2 /* This work is part of OpenLDAP Software <http://www.openldap.org/>.
4 * Copyright 1998-2004 The OpenLDAP Foundation.
5 * Portions Copyright 2000 Mark Adamson, Carnegie Mellon.
8 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
9 * modification, are permitted only as authorized by the OpenLDAP
12 * A copy of this license is available in the file LICENSE in the
13 * top-level directory of the distribution or, alternatively, at
14 * <http://www.OpenLDAP.org/license.html>.
21 #include <ac/stdlib.h>
22 #include <ac/string.h>
30 #define SASLREGEX_REPLACE 10
32 #define LDAP_X_SCOPE_EXACT ((ber_int_t) 0x0010)
33 #define LDAP_X_SCOPE_REGEX ((ber_int_t) 0x0020)
34 #define LDAP_X_SCOPE_CHILDREN ((ber_int_t) 0x0030)
35 #define LDAP_X_SCOPE_SUBTREE ((ber_int_t) 0x0040)
36 #define LDAP_X_SCOPE_ONELEVEL ((ber_int_t) 0x0050)
39 * IDs in DNauthzid form can now have a type specifier, that
40 * influences how they are used in related operations.
42 * syntax: dn[.{exact|regex}]:<val>
44 * dn.exact: the value must pass normalization and is used
46 * dn.regex: the value is treated as a regular expression
47 * in matching DN values in saslAuthz{To|From}
49 * dn: for backwards compatibility reasons, the value
50 * is treated as a regular expression, and thus
51 * it is not normalized nor validated; it is used
52 * in exact or regex comparisons based on the
55 * IDs in DNauthzid form can now have a type specifier, that
56 * influences how they are used in related operations.
58 * syntax: u[.mech[/realm]]:<val>
60 * where mech is a SIMPLE, AUTHZ, or a SASL mechanism name
61 * and realm is mechanism specific realm (separate to those
62 * which are representable as part of the principal).
65 typedef struct sasl_regexp {
66 char *sr_match; /* regexp match pattern */
67 char *sr_replace; /* regexp replace pattern */
68 regex_t sr_workspace; /* workspace for regexp engine */
69 int sr_offset[SASLREGEX_REPLACE+2]; /* offsets of $1,$2... in *replace */
72 static int nSaslRegexp = 0;
73 static SaslRegexp_t *SaslRegexp = NULL;
75 /* What SASL proxy authorization policies are allowed? */
76 #define SASL_AUTHZ_NONE 0x00
77 #define SASL_AUTHZ_FROM 0x01
78 #define SASL_AUTHZ_TO 0x02
79 #define SASL_AUTHZ_AND 0x10
81 static int authz_policy = SASL_AUTHZ_NONE;
83 int slap_sasl_setpolicy( const char *arg )
85 int rc = LDAP_SUCCESS;
87 if ( strcasecmp( arg, "none" ) == 0 ) {
88 authz_policy = SASL_AUTHZ_NONE;
89 } else if ( strcasecmp( arg, "from" ) == 0 ) {
90 authz_policy = SASL_AUTHZ_FROM;
91 } else if ( strcasecmp( arg, "to" ) == 0 ) {
92 authz_policy = SASL_AUTHZ_TO;
93 } else if ( strcasecmp( arg, "both" ) == 0 || strcasecmp( arg, "any" ) == 0 ) {
94 authz_policy = SASL_AUTHZ_FROM | SASL_AUTHZ_TO;
95 } else if ( strcasecmp( arg, "all" ) == 0 ) {
96 authz_policy = SASL_AUTHZ_FROM | SASL_AUTHZ_TO | SASL_AUTHZ_AND;
103 int slap_parse_user( struct berval *id, struct berval *user,
104 struct berval *realm, struct berval *mech )
109 assert( id->bv_val );
116 if ( u != 'u' && u != 'U' ) {
117 /* called with something other than u: */
118 return LDAP_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
122 * u[.mech[/realm]]:user
125 user->bv_val = strchr( id->bv_val, ':' );
126 if ( user->bv_val == NULL ) {
127 return LDAP_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
129 user->bv_val[ 0 ] = '\0';
131 user->bv_len = id->bv_len - ( user->bv_val - id->bv_val );
133 mech->bv_val = strchr( id->bv_val, '.' );
134 if ( mech->bv_val != NULL ) {
135 mech->bv_val[ 0 ] = '\0';
138 realm->bv_val = strchr( mech->bv_val, '/' );
140 if ( realm->bv_val ) {
141 realm->bv_val[ 0 ] = '\0';
143 mech->bv_len = realm->bv_val - mech->bv_val - 1;
144 realm->bv_len = user->bv_val - realm->bv_val - 1;
146 mech->bv_len = user->bv_val - mech->bv_val - 1;
150 realm->bv_val = NULL;
153 if ( id->bv_val[ 1 ] != '\0' ) {
154 return LDAP_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
157 if ( mech->bv_val != NULL ) {
158 assert( mech->bv_val == id->bv_val + 2 );
160 AC_MEMCPY( mech->bv_val - 2, mech->bv_val, mech->bv_len + 1 );
164 if ( realm->bv_val ) {
165 assert( realm->bv_val >= id->bv_val + 2 );
167 AC_MEMCPY( realm->bv_val - 2, realm->bv_val, realm->bv_len + 1 );
171 /* leave "u:" before user */
174 user->bv_val[ 0 ] = u;
175 user->bv_val[ 1 ] = ':';
180 static int slap_parseURI( Operation *op, struct berval *uri,
181 struct berval *base, struct berval *nbase,
182 int *scope, Filter **filter, struct berval *fstr )
188 assert( uri != NULL && uri->bv_val != NULL );
191 nbase->bv_val = NULL;
199 LDAP_LOG( TRANSPORT, ENTRY,
200 "slap_parseURI: parsing %s\n", uri->bv_val, 0, 0 );
202 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE,
203 "slap_parseURI: parsing %s\n", uri->bv_val, 0, 0 );
206 rc = LDAP_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
207 if ( !strncasecmp( uri->bv_val, "dn", sizeof( "dn" ) - 1 ) ) {
208 bv.bv_val = uri->bv_val + sizeof( "dn" ) - 1;
210 if ( bv.bv_val[ 0 ] == '.' ) {
213 if ( !strncasecmp( bv.bv_val, "exact:", sizeof( "exact:" ) - 1 ) ) {
214 bv.bv_val += sizeof( "exact" ) - 1;
215 *scope = LDAP_X_SCOPE_EXACT;
217 } else if ( !strncasecmp( bv.bv_val, "regex:", sizeof( "regex:" ) - 1 ) ) {
218 bv.bv_val += sizeof( "regex" ) - 1;
219 *scope = LDAP_X_SCOPE_REGEX;
221 } else if ( !strncasecmp( bv.bv_val, "children:", sizeof( "chldren:" ) - 1 ) ) {
222 bv.bv_val += sizeof( "children" ) - 1;
223 *scope = LDAP_X_SCOPE_CHILDREN;
225 } else if ( !strncasecmp( bv.bv_val, "subtree:", sizeof( "subtree:" ) - 1 ) ) {
226 bv.bv_val += sizeof( "subtree" ) - 1;
227 *scope = LDAP_X_SCOPE_SUBTREE;
229 } else if ( !strncasecmp( bv.bv_val, "onelevel:", sizeof( "onelevel:" ) - 1 ) ) {
230 bv.bv_val += sizeof( "onelevel" ) - 1;
231 *scope = LDAP_X_SCOPE_ONELEVEL;
234 return LDAP_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
238 if ( bv.bv_val[ 0 ] != ':' ) {
239 return LDAP_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
243 bv.bv_val += strspn( bv.bv_val, " " );
244 /* jump here in case no type specification was present
245 * and uir was not an URI... HEADS-UP: assuming EXACT */
246 is_dn: bv.bv_len = uri->bv_len - (bv.bv_val - uri->bv_val);
249 case LDAP_X_SCOPE_EXACT:
250 case LDAP_X_SCOPE_CHILDREN:
251 case LDAP_X_SCOPE_SUBTREE:
252 case LDAP_X_SCOPE_ONELEVEL:
253 rc = dnNormalize( 0, NULL, NULL, &bv, nbase, op->o_tmpmemctx );
254 if( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
259 case LDAP_X_SCOPE_REGEX:
260 ber_dupbv_x( nbase, &bv, op->o_tmpmemctx );
271 } else if ( ( uri->bv_val[ 0 ] == 'u' || uri->bv_val[ 0 ] == 'U' )
272 && ( uri->bv_val[ 1 ] == ':'
273 || uri->bv_val[ 1 ] == '/'
274 || uri->bv_val[ 1 ] == '.' ) )
276 Connection c = *op->o_conn;
277 char buf[ SLAP_LDAPDN_MAXLEN ];
283 if ( sizeof( buf ) <= uri->bv_len ) {
284 return LDAP_INVALID_SYNTAX;
287 id.bv_len = uri->bv_len;
289 strncpy( buf, uri->bv_val, sizeof( buf ) );
291 rc = slap_parse_user( &id, &user, &realm, &mech );
292 if ( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
297 c.c_sasl_bind_mech = mech;
299 c.c_sasl_bind_mech.bv_val = "AUTHZ";
300 c.c_sasl_bind_mech.bv_len = sizeof( "AUTHZ" ) - 1;
303 rc = slap_sasl_getdn( &c, op, user.bv_val, user.bv_len,
304 realm.bv_val, nbase, SLAP_GETDN_AUTHZID );
306 if ( rc == LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
307 *scope = LDAP_X_SCOPE_EXACT;
313 rc = ldap_url_parse( uri->bv_val, &ludp );
314 if ( rc == LDAP_URL_ERR_BADSCHEME ) {
315 /* last chance: assume it's a(n exact) DN ... */
316 bv.bv_val = uri->bv_val;
317 *scope = LDAP_X_SCOPE_EXACT;
321 if ( rc != LDAP_URL_SUCCESS ) {
322 return LDAP_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
325 if (( ludp->lud_host && *ludp->lud_host )
326 || ludp->lud_attrs || ludp->lud_exts )
328 /* host part must be empty */
329 /* attrs and extensions parts must be empty */
330 rc = LDAP_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
335 *scope = ludp->lud_scope;
337 /* Grab the filter */
338 if ( ludp->lud_filter ) {
339 *filter = str2filter_x( op, ludp->lud_filter );
340 if ( *filter == NULL ) {
341 rc = LDAP_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
344 ber_str2bv( ludp->lud_filter, 0, 0, fstr );
347 /* Grab the searchbase */
348 ber_str2bv( ludp->lud_dn, 0, 0, base );
349 rc = dnNormalize( 0, NULL, NULL, base, nbase, op->o_tmpmemctx );
352 if( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
353 if( *filter ) filter_free_x( op, *filter );
359 /* Don't free these, return them to caller */
360 ludp->lud_filter = NULL;
364 ldap_free_urldesc( ludp );
368 static int slap_sasl_rx_off(char *rep, int *off)
373 /* Precompile replace pattern. Find the $<n> placeholders */
376 for ( c = rep; *c; c++ ) {
377 if ( *c == '\\' && c[1] ) {
382 if ( n == SASLREGEX_REPLACE ) {
384 LDAP_LOG( TRANSPORT, ERR,
385 "slap_sasl_rx_off: \"%s\" has too many $n "
386 "placeholders (max %d)\n", rep, SASLREGEX_REPLACE, 0 );
388 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ANY,
389 "SASL replace pattern %s has too many $n "
390 "placeholders (max %d)\n",
391 rep, SASLREGEX_REPLACE, 0 );
394 return( LDAP_OTHER );
401 /* Final placeholder, after the last $n */
405 return( LDAP_SUCCESS );
408 int slap_sasl_regexp_config( const char *match, const char *replace )
413 SaslRegexp = (SaslRegexp_t *) ch_realloc( (char *) SaslRegexp,
414 (nSaslRegexp + 1) * sizeof(SaslRegexp_t) );
416 reg = &SaslRegexp[nSaslRegexp];
418 reg->sr_match = ch_strdup( match );
419 reg->sr_replace = ch_strdup( replace );
421 /* Precompile matching pattern */
422 rc = regcomp( ®->sr_workspace, reg->sr_match, REG_EXTENDED|REG_ICASE );
425 LDAP_LOG( TRANSPORT, ERR,
426 "slap_sasl_regexp_config: \"%s\" could not be compiled.\n",
427 reg->sr_match, 0, 0 );
429 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ANY,
430 "SASL match pattern %s could not be compiled by regexp engine\n",
431 reg->sr_match, 0, 0 );
434 return( LDAP_OTHER );
437 rc = slap_sasl_rx_off( reg->sr_replace, reg->sr_offset );
438 if ( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) return rc;
441 return( LDAP_SUCCESS );
445 /* Perform replacement on regexp matches */
446 static void slap_sasl_rx_exp(
450 const char *saslname,
454 int i, n, len, insert;
456 /* Get the total length of the final URI */
460 while( off[n] >= 0 ) {
461 /* Len of next section from replacement string (x,y,z above) */
462 len += off[n] - off[n-1] - 2;
466 /* Len of string from saslname that matched next $i (b,d above) */
467 i = rep[ off[n] + 1 ] - '0';
468 len += str[i].rm_eo - str[i].rm_so;
471 out->bv_val = sl_malloc( len + 1, ctx );
474 /* Fill in URI with replace string, replacing $i as we go */
477 while( off[n] >= 0) {
478 /* Paste in next section from replacement string (x,y,z above) */
479 len = off[n] - off[n-1] - 2;
480 strncpy( out->bv_val+insert, rep + off[n-1] + 2, len);
485 /* Paste in string from saslname that matched next $i (b,d above) */
486 i = rep[ off[n] + 1 ] - '0';
487 len = str[i].rm_eo - str[i].rm_so;
488 strncpy( out->bv_val+insert, saslname + str[i].rm_so, len );
494 out->bv_val[insert] = '\0';
497 /* Take the passed in SASL name and attempt to convert it into an
498 LDAP URI to find the matching LDAP entry, using the pattern matching
499 strings given in the saslregexp config file directive(s) */
501 static int slap_sasl_regexp( struct berval *in, struct berval *out,
502 int flags, void *ctx )
504 char *saslname = in->bv_val;
506 regmatch_t sr_strings[SASLREGEX_REPLACE]; /* strings matching $1,$2 ... */
509 memset( out, 0, sizeof( *out ) );
512 LDAP_LOG( TRANSPORT, ENTRY,
513 "slap_sasl_regexp: converting SASL name %s\n", saslname, 0, 0 );
515 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, "slap_sasl_regexp: converting SASL name %s\n",
519 if (( saslname == NULL ) || ( nSaslRegexp == 0 )) {
523 /* Match the normalized SASL name to the saslregexp patterns */
524 for( reg = SaslRegexp,i=0; i<nSaslRegexp; i++,reg++ ) {
525 if ( regexec( ®->sr_workspace, saslname, SASLREGEX_REPLACE,
526 sr_strings, 0) == 0 )
530 if( i >= nSaslRegexp ) return( 0 );
533 * The match pattern may have been of the form "a(b.*)c(d.*)e" and the
534 * replace pattern of the form "x$1y$2z". The returned string needs
535 * to replace the $1,$2 with the strings that matched (b.*) and (d.*)
537 slap_sasl_rx_exp( reg->sr_replace, reg->sr_offset,
538 sr_strings, saslname, out, ctx );
541 LDAP_LOG( TRANSPORT, ENTRY,
542 "slap_sasl_regexp: converted SASL name to %s\n",
543 out->bv_len ? out->bv_val : "", 0, 0 );
545 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE,
546 "slap_sasl_regexp: converted SASL name to %s\n",
547 out->bv_len ? out->bv_val : "", 0, 0 );
553 /* This callback actually does some work...*/
554 static int sasl_sc_sasl2dn( Operation *o, SlapReply *rs )
556 struct berval *ndn = o->o_callback->sc_private;
558 if (rs->sr_type != REP_SEARCH) return 0;
560 /* We only want to be called once */
562 o->o_tmpfree(ndn->bv_val, o->o_tmpmemctx);
566 LDAP_LOG( TRANSPORT, DETAIL1,
567 "slap_sc_sasl2dn: search DN returned more than 1 entry\n", 0, 0, 0 );
569 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE,
570 "slap_sc_sasl2dn: search DN returned more than 1 entry\n", 0, 0, 0 );
575 ber_dupbv_x(ndn, &rs->sr_entry->e_nname, o->o_tmpmemctx);
580 typedef struct smatch_info {
585 static int sasl_sc_smatch( Operation *o, SlapReply *rs )
587 smatch_info *sm = o->o_callback->sc_private;
589 if (rs->sr_type != REP_SEARCH) return 0;
591 if (dn_match(sm->dn, &rs->sr_entry->e_nname)) {
593 return -1; /* short-circuit the search */
600 * Map a SASL regexp rule to a DN. If the rule is just a DN or a scope=base
601 * URI, just strcmp the rule (or its searchbase) to the *assertDN. Otherwise,
602 * the rule must be used as an internal search for entries. If that search
603 * returns the *assertDN entry, the match is successful.
605 * The assertDN should not have the dn: prefix
609 int slap_sasl_match( Operation *opx, struct berval *rule,
610 struct berval *assertDN, struct berval *authc )
615 slap_callback cb = { NULL, sasl_sc_smatch, NULL, NULL };
617 SlapReply rs = {REP_RESULT};
620 LDAP_LOG( TRANSPORT, ENTRY,
621 "slap_sasl_match: comparing DN %s to rule %s\n",
622 assertDN->bv_val, rule->bv_val,0 );
624 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE,
625 "===>slap_sasl_match: comparing DN %s to rule %s\n",
626 assertDN->bv_val, rule->bv_val, 0 );
629 rc = slap_parseURI( opx, rule, &op.o_req_dn,
630 &op.o_req_ndn, &op.oq_search.rs_scope, &op.oq_search.rs_filter,
632 if( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) goto CONCLUDED;
634 /* Massive shortcut: search scope == base */
635 switch ( op.oq_search.rs_scope ) {
636 case LDAP_SCOPE_BASE:
637 case LDAP_X_SCOPE_EXACT:
639 if ( dn_match( &op.o_req_ndn, assertDN ) ) {
642 rc = LDAP_INAPPROPRIATE_AUTH;
646 case LDAP_X_SCOPE_CHILDREN:
647 case LDAP_X_SCOPE_SUBTREE:
648 case LDAP_X_SCOPE_ONELEVEL:
650 int d = assertDN->bv_len - op.o_req_ndn.bv_len;
652 rc = LDAP_INAPPROPRIATE_AUTH;
654 if ( d == 0 && op.oq_search.rs_scope == LDAP_X_SCOPE_SUBTREE ) {
657 } else if ( d > 0 ) {
660 bv.bv_len = op.o_req_ndn.bv_len;
661 bv.bv_val = assertDN->bv_val + d;
663 if ( bv.bv_val[ -1 ] == ',' && dn_match( &op.o_req_ndn, &bv ) ) {
664 switch ( op.oq_search.rs_scope ) {
665 case LDAP_X_SCOPE_CHILDREN:
669 case LDAP_X_SCOPE_ONELEVEL:
673 dnParent( assertDN, &pdn );
674 /* the common portion of the DN
675 * already matches, so only check
676 * if parent DN of assertedDN
677 * is all the pattern */
678 if ( pdn.bv_len == op.o_req_ndn.bv_len ) {
684 /* at present, impossible */
692 case LDAP_X_SCOPE_REGEX:
693 rc = regcomp(®, op.o_req_ndn.bv_val,
694 REG_EXTENDED|REG_ICASE|REG_NOSUB);
696 rc = regexec(®, assertDN->bv_val, 0, NULL, 0);
702 rc = LDAP_INAPPROPRIATE_AUTH;
710 /* Must run an internal search. */
711 if ( op.oq_search.rs_filter == NULL ) {
712 rc = LDAP_FILTER_ERROR;
717 LDAP_LOG( TRANSPORT, DETAIL1,
718 "slap_sasl_match: performing internal search (base=%s, scope=%d)\n",
719 op.o_req_ndn.bv_val, op.oq_search.rs_scope, 0 );
721 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE,
722 "slap_sasl_match: performing internal search (base=%s, scope=%d)\n",
723 op.o_req_ndn.bv_val, op.oq_search.rs_scope, 0 );
726 op.o_bd = select_backend( &op.o_req_ndn, 0, 1 );
727 if(( op.o_bd == NULL ) || ( op.o_bd->be_search == NULL)) {
728 rc = LDAP_INAPPROPRIATE_AUTH;
736 op.o_tag = LDAP_REQ_SEARCH;
737 op.o_protocol = LDAP_VERSION3;
740 op.o_time = slap_get_time();
741 op.o_do_not_cache = 1;
742 op.o_is_auth_check = 1;
743 op.o_threadctx = opx->o_threadctx;
744 op.o_tmpmemctx = opx->o_tmpmemctx;
745 op.o_tmpmfuncs = opx->o_tmpmfuncs;
749 op.o_conn = opx->o_conn;
750 op.o_connid = opx->o_connid;
751 op.o_req_dn = op.o_req_ndn;
753 op.o_bd->be_search( &op, &rs );
758 rc = LDAP_INAPPROPRIATE_AUTH;
762 if( op.o_req_dn.bv_len ) ch_free( op.o_req_dn.bv_val );
763 if( op.o_req_ndn.bv_len ) sl_free( op.o_req_ndn.bv_val, opx->o_tmpmemctx );
764 if( op.oq_search.rs_filter ) filter_free_x( opx, op.oq_search.rs_filter );
765 if( op.ors_filterstr.bv_len ) ch_free( op.ors_filterstr.bv_val );
768 LDAP_LOG( TRANSPORT, ENTRY,
769 "slap_sasl_match: comparison returned %d\n", rc, 0, 0 );
771 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE,
772 "<===slap_sasl_match: comparison returned %d\n", rc, 0, 0);
780 * This function answers the question, "Can this ID authorize to that ID?",
781 * based on authorization rules. The rules are stored in the *searchDN, in the
782 * attribute named by *attr. If any of those rules map to the *assertDN, the
783 * authorization is approved.
785 * The DNs should not have the dn: prefix
788 slap_sasl_check_authz( Operation *op,
789 struct berval *searchDN,
790 struct berval *assertDN,
791 AttributeDescription *ad,
792 struct berval *authc )
798 LDAP_LOG( TRANSPORT, ENTRY,
799 "slap_sasl_check_authz: does %s match %s rule in %s?\n",
800 assertDN->bv_val, ad->ad_cname.bv_val, searchDN->bv_val);
802 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE,
803 "==>slap_sasl_check_authz: does %s match %s rule in %s?\n",
804 assertDN->bv_val, ad->ad_cname.bv_val, searchDN->bv_val);
807 rc = backend_attribute( op, NULL,
808 searchDN, ad, &vals );
809 if( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) goto COMPLETE;
811 /* Check if the *assertDN matches any **vals */
813 for( i=0; vals[i].bv_val != NULL; i++ ) {
814 rc = slap_sasl_match( op, &vals[i], assertDN, authc );
815 if ( rc == LDAP_SUCCESS ) goto COMPLETE;
818 rc = LDAP_INAPPROPRIATE_AUTH;
821 if( vals ) ber_bvarray_free_x( vals, op->o_tmpmemctx );
824 LDAP_LOG( TRANSPORT, RESULTS,
825 "slap_sasl_check_authz: %s check returning %s\n",
826 ad->ad_cname.bv_val, rc, 0 );
828 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE,
829 "<==slap_sasl_check_authz: %s check returning %d\n",
830 ad->ad_cname.bv_val, rc, 0);
837 * Given a SASL name (e.g. "UID=name,cn=REALM,cn=MECH,cn=AUTH")
838 * return the LDAP DN to which it matches. The SASL regexp rules in the config
839 * file turn the SASL name into an LDAP URI. If the URI is just a DN (or a
840 * search with scope=base), just return the URI (or its searchbase). Otherwise
841 * an internal search must be done, and if that search returns exactly one
842 * entry, return the DN of that one entry.
844 void slap_sasl2dn( Operation *opx,
845 struct berval *saslname, struct berval *sasldn, int flags )
848 slap_callback cb = { NULL, sasl_sc_sasl2dn, NULL, NULL };
850 SlapReply rs = {REP_RESULT};
851 struct berval regout = { 0, NULL };
854 LDAP_LOG( TRANSPORT, ENTRY,
855 "slap_sasl2dn: converting SASL name %s to DN.\n",
856 saslname->bv_val, 0, 0 );
858 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, "==>slap_sasl2dn: "
859 "converting SASL name %s to a DN\n",
860 saslname->bv_val, 0,0 );
863 sasldn->bv_val = NULL;
865 cb.sc_private = sasldn;
867 /* Convert the SASL name into a minimal URI */
868 if( !slap_sasl_regexp( saslname, ®out, flags, opx->o_tmpmemctx ) ) {
872 rc = slap_parseURI( opx, ®out, &op.o_req_dn,
873 &op.o_req_ndn, &op.oq_search.rs_scope, &op.oq_search.rs_filter,
875 if( regout.bv_val ) sl_free( regout.bv_val, opx->o_tmpmemctx );
876 if( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
880 /* Must do an internal search */
881 op.o_bd = select_backend( &op.o_req_ndn, 0, 1 );
883 /* Massive shortcut: search scope == base */
884 switch ( op.oq_search.rs_scope ) {
885 case LDAP_SCOPE_BASE:
886 case LDAP_X_SCOPE_EXACT:
887 *sasldn = op.o_req_ndn;
888 op.o_req_ndn.bv_len = 0;
889 op.o_req_ndn.bv_val = NULL;
890 /* intentionally continue to next case */
892 case LDAP_X_SCOPE_REGEX:
893 case LDAP_X_SCOPE_SUBTREE:
894 case LDAP_X_SCOPE_CHILDREN:
895 case LDAP_X_SCOPE_ONELEVEL:
896 /* correctly parsed, but illegal */
899 case LDAP_SCOPE_ONELEVEL:
900 case LDAP_SCOPE_SUBTREE:
901 case LDAP_SCOPE_SUBORDINATE:
906 /* catch unhandled cases (there shouldn't be) */
911 LDAP_LOG( TRANSPORT, DETAIL1,
912 "slap_sasl2dn: performing internal search (base=%s, scope=%d)\n",
913 op.o_req_ndn.bv_val, op.oq_search.rs_scope, 0 );
915 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE,
916 "slap_sasl2dn: performing internal search (base=%s, scope=%d)\n",
917 op.o_req_ndn.bv_val, op.oq_search.rs_scope, 0 );
920 if(( op.o_bd == NULL ) || ( op.o_bd->be_search == NULL)) {
924 op.o_conn = opx->o_conn;
925 op.o_connid = opx->o_connid;
926 op.o_tag = LDAP_REQ_SEARCH;
927 op.o_protocol = LDAP_VERSION3;
928 op.o_ndn = opx->o_conn->c_ndn;
930 op.o_time = slap_get_time();
931 op.o_do_not_cache = 1;
932 op.o_is_auth_check = 1;
933 op.o_threadctx = opx->o_threadctx;
934 op.o_tmpmemctx = opx->o_tmpmemctx;
935 op.o_tmpmfuncs = opx->o_tmpmfuncs;
939 op.oq_search.rs_deref = LDAP_DEREF_NEVER;
940 op.oq_search.rs_slimit = 1;
941 op.oq_search.rs_attrsonly = 1;
942 op.o_req_dn = op.o_req_ndn;
944 op.o_bd->be_search( &op, &rs );
947 if( sasldn->bv_len ) {
948 opx->o_conn->c_authz_backend = op.o_bd;
950 if( op.o_req_dn.bv_len ) ch_free( op.o_req_dn.bv_val );
951 if( op.o_req_ndn.bv_len ) sl_free( op.o_req_ndn.bv_val, opx->o_tmpmemctx );
952 if( op.oq_search.rs_filter ) filter_free_x( opx, op.oq_search.rs_filter );
953 if( op.ors_filterstr.bv_len ) ch_free( op.ors_filterstr.bv_val );
956 LDAP_LOG( TRANSPORT, ENTRY,
957 "slap_sasl2dn: Converted SASL name to %s\n",
958 sasldn->bv_len ? sasldn->bv_val : "<nothing>", 0, 0 );
960 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, "<==slap_sasl2dn: Converted SASL name to %s\n",
961 sasldn->bv_len ? sasldn->bv_val : "<nothing>", 0, 0 );
968 /* Check if a bind can SASL authorize to another identity.
969 * The DNs should not have the dn: prefix
972 int slap_sasl_authorized( Operation *op,
973 struct berval *authcDN, struct berval *authzDN )
975 int rc = LDAP_INAPPROPRIATE_AUTH;
977 /* User binding as anonymous */
978 if ( authzDN == NULL ) {
984 LDAP_LOG( TRANSPORT, ENTRY,
985 "slap_sasl_authorized: can %s become %s?\n",
986 authcDN->bv_val, authzDN->bv_val, 0 );
988 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE,
989 "==>slap_sasl_authorized: can %s become %s?\n",
990 authcDN->bv_val, authzDN->bv_val, 0 );
993 /* If person is authorizing to self, succeed */
994 if ( dn_match( authcDN, authzDN ) ) {
999 /* Allow the manager to authorize as any DN. */
1000 if( op->o_conn->c_authz_backend && be_isroot( op->o_conn->c_authz_backend, authcDN )) {
1005 /* Check source rules */
1006 if( authz_policy & SASL_AUTHZ_TO ) {
1007 rc = slap_sasl_check_authz( op, authcDN, authzDN,
1008 slap_schema.si_ad_saslAuthzTo, authcDN );
1009 if( rc == LDAP_SUCCESS && !(authz_policy & SASL_AUTHZ_AND) ) {
1014 /* Check destination rules */
1015 if( authz_policy & SASL_AUTHZ_FROM ) {
1016 rc = slap_sasl_check_authz( op, authzDN, authcDN,
1017 slap_schema.si_ad_saslAuthzFrom, authcDN );
1018 if( rc == LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
1023 rc = LDAP_INAPPROPRIATE_AUTH;
1028 LDAP_LOG( TRANSPORT, RESULTS, "slap_sasl_authorized: return %d\n", rc,0,0 );
1030 Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE,
1031 "<== slap_sasl_authorized: return %d\n", rc, 0, 0 );