",
1378 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
1379 "=> acl_mask: to %s by \"%s\", (%s) \n",
1380 val ? "value" : "all values",
1381 op->o_ndn.bv_val ? op->o_ndn.bv_val : "",
1382 accessmask2str( *mask, accessmaskbuf, 1 ) );
1385 if( state && ( state->as_recorded & ACL_STATE_RECORDED_VD )
1386 && state->as_vd_acl == a )
1388 b = state->as_vd_access;
1389 i = state->as_vd_access_count;
1396 for ( ; b != NULL; b = b->a_next, i++ ) {
1397 slap_mask_t oldmask, modmask;
1399 ACL_INVALIDATE( modmask );
1401 /* AND <who> clauses */
1402 if ( !BER_BVISEMPTY( &b->a_dn_pat ) ) {
1403 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= check a_dn_pat: %s\n",
1404 b->a_dn_pat.bv_val, 0, 0);
1406 * if access applies to the entry itself, and the
1407 * user is bound as somebody in the same namespace as
1408 * the entry, OR the given dn matches the dn pattern
1411 * NOTE: styles "anonymous", "users" and "self"
1412 * have been moved to enum slap_style_t, whose
1413 * value is set in a_dn_style; however, the string
1414 * is maintained in a_dn_pat.
1417 if ( acl_mask_dn( op, e, desc, val, a, nmatch, matches,
1418 &b->a_dn, &op->o_ndn ) )
1424 if ( !BER_BVISEMPTY( &b->a_realdn_pat ) ) {
1427 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= check a_realdn_pat: %s\n",
1428 b->a_realdn_pat.bv_val, 0, 0);
1430 * if access applies to the entry itself, and the
1431 * user is bound as somebody in the same namespace as
1432 * the entry, OR the given dn matches the dn pattern
1435 * NOTE: styles "anonymous", "users" and "self"
1436 * have been moved to enum slap_style_t, whose
1437 * value is set in a_dn_style; however, the string
1438 * is maintained in a_dn_pat.
1441 if ( op->o_conn && !BER_BVISNULL( &op->o_conn->c_ndn ) )
1443 ndn = op->o_conn->c_ndn;
1448 if ( acl_mask_dn( op, e, desc, val, a, nmatch, matches,
1449 &b->a_realdn, &ndn ) )
1455 if ( !BER_BVISEMPTY( &b->a_sockurl_pat ) ) {
1456 if ( ! op->o_conn->c_listener ) {
1459 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= check a_sockurl_pat: %s\n",
1460 b->a_sockurl_pat.bv_val, 0, 0 );
1462 if ( !ber_bvccmp( &b->a_sockurl_pat, '*' ) ) {
1463 if ( b->a_sockurl_style == ACL_STYLE_REGEX) {
1464 if (!regex_matches( &b->a_sockurl_pat, op->o_conn->c_listener_url.bv_val,
1465 e->e_ndn, nmatch, matches ) )
1470 } else if ( b->a_sockurl_style == ACL_STYLE_EXPAND ) {
1472 char buf[ACL_BUF_SIZE];
1474 bv.bv_len = sizeof( buf ) - 1;
1476 if ( acl_string_expand( &bv, &b->a_sockurl_pat,
1477 e->e_ndn, nmatch, matches ) )
1482 if ( ber_bvstrcasecmp( &bv, &op->o_conn->c_listener_url ) != 0 )
1488 if ( ber_bvstrcasecmp( &b->a_sockurl_pat, &op->o_conn->c_listener_url ) != 0 )
1496 if ( !BER_BVISEMPTY( &b->a_domain_pat ) ) {
1497 if ( !op->o_conn->c_peer_domain.bv_val ) {
1500 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= check a_domain_pat: %s\n",
1501 b->a_domain_pat.bv_val, 0, 0 );
1502 if ( !ber_bvccmp( &b->a_domain_pat, '*' ) ) {
1503 if ( b->a_domain_style == ACL_STYLE_REGEX) {
1504 if (!regex_matches( &b->a_domain_pat, op->o_conn->c_peer_domain.bv_val,
1505 e->e_ndn, nmatch, matches ) )
1510 char buf[ACL_BUF_SIZE];
1512 struct berval cmp = op->o_conn->c_peer_domain;
1513 struct berval pat = b->a_domain_pat;
1515 if ( b->a_domain_expand ) {
1518 bv.bv_len = sizeof(buf) - 1;
1521 if ( acl_string_expand(&bv, &b->a_domain_pat,
1522 e->e_ndn, nmatch, matches) )
1529 if ( b->a_domain_style == ACL_STYLE_SUBTREE ) {
1530 int offset = cmp.bv_len - pat.bv_len;
1535 if ( offset == 1 || ( offset > 1 && cmp.bv_val[ offset - 1 ] != '.' ) ) {
1539 /* trim the domain */
1540 cmp.bv_val = &cmp.bv_val[ offset ];
1541 cmp.bv_len -= offset;
1544 if ( ber_bvstrcasecmp( &pat, &cmp ) != 0 ) {
1551 if ( !BER_BVISEMPTY( &b->a_peername_pat ) ) {
1552 if ( !op->o_conn->c_peer_name.bv_val ) {
1555 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= check a_peername_path: %s\n",
1556 b->a_peername_pat.bv_val, 0, 0 );
1557 if ( !ber_bvccmp( &b->a_peername_pat, '*' ) ) {
1558 if ( b->a_peername_style == ACL_STYLE_REGEX ) {
1559 if (!regex_matches( &b->a_peername_pat, op->o_conn->c_peer_name.bv_val,
1560 e->e_ndn, nmatch, matches ) )
1566 /* try exact match */
1567 if ( b->a_peername_style == ACL_STYLE_BASE ) {
1568 if ( ber_bvstrcasecmp( &b->a_peername_pat, &op->o_conn->c_peer_name ) != 0 ) {
1572 } else if ( b->a_peername_style == ACL_STYLE_EXPAND ) {
1574 char buf[ACL_BUF_SIZE];
1576 bv.bv_len = sizeof( buf ) - 1;
1578 if ( acl_string_expand( &bv, &b->a_peername_pat,
1579 e->e_ndn, nmatch, matches ) )
1584 if ( ber_bvstrcasecmp( &bv, &op->o_conn->c_peer_name ) != 0 ) {
1588 /* extract IP and try exact match */
1589 } else if ( b->a_peername_style == ACL_STYLE_IP ) {
1591 char buf[] = "255.255.255.255";
1594 int port_number = -1;
1596 if ( strncasecmp( op->o_conn->c_peer_name.bv_val,
1597 acl_bv_ip_eq.bv_val,
1598 acl_bv_ip_eq.bv_len ) != 0 )
1601 ip.bv_val = op->o_conn->c_peer_name.bv_val + acl_bv_ip_eq.bv_len;
1602 ip.bv_len = op->o_conn->c_peer_name.bv_len - acl_bv_ip_eq.bv_len;
1604 port = strrchr( ip.bv_val, ':' );
1606 ip.bv_len = port - ip.bv_val;
1608 if ( lutil_atoi( &port_number, port ) != 0 )
1612 /* the port check can be anticipated here */
1613 if ( b->a_peername_port != -1 && port_number != b->a_peername_port )
1616 /* address longer than expected? */
1617 if ( ip.bv_len >= sizeof(buf) )
1620 AC_MEMCPY( buf, ip.bv_val, ip.bv_len );
1621 buf[ ip.bv_len ] = '\0';
1623 addr = inet_addr( buf );
1625 /* unable to convert? */
1626 if ( addr == (unsigned long)(-1) )
1629 if ( (addr & b->a_peername_mask) != b->a_peername_addr )
1632 #ifdef LDAP_PF_LOCAL
1633 /* extract path and try exact match */
1634 } else if ( b->a_peername_style == ACL_STYLE_PATH ) {
1637 if ( strncmp( op->o_conn->c_peer_name.bv_val,
1638 acl_bv_path_eq.bv_val,
1639 acl_bv_path_eq.bv_len ) != 0 )
1642 path.bv_val = op->o_conn->c_peer_name.bv_val
1643 + acl_bv_path_eq.bv_len;
1644 path.bv_len = op->o_conn->c_peer_name.bv_len
1645 - acl_bv_path_eq.bv_len;
1647 if ( ber_bvcmp( &b->a_peername_pat, &path ) != 0 )
1650 #endif /* LDAP_PF_LOCAL */
1652 /* exact match (very unlikely...) */
1653 } else if ( ber_bvcmp( &op->o_conn->c_peer_name, &b->a_peername_pat ) != 0 ) {
1660 if ( !BER_BVISEMPTY( &b->a_sockname_pat ) ) {
1661 if ( BER_BVISNULL( &op->o_conn->c_sock_name ) ) {
1664 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= check a_sockname_path: %s\n",
1665 b->a_sockname_pat.bv_val, 0, 0 );
1666 if ( !ber_bvccmp( &b->a_sockname_pat, '*' ) ) {
1667 if ( b->a_sockname_style == ACL_STYLE_REGEX) {
1668 if (!regex_matches( &b->a_sockname_pat, op->o_conn->c_sock_name.bv_val,
1669 e->e_ndn, nmatch, matches ) )
1674 } else if ( b->a_sockname_style == ACL_STYLE_EXPAND ) {
1676 char buf[ACL_BUF_SIZE];
1678 bv.bv_len = sizeof( buf ) - 1;
1680 if ( acl_string_expand( &bv, &b->a_sockname_pat,
1681 e->e_ndn, nmatch, matches ) )
1686 if ( ber_bvstrcasecmp( &bv, &op->o_conn->c_sock_name ) != 0 ) {
1691 if ( ber_bvstrcasecmp( &b->a_sockname_pat, &op->o_conn->c_sock_name ) != 0 ) {
1698 if ( b->a_dn_at != NULL ) {
1699 if ( acl_mask_dnattr( op, e, val, a, b, i,
1700 matches, count, state,
1701 &b->a_dn, &op->o_ndn ) )
1707 if ( b->a_realdn_at != NULL ) {
1710 if ( op->o_conn && !BER_BVISNULL( &op->o_conn->c_ndn ) )
1712 ndn = op->o_conn->c_ndn;
1717 if ( acl_mask_dnattr( op, e, val, a, b, i,
1718 matches, count, state,
1719 &b->a_realdn, &ndn ) )
1725 if ( !BER_BVISEMPTY( &b->a_group_pat ) ) {
1727 struct berval ndn = BER_BVNULL;
1730 if ( op->o_ndn.bv_len == 0 ) {
1734 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= check a_group_pat: %s\n",
1735 b->a_group_pat.bv_val, 0, 0 );
1737 /* b->a_group is an unexpanded entry name, expanded it should be an
1738 * entry with objectclass group* and we test to see if odn is one of
1739 * the values in the attribute group
1741 /* see if asker is listed in dnattr */
1742 if ( b->a_group_style == ACL_STYLE_EXPAND ) {
1743 char buf[ACL_BUF_SIZE];
1745 regmatch_t tmp_matches[2],
1746 *tmp_matchesp = tmp_matches;
1748 bv.bv_len = sizeof(buf) - 1;
1753 switch ( a->acl_dn_style ) {
1754 case ACL_STYLE_REGEX:
1755 if ( !BER_BVISNULL( &a->acl_dn_pat ) ) {
1756 tmp_matchesp = matches;
1757 tmp_nmatch = nmatch;
1761 /* FALLTHRU: applies also to ACL_STYLE_REGEX when pattern is "*" */
1762 case ACL_STYLE_BASE:
1763 tmp_matches[0].rm_so = 0;
1764 tmp_matches[0].rm_eo = e->e_nname.bv_len;
1769 case ACL_STYLE_SUBTREE:
1770 case ACL_STYLE_CHILDREN:
1771 tmp_matches[0].rm_so = 0;
1772 tmp_matches[0].rm_eo = e->e_nname.bv_len;
1773 tmp_matches[1].rm_so = e->e_nname.bv_len - a->acl_dn_pat.bv_len;
1774 tmp_matches[1].rm_eo = e->e_nname.bv_len;
1788 if ( acl_string_expand( &bv, &b->a_group_pat,
1790 tmp_nmatch, tmp_matchesp ) )
1795 if ( dnNormalize( 0, NULL, NULL, &bv, &ndn,
1796 op->o_tmpmemctx ) != LDAP_SUCCESS )
1798 /* did not expand to a valid dn */
1805 bv = b->a_group_pat;
1808 rc = backend_group( op, e, &bv, &op->o_ndn,
1809 b->a_group_oc, b->a_group_at );
1812 slap_sl_free( ndn.bv_val, op->o_tmpmemctx );
1820 if ( !BER_BVISEMPTY( &b->a_set_pat ) ) {
1822 char buf[ACL_BUF_SIZE];
1824 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= check a_set_pat: %s\n",
1825 b->a_set_pat.bv_val, 0, 0 );
1827 if ( b->a_set_style == ACL_STYLE_EXPAND ) {
1829 regmatch_t tmp_matches[2],
1830 *tmp_matchesp = tmp_matches;
1833 bv.bv_len = sizeof( buf ) - 1;
1838 switch ( a->acl_dn_style ) {
1839 case ACL_STYLE_REGEX:
1840 if ( !BER_BVISNULL( &a->acl_dn_pat ) ) {
1841 tmp_matchesp = matches;
1842 tmp_nmatch = nmatch;
1846 /* FALLTHRU: applies also to ACL_STYLE_REGEX when pattern is "*" */
1847 case ACL_STYLE_BASE:
1848 tmp_matches[0].rm_so = 0;
1849 tmp_matches[0].rm_eo = e->e_nname.bv_len;
1854 case ACL_STYLE_SUBTREE:
1855 case ACL_STYLE_CHILDREN:
1856 tmp_matches[0].rm_so = 0;
1857 tmp_matches[0].rm_eo = e->e_nname.bv_len;
1858 tmp_matches[1].rm_so = e->e_nname.bv_len - a->acl_dn_pat.bv_len;
1859 tmp_matches[1].rm_eo = e->e_nname.bv_len;
1873 if ( acl_string_expand( &bv, &b->a_set_pat,
1875 tmp_nmatch, tmp_matchesp ) )
1884 if ( acl_match_set( &bv, op, e, NULL ) == 0 ) {
1889 if ( b->a_authz.sai_ssf ) {
1890 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= check a_authz.sai_ssf: ACL %u > OP %u\n",
1891 b->a_authz.sai_ssf, op->o_ssf, 0 );
1892 if ( b->a_authz.sai_ssf > op->o_ssf ) {
1897 if ( b->a_authz.sai_transport_ssf ) {
1898 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
1899 "<= check a_authz.sai_transport_ssf: ACL %u > OP %u\n",
1900 b->a_authz.sai_transport_ssf, op->o_transport_ssf, 0 );
1901 if ( b->a_authz.sai_transport_ssf > op->o_transport_ssf ) {
1906 if ( b->a_authz.sai_tls_ssf ) {
1907 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
1908 "<= check a_authz.sai_tls_ssf: ACL %u > OP %u\n",
1909 b->a_authz.sai_tls_ssf, op->o_tls_ssf, 0 );
1910 if ( b->a_authz.sai_tls_ssf > op->o_tls_ssf ) {
1915 if ( b->a_authz.sai_sasl_ssf ) {
1916 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
1917 "<= check a_authz.sai_sasl_ssf: ACL %u > OP %u\n",
1918 b->a_authz.sai_sasl_ssf, op->o_sasl_ssf, 0 );
1919 if ( b->a_authz.sai_sasl_ssf > op->o_sasl_ssf ) {
1924 /* check for the "self" modifier in the <access> field */
1925 if ( b->a_dn.a_self ) {
1929 ACL_RECORD_VALUE_STATE;
1931 /* must have DN syntax */
1932 if ( desc->ad_type->sat_syntax != slap_schema.si_syn_distinguishedName &&
1933 !is_at_syntax( desc->ad_type, SLAPD_NAMEUID_SYNTAX )) continue;
1935 /* check if the target is an attribute. */
1936 if ( val == NULL ) continue;
1938 /* a DN must be present */
1939 if ( BER_BVISEMPTY( &op->o_ndn ) ) {
1943 /* target is attribute, check if the attribute value
1946 rc = value_match( &match, desc,
1947 desc->ad_type->sat_equality, 0,
1948 val, &op->o_ndn, &dummy );
1949 /* on match error or no match, fail the ACL clause */
1950 if ( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS || match != 0 )
1954 if ( b->a_dynacl ) {
1956 slap_access_t tgrant, tdeny;
1958 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= check a_dynacl\n",
1961 /* this case works different from the others above.
1962 * since dynamic ACL's themselves give permissions, we need
1963 * to first check b->a_access_mask, the ACL's access level.
1965 /* first check if the right being requested
1966 * is allowed by the ACL clause.
1968 if ( ! ACL_PRIV_ISSET( b->a_access_mask, a2pmask ) ) {
1972 /* start out with nothing granted, nothing denied */
1973 ACL_INVALIDATE(tgrant);
1974 ACL_INVALIDATE(tdeny);
1976 for ( da = b->a_dynacl; da; da = da->da_next ) {
1977 slap_access_t grant,
1980 ACL_INVALIDATE(grant);
1981 ACL_INVALIDATE(deny);
1983 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, " <= check a_dynacl: %s\n",
1984 da->da_name, 0, 0 );
1986 (void)( *da->da_mask )( da->da_private, op, e, desc, val, nmatch, matches, &grant, &deny );
1992 /* remove anything that the ACL clause does not allow */
1993 tgrant &= b->a_access_mask & ACL_PRIV_MASK;
1994 tdeny &= ACL_PRIV_MASK;
1996 /* see if we have anything to contribute */
1997 if( ACL_IS_INVALID(tgrant) && ACL_IS_INVALID(tdeny) ) {
2001 /* this could be improved by changing slap_acl_mask so that it can deal with
2002 * by clauses that return grant/deny pairs. Right now, it does either
2003 * additive or subtractive rights, but not both at the same time. So,
2004 * we need to combine the grant/deny pair into a single rights mask in
2005 * a smart way: if either grant or deny is "empty", then we use the
2006 * opposite as is, otherwise we remove any denied rights from the grant
2007 * rights mask and construct an additive mask.
2009 if (ACL_IS_INVALID(tdeny)) {
2010 modmask = tgrant | ACL_PRIV_ADDITIVE;
2012 } else if (ACL_IS_INVALID(tgrant)) {
2013 modmask = tdeny | ACL_PRIV_SUBSTRACTIVE;
2016 modmask = (tgrant & ~tdeny) | ACL_PRIV_ADDITIVE;
2020 #else /* !SLAP_DYNACL */
2022 /* NOTE: this entire block can be eliminated when SLAP_DYNACL
2023 * moves outside of LDAP_DEVEL */
2024 #ifdef SLAPD_ACI_ENABLED
2025 if ( b->a_aci_at != NULL ) {
2027 slap_access_t grant, deny, tgrant, tdeny;
2028 struct berval parent_ndn;
2029 BerVarray bvals = NULL;
2032 char accessmaskbuf1[ACCESSMASK_MAXLEN];
2035 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, " <= check a_aci_at: %s\n",
2036 b->a_aci_at->ad_cname.bv_val, 0, 0 );
2038 /* this case works different from the others above.
2039 * since aci's themselves give permissions, we need
2040 * to first check b->a_access_mask, the ACL's access level.
2043 if ( BER_BVISEMPTY( &e->e_nname ) ) {
2044 /* no ACIs in the root DSE */
2048 /* first check if the right being requested
2049 * is allowed by the ACL clause.
2051 if ( ! ACL_GRANT( b->a_access_mask, *mask ) ) {
2054 /* start out with nothing granted, nothing denied */
2058 /* get the aci attribute */
2059 at = attr_find( e->e_attrs, b->a_aci_at );
2062 /* FIXME: this breaks acl caching;
2063 * see also ACL_RECORD_VALUE_STATE below */
2064 ACL_RECORD_VALUE_STATE;
2066 /* the aci is an multi-valued attribute. The
2067 * rights are determined by OR'ing the individual
2068 * rights given by the acis.
2070 for ( i = 0; !BER_BVISNULL( &at->a_nvals[i] ); i++ ) {
2075 &grant, &deny, SLAP_ACI_SCOPE_ENTRY ) != 0 )
2081 Debug(LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= aci_mask grant %s deny %s\n",
2082 accessmask2str(tgrant, accessmaskbuf, 1),
2083 accessmask2str(tdeny, accessmaskbuf1, 1), 0);
2086 /* If the entry level aci didn't contain anything valid for the
2087 * current operation, climb up the tree and evaluate the
2088 * acis with scope set to subtree
2090 if ( (tgrant == ACL_PRIV_NONE) && (tdeny == ACL_PRIV_NONE) ) {
2091 dnParent( &e->e_nname, &parent_ndn );
2092 while ( !BER_BVISEMPTY( &parent_ndn ) ) {
2093 Debug(LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "checking ACI of %s\n", parent_ndn.bv_val, 0, 0);
2094 ret = backend_attribute(op, NULL, &parent_ndn, b->a_aci_at, &bvals, ACL_AUTH);
2102 for ( i = 0; !BER_BVISNULL( &bvals[i] ); i++ ) {
2104 /* FIXME: this breaks acl caching;
2105 * see also ACL_RECORD_VALUE_STATE above */
2106 ACL_RECORD_VALUE_STATE;
2108 if ( aci_mask( op, e, desc, val, &bvals[i],
2110 &grant, &deny, SLAP_ACI_SCOPE_CHILDREN ) != 0 )
2114 /* evaluation stops as soon as either a "deny" or a
2115 * "grant" directive matches.
2117 if( (tgrant != ACL_PRIV_NONE) || (tdeny != ACL_PRIV_NONE) ){
2121 Debug(LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= aci_mask grant %s deny %s\n",
2122 accessmask2str(tgrant, accessmaskbuf, 1),
2123 accessmask2str(tdeny, accessmaskbuf1, 1), 0);
2127 case LDAP_NO_SUCH_ATTRIBUTE:
2128 /* just go on if the aci-Attribute is not present in
2131 Debug(LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "no such attribute\n", 0, 0, 0);
2135 case LDAP_NO_SUCH_OBJECT:
2136 /* We have reached the base object */
2137 Debug(LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "no such object\n", 0, 0, 0);
2148 dnParent( &parent_ndn, &parent_ndn );
2153 /* remove anything that the ACL clause does not allow */
2154 tgrant &= b->a_access_mask & ACL_PRIV_MASK;
2155 tdeny &= ACL_PRIV_MASK;
2157 /* see if we have anything to contribute */
2158 if( ACL_IS_INVALID(tgrant) && ACL_IS_INVALID(tdeny) ) {
2162 /* this could be improved by changing slap_acl_mask so that it can deal with
2163 * by clauses that return grant/deny pairs. Right now, it does either
2164 * additive or subtractive rights, but not both at the same time. So,
2165 * we need to combine the grant/deny pair into a single rights mask in
2166 * a smart way: if either grant or deny is "empty", then we use the
2167 * opposite as is, otherwise we remove any denied rights from the grant
2168 * rights mask and construct an additive mask.
2170 if (ACL_IS_INVALID(tdeny)) {
2171 modmask = tgrant | ACL_PRIV_ADDITIVE;
2173 } else if (ACL_IS_INVALID(tgrant)) {
2174 modmask = tdeny | ACL_PRIV_SUBSTRACTIVE;
2177 modmask = (tgrant & ~tdeny) | ACL_PRIV_ADDITIVE;
2181 #endif /* SLAPD_ACI_ENABLED */
2182 #endif /* !SLAP_DYNACL */
2184 modmask = b->a_access_mask;
2187 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
2188 "<= acl_mask: [%d] applying %s (%s)\n",
2189 i, accessmask2str( modmask, accessmaskbuf, 1 ),
2190 b->a_type == ACL_CONTINUE
2192 : b->a_type == ACL_BREAK
2198 if( ACL_IS_ADDITIVE(modmask) ) {
2200 ACL_PRIV_SET( *mask, modmask );
2203 ACL_PRIV_CLR( *mask, ~ACL_PRIV_MASK );
2205 } else if( ACL_IS_SUBTRACTIVE(modmask) ) {
2206 /* substract privs */
2207 ACL_PRIV_CLR( *mask, modmask );
2210 ACL_PRIV_CLR( *mask, ~ACL_PRIV_MASK );
2219 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
2220 "<= acl_mask: [%d] mask: %s\n",
2221 i, accessmask2str(*mask, accessmaskbuf, 1), 0 );
2223 if( b->a_type == ACL_CONTINUE ) {
2226 } else if ( b->a_type == ACL_BREAK ) {
2234 /* implicit "by * none" clause */
2237 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
2238 "<= acl_mask: no more <who> clauses, returning %s (stop)\n",
2239 accessmask2str(*mask, accessmaskbuf, 1), 0, 0 );
2244 * acl_check_modlist - check access control on the given entry to see if
2245 * it allows the given modifications by the user associated with op.
2246 * returns 1 if mods allowed ok
2247 * 0 mods not allowed
2254 Modifications *mlist )
2257 AccessControlState state = ACL_STATE_INIT;
2260 int ret = 1; /* default is access allowed */
2264 be = LDAP_STAILQ_FIRST(&backendDB);
2268 assert( be != NULL );
2270 /* short circuit root database access */
2271 if ( be_isroot( op ) ) {
2272 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
2273 "<= acl_access_allowed: granted to database root\n",
2278 /* use backend default access if no backend acls */
2279 if( op->o_bd != NULL && op->o_bd->be_acl == NULL ) {
2280 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
2281 "=> access_allowed: backend default %s access %s to \"%s\"\n",
2282 access2str( ACL_WRITE ),
2283 op->o_bd->be_dfltaccess >= ACL_WRITE
2284 ? "granted" : "denied",
2286 ret = (op->o_bd->be_dfltaccess >= ACL_WRITE);
2290 for ( ; mlist != NULL; mlist = mlist->sml_next ) {
2292 * Internal mods are ignored by ACL_WRITE checking
2294 if ( mlist->sml_flags & SLAP_MOD_INTERNAL ) {
2295 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "acl: internal mod %s:"
2296 " modify access granted\n",
2297 mlist->sml_desc->ad_cname.bv_val, 0, 0 );
2302 * no-user-modification operational attributes are ignored
2303 * by ACL_WRITE checking as any found here are not provided
2306 if ( is_at_no_user_mod( mlist->sml_desc->ad_type )
2307 && ! ( mlist->sml_flags & SLAP_MOD_MANAGING ) )
2309 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "acl: no-user-mod %s:"
2310 " modify access granted\n",
2311 mlist->sml_desc->ad_cname.bv_val, 0, 0 );
2315 switch ( mlist->sml_op ) {
2316 case LDAP_MOD_REPLACE:
2317 case LDAP_MOD_INCREMENT:
2319 * We must check both permission to delete the whole
2320 * attribute and permission to add the specific attributes.
2321 * This prevents abuse from selfwriters.
2323 if ( ! access_allowed( op, e,
2324 mlist->sml_desc, NULL,
2325 ( mlist->sml_flags & SLAP_MOD_MANAGING ) ? ACL_MANAGE : ACL_WDEL,
2332 if ( mlist->sml_values == NULL ) break;
2334 /* fall thru to check value to add */
2337 assert( mlist->sml_values != NULL );
2339 for ( bv = mlist->sml_nvalues
2340 ? mlist->sml_nvalues : mlist->sml_values;
2341 bv->bv_val != NULL; bv++ )
2343 if ( ! access_allowed( op, e,
2344 mlist->sml_desc, bv,
2345 ( mlist->sml_flags & SLAP_MOD_MANAGING ) ? ACL_MANAGE : ACL_WADD,
2354 case LDAP_MOD_DELETE:
2355 if ( mlist->sml_values == NULL ) {
2356 if ( ! access_allowed( op, e,
2357 mlist->sml_desc, NULL,
2358 ( mlist->sml_flags & SLAP_MOD_MANAGING ) ? ACL_MANAGE : ACL_WDEL,
2366 for ( bv = mlist->sml_nvalues
2367 ? mlist->sml_nvalues : mlist->sml_values;
2368 bv->bv_val != NULL; bv++ )
2370 if ( ! access_allowed( op, e,
2371 mlist->sml_desc, bv,
2372 ( mlist->sml_flags & SLAP_MOD_MANAGING ) ? ACL_MANAGE : ACL_WDEL,
2381 case SLAP_MOD_SOFTADD:
2382 /* allow adding attribute via modrdn thru */
2394 if (be_null) op->o_bd = NULL;
2400 struct berval *list,
2413 while ( len >= 0 && --ix >= 0 ) {
2414 while ( --len >= 0 && *p++ != sep )
2417 while ( len >= 0 && *p == ' ' ) {
2430 while ( --len >= 0 && *p != sep ) {
2434 while ( bv->bv_len > 0 && *--p == ' ' ) {
2441 typedef struct acl_set_gather_t {
2447 acl_set_cb_gather( Operation *op, SlapReply *rs )
2449 acl_set_gather_t *p = (acl_set_gather_t *)op->o_callback->sc_private;
2451 if ( rs->sr_type == REP_SEARCH ) {
2452 BerValue bvals[ 2 ];
2453 BerVarray bvalsp = NULL;
2456 for ( j = 0; !BER_BVISNULL( &rs->sr_attrs[ j ].an_name ); j++ ) {
2457 AttributeDescription *desc = rs->sr_attrs[ j ].an_desc;
2459 if ( desc == slap_schema.si_ad_entryDN ) {
2461 bvals[ 0 ] = rs->sr_entry->e_nname;
2462 BER_BVZERO( &bvals[ 1 ] );
2467 a = attr_find( rs->sr_entry->e_attrs, desc );
2471 for ( i = 0; !BER_BVISNULL( &a->a_nvals[ i ] ); i++ )
2474 bvalsp = a->a_nvals;
2480 p->bvals = slap_set_join( p->cookie, p->bvals,
2481 ( '|' | SLAP_SET_RREF ), bvalsp );
2485 assert( rs->sr_type == REP_RESULT );
2492 acl_set_gather( SetCookie *cookie, struct berval *name, AttributeDescription *desc )
2494 AclSetCookie *cp = (AclSetCookie *)cookie;
2496 LDAPURLDesc *ludp = NULL;
2497 Operation op2 = { 0 };
2498 SlapReply rs = {REP_RESULT};
2499 AttributeName anlist[ 2 ], *anlistp = NULL;
2501 slap_callback cb = { NULL, acl_set_cb_gather, NULL, NULL };
2502 acl_set_gather_t p = { 0 };
2503 const char *text = NULL;
2504 static struct berval defaultFilter_bv = BER_BVC( "(objectClass=*)" );
2506 /* this routine needs to return the bervals instead of
2507 * plain strings, since syntax is not known. It should
2508 * also return the syntax or some "comparison cookie".
2510 if ( strncasecmp( name->bv_val, "ldap:///", STRLENOF( "ldap:///" ) ) != 0 ) {
2511 return acl_set_gather2( cookie, name, desc );
2514 rc = ldap_url_parse( name->bv_val, &ludp );
2515 if ( rc != LDAP_URL_SUCCESS ) {
2516 rc = LDAP_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
2520 if ( ( ludp->lud_host && ludp->lud_host[0] ) || ludp->lud_exts )
2522 /* host part must be empty */
2523 /* extensions parts must be empty */
2524 rc = LDAP_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
2528 /* Grab the searchbase and see if an appropriate database can be found */
2529 ber_str2bv( ludp->lud_dn, 0, 0, &op2.o_req_dn );
2530 rc = dnNormalize( 0, NULL, NULL, &op2.o_req_dn,
2531 &op2.o_req_ndn, cp->asc_op->o_tmpmemctx );
2532 BER_BVZERO( &op2.o_req_dn );
2533 if ( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
2537 op2.o_bd = select_backend( &op2.o_req_ndn, 0, 1 );
2538 if ( ( op2.o_bd == NULL ) || ( op2.o_bd->be_search == NULL ) ) {
2539 rc = LDAP_NO_SUCH_OBJECT;
2543 /* Grab the filter */
2544 if ( ludp->lud_filter ) {
2545 ber_str2bv_x( ludp->lud_filter, 0, 0, &op2.ors_filterstr,
2546 cp->asc_op->o_tmpmemctx );
2549 op2.ors_filterstr = defaultFilter_bv;
2552 op2.ors_filter = str2filter_x( cp->asc_op, op2.ors_filterstr.bv_val );
2553 if ( op2.ors_filter == NULL ) {
2554 rc = LDAP_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
2558 /* Grab the scope */
2559 op2.ors_scope = ludp->lud_scope;
2561 /* Grap the attributes */
2562 if ( ludp->lud_attrs ) {
2563 for ( ; ludp->lud_attrs[ nattrs ]; nattrs++ )
2566 anlistp = slap_sl_malloc( sizeof( AttributeName ) * ( nattrs + 2 ),
2567 cp->asc_op->o_tmpmemctx );
2569 for ( ; ludp->lud_attrs[ nattrs ]; nattrs++ ) {
2570 ber_str2bv( ludp->lud_attrs[ nattrs ], 0, 0, &anlistp[ nattrs ].an_name );
2571 anlistp[ nattrs ].an_desc = NULL;
2572 rc = slap_bv2ad( &anlistp[ nattrs ].an_name,
2573 &anlistp[ nattrs ].an_desc, &text );
2574 if ( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
2583 anlistp[ nattrs ].an_name = desc->ad_cname;
2584 anlistp[ nattrs ].an_desc = desc;
2586 BER_BVZERO( &anlistp[ nattrs + 1 ].an_name );
2590 op2.o_hdr = cp->asc_op->o_hdr;
2591 op2.o_tag = LDAP_REQ_SEARCH;
2592 op2.o_ndn = op2.o_bd->be_rootndn;
2593 op2.o_callback = &cb;
2594 slap_op_time( &op2.o_time, &op2.o_tincr );
2595 op2.o_do_not_cache = 1;
2596 op2.o_is_auth_check = 0;
2597 ber_dupbv_x( &op2.o_req_dn, &op2.o_req_ndn, cp->asc_op->o_tmpmemctx );
2598 op2.ors_slimit = SLAP_NO_LIMIT;
2599 op2.ors_tlimit = SLAP_NO_LIMIT;
2600 op2.ors_attrs = anlistp;
2601 op2.ors_attrsonly = 0;
2602 op2.o_private = cp->asc_op->o_private;
2606 rc = op2.o_bd->be_search( &op2, &rs );
2612 if ( op2.ors_filter ) {
2613 filter_free_x( cp->asc_op, op2.ors_filter );
2615 if ( !BER_BVISNULL( &op2.o_req_ndn ) ) {
2616 slap_sl_free( op2.o_req_ndn.bv_val, cp->asc_op->o_tmpmemctx );
2618 if ( !BER_BVISNULL( &op2.o_req_dn ) ) {
2619 slap_sl_free( op2.o_req_dn.bv_val, cp->asc_op->o_tmpmemctx );
2622 ldap_free_urldesc( ludp );
2624 if ( anlistp && anlistp != anlist ) {
2625 slap_sl_free( anlistp, cp->asc_op->o_tmpmemctx );
2632 acl_set_gather2( SetCookie *cookie, struct berval *name, AttributeDescription *desc )
2634 AclSetCookie *cp = (AclSetCookie *)cookie;
2635 BerVarray bvals = NULL;
2639 /* this routine needs to return the bervals instead of
2640 * plain strings, since syntax is not known. It should
2641 * also return the syntax or some "comparison cookie".
2643 rc = dnNormalize( 0, NULL, NULL, name, &ndn, cp->asc_op->o_tmpmemctx );
2644 if ( rc == LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
2645 if ( desc == slap_schema.si_ad_entryDN ) {
2646 bvals = (BerVarray)slap_sl_malloc( sizeof( BerValue ) * 2,
2647 cp->asc_op->o_tmpmemctx );
2649 BER_BVZERO( &bvals[ 1 ] );
2653 backend_attribute( cp->asc_op,
2654 cp->asc_e, &ndn, desc, &bvals, ACL_NONE );
2657 if ( !BER_BVISNULL( &ndn ) ) {
2658 slap_sl_free( ndn.bv_val, cp->asc_op->o_tmpmemctx );
2667 struct berval *subj,
2670 struct berval *default_set_attribute )
2672 struct berval set = BER_BVNULL;
2674 AclSetCookie cookie;
2676 if ( default_set_attribute == NULL ) {
2677 ber_dupbv_x( &set, subj, op->o_tmpmemctx );
2680 struct berval subjdn, ndn = BER_BVNULL;
2681 struct berval setat;
2682 BerVarray bvals=NULL;
2684 AttributeDescription *desc = NULL;
2686 /* format of string is "entry/setAttrName" */
2687 if ( acl_get_part( subj, 0, '/', &subjdn ) < 0 ) {
2691 if ( acl_get_part( subj, 1, '/', &setat ) < 0 ) {
2692 setat = *default_set_attribute;
2696 * NOTE: dnNormalize honors the ber_len field
2697 * as the length of the dn to be normalized
2699 if ( slap_bv2ad( &setat, &desc, &text ) == LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
2700 if ( dnNormalize( 0, NULL, NULL, &subjdn, &ndn, op->o_tmpmemctx ) == LDAP_SUCCESS )
2702 backend_attribute( op, e, &ndn, desc, &bvals, ACL_NONE );
2703 if ( bvals != NULL && !BER_BVISNULL( &bvals[0] ) ) {
2707 BER_BVZERO( &bvals[0] );
2708 for ( i = 1; !BER_BVISNULL( &bvals[i] ); i++ )
2710 bvals[0].bv_val = bvals[i-1].bv_val;
2711 BER_BVZERO( &bvals[i-1] );
2713 ber_bvarray_free_x( bvals, op->o_tmpmemctx );
2714 slap_sl_free( ndn.bv_val, op->o_tmpmemctx );
2719 if ( !BER_BVISNULL( &set ) ) {
2722 rc = ( slap_set_filter(
2724 (SetCookie *)&cookie, &set,
2725 &op->o_ndn, &e->e_nname, NULL ) > 0 );
2726 slap_sl_free( set.bv_val, op->o_tmpmemctx );
2735 * dynamic ACL infrastructure
2737 static slap_dynacl_t *da_list = NULL;
2740 slap_dynacl_register( slap_dynacl_t *da )
2744 for ( tmp = da_list; tmp; tmp = tmp->da_next ) {
2745 if ( strcasecmp( da->da_name, tmp->da_name ) == 0 ) {
2750 if ( tmp != NULL ) {
2754 if ( da->da_mask == NULL ) {
2758 da->da_private = NULL;
2759 da->da_next = da_list;
2765 static slap_dynacl_t *
2766 slap_dynacl_next( slap_dynacl_t *da )
2775 slap_dynacl_get( const char *name )
2779 for ( da = slap_dynacl_next( NULL ); da; da = slap_dynacl_next( da ) ) {
2780 if ( strcasecmp( da->da_name, name ) == 0 ) {
2787 #endif /* SLAP_DYNACL */
2790 * statically built-in dynamic ACL initialization
2792 static int (*acl_init_func[])( void ) = {
2793 #ifdef SLAPD_ACI_ENABLED
2796 #else /* !SLAP_DYNACL */
2798 #endif /* !SLAP_DYNACL */
2799 #endif /* SLAPD_ACI_ENABLED */
2809 for ( i = 0; acl_init_func[ i ] != NULL; i++ ) {
2810 rc = (*(acl_init_func[ i ]))();
2825 regmatch_t *matches)
2833 bv->bv_val[0] = '\0';
2834 bv->bv_len--; /* leave space for lone $ */
2837 for ( dp = bv->bv_val, sp = pat->bv_val; size < bv->bv_len &&
2838 sp < pat->bv_val + pat->bv_len ; sp++ )
2840 /* did we previously see a $ */
2842 if ( flag == 1 && *sp == '$' ) {
2847 } else if ( flag == 1 && *sp == '{' /*'}'*/) {
2850 } else if ( *sp >= '0' && *sp <= '9' ) {
2858 for ( sp++; *sp != '\0' && *sp != /*'{'*/ '}'; sp++ ) {
2859 if ( *sp >= '0' && *sp <= '9' ) {
2860 n = 10*n + ( *sp - '0' );
2864 if ( *sp != /*'{'*/ '}' ) {
2870 if ( n >= nmatch ) {
2876 i = matches[n].rm_so;
2877 l = matches[n].rm_eo;
2878 for ( ; size < bv->bv_len && i < l; size++, i++ ) {
2896 /* must have ended with a single $ */
2904 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, "=> acl_string_expand: pattern: %.*s\n", (int)pat->bv_len, pat->bv_val, 0 );
2905 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, "=> acl_string_expand: expanded: %s\n", bv->bv_val, 0, 0 );
2912 struct berval *pat, /* pattern to expand and match against */
2913 char *str, /* string to match against pattern */
2914 char *buf, /* buffer with $N expansion variables */
2915 int nmatch, /* size of the matches array */
2916 regmatch_t *matches /* offsets in buffer for $N expansion variables */
2920 char newbuf[ACL_BUF_SIZE];
2924 bv.bv_len = sizeof( newbuf ) - 1;
2931 acl_string_expand( &bv, pat, buf, nmatch, matches );
2932 rc = regcomp( &re, newbuf, REG_EXTENDED|REG_ICASE );
2934 char error[ACL_BUF_SIZE];
2935 regerror( rc, &re, error, sizeof( error ) );
2937 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE,
2938 "compile( \"%s\", \"%s\") failed %s\n",
2939 pat->bv_val, str, error );
2943 rc = regexec( &re, str, 0, NULL, 0 );
2946 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE,
2947 "=> regex_matches: string: %s\n", str, 0, 0 );
2948 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE,
2949 "=> regex_matches: rc: %d %s\n",
2950 rc, !rc ? "matches" : "no matches", 0 );