1 /* acl.c - routines to parse and check acl's */
4 * Copyright 1998-1999 The OpenLDAP Foundation, All Rights Reserved.
5 * COPYING RESTRICTIONS APPLY, see COPYRIGHT file
13 #include <ac/socket.h>
14 #include <ac/string.h>
18 static AccessControl * acl_get(
19 AccessControl *ac, int *count,
20 Backend *be, Operation *op,
22 int nmatches, regmatch_t *matches );
24 static slap_control_t acl_mask(
25 AccessControl *ac, slap_access_mask_t *mask,
26 Backend *be, Connection *conn, Operation *op,
27 Entry *e, char *attr, struct berval *val,
28 regmatch_t *matches );
30 #ifdef SLAPD_ACI_ENABLED
34 Entry *e, char *attr, struct berval *val, struct berval *aci,
35 regmatch_t *matches, slap_access_t *grant, slap_access_t *deny );
37 char *supportedACIMechs[] = {
38 "1.3.6.1.4.1.4203.666.7.1", /* experimental draft aci family */
39 "1.3.6.1.4.1.4203.666.7.2", /* experimental OpenLDAP aci family */
44 static int regex_matches(char *pat, char *str, char *buf, regmatch_t *matches);
45 static void string_expand(char *newbuf, int bufsiz, char *pattern,
46 char *match, regmatch_t *matches);
50 * access_allowed - check whether op->o_ndn is allowed the requested access
51 * to entry e, attribute attr, value val. if val is null, access to
52 * the whole attribute is assumed (all values).
54 * This routine loops through all access controls and calls
55 * acl_mask() on each applicable access control.
56 * The loop exits when a definitive answer is reached or
57 * or no more controls remain.
77 char accessmaskbuf[ACCESSMASK_MAXLEN];
78 slap_access_mask_t mask;
79 slap_control_t control;
81 regmatch_t matches[MAXREMATCHES];
83 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
84 "=> access_allowed: %s access to \"%s\" \"%s\" requested\n",
90 assert( attr != NULL );
91 assert( access > ACL_NONE );
93 /* grant database root access */
94 if ( be != NULL && be_isroot( be, op->o_ndn ) ) {
95 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
96 "<= root access granted\n",
101 /* no user modify operational attributes are ignored by ACL checking */
102 if ( oc_check_no_usermod_attr( attr ) ) {
103 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "NoUserMod Operational attribute:"
104 " %s access granted\n",
109 /* use backend default access if no backend acls */
110 if( be != NULL && be->be_acl == NULL ) {
111 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
112 "=> access_allowed: backend default %s access %s to \"%s\"\n",
113 access2str( access ),
114 be->be_dfltaccess >= access ? "granted" : "denied", op->o_dn );
116 return be->be_dfltaccess >= access;
119 /* be is always non-NULL */
120 /* use global default access if no global acls */
121 } else if ( be == NULL && global_acl == NULL ) {
122 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
123 "=> access_allowed: global default %s access %s to \"%s\"\n",
124 access2str( access ),
125 global_default_access >= access ? "granted" : "denied", op->o_dn );
127 return global_default_access >= access;
132 memset(matches, 0, sizeof(matches));
138 while( a = acl_get( a, &count, be, op, e, attr, MAXREMATCHES, matches ) )
142 for (i = 0; i < MAXREMATCHES && matches[i].rm_so > 0; i++) {
143 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "=> match[%d]: %d %d ", i,
144 (int)matches[i].rm_so, (int)matches[i].rm_eo );
146 if( matches[i].rm_so <= matches[0].rm_eo ) {
148 for ( n = matches[i].rm_so; n < matches[i].rm_eo; n++) {
149 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "%c", e->e_ndn[n], 0, 0 );
152 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ARGS, "\n", 0, 0, 0 );
155 control = acl_mask( a, &mask, be, conn, op,
156 e, attr, val, matches );
158 if ( control != ACL_BREAK ) {
162 memset(matches, 0, sizeof(matches));
165 if ( ACL_IS_INVALID( mask ) ) {
166 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
167 "=> access_allowed: \"%s\" (%s) invalid!\n",
171 } else if ( control == ACL_BREAK ) {
172 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
173 "=> access_allowed: no more rules\n", 0, 0, 0);
177 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
178 "=> access_allowed: %s access %s by %s\n",
179 access2str( access ),
180 ACL_GRANT(mask, access) ? "granted" : "denied",
181 accessmask2str( mask, accessmaskbuf ) );
183 return ACL_GRANT(mask, access);
187 * acl_get - return the acl applicable to entry e, attribute
188 * attr. the acl returned is suitable for use in subsequent calls to
189 * acl_access_allowed().
192 static AccessControl *
205 assert( count != NULL );
220 for ( ; a != NULL; a = a->acl_next ) {
223 if (a->acl_dn_pat != NULL) {
224 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "=> dnpat: [%d] %s nsub: %d\n",
225 *count, a->acl_dn_pat, (int) a->acl_dn_re.re_nsub );
227 if (regexec(&a->acl_dn_re, e->e_ndn, nmatch, matches, 0)) {
231 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "=> acl_get: [%d] matched\n",
236 if ( a->acl_filter != NULL ) {
237 if ( test_filter( NULL, NULL, NULL, e, a->acl_filter ) != 0 ) {
242 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "=> acl_get: [%d] check attr %s\n",
245 if ( attr == NULL || a->acl_attrs == NULL ||
246 charray_inlist( a->acl_attrs, attr ) )
248 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
249 "<= acl_get: [%d] acl %s attr: %s\n",
250 *count, e->e_dn, attr );
253 matches[0].rm_so = matches[0].rm_eo = -1;
256 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= acl_get: done.\n", 0, 0, 0 );
262 * acl_mask - modifies mask based upon the given acl and the
263 * requested access to entry e, attribute attr, value val. if val
264 * is null, access to the whole attribute is assumed (all values).
266 * returns 0 access NOT allowed
270 static slap_control_t
273 slap_access_mask_t *mask,
285 char accessmaskbuf[ACCESSMASK_MAXLEN];
288 assert( mask != NULL );
290 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
291 "=> acl_mask: access to entry \"%s\", attr \"%s\" requested\n",
294 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
295 "=> acl_mask: to value \"%s\" by \"%s\", (%s) \n",
296 val ? val->bv_val : "*",
297 op->o_ndn ? op->o_ndn : "",
298 accessmask2str( *mask, accessmaskbuf ) );
300 for ( i = 1, b = a->acl_access; b != NULL; b = b->a_next, i++ ) {
301 slap_access_mask_t oldmask, modmask;
303 ACL_INVALIDATE( modmask );
305 /* AND <who> clauses */
306 if ( b->a_dn_pat != NULL ) {
307 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= check a_dn_pat: %s\n",
310 * if access applies to the entry itself, and the
311 * user is bound as somebody in the same namespace as
312 * the entry, OR the given dn matches the dn pattern
314 if ( strcmp( b->a_dn_pat, "anonymous" ) == 0 ) {
315 if (op->o_ndn != NULL && op->o_ndn[0] != '\0' ) {
319 } else if ( strcmp( b->a_dn_pat, "users" ) == 0 ) {
320 if (op->o_ndn == NULL || op->o_ndn[0] == '\0' ) {
324 } else if ( strcmp( b->a_dn_pat, "self" ) == 0 ) {
325 if( op->o_ndn == NULL || op->o_ndn[0] == '\0' ) {
329 if ( e->e_dn == NULL || strcmp( e->e_ndn, op->o_ndn ) != 0 ) {
333 } else if ( strcmp( b->a_dn_pat, "*" ) != 0 ) {
334 int ret = regex_matches( b->a_dn_pat,
335 op->o_ndn, e->e_ndn, matches );
343 if ( b->a_sockurl_pat != NULL ) {
344 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= check a_sockurl_pat: %s\n",
345 b->a_sockurl_pat, 0, 0 );
347 if ( strcmp( b->a_sockurl_pat, "*" ) != 0 &&
348 !regex_matches( b->a_sockurl_pat, conn->c_listener_url,
349 e->e_ndn, matches ) )
355 if ( b->a_domain_pat != NULL ) {
356 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= check a_domain_pat: %s\n",
357 b->a_domain_pat, 0, 0 );
359 if ( strcmp( b->a_domain_pat, "*" ) != 0 &&
360 !regex_matches( b->a_domain_pat, conn->c_peer_domain,
361 e->e_ndn, matches ) )
367 if ( b->a_peername_pat != NULL ) {
368 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= check a_peername_path: %s\n",
369 b->a_peername_pat, 0, 0 );
371 if ( strcmp( b->a_peername_pat, "*" ) != 0 &&
372 !regex_matches( b->a_peername_pat, conn->c_peer_name,
373 e->e_ndn, matches ) )
379 if ( b->a_sockname_pat != NULL ) {
380 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= check a_sockname_path: %s\n",
381 b->a_sockname_pat, 0, 0 );
383 if ( strcmp( b->a_sockname_pat, "*" ) != 0 &&
384 !regex_matches( b->a_sockname_pat, conn->c_sock_name,
385 e->e_ndn, matches ) )
391 if ( b->a_dn_at != NULL && op->o_ndn != NULL ) {
395 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= check a_dn_at: %s\n",
398 bv.bv_val = op->o_ndn;
399 bv.bv_len = strlen( bv.bv_val );
401 /* see if asker is listed in dnattr */
402 if ( (at = attr_find( e->e_attrs, b->a_dn_at )) != NULL &&
403 value_find( at->a_vals, &bv, at->a_syntax, 3 ) == 0 )
406 (val == NULL || value_cmp( &bv, val, at->a_syntax, 2 )) )
411 /* asker not listed in dnattr - check for self access */
412 } else if ( ! b->a_dn_self || val == NULL ||
413 value_cmp( &bv, val, at->a_syntax, 2 ) != 0 )
419 if ( b->a_group_pat != NULL && op->o_ndn != NULL ) {
422 /* b->a_group is an unexpanded entry name, expanded it should be an
423 * entry with objectclass group* and we test to see if odn is one of
424 * the values in the attribute group
426 /* see if asker is listed in dnattr */
427 string_expand(buf, sizeof(buf), b->a_group_pat, e->e_ndn, matches);
428 if ( dn_normalize(buf) == NULL ) {
429 /* did not expand to a valid dn */
433 if (backend_group(be, e, buf, op->o_ndn,
434 b->a_group_oc, b->a_group_at) != 0)
440 #ifdef SLAPD_ACI_ENABLED
441 if ( b->a_aci_at != NULL ) {
443 slap_access_t grant, deny, tgrant, tdeny;
445 /* this case works different from the others above.
446 * since aci's themselves give permissions, we need
447 * to first check b->a_mask, the ACL's access level.
450 if( op->o_ndn == NULL || op->o_ndn[0] == '\0' ) {
454 if ( e->e_dn == NULL ) {
458 /* first check if the right being requested
459 * is allowed by the ACL clause.
461 if ( ! ACL_GRANT( b->a_mask, *mask ) ) {
465 /* get the aci attribute */
466 at = attr_find( e->e_attrs, b->a_aci_at );
471 /* start out with nothing granted, nothing denied */
475 /* the aci is an multi-valued attribute. The
476 * rights are determined by OR'ing the individual
477 * rights given by the acis.
479 for ( i = 0; at->a_vals[i] != NULL; i++ ) {
480 if (aci_mask( be, op,
481 e, attr, val, at->a_vals[i],
482 matches, &grant, &deny ) != 0)
489 /* remove anything that the ACL clause does not allow */
490 tgrant &= b->a_mask & ACL_PRIV_MASK;
491 tdeny &= ACL_PRIV_MASK;
493 /* see if we have anything to contribute */
494 if( ACL_IS_INVALID(tgrant) && ACL_IS_INVALID(tdeny) ) {
498 /* this could be improved by changing acl_mask so that it can deal with
499 * by clauses that return grant/deny pairs. Right now, it does either
500 * additive or subtractive rights, but not both at the same time. So,
501 * we need to combine the grant/deny pair into a single rights mask in
502 * a smart way: if either grant or deny is "empty", then we use the
503 * opposite as is, otherwise we remove any denied rights from the grant
504 * rights mask and construct an additive mask.
506 if (ACL_IS_INVALID(tdeny)) {
507 modmask = tgrant | ACL_PRIV_ADDITIVE;
509 } else if (ACL_IS_INVALID(tgrant)) {
510 modmask = tdeny | ACL_PRIV_SUBSTRACTIVE;
513 modmask = (tgrant & ~tdeny) | ACL_PRIV_ADDITIVE;
523 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
524 "<= acl_mask: [%d] applying %s (%s)\n",
525 i, accessmask2str( modmask, accessmaskbuf ),
526 b->a_type == ACL_CONTINUE
528 : b->a_type == ACL_BREAK
535 if( ACL_IS_ADDITIVE(modmask) ) {
537 ACL_PRIV_SET( *mask, modmask );
540 ACL_PRIV_CLR( *mask, ~ACL_PRIV_MASK );
542 } else if( ACL_IS_SUBTRACTIVE(modmask) ) {
543 /* substract privs */
544 ACL_PRIV_CLR( *mask, modmask );
547 ACL_PRIV_CLR( *mask, ~ACL_PRIV_MASK );
554 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
555 "<= acl_mask: [%d] mask: %s\n",
556 i, accessmask2str(*mask, accessmaskbuf), 0 );
558 if( b->a_type == ACL_CONTINUE ) {
561 } else if ( b->a_type == ACL_BREAK ) {
569 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
570 "<= acl_mask: no more <who> clauses, returning %s (stop)\n",
571 accessmask2str(*mask, accessmaskbuf), 0, 0 );
576 * acl_check_modlist - check access control on the given entry to see if
577 * it allows the given modifications by the user associated with op.
578 * returns 1 if mods allowed ok
593 assert( be != NULL );
595 /* short circuit root database access */
596 if ( be_isroot( be, op->o_ndn ) ) {
597 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
598 "<= acl_access_allowed: granted to database root\n",
603 /* use backend default access if no backend acls */
604 if( be != NULL && be->be_acl == NULL ) {
605 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
606 "=> access_allowed: backend default %s access %s to \"%s\"\n",
607 access2str( ACL_WRITE ),
608 be->be_dfltaccess >= ACL_WRITE ? "granted" : "denied", op->o_dn );
610 return be->be_dfltaccess >= ACL_WRITE;
613 /* be is always non-NULL */
614 /* use global default access if no global acls */
615 } else if ( be == NULL && global_acl == NULL ) {
616 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
617 "=> access_allowed: global default %s access %s to \"%s\"\n",
618 access2str( ACL_WRITE ),
619 global_default_access >= ACL_WRITE ? "granted" : "denied", op->o_dn );
621 return global_default_access >= ACL_WRITE;
625 for ( ; mlist != NULL; mlist = mlist->ml_next ) {
626 /* the lastmod attributes are ignored by ACL checking */
627 if ( oc_check_no_usermod_attr( mlist->ml_type ) ) {
628 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "Operational attribute: %s access allowed\n",
629 mlist->ml_type, 0, 0 );
633 switch ( mlist->ml_op & ~LDAP_MOD_BVALUES ) {
634 case LDAP_MOD_REPLACE:
636 if ( mlist->ml_bvalues == NULL ) {
639 for ( i = 0; mlist->ml_bvalues[i] != NULL; i++ ) {
640 if ( ! access_allowed( be, conn, op, e,
641 mlist->ml_type, mlist->ml_bvalues[i],
649 case LDAP_MOD_DELETE:
650 if ( mlist->ml_bvalues == NULL ) {
651 if ( ! access_allowed( be, conn, op, e,
652 mlist->ml_type, NULL,
659 for ( i = 0; mlist->ml_bvalues[i] != NULL; i++ ) {
660 if ( ! access_allowed( be, conn, op, e,
661 mlist->ml_type, mlist->ml_bvalues[i],
674 #ifdef SLAPD_ACI_ENABLED
676 aci_bvstrdup (struct berval *bv)
680 s = (char *)ch_malloc(bv->bv_len + 1);
682 memcpy(s, bv->bv_val, bv->bv_len);
689 aci_strbvcmp (char *s, struct berval *bv)
693 res = strncasecmp( s, bv->bv_val, bv->bv_len );
697 if (len > (int)bv->bv_len)
699 if (len < (int)bv->bv_len)
705 aci_get_part (struct berval *list, int ix, char sep, struct berval *bv)
716 while (len >= 0 && --ix >= 0) {
717 while (--len >= 0 && *p++ != sep) ;
719 while (len >= 0 && *p == ' ') {
730 while (--len >= 0 && *p != sep) {
734 while (bv->bv_len > 0 && *--p == ' ')
740 aci_list_map_rights (
748 for (i = 0; aci_get_part(list, i, ',', &bv) >= 0; i++) {
751 switch (*bv.bv_val) {
753 ACL_PRIV_SET(mask, ACL_PRIV_COMPARE);
756 /* **** NOTE: draft-ietf-ldapext-aci-model-0.3.txt defines
757 * the right 's' to mean "set", but in the examples states
758 * that the right 's' means "search". The latter definition
761 ACL_PRIV_SET(mask, ACL_PRIV_SEARCH);
764 ACL_PRIV_SET(mask, ACL_PRIV_READ);
767 ACL_PRIV_SET(mask, ACL_PRIV_WRITE);
770 /* **** NOTE: draft-ietf-ldapext-aci-model-0.3.txt does not
771 * define any equivalent to the AUTH right, so I've just used
774 ACL_PRIV_SET(mask, ACL_PRIV_AUTH);
785 aci_list_has_attr (struct berval *list, char *attr, struct berval *val)
787 struct berval bv, left, right;
790 for (i = 0; aci_get_part(list, i, ',', &bv) >= 0; i++) {
791 if (aci_get_part(&bv, 0, '=', &left) < 0
792 || aci_get_part(&bv, 1, '=', &right) < 0)
794 if (aci_strbvcmp(attr, &bv) == 0)
796 } else if (val == NULL) {
797 if (aci_strbvcmp(attr, &left) == 0)
800 if (aci_strbvcmp(attr, &left) == 0) {
801 /* this is experimental code that implements a
802 * simple (prefix) match of the attribute value.
803 * the ACI draft does not provide for aci's that
804 * apply to specific values, but it would be
805 * nice to have. If the <attr> part of an aci's
806 * rights list is of the form <attr>=<value>,
807 * that means the aci applies only to attrs with
808 * the given value. Furthermore, if the attr is
809 * of the form <attr>=<value>*, then <value> is
810 * treated as a prefix, and the aci applies to
811 * any value with that prefix.
813 * Ideally, this would allow r.e. matches.
815 if (aci_get_part(&right, 0, '*', &left) < 0
816 || right.bv_len <= left.bv_len)
818 if (aci_strbvcmp(val->bv_val, &right) == 0)
820 } else if (val->bv_len >= left.bv_len) {
821 if (strncasecmp( val->bv_val, left.bv_val, left.bv_len ) == 0)
831 aci_list_get_attr_rights (struct berval *list, char *attr, struct berval *val)
837 /* loop through each rights/attr pair, skip first part (action) */
839 for (i = 1; aci_get_part(list, i + 1, ';', &bv) >= 0; i += 2) {
840 if (aci_list_has_attr(&bv, attr, val) == 0)
842 if (aci_get_part(list, i, ';', &bv) < 0)
844 mask |= aci_list_map_rights(&bv);
850 aci_list_get_rights (
854 slap_access_t *grant,
857 struct berval perm, actn;
861 if (attr == NULL || *attr == 0 || strcasecmp(attr, "entry") == 0) {
868 /* loop through each permissions clause */
869 for (i = 0; aci_get_part(list, i, '$', &perm) >= 0; i++) {
870 if (aci_get_part(&perm, 0, ';', &actn) < 0)
872 if (aci_strbvcmp( "grant", &actn ) == 0) {
874 } else if (aci_strbvcmp( "deny", &actn ) == 0) {
881 *mask |= aci_list_get_attr_rights(&perm, attr, val);
882 *mask |= aci_list_get_attr_rights(&perm, "[all]", NULL);
899 char *subjdn, *grpdn;
902 /* format of string is "group/objectClassValue/groupAttrName" */
903 if (aci_get_part(subj, 0, '/', &bv) < 0)
905 subjdn = aci_bvstrdup(&bv);
909 if (aci_get_part(subj, 1, '/', &bv) < 0)
910 grpoc = ch_strdup(grpoc);
912 grpoc = aci_bvstrdup(&bv);
914 if (aci_get_part(subj, 2, '/', &bv) < 0)
915 grpat = ch_strdup(grpat);
917 grpat = aci_bvstrdup(&bv);
919 grpdn = (char *)ch_malloc(1024);
920 if (grpoc != NULL && grpat != NULL && grpdn != NULL) {
921 string_expand(grpdn, 1024, subjdn, e->e_ndn, matches);
922 if ( dn_normalize(grpdn) != NULL ) {
923 rc = (backend_group(be, e, grpdn, op->o_ndn, grpoc, grpat) == 0);
944 slap_access_t *grant,
948 struct berval bv, perms, sdn;
952 /* parse an aci of the form:
953 oid#scope#action;rights;attr;rights;attr$action;rights;attr;rights;attr#dnType#subjectDN
955 See draft-ietf-ldapext-aci-model-04.txt section 9.1 for
956 a full description of the format for this attribute.
958 For now, this routine only supports scope=entry.
961 /* check that the aci has all 5 components */
962 if (aci_get_part(aci, 4, '#', NULL) < 0)
965 /* check that the aci family is supported */
966 if (aci_get_part(aci, 0, '#', &bv) < 0)
968 for (i = 0; supportedACIMechs[i] != NULL; i++) {
969 if (aci_strbvcmp( supportedACIMechs[i], &bv ) == 0)
972 if (supportedACIMechs[i] == NULL)
975 /* check that the scope is "entry" */
976 if (aci_get_part(aci, 1, '#', &bv) < 0
977 || aci_strbvcmp( "entry", &bv ) != 0)
982 /* get the list of permissions clauses, bail if empty */
983 if (aci_get_part(aci, 2, '#', &perms) <= 0)
986 /* check if any permissions allow desired access */
987 if (aci_list_get_rights(&perms, attr, val, grant, deny) == 0)
990 /* see if we have a DN match */
991 if (aci_get_part(aci, 3, '#', &bv) < 0)
994 if (aci_get_part(aci, 4, '#', &sdn) < 0)
997 if (aci_strbvcmp( "access-id", &bv ) == 0) {
998 subjdn = aci_bvstrdup(&sdn);
1002 if ( dn_normalize(subjdn) != NULL )
1003 if (strcasecmp(op->o_ndn, subjdn) != 0)
1009 if (aci_strbvcmp( "self", &bv ) == 0) {
1010 if (strcasecmp(op->o_ndn, e->e_ndn) == 0)
1013 } else if (aci_strbvcmp( "dnattr", &bv ) == 0) {
1017 attrname = aci_bvstrdup(&sdn);
1018 at = attr_find(e->e_attrs, attrname);
1022 bv.bv_val = op->o_ndn;
1023 bv.bv_len = strlen( bv.bv_val );
1025 if (value_find( at->a_vals, &bv, at->a_syntax, 3 ) == 0 )
1029 } else if (aci_strbvcmp( "group", &bv ) == 0) {
1030 if (aci_group_member(&sdn, "groupOfNames", "member", be, e, op, matches))
1033 } else if (aci_strbvcmp( "role", &bv ) == 0) {
1034 if (aci_group_member(&sdn, "organizationalRole", "roleOccupant", be, e, op, matches))
1042 get_supported_acimech (int index)
1044 if (index < 0 || index >= (sizeof(supportedACIMechs) / sizeof(char *)))
1046 return(supportedACIMechs[index]);
1049 #endif /* SLAPD_ACI_ENABLED */
1057 regmatch_t *matches)
1066 bufsiz--; /* leave space for lone $ */
1069 for ( dp = newbuf, sp = pat; size < bufsiz && *sp ; sp++) {
1070 /* did we previously see a $ */
1075 } else if (*sp >= '0' && *sp <= '9' ) {
1082 i = matches[n].rm_so;
1083 l = matches[n].rm_eo;
1084 for ( ; size < 512 && i < l; size++, i++ ) {
1102 /* must have ended with a single $ */
1109 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, "=> string_expand: pattern: %s\n", pat, 0, 0 );
1110 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, "=> string_expand: expanded: %s\n", newbuf, 0, 0 );
1115 char *pat, /* pattern to expand and match against */
1116 char *str, /* string to match against pattern */
1117 char *buf, /* buffer with $N expansion variables */
1118 regmatch_t *matches /* offsets in buffer for $N expansion variables */
1125 if(str == NULL) str = "";
1127 string_expand(newbuf, sizeof(newbuf), pat, buf, matches);
1128 if (( rc = regcomp(&re, newbuf, REG_EXTENDED|REG_ICASE))) {
1130 regerror(rc, &re, error, sizeof(error));
1132 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE,
1133 "compile( \"%s\", \"%s\") failed %s\n",
1138 rc = regexec(&re, str, 0, NULL, 0);
1141 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE,
1142 "=> regex_matches: string: %s\n", str, 0, 0 );
1143 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE,
1144 "=> regex_matches: rc: %d %s\n",
1145 rc, !rc ? "matches" : "no matches", 0 );