1 /* acl.c - routines to parse and check acl's */
4 * Copyright 1998-2002 The OpenLDAP Foundation, All Rights Reserved.
5 * COPYING RESTRICTIONS APPLY, see COPYRIGHT file
13 #include <ac/socket.h>
14 #include <ac/string.h>
25 aci_bv_entry = { sizeof("entry") - 1, "entry" },
26 aci_bv_br_entry = { sizeof("[entry]") - 1, "[entry]" },
27 aci_bv_br_all = { sizeof("[all]") - 1, "[all]" },
28 aci_bv_access_id = { sizeof("access-id") - 1, "access-id" },
29 aci_bv_anonymous = { sizeof("anonymous") - 1, "anonymous" },
30 aci_bv_users = { sizeof("users") - 1, "users" },
31 aci_bv_self = { sizeof("self") - 1, "self" },
32 aci_bv_dnattr = { sizeof("dnattr") - 1, "dnattr" },
33 aci_bv_group = { sizeof("group") - 1, "group" },
34 aci_bv_role = { sizeof("role") - 1, "role" },
35 aci_bv_set = { sizeof("set") - 1, "set" },
36 aci_bv_set_ref = { sizeof("set-ref") - 1, "set-ref"},
37 aci_bv_grant = { sizeof("grant") - 1, "grant" },
38 aci_bv_deny = { sizeof("deny") - 1, "deny" };
40 static AccessControl * acl_get(
41 AccessControl *ac, int *count,
42 Backend *be, Operation *op,
44 AttributeDescription *desc,
45 int nmatches, regmatch_t *matches );
47 static slap_control_t acl_mask(
48 AccessControl *ac, slap_mask_t *mask,
49 Backend *be, Connection *conn, Operation *op,
51 AttributeDescription *desc,
55 AccessControlState *state );
57 #ifdef SLAPD_ACI_ENABLED
63 AttributeDescription *desc,
68 slap_access_t *deny );
71 static int regex_matches(
72 struct berval *pat, char *str, char *buf, regmatch_t *matches);
73 static void string_expand(
74 struct berval *newbuf, struct berval *pattern,
75 char *match, regmatch_t *matches);
77 typedef struct AciSetCookie {
84 SLAP_SET_GATHER aci_set_gather;
85 static int aci_match_set ( struct berval *subj, Backend *be,
86 Entry *e, Connection *conn, Operation *op, int setref );
89 * access_allowed - check whether op->o_ndn is allowed the requested access
90 * to entry e, attribute attr, value val. if val is null, access to
91 * the whole attribute is assumed (all values).
93 * This routine loops through all access controls and calls
94 * acl_mask() on each applicable access control.
95 * The loop exits when a definitive answer is reached or
96 * or no more controls remain.
109 AttributeDescription *desc,
111 slap_access_t access,
112 AccessControlState *state )
118 char accessmaskbuf[ACCESSMASK_MAXLEN];
121 slap_control_t control;
123 regmatch_t matches[MAXREMATCHES];
126 assert( desc != NULL );
127 assert( access > ACL_NONE );
129 attr = desc->ad_cname.bv_val;
131 assert( attr != NULL );
133 if( state && state->as_recorded ) {
134 if( state->as_recorded & ACL_STATE_RECORDED_NV &&
137 return state->as_result;
139 } else if ( state->as_recorded & ACL_STATE_RECORDED_VD &&
140 val != NULL && state->as_vd_acl == NULL )
142 return state->as_result;
147 LDAP_LOG(( "acl", LDAP_LEVEL_ENTRY,
148 "access_allowed: conn %lu %s access to \"%s\" \"%s\" requested\n",
149 conn ? conn->c_connid : -1, access2str( access ), e->e_dn, attr ));
151 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
152 "=> access_allowed: %s access to \"%s\" \"%s\" requested\n",
153 access2str( access ), e->e_dn, attr );
161 if ( be == NULL ) be = &backends[0];
162 assert( be != NULL );
164 /* grant database root access */
165 if ( be != NULL && be_isroot( be, &op->o_ndn ) ) {
167 LDAP_LOG(( "acl", LDAP_LEVEL_INFO,
168 "access_allowed: conn %lu root access granted\n",
171 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
172 "<= root access granted\n",
179 * no-user-modification operational attributes are ignored
180 * by ACL_WRITE checking as any found here are not provided
183 if ( access >= ACL_WRITE && is_at_no_user_mod( desc->ad_type )
184 && desc != slap_schema.si_ad_entry
185 && desc != slap_schema.si_ad_children )
188 LDAP_LOG(( "acl", LDAP_LEVEL_DETAIL1,
189 "access_allowed: conn %lu NoUserMod Operational attribute: %s access granted\n",
190 conn->c_connid, attr ));
192 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "NoUserMod Operational attribute:"
193 " %s access granted\n",
199 /* use backend default access if no backend acls */
200 if( be != NULL && be->be_acl == NULL ) {
202 LDAP_LOG(( "acl", LDAP_LEVEL_DETAIL1,
203 "access_allowed: conn %lu backend default %s access %s to \"%s\"\n",
204 conn->c_connid, access2str( access ),
205 be->be_dfltaccess >= access ? "granted" : "denied", op->o_dn.bv_val ));
207 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
208 "=> access_allowed: backend default %s access %s to \"%s\"\n",
209 access2str( access ),
210 be->be_dfltaccess >= access ? "granted" : "denied", op->o_dn.bv_val );
212 ret = be->be_dfltaccess >= access;
216 /* be is always non-NULL */
217 /* use global default access if no global acls */
218 } else if ( be == NULL && global_acl == NULL ) {
220 LDAP_LOG(( "acl", LDAP_LEVEL_DETAIL1,
221 "access_allowed: conn %lu global default %s access %s to \"%s\"\n",
222 conn->c_connid, access2str( access ),
223 global_default_access >= access ? "granted" : "denied", op->o_dn.bv_val ));
225 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
226 "=> access_allowed: global default %s access %s to \"%s\"\n",
227 access2str( access ),
228 global_default_access >= access ? "granted" : "denied", op->o_dn.bv_val );
230 ret = global_default_access >= access;
238 if( state && ( state->as_recorded & ACL_STATE_RECORDED_VD )) {
239 assert( state->as_vd_acl != NULL );
241 a = state->as_vd_acl;
242 mask = state->as_vd_acl_mask;
243 count = state->as_vd_acl_count;
244 AC_MEMCPY( matches, state->as_vd_acl_matches,
252 memset(matches, '\0', sizeof(matches));
255 while((a = acl_get( a, &count, be, op, e, desc,
256 MAXREMATCHES, matches )) != NULL)
260 for (i = 0; i < MAXREMATCHES && matches[i].rm_so > 0; i++) {
262 LDAP_LOG(( "acl", LDAP_LEVEL_DETAIL1,
263 "access_allowed: conn %lu match[%d]: %d %d ",
265 (int)matches[i].rm_so, (int)matches[i].rm_eo ));
267 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "=> match[%d]: %d %d ", i,
268 (int)matches[i].rm_so, (int)matches[i].rm_eo );
270 if( matches[i].rm_so <= matches[0].rm_eo ) {
272 for ( n = matches[i].rm_so; n < matches[i].rm_eo; n++) {
273 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "%c", e->e_ndn[n], 0, 0 );
277 LDAP_LOG(( "acl", LDAP_LEVEL_ARGS, "\n" ));
279 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ARGS, "\n", 0, 0, 0 );
284 control = acl_mask( a, &mask, be, conn, op,
285 e, desc, val, matches, count, state );
287 if ( control != ACL_BREAK ) {
291 memset(matches, '\0', sizeof(matches));
294 if ( ACL_IS_INVALID( mask ) ) {
296 LDAP_LOG(( "acl", LDAP_LEVEL_DETAIL1,
297 "access_allowed: conn %lu \"%s\" (%s) invalid!\n",
298 conn->c_connid, e->e_dn, attr ));
300 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
301 "=> access_allowed: \"%s\" (%s) invalid!\n",
306 } else if ( control == ACL_BREAK ) {
308 LDAP_LOG(( "acl", LDAP_LEVEL_DETAIL1,
309 "access_allowed: conn %lu no more rules\n",
312 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
313 "=> access_allowed: no more rules\n", 0, 0, 0);
320 LDAP_LOG(( "acl", LDAP_LEVEL_ENTRY,
321 "access_allowed: conn %lu %s access %s by %s\n",
323 access2str( access ),
324 ACL_GRANT( mask, access ) ? "granted" : "denied",
325 accessmask2str( mask, accessmaskbuf ) ));
327 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
328 "=> access_allowed: %s access %s by %s\n",
329 access2str( access ),
330 ACL_GRANT(mask, access) ? "granted" : "denied",
331 accessmask2str( mask, accessmaskbuf ) );
334 ret = ACL_GRANT(mask, access);
337 if( state != NULL ) {
338 state->as_recorded |= ACL_STATE_RECORDED;
339 state->as_result = ret;
345 * acl_get - return the acl applicable to entry e, attribute
346 * attr. the acl returned is suitable for use in subsequent calls to
347 * acl_access_allowed().
350 static AccessControl *
357 AttributeDescription *desc,
359 regmatch_t *matches )
365 assert( count != NULL );
366 assert( desc != NULL );
368 attr = desc->ad_cname.bv_val;
370 assert( attr != NULL );
385 dnlen = e->e_nname.bv_len;
387 for ( ; a != NULL; a = a->acl_next ) {
390 if (a->acl_dn_pat.bv_len != 0) {
391 if ( a->acl_dn_style == ACL_STYLE_REGEX ) {
393 LDAP_LOG(( "acl", LDAP_LEVEL_DETAIL1,
394 "acl_get: dnpat [%d] %s nsub: %d\n",
395 *count, a->acl_dn_pat.bv_val, (int) a->acl_dn_re.re_nsub ));
397 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "=> dnpat: [%d] %s nsub: %d\n",
398 *count, a->acl_dn_pat.bv_val, (int) a->acl_dn_re.re_nsub );
400 if (regexec(&a->acl_dn_re, e->e_ndn, nmatch, matches, 0))
405 LDAP_LOG(( "acl", LDAP_LEVEL_DETAIL1,
406 "acl_get: dn [%d] %s\n",
407 *count, a->acl_dn_pat.bv_val ));
409 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "=> dn: [%d] %s\n",
410 *count, a->acl_dn_pat.bv_val, 0 );
412 patlen = a->acl_dn_pat.bv_len;
413 if ( dnlen < patlen )
416 if ( a->acl_dn_style == ACL_STYLE_BASE ) {
417 /* base dn -- entire object DN must match */
418 if ( dnlen != patlen )
421 } else if ( a->acl_dn_style == ACL_STYLE_ONE ) {
424 if ( dnlen <= patlen )
427 if ( !DN_SEPARATOR( e->e_ndn[dnlen - patlen - 1] ) )
430 rdnlen = dn_rdnlen( NULL, &e->e_nname );
431 if ( rdnlen != dnlen - patlen - 1 )
434 } else if ( a->acl_dn_style == ACL_STYLE_SUBTREE ) {
435 if ( dnlen > patlen && !DN_SEPARATOR( e->e_ndn[dnlen - patlen - 1] ) )
438 } else if ( a->acl_dn_style == ACL_STYLE_CHILDREN ) {
439 if ( dnlen <= patlen )
441 if ( !DN_SEPARATOR( e->e_ndn[dnlen - patlen - 1] ) )
445 if ( strcmp( a->acl_dn_pat.bv_val, e->e_ndn + dnlen - patlen ) != 0 )
450 LDAP_LOG(( "acl", LDAP_LEVEL_DETAIL1,
451 "acl_get: [%d] matched\n",
454 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "=> acl_get: [%d] matched\n",
459 if ( a->acl_filter != NULL ) {
460 ber_int_t rc = test_filter( NULL, NULL, NULL, e, a->acl_filter );
461 if ( rc != LDAP_COMPARE_TRUE ) {
467 LDAP_LOG(( "acl", LDAP_LEVEL_DETAIL1,
468 "acl_get: [%d] check attr %s\n",
471 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "=> acl_get: [%d] check attr %s\n",
474 if ( attr == NULL || a->acl_attrs == NULL ||
475 ad_inlist( desc, a->acl_attrs ) )
478 LDAP_LOG(( "acl", LDAP_LEVEL_DETAIL1,
479 "acl_get: [%d] acl %s attr: %s\n",
480 *count, e->e_dn, attr ));
482 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
483 "<= acl_get: [%d] acl %s attr: %s\n",
484 *count, e->e_dn, attr );
488 matches[0].rm_so = matches[0].rm_eo = -1;
492 LDAP_LOG(( "acl", LDAP_LEVEL_ENTRY,
493 "acl_get: done.\n" ));
495 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= acl_get: done.\n", 0, 0, 0 );
501 * Record value-dependent access control state
503 #define ACL_RECORD_VALUE_STATE do { \
504 if( state && !( state->as_recorded & ACL_STATE_RECORDED_VD )) { \
505 state->as_recorded |= ACL_STATE_RECORDED_VD; \
506 state->as_vd_acl = a; \
507 AC_MEMCPY( state->as_vd_acl_matches, matches, \
508 sizeof( state->as_vd_acl_matches )) ; \
509 state->as_vd_acl_count = count; \
510 state->as_vd_access = b; \
511 state->as_vd_access_count = i; \
516 * acl_mask - modifies mask based upon the given acl and the
517 * requested access to entry e, attribute attr, value val. if val
518 * is null, access to the whole attribute is assumed (all values).
520 * returns 0 access NOT allowed
524 static slap_control_t
532 AttributeDescription *desc,
536 AccessControlState *state )
538 int i, odnlen, patlen;
541 char accessmaskbuf[ACCESSMASK_MAXLEN];
546 assert( mask != NULL );
547 assert( desc != NULL );
549 attr = desc->ad_cname.bv_val;
551 assert( attr != NULL );
554 LDAP_LOG(( "acl", LDAP_LEVEL_ENTRY,
555 "acl_mask: conn %lu access to entry \"%s\", attr \"%s\" requested\n",
556 conn->c_connid, e->e_dn, attr ));
558 LDAP_LOG(( "acl", LDAP_LEVEL_ARGS,
559 " to %s by \"%s\", (%s) \n",
560 val ? "value" : "all values",
561 op->o_ndn.bv_val ? op->o_ndn.bv_val : "",
562 accessmask2str( *mask, accessmaskbuf ) ));
564 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
565 "=> acl_mask: access to entry \"%s\", attr \"%s\" requested\n",
568 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
569 "=> acl_mask: to %s by \"%s\", (%s) \n",
570 val ? "value" : "all values",
571 op->o_ndn.bv_val ? op->o_ndn.bv_val : "",
572 accessmask2str( *mask, accessmaskbuf ) );
575 if( state && ( state->as_recorded & ACL_STATE_RECORDED_VD )
576 && state->as_vd_acl == a )
578 b = state->as_vd_access;
579 i = state->as_vd_access_count;
586 for ( ; b != NULL; b = b->a_next, i++ ) {
587 slap_mask_t oldmask, modmask;
589 ACL_INVALIDATE( modmask );
591 /* AND <who> clauses */
592 if ( b->a_dn_pat.bv_len != 0 ) {
594 LDAP_LOG(( "acl", LDAP_LEVEL_DETAIL1,
595 "acl_mask: conn %lu check a_dn_pat: %s\n",
596 conn->c_connid, b->a_dn_pat.bv_val ));
598 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= check a_dn_pat: %s\n",
599 b->a_dn_pat.bv_val, 0, 0);
602 * if access applies to the entry itself, and the
603 * user is bound as somebody in the same namespace as
604 * the entry, OR the given dn matches the dn pattern
606 if ( ber_bvcmp( &b->a_dn_pat, &aci_bv_anonymous ) == 0 ) {
607 if ( op->o_ndn.bv_len != 0 ) {
611 } else if ( ber_bvcmp( &b->a_dn_pat, &aci_bv_users ) == 0 ) {
612 if ( op->o_ndn.bv_len == 0 ) {
616 } else if ( ber_bvcmp( &b->a_dn_pat, &aci_bv_self ) == 0 ) {
617 if ( op->o_ndn.bv_len == 0 ) {
621 if ( e->e_dn == NULL || !dn_match( &e->e_nname, &op->o_ndn ) ) {
625 } else if ( b->a_dn_style == ACL_STYLE_REGEX ) {
626 if ( !ber_bvccmp( &b->a_dn_pat, '*' ) ) {
627 int ret = regex_matches( &b->a_dn_pat,
628 op->o_ndn.bv_val, e->e_ndn, matches );
639 if ( e->e_dn == NULL )
642 if ( b->a_dn_expand ) {
646 bv.bv_len = sizeof( buf ) - 1;
649 string_expand(&bv, &b->a_dn_pat,
651 if ( dnNormalize2(NULL, &bv, &pat) != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
652 /* did not expand to a valid dn */
660 odnlen = op->o_ndn.bv_len;
661 if ( odnlen < patlen ) {
662 goto dn_match_cleanup;
666 if ( b->a_dn_style == ACL_STYLE_BASE ) {
667 /* base dn -- entire object DN must match */
668 if ( odnlen != patlen ) {
669 goto dn_match_cleanup;
672 } else if ( b->a_dn_style == ACL_STYLE_ONE ) {
675 if ( odnlen <= patlen ) {
676 goto dn_match_cleanup;
679 if ( !DN_SEPARATOR( op->o_ndn.bv_val[odnlen - patlen - 1] ) ) {
680 goto dn_match_cleanup;
683 rdnlen = dn_rdnlen( NULL, &op->o_ndn );
684 if ( rdnlen != odnlen - patlen - 1 ) {
685 goto dn_match_cleanup;
688 } else if ( b->a_dn_style == ACL_STYLE_SUBTREE ) {
689 if ( odnlen > patlen && !DN_SEPARATOR( op->o_ndn.bv_val[odnlen - patlen - 1] ) ) {
690 goto dn_match_cleanup;
693 } else if ( b->a_dn_style == ACL_STYLE_CHILDREN ) {
694 if ( odnlen <= patlen ) {
695 goto dn_match_cleanup;
698 if ( !DN_SEPARATOR( op->o_ndn.bv_val[odnlen - patlen - 1] ) ) {
699 goto dn_match_cleanup;
703 got_match = !strcmp( pat.bv_val, op->o_ndn.bv_val + odnlen - patlen );
706 if ( pat.bv_val != b->a_dn_pat.bv_val ) {
716 if ( b->a_sockurl_pat.bv_len ) {
718 LDAP_LOG(( "acl", LDAP_LEVEL_DETAIL1,
719 "acl_mask: conn %lu check a_sockurl_pat: %s\n",
720 conn->c_connid, b->a_sockurl_pat.bv_val ));
722 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= check a_sockurl_pat: %s\n",
723 b->a_sockurl_pat.bv_val, 0, 0 );
726 if ( !ber_bvccmp( &b->a_sockurl_pat, '*' ) ) {
727 if ( b->a_sockurl_style == ACL_STYLE_REGEX) {
728 if (!regex_matches( &b->a_sockurl_pat, conn->c_listener_url.bv_val,
729 e->e_ndn, matches ) )
734 if ( ber_bvstrcasecmp( &b->a_sockurl_pat, &conn->c_listener_url ) != 0 )
740 if ( b->a_domain_pat.bv_len ) {
742 LDAP_LOG(( "acl", LDAP_LEVEL_DETAIL1,
743 "acl_mask: conn %lu check a_domain_pat: %s\n",
744 conn->c_connid, b->a_domain_pat.bv_val ));
746 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= check a_domain_pat: %s\n",
747 b->a_domain_pat.bv_val, 0, 0 );
749 if ( !ber_bvccmp( &b->a_domain_pat, '*' ) ) {
750 if ( b->a_domain_style == ACL_STYLE_REGEX) {
751 if (!regex_matches( &b->a_domain_pat, conn->c_peer_domain.bv_val,
752 e->e_ndn, matches ) )
759 struct berval cmp = conn->c_peer_domain;
760 struct berval pat = b->a_domain_pat;
762 if ( b->a_domain_expand ) {
765 bv.bv_len = sizeof(buf);
768 string_expand(&bv, &b->a_domain_pat, e->e_ndn, matches);
772 if ( b->a_domain_style == ACL_STYLE_SUBTREE ) {
773 int offset = cmp.bv_len - pat.bv_len;
778 if ( offset == 1 || ( offset > 1 && cmp.bv_val[ offset - 1 ] != '.' ) ) {
782 /* trim the domain */
783 cmp.bv_val = &cmp.bv_val[ offset ];
784 cmp.bv_len -= offset;
787 if ( ber_bvstrcasecmp( &pat, &cmp ) != 0 ) {
794 if ( b->a_peername_pat.bv_len ) {
796 LDAP_LOG(( "acl", LDAP_LEVEL_DETAIL1,
797 "acl_mask: conn %lu check a_perrname_path: %s\n",
798 conn->c_connid, b->a_peername_pat.bv_val ));
800 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= check a_peername_path: %s\n",
801 b->a_peername_pat.bv_val, 0, 0 );
803 if ( !ber_bvccmp( &b->a_peername_pat, '*' ) ) {
804 if ( b->a_peername_style == ACL_STYLE_REGEX) {
805 if (!regex_matches( &b->a_peername_pat, conn->c_peer_name.bv_val,
806 e->e_ndn, matches ) )
811 if ( ber_bvstrcasecmp( &b->a_peername_pat, &conn->c_peer_name ) != 0 )
817 if ( b->a_sockname_pat.bv_len ) {
819 LDAP_LOG(( "acl", LDAP_LEVEL_DETAIL1,
820 "acl_mask: conn %lu check a_sockname_path: %s\n",
821 conn->c_connid, b->a_sockname_pat.bv_val ));
823 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= check a_sockname_path: %s\n",
824 b->a_sockname_pat.bv_val, 0, 0 );
826 if ( !ber_bvccmp( &b->a_sockname_pat, '*' ) ) {
827 if ( b->a_sockname_style == ACL_STYLE_REGEX) {
828 if (!regex_matches( &b->a_sockname_pat, conn->c_sock_name.bv_val,
829 e->e_ndn, matches ) )
834 if ( ber_bvstrcasecmp( &b->a_sockname_pat, &conn->c_sock_name ) != 0 )
840 if ( b->a_dn_at != NULL ) {
845 const char *attr = b->a_dn_at->ad_cname.bv_val;
847 assert( attr != NULL );
849 if ( op->o_ndn.bv_len == 0 ) {
854 LDAP_LOG(( "acl", LDAP_LEVEL_DETAIL1,
855 "acl_mask: conn %lu check a_dn_pat: %s\n",
856 conn->c_connid, attr ));
858 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= check a_dn_at: %s\n",
863 /* see if asker is listed in dnattr */
864 for( at = attrs_find( e->e_attrs, b->a_dn_at );
866 at = attrs_find( at->a_next, b->a_dn_at ) )
868 if( value_find( b->a_dn_at, at->a_vals, &bv ) == 0 ) {
876 /* have a dnattr match. if this is a self clause then
877 * the target must also match the op dn.
879 if ( b->a_dn_self ) {
880 /* check if the target is an attribute. */
883 /* target is attribute, check if the attribute value
886 rc = value_match( &match, b->a_dn_at,
887 b->a_dn_at->ad_type->sat_equality, 0,
889 /* on match error or no match, fail the ACL clause */
890 if (rc != LDAP_SUCCESS || match != 0 )
894 /* no dnattr match, check if this is a self clause */
895 if ( ! b->a_dn_self )
898 ACL_RECORD_VALUE_STATE;
900 /* this is a self clause, check if the target is an
906 /* target is attribute, check if the attribute value
909 rc = value_match( &match, b->a_dn_at,
910 b->a_dn_at->ad_type->sat_equality, 0,
913 /* on match error or no match, fail the ACL clause */
914 if (rc != LDAP_SUCCESS || match != 0 )
919 if ( b->a_group_pat.bv_len ) {
922 struct berval ndn = { 0, NULL };
925 if ( op->o_ndn.bv_len == 0 ) {
929 bv.bv_len = sizeof(buf) - 1;
932 /* b->a_group is an unexpanded entry name, expanded it should be an
933 * entry with objectclass group* and we test to see if odn is one of
934 * the values in the attribute group
936 /* see if asker is listed in dnattr */
937 if ( b->a_group_style == ACL_STYLE_REGEX ) {
938 string_expand(&bv, &b->a_group_pat, e->e_ndn, matches);
939 if ( dnNormalize2(NULL, &bv, &ndn) != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
940 /* did not expand to a valid dn */
948 rc = backend_group(be, conn, op, e, &bv, &op->o_ndn,
949 b->a_group_oc, b->a_group_at);
957 if ( b->a_set_pat.bv_len != 0 ) {
958 if (aci_match_set( &b->a_set_pat, be, e, conn, op, 0 ) == 0) {
963 if ( b->a_authz.sai_ssf ) {
965 LDAP_LOG(( "acl", LDAP_LEVEL_DETAIL1,
966 "acl_mask: conn %lu check a_authz.sai_ssf: ACL %u > OP %u\n",
967 conn->c_connid, b->a_authz.sai_ssf, op->o_ssf ));
969 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= check a_authz.sai_ssf: ACL %u > OP %u\n",
970 b->a_authz.sai_ssf, op->o_ssf, 0 );
972 if ( b->a_authz.sai_ssf > op->o_ssf ) {
977 if ( b->a_authz.sai_transport_ssf ) {
979 LDAP_LOG(( "acl", LDAP_LEVEL_DETAIL1,
980 "acl_mask: conn %lu check a_authz.sai_transport_ssf: ACL %u > OP %u\n",
981 conn->c_connid, b->a_authz.sai_transport_ssf, op->o_transport_ssf ));
983 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
984 "<= check a_authz.sai_transport_ssf: ACL %u > OP %u\n",
985 b->a_authz.sai_transport_ssf, op->o_transport_ssf, 0 );
987 if ( b->a_authz.sai_transport_ssf > op->o_transport_ssf ) {
992 if ( b->a_authz.sai_tls_ssf ) {
994 LDAP_LOG(( "acl", LDAP_LEVEL_DETAIL1,
995 "acl_mask: conn %lu check a_authz.sai_tls_ssf: ACL %u > OP %u\n",
996 conn->c_connid, b->a_authz.sai_tls_ssf, op->o_tls_ssf ));
998 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
999 "<= check a_authz.sai_tls_ssf: ACL %u > OP %u\n",
1000 b->a_authz.sai_tls_ssf, op->o_tls_ssf, 0 );
1002 if ( b->a_authz.sai_tls_ssf > op->o_tls_ssf ) {
1007 if ( b->a_authz.sai_sasl_ssf ) {
1009 LDAP_LOG(( "acl", LDAP_LEVEL_DETAIL1,
1010 "acl_mask: conn %lu check a_authz.sai_sasl_ssf: ACL %u > OP %u\n",
1011 conn->c_connid, b->a_authz.sai_sasl_ssf, op->o_sasl_ssf ));
1013 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
1014 "<= check a_authz.sai_sasl_ssf: ACL %u > OP %u\n",
1015 b->a_authz.sai_sasl_ssf, op->o_sasl_ssf, 0 );
1017 if ( b->a_authz.sai_sasl_ssf > op->o_sasl_ssf ) {
1022 #ifdef SLAPD_ACI_ENABLED
1023 if ( b->a_aci_at != NULL ) {
1025 slap_access_t grant, deny, tgrant, tdeny;
1027 /* this case works different from the others above.
1028 * since aci's themselves give permissions, we need
1029 * to first check b->a_access_mask, the ACL's access level.
1032 if ( e->e_nname.bv_len == 0 ) {
1033 /* no ACIs in the root DSE */
1037 /* first check if the right being requested
1038 * is allowed by the ACL clause.
1040 if ( ! ACL_GRANT( b->a_access_mask, *mask ) ) {
1044 /* get the aci attribute */
1045 at = attr_find( e->e_attrs, b->a_aci_at );
1050 ACL_RECORD_VALUE_STATE;
1052 /* start out with nothing granted, nothing denied */
1056 /* the aci is an multi-valued attribute. The
1057 * rights are determined by OR'ing the individual
1058 * rights given by the acis.
1060 for ( i = 0; at->a_vals[i].bv_val != NULL; i++ ) {
1061 if (aci_mask( be, conn, op,
1062 e, desc, val, &at->a_vals[i],
1063 matches, &grant, &deny ) != 0)
1070 /* remove anything that the ACL clause does not allow */
1071 tgrant &= b->a_access_mask & ACL_PRIV_MASK;
1072 tdeny &= ACL_PRIV_MASK;
1074 /* see if we have anything to contribute */
1075 if( ACL_IS_INVALID(tgrant) && ACL_IS_INVALID(tdeny) ) {
1079 /* this could be improved by changing acl_mask so that it can deal with
1080 * by clauses that return grant/deny pairs. Right now, it does either
1081 * additive or subtractive rights, but not both at the same time. So,
1082 * we need to combine the grant/deny pair into a single rights mask in
1083 * a smart way: if either grant or deny is "empty", then we use the
1084 * opposite as is, otherwise we remove any denied rights from the grant
1085 * rights mask and construct an additive mask.
1087 if (ACL_IS_INVALID(tdeny)) {
1088 modmask = tgrant | ACL_PRIV_ADDITIVE;
1090 } else if (ACL_IS_INVALID(tgrant)) {
1091 modmask = tdeny | ACL_PRIV_SUBSTRACTIVE;
1094 modmask = (tgrant & ~tdeny) | ACL_PRIV_ADDITIVE;
1100 modmask = b->a_access_mask;
1104 LDAP_LOG(( "acl", LDAP_LEVEL_RESULTS,
1105 "acl_mask: conn %lu [%d] applying %s (%s)\n",
1106 conn->c_connid, i, accessmask2str( modmask, accessmaskbuf),
1107 b->a_type == ACL_CONTINUE ? "continue" : b->a_type == ACL_BREAK
1108 ? "break" : "stop" ));
1110 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
1111 "<= acl_mask: [%d] applying %s (%s)\n",
1112 i, accessmask2str( modmask, accessmaskbuf ),
1113 b->a_type == ACL_CONTINUE
1115 : b->a_type == ACL_BREAK
1122 if( ACL_IS_ADDITIVE(modmask) ) {
1124 ACL_PRIV_SET( *mask, modmask );
1127 ACL_PRIV_CLR( *mask, ~ACL_PRIV_MASK );
1129 } else if( ACL_IS_SUBTRACTIVE(modmask) ) {
1130 /* substract privs */
1131 ACL_PRIV_CLR( *mask, modmask );
1134 ACL_PRIV_CLR( *mask, ~ACL_PRIV_MASK );
1142 LDAP_LOG(( "aci", LDAP_LEVEL_DETAIL1,
1143 "acl_mask: conn %lu [%d] mask: %s\n",
1144 conn->c_connid, i, accessmask2str( *mask, accessmaskbuf) ));
1146 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
1147 "<= acl_mask: [%d] mask: %s\n",
1148 i, accessmask2str(*mask, accessmaskbuf), 0 );
1151 if( b->a_type == ACL_CONTINUE ) {
1154 } else if ( b->a_type == ACL_BREAK ) {
1162 /* implicit "by * none" clause */
1166 LDAP_LOG(( "acl", LDAP_LEVEL_RESULTS,
1167 "acl_mask: conn %lu no more <who> clauses, returning %d (stop)\n",
1168 conn->c_connid, accessmask2str( *mask, accessmaskbuf) ));
1170 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
1171 "<= acl_mask: no more <who> clauses, returning %s (stop)\n",
1172 accessmask2str(*mask, accessmaskbuf), 0, 0 );
1178 * acl_check_modlist - check access control on the given entry to see if
1179 * it allows the given modifications by the user associated with op.
1180 * returns 1 if mods allowed ok
1181 * 0 mods not allowed
1190 Modifications *mlist
1195 assert( be != NULL );
1197 /* short circuit root database access */
1198 if ( be_isroot( be, &op->o_ndn ) ) {
1200 LDAP_LOG(( "acl", LDAP_LEVEL_DETAIL1,
1201 "acl_check_modlist: conn %lu access granted to root user\n",
1204 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
1205 "<= acl_access_allowed: granted to database root\n",
1211 /* use backend default access if no backend acls */
1212 if( be != NULL && be->be_acl == NULL ) {
1214 LDAP_LOG(( "aci", LDAP_LEVEL_DETAIL1,
1215 "acl_check_modlist: conn %lu backend default %s access %s to \"%s\"\n",
1216 conn->c_connid, access2str( ACL_WRITE ),
1217 be->be_dfltaccess >= ACL_WRITE ? "granted" : "denied", op->o_dn.bv_val ));
1219 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
1220 "=> access_allowed: backend default %s access %s to \"%s\"\n",
1221 access2str( ACL_WRITE ),
1222 be->be_dfltaccess >= ACL_WRITE ? "granted" : "denied", op->o_dn.bv_val );
1224 return be->be_dfltaccess >= ACL_WRITE;
1227 /* be is always non-NULL */
1228 /* use global default access if no global acls */
1229 } else if ( be == NULL && global_acl == NULL ) {
1231 LDAP_LOG(( "aci", LDAP_LEVEL_DETAIL1,
1232 "acl_check_modlist: conn %lu global default %s access %s to \"%s\"\n",
1233 conn->c_connid, access2str( ACL_WRITE ),
1234 global_default_access >= ACL_WRITE ? "granted" : "denied", op->o_dn ));
1236 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
1237 "=> access_allowed: global default %s access %s to \"%s\"\n",
1238 access2str( ACL_WRITE ),
1239 global_default_access >= ACL_WRITE ? "granted" : "denied", op->o_dn );
1241 return global_default_access >= ACL_WRITE;
1245 for ( ; mlist != NULL; mlist = mlist->sml_next ) {
1246 static AccessControlState state_init = ACL_STATE_INIT;
1247 AccessControlState state;
1250 * no-user-modification operational attributes are ignored
1251 * by ACL_WRITE checking as any found here are not provided
1254 if ( is_at_no_user_mod( mlist->sml_desc->ad_type ) ) {
1256 LDAP_LOG(( "aci", LDAP_LEVEL_DETAIL1,
1257 "acl_check_modlist: conn %lu no-user-mod %s: modify access granted\n",
1258 conn->c_connid, mlist->sml_desc->ad_cname.bv_val ));
1260 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "acl: no-user-mod %s:"
1261 " modify access granted\n",
1262 mlist->sml_desc->ad_cname.bv_val, 0, 0 );
1269 switch ( mlist->sml_op ) {
1270 case LDAP_MOD_REPLACE:
1272 * We must check both permission to delete the whole
1273 * attribute and permission to add the specific attributes.
1274 * This prevents abuse from selfwriters.
1276 if ( ! access_allowed( be, conn, op, e,
1277 mlist->sml_desc, NULL, ACL_WRITE, &state ) )
1282 if ( mlist->sml_bvalues == NULL ) break;
1284 /* fall thru to check value to add */
1287 assert( mlist->sml_bvalues != NULL );
1289 for ( bv = mlist->sml_bvalues; bv->bv_val != NULL; bv++ ) {
1290 if ( ! access_allowed( be, conn, op, e,
1291 mlist->sml_desc, bv, ACL_WRITE, &state ) )
1298 case LDAP_MOD_DELETE:
1299 if ( mlist->sml_bvalues == NULL ) {
1300 if ( ! access_allowed( be, conn, op, e,
1301 mlist->sml_desc, NULL, ACL_WRITE, NULL ) )
1307 for ( bv = mlist->sml_bvalues; bv->bv_val != NULL; bv++ ) {
1308 if ( ! access_allowed( be, conn, op, e,
1309 mlist->sml_desc, bv, ACL_WRITE, &state ) )
1316 case SLAP_MOD_SOFTADD:
1317 /* allow adding attribute via modrdn thru */
1329 #if 0 /* not used any more */
1331 aci_bvstrdup( struct berval *bv )
1335 s = (char *)ch_malloc(bv->bv_len + 1);
1337 AC_MEMCPY(s, bv->bv_val, bv->bv_len);
1346 struct berval *list,
1360 while (len >= 0 && --ix >= 0) {
1361 while (--len >= 0 && *p++ != sep) ;
1363 while (len >= 0 && *p == ' ') {
1374 while (--len >= 0 && *p != sep) {
1378 while (bv->bv_len > 0 && *--p == ' ')
1384 aci_set_gather (void *cookie, struct berval *name, struct berval *attr)
1386 AciSetCookie *cp = cookie;
1387 BerVarray bvals = NULL;
1390 /* this routine needs to return the bervals instead of
1391 * plain strings, since syntax is not known. It should
1392 * also return the syntax or some "comparison cookie".
1395 if (dnNormalize2(NULL, name, &ndn) == LDAP_SUCCESS) {
1397 AttributeDescription *desc = NULL;
1398 if (slap_bv2ad(attr, &desc, &text) == LDAP_SUCCESS) {
1399 backend_attribute(cp->be, NULL, NULL,
1400 cp->e, &ndn, desc, &bvals);
1409 struct berval *subj,
1417 struct berval set = { 0, NULL };
1419 AciSetCookie cookie;
1422 ber_dupbv( &set, subj );
1424 struct berval subjdn, ndn = { 0, NULL };
1425 struct berval setat;
1428 AttributeDescription *desc = NULL;
1430 /* format of string is "entry/setAttrName" */
1431 if (aci_get_part(subj, 0, '/', &subjdn) < 0) {
1435 if ( aci_get_part(subj, 1, '/', &setat) < 0 ) {
1436 setat.bv_val = SLAPD_ACI_SET_ATTR;
1437 setat.bv_len = sizeof(SLAPD_ACI_SET_ATTR)-1;
1440 if ( setat.bv_val != NULL ) {
1442 * NOTE: dnNormalize2 honors the ber_len field
1443 * as the length of the dn to be normalized
1445 if ( dnNormalize2(NULL, &subjdn, &ndn) == LDAP_SUCCESS
1446 && slap_bv2ad(&setat, &desc, &text) == LDAP_SUCCESS )
1448 backend_attribute(be, NULL, NULL, e,
1449 &ndn, desc, &bvals);
1450 if ( bvals != NULL ) {
1451 if ( bvals[0].bv_val != NULL ) {
1454 bvals[0].bv_val = NULL;
1455 for (i=1;bvals[i].bv_val;i++);
1456 bvals[0].bv_val = bvals[i-1].bv_val;
1457 bvals[i-1].bv_val = NULL;
1459 ber_bvarray_free(bvals);
1467 if (set.bv_val != NULL) {
1472 rc = (slap_set_filter(aci_set_gather, &cookie, &set,
1473 &op->o_ndn, &e->e_nname, NULL) > 0);
1474 ch_free(set.bv_val);
1479 #ifdef SLAPD_ACI_ENABLED
1481 aci_list_map_rights(
1482 struct berval *list )
1489 for (i = 0; aci_get_part(list, i, ',', &bv) >= 0; i++) {
1492 switch (*bv.bv_val) {
1494 ACL_PRIV_SET(mask, ACL_PRIV_COMPARE);
1497 /* **** NOTE: draft-ietf-ldapext-aci-model-0.3.txt defines
1498 * the right 's' to mean "set", but in the examples states
1499 * that the right 's' means "search". The latter definition
1502 ACL_PRIV_SET(mask, ACL_PRIV_SEARCH);
1505 ACL_PRIV_SET(mask, ACL_PRIV_READ);
1508 ACL_PRIV_SET(mask, ACL_PRIV_WRITE);
1511 /* **** NOTE: draft-ietf-ldapext-aci-model-0.3.txt does not
1512 * define any equivalent to the AUTH right, so I've just used
1515 ACL_PRIV_SET(mask, ACL_PRIV_AUTH);
1527 struct berval *list,
1528 const struct berval *attr,
1529 struct berval *val )
1531 struct berval bv, left, right;
1534 for (i = 0; aci_get_part(list, i, ',', &bv) >= 0; i++) {
1535 if (aci_get_part(&bv, 0, '=', &left) < 0
1536 || aci_get_part(&bv, 1, '=', &right) < 0)
1538 if (ber_bvstrcasecmp(attr, &bv) == 0)
1540 } else if (val == NULL) {
1541 if (ber_bvstrcasecmp(attr, &left) == 0)
1544 if (ber_bvstrcasecmp(attr, &left) == 0) {
1545 /* this is experimental code that implements a
1546 * simple (prefix) match of the attribute value.
1547 * the ACI draft does not provide for aci's that
1548 * apply to specific values, but it would be
1549 * nice to have. If the <attr> part of an aci's
1550 * rights list is of the form <attr>=<value>,
1551 * that means the aci applies only to attrs with
1552 * the given value. Furthermore, if the attr is
1553 * of the form <attr>=<value>*, then <value> is
1554 * treated as a prefix, and the aci applies to
1555 * any value with that prefix.
1557 * Ideally, this would allow r.e. matches.
1559 if (aci_get_part(&right, 0, '*', &left) < 0
1560 || right.bv_len <= left.bv_len)
1562 if (ber_bvstrcasecmp(val, &right) == 0)
1564 } else if (val->bv_len >= left.bv_len) {
1565 if (strncasecmp( val->bv_val, left.bv_val, left.bv_len ) == 0)
1574 static slap_access_t
1575 aci_list_get_attr_rights(
1576 struct berval *list,
1577 const struct berval *attr,
1578 struct berval *val )
1584 /* loop through each rights/attr pair, skip first part (action) */
1586 for (i = 1; aci_get_part(list, i + 1, ';', &bv) >= 0; i += 2) {
1587 if (aci_list_has_attr(&bv, attr, val) == 0)
1589 if (aci_get_part(list, i, ';', &bv) < 0)
1591 mask |= aci_list_map_rights(&bv);
1597 aci_list_get_rights(
1598 struct berval *list,
1599 const struct berval *attr,
1601 slap_access_t *grant,
1602 slap_access_t *deny )
1604 struct berval perm, actn;
1605 slap_access_t *mask;
1608 if (attr == NULL || attr->bv_len == 0
1609 || ber_bvstrcasecmp( attr, &aci_bv_entry ) == 0) {
1610 attr = &aci_bv_br_entry;
1616 /* loop through each permissions clause */
1617 for (i = 0; aci_get_part(list, i, '$', &perm) >= 0; i++) {
1618 if (aci_get_part(&perm, 0, ';', &actn) < 0)
1620 if (ber_bvstrcasecmp( &aci_bv_grant, &actn ) == 0) {
1622 } else if (ber_bvstrcasecmp( &aci_bv_deny, &actn ) == 0) {
1629 *mask |= aci_list_get_attr_rights(&perm, attr, val);
1630 *mask |= aci_list_get_attr_rights(&perm, &aci_bv_br_all, NULL);
1637 struct berval *subj,
1638 struct berval *defgrpoc,
1639 struct berval *defgrpat,
1648 struct berval subjdn;
1649 struct berval grpoc;
1650 struct berval grpat;
1651 ObjectClass *grp_oc = NULL;
1652 AttributeDescription *grp_ad = NULL;
1656 /* format of string is "group/objectClassValue/groupAttrName" */
1657 if (aci_get_part(subj, 0, '/', &subjdn) < 0) {
1661 if (aci_get_part(subj, 1, '/', &grpoc) < 0) {
1665 if (aci_get_part(subj, 2, '/', &grpat) < 0) {
1669 rc = slap_bv2ad( &grpat, &grp_ad, &text );
1670 if( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
1676 grp_oc = oc_bvfind( &grpoc );
1678 if (grp_oc != NULL && grp_ad != NULL ) {
1680 bv.bv_val = (char *)ch_malloc(1024);
1682 string_expand(&bv, &subjdn, e->e_ndn, matches);
1683 if ( dnNormalize2(NULL, &bv, &ndn) == LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
1684 rc = (backend_group(be, conn, op, e, &ndn, &op->o_ndn, grp_oc, grp_ad) == 0);
1694 static struct berval GroupClass = {
1695 sizeof(SLAPD_GROUP_CLASS)-1, SLAPD_GROUP_CLASS };
1696 static struct berval GroupAttr = {
1697 sizeof(SLAPD_GROUP_ATTR)-1, SLAPD_GROUP_ATTR };
1698 static struct berval RoleClass = {
1699 sizeof(SLAPD_ROLE_CLASS)-1, SLAPD_ROLE_CLASS };
1700 static struct berval RoleAttr = {
1701 sizeof(SLAPD_ROLE_ATTR)-1, SLAPD_ROLE_ATTR };
1709 AttributeDescription *desc,
1712 regmatch_t *matches,
1713 slap_access_t *grant,
1717 struct berval bv, perms, sdn;
1721 assert( desc->ad_cname.bv_val != NULL );
1723 /* parse an aci of the form:
1724 oid#scope#action;rights;attr;rights;attr$action;rights;attr;rights;attr#dnType#subjectDN
1726 See draft-ietf-ldapext-aci-model-04.txt section 9.1 for
1727 a full description of the format for this attribute.
1729 For now, this routine only supports scope=entry.
1732 /* check that the aci has all 5 components */
1733 if (aci_get_part(aci, 4, '#', NULL) < 0)
1736 /* check that the aci family is supported */
1737 if (aci_get_part(aci, 0, '#', &bv) < 0)
1740 /* check that the scope is "entry" */
1741 if (aci_get_part(aci, 1, '#', &bv) < 0
1742 || ber_bvstrcasecmp( &aci_bv_entry, &bv ) != 0)
1747 /* get the list of permissions clauses, bail if empty */
1748 if (aci_get_part(aci, 2, '#', &perms) <= 0)
1751 /* check if any permissions allow desired access */
1752 if (aci_list_get_rights(&perms, &desc->ad_cname, val, grant, deny) == 0)
1755 /* see if we have a DN match */
1756 if (aci_get_part(aci, 3, '#', &bv) < 0)
1759 if (aci_get_part(aci, 4, '#', &sdn) < 0)
1762 if (ber_bvstrcasecmp( &aci_bv_access_id, &bv ) == 0) {
1765 if ( dnNormalize2(NULL, &sdn, &ndn) == LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
1766 if (!dn_match( &op->o_ndn, &ndn))
1773 if (ber_bvstrcasecmp( &aci_bv_self, &bv ) == 0) {
1774 if (dn_match(&op->o_ndn, &e->e_nname))
1777 } else if (ber_bvstrcasecmp( &aci_bv_dnattr, &bv ) == 0) {
1779 AttributeDescription *ad = NULL;
1782 rc = slap_bv2ad( &sdn, &ad, &text );
1784 if( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
1792 for(at = attrs_find( e->e_attrs, ad );
1794 at = attrs_find( at->a_next, ad ) )
1796 if (value_find( ad, at->a_vals, &bv) == 0 ) {
1805 } else if (ber_bvstrcasecmp( &aci_bv_group, &bv ) == 0) {
1806 if (aci_group_member(&sdn, &GroupClass, &GroupAttr, be, e, conn, op, matches))
1809 } else if (ber_bvstrcasecmp( &aci_bv_role, &bv ) == 0) {
1810 if (aci_group_member(&sdn, &RoleClass, &RoleAttr, be, e, conn, op, matches))
1813 } else if (ber_bvstrcasecmp( &aci_bv_set, &bv ) == 0) {
1814 if (aci_match_set(&sdn, be, e, conn, op, 0))
1817 } else if (ber_bvstrcasecmp( &aci_bv_set_ref, &bv ) == 0) {
1818 if (aci_match_set(&sdn, be, e, conn, op, 1))
1826 #endif /* SLAPD_ACI_ENABLED */
1833 regmatch_t *matches)
1841 bv->bv_val[0] = '\0';
1842 bv->bv_len--; /* leave space for lone $ */
1845 for ( dp = bv->bv_val, sp = pat->bv_val; size < bv->bv_len &&
1846 sp < pat->bv_val + pat->bv_len ; sp++) {
1847 /* did we previously see a $ */
1849 if ( flag == 1 && *sp == '$' ) {
1854 } else if ( flag == 1 && *sp == '{') {
1857 } else if ( *sp >= '0' && *sp <= '9' ) {
1865 for ( sp++; *sp != '\0' && *sp != /* { */ '}'; sp++ ) {
1866 if ( *sp >= '0' && *sp <= '9' ) {
1867 n = 10*n + ( *sp - '0' );
1871 if ( *sp != /* { */ '}' ) {
1876 if ( n >= MAXREMATCHES ) {
1881 i = matches[n].rm_so;
1882 l = matches[n].rm_eo;
1883 for ( ; size < bv->bv_len && i < l; size++, i++ ) {
1901 /* must have ended with a single $ */
1910 LDAP_LOG(( "aci", LDAP_LEVEL_DETAIL1,
1911 "string_expand: pattern = %.*s\n", (int)pat->bv_len, pat->bv_val ));
1912 LDAP_LOG(( "aci", LDAP_LEVEL_DETAIL1,
1913 "string_expand: expanded = %s\n", bv->bv_val ));
1915 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, "=> string_expand: pattern: %.*s\n", (int)pat->bv_len, pat->bv_val, 0 );
1916 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, "=> string_expand: expanded: %s\n", bv->bv_val, 0, 0 );
1922 struct berval *pat, /* pattern to expand and match against */
1923 char *str, /* string to match against pattern */
1924 char *buf, /* buffer with $N expansion variables */
1925 regmatch_t *matches /* offsets in buffer for $N expansion variables */
1933 bv.bv_len = sizeof(newbuf);
1936 if(str == NULL) str = "";
1938 string_expand(&bv, pat, buf, matches);
1939 if (( rc = regcomp(&re, newbuf, REG_EXTENDED|REG_ICASE))) {
1941 regerror(rc, &re, error, sizeof(error));
1944 LDAP_LOG(( "aci", LDAP_LEVEL_ERR,
1945 "regex_matches: compile( \"%s\", \"%s\") failed %s\n",
1946 pat->bv_val, str, error ));
1948 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE,
1949 "compile( \"%s\", \"%s\") failed %s\n",
1950 pat->bv_val, str, error );
1955 rc = regexec(&re, str, 0, NULL, 0);
1959 LDAP_LOG(( "aci", LDAP_LEVEL_DETAIL2,
1960 "regex_matches: string: %s\n", str ));
1961 LDAP_LOG(( "aci", LDAP_LEVEL_DETAIL2,
1962 "regex_matches: rc: %d %s\n",
1963 rc, rc ? "matches" : "no matches" ));
1965 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE,
1966 "=> regex_matches: string: %s\n", str, 0, 0 );
1967 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE,
1968 "=> regex_matches: rc: %d %s\n",
1969 rc, !rc ? "matches" : "no matches", 0 );