/* $OpenLDAP$ */
/*
- * Copyright 1998-1999 The OpenLDAP Foundation, All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1998-2002 The OpenLDAP Foundation, All Rights Reserved.
* COPYING RESTRICTIONS APPLY, see COPYRIGHT file
*/
#include "portable.h"
+#include <ac/string.h>
+#include <ac/time.h>
+#include <ac/unistd.h>
+
+#ifdef HAVE_PROCESS_H
+#include <process.h>
+#endif
+
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <lutil.h>
/*
* lutil_entropy() provides nbytes of entropy in buf.
* Quality offerred is suitable for one-time uses, such as "once" keys.
+ * Values may not be suitable for multi-time uses.
+ *
+ * Note: Callers are encouraged to provide additional bytes of
+ * of entropy in the buf argument. This information is used in
+ * fallback mode to improve the quality of bytes returned.
+ *
+ * This routinue should be extended to support additional sources
+ * of entropy.
*/
-int lutil_entropy( char *buf, int nbytes )
+int lutil_entropy( unsigned char *buf, ber_len_t nbytes )
{
- if( nbytes < 0 ) return -1;
if( nbytes == 0 ) return 0;
#ifdef URANDOM_DEVICE
+#define URANDOM_NREADS 4
/* Linux and *BSD offer a urandom device */
{
- int rc, fd;
+ int rc, fd, n=0;
fd = open( URANDOM_DEVICE, O_RDONLY );
if( fd < 0 ) return -1;
- rc = read( fd, buf, nbytes );
+ do {
+ rc = read( fd, buf, nbytes );
+ if( rc <= 0 ) break;
+
+ buf+=rc;
+ nbytes-=rc;
+
+ if( ++n >= URANDOM_NREADS ) break;
+ } while( nbytes > 0 );
+
close(fd);
+ return nbytes > 0 ? -1 : 0;
+ }
+#elif PROV_RSA_FULL
+ {
+ /* Not used since _WIN32_WINNT not set... */
+ HCRYPTPROV hProv = 0;
- /* should return nbytes */
- if( rc < nbytes ) return -1;
+ /* Get handle to user default provider */
+ if(!CryptAcquireContext(&hProv, NULL, NULL, PROV_RSA_FULL, 0)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Generate random initialization vector */
+ if(!CryptGenRandom(hProv, (DWORD) nbytes, (BYTE *) buf)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Release provider handle */
+ if(hProv != 0) CryptReleaseContext(hProv, 0);
return 0;
}
#else
{
/* based upon Phil Karn's "practical randomness" idea
- * but implementation 100% OpenLDAP. So don't blame Phil. */
- /* worse case is this is a MD5 hash of a counter, if
- * MD5 is a strong cryptographic hash, this should
- * be fairly resistant to attack
+ * but implementation 100% OpenLDAP. So don't blame Phil.
+ *
+ * Worse case is that this is a MD5 hash of a counter, if
+ * MD5 is a strong cryptographic hash, this should be fairly
+ * resistant to attack
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * the caller may need to provide external synchronization OR
+ * provide entropy (in buf) to ensure quality results as
+ * access to this counter may not be atomic.
*/
static int counter = 0;
- int n;
+ ber_len_t n;
struct rdata_s {
int counter;
- char *buf;
+ unsigned char *buf;
struct rdata_s *stack;
pid_t pid;
#ifdef HAVE_GETTIMEOFDAY
- struct timeval *tv;
+ struct timeval tv;
#else
time_t time;
#endif
- unsigned long junk;
+
+ unsigned long junk; /* purposely not initialized */
} rdata;
/* make sure rdata differs for each process */
struct lutil_MD5Context ctx;
char digest[16];
- /* hopefully has good resolution */
+ /* poor resolution */
#ifdef HAVE_GETTIMEOFDAY
- (void) gettimeofday( &rdata.tv, sizeof( rdata.tv ) );
+ (void) gettimeofday( &rdata.tv, NULL );
#else
(void) time( &rdata.time );
#endif
rdata.junk++;
lutil_MD5Init( &ctx );
- lutil_MD5Update( &ctx, (char *) &rdata, sizeof( rdata ) );
+ lutil_MD5Update( &ctx, (unsigned char *) &rdata, sizeof( rdata ) );
+
+ /* allow caller to provided additional entropy */
+ lutil_MD5Update( &ctx, buf, nbytes );
+
lutil_MD5Final( digest, &ctx );
- memcpy( &buf[n], digest,
- nbytes - n > 16 ? 16 : nbytes - n );
+ AC_MEMCPY( &buf[n], digest,
+ nbytes - n >= 16 ? 16 : nbytes - n );
}
return 0;