--- /dev/null
+/*\r
+ * X.509 certificate parsing and verification\r
+ *\r
+ * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved\r
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0\r
+ *\r
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may\r
+ * not use this file except in compliance with the License.\r
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at\r
+ *\r
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0\r
+ *\r
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software\r
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT\r
+ * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.\r
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and\r
+ * limitations under the License.\r
+ *\r
+ * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org)\r
+ */\r
+/*\r
+ * The ITU-T X.509 standard defines a certificate format for PKI.\r
+ *\r
+ * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5280.txt (Certificates and CRLs)\r
+ * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3279.txt (Alg IDs for CRLs)\r
+ * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2986.txt (CSRs, aka PKCS#10)\r
+ *\r
+ * http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/languages/X.680-0207.pdf\r
+ * http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/languages/X.690-0207.pdf\r
+ *\r
+ * [SIRO] https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/Chunghwatelecom201503cabforumV4.pdf\r
+ */\r
+\r
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)\r
+#include "mbedtls/config.h"\r
+#else\r
+#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE\r
+#endif\r
+\r
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)\r
+\r
+#include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h"\r
+#include "mbedtls/oid.h"\r
+#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"\r
+\r
+#include <string.h>\r
+\r
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C)\r
+#include "mbedtls/pem.h"\r
+#endif\r
+\r
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)\r
+#include "psa/crypto.h"\r
+#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h"\r
+#endif\r
+\r
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)\r
+#include "mbedtls/platform.h"\r
+#else\r
+#include <stdio.h>\r
+#include <stdlib.h>\r
+#define mbedtls_free free\r
+#define mbedtls_calloc calloc\r
+#define mbedtls_snprintf snprintf\r
+#endif\r
+\r
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)\r
+#include "mbedtls/threading.h"\r
+#endif\r
+\r
+#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32)\r
+#include <windows.h>\r
+#else\r
+#include <time.h>\r
+#endif\r
+\r
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)\r
+#include <stdio.h>\r
+#if !defined(_WIN32) || defined(EFIX64) || defined(EFI32)\r
+#include <sys/types.h>\r
+#include <sys/stat.h>\r
+#include <dirent.h>\r
+#endif /* !_WIN32 || EFIX64 || EFI32 */\r
+#endif\r
+\r
+/*\r
+ * Item in a verification chain: cert and flags for it\r
+ */\r
+typedef struct {\r
+ mbedtls_x509_crt *crt;\r
+ uint32_t flags;\r
+} x509_crt_verify_chain_item;\r
+\r
+/*\r
+ * Max size of verification chain: end-entity + intermediates + trusted root\r
+ */\r
+#define X509_MAX_VERIFY_CHAIN_SIZE ( MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA + 2 )\r
+\r
+/*\r
+ * Default profile\r
+ */\r
+const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default =\r
+{\r
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TLS_DEFAULT_ALLOW_SHA1_IN_CERTIFICATES)\r
+ /* Allow SHA-1 (weak, but still safe in controlled environments) */\r
+ MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 ) |\r
+#endif\r
+ /* Only SHA-2 hashes */\r
+ MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224 ) |\r
+ MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 ) |\r
+ MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ) |\r
+ MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512 ),\r
+ 0xFFFFFFF, /* Any PK alg */\r
+ 0xFFFFFFF, /* Any curve */\r
+ 2048,\r
+};\r
+\r
+/*\r
+ * Next-default profile\r
+ */\r
+const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_next =\r
+{\r
+ /* Hashes from SHA-256 and above */\r
+ MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 ) |\r
+ MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ) |\r
+ MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512 ),\r
+ 0xFFFFFFF, /* Any PK alg */\r
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)\r
+ /* Curves at or above 128-bit security level */\r
+ MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1 ) |\r
+ MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1 ) |\r
+ MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1 ) |\r
+ MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1 ) |\r
+ MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1 ) |\r
+ MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1 ) |\r
+ MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1 ),\r
+#else\r
+ 0,\r
+#endif\r
+ 2048,\r
+};\r
+\r
+/*\r
+ * NSA Suite B Profile\r
+ */\r
+const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_suiteb =\r
+{\r
+ /* Only SHA-256 and 384 */\r
+ MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 ) |\r
+ MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ),\r
+ /* Only ECDSA */\r
+ MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA ) |\r
+ MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ),\r
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)\r
+ /* Only NIST P-256 and P-384 */\r
+ MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1 ) |\r
+ MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1 ),\r
+#else\r
+ 0,\r
+#endif\r
+ 0,\r
+};\r
+\r
+/*\r
+ * Check md_alg against profile\r
+ * Return 0 if md_alg is acceptable for this profile, -1 otherwise\r
+ */\r
+static int x509_profile_check_md_alg( const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile,\r
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg )\r
+{\r
+ if( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE )\r
+ return( -1 );\r
+\r
+ if( ( profile->allowed_mds & MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( md_alg ) ) != 0 )\r
+ return( 0 );\r
+\r
+ return( -1 );\r
+}\r
+\r
+/*\r
+ * Check pk_alg against profile\r
+ * Return 0 if pk_alg is acceptable for this profile, -1 otherwise\r
+ */\r
+static int x509_profile_check_pk_alg( const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile,\r
+ mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg )\r
+{\r
+ if( pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE )\r
+ return( -1 );\r
+\r
+ if( ( profile->allowed_pks & MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( pk_alg ) ) != 0 )\r
+ return( 0 );\r
+\r
+ return( -1 );\r
+}\r
+\r
+/*\r
+ * Check key against profile\r
+ * Return 0 if pk is acceptable for this profile, -1 otherwise\r
+ */\r
+static int x509_profile_check_key( const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile,\r
+ const mbedtls_pk_context *pk )\r
+{\r
+ const mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg = mbedtls_pk_get_type( pk );\r
+\r
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)\r
+ if( pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA || pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS )\r
+ {\r
+ if( mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen( pk ) >= profile->rsa_min_bitlen )\r
+ return( 0 );\r
+\r
+ return( -1 );\r
+ }\r
+#endif\r
+\r
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)\r
+ if( pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA ||\r
+ pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ||\r
+ pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH )\r
+ {\r
+ const mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid = mbedtls_pk_ec( *pk )->grp.id;\r
+\r
+ if( gid == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE )\r
+ return( -1 );\r
+\r
+ if( ( profile->allowed_curves & MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( gid ) ) != 0 )\r
+ return( 0 );\r
+\r
+ return( -1 );\r
+ }\r
+#endif\r
+\r
+ return( -1 );\r
+}\r
+\r
+/*\r
+ * Like memcmp, but case-insensitive and always returns -1 if different\r
+ */\r
+static int x509_memcasecmp( const void *s1, const void *s2, size_t len )\r
+{\r
+ size_t i;\r
+ unsigned char diff;\r
+ const unsigned char *n1 = s1, *n2 = s2;\r
+\r
+ for( i = 0; i < len; i++ )\r
+ {\r
+ diff = n1[i] ^ n2[i];\r
+\r
+ if( diff == 0 )\r
+ continue;\r
+\r
+ if( diff == 32 &&\r
+ ( ( n1[i] >= 'a' && n1[i] <= 'z' ) ||\r
+ ( n1[i] >= 'A' && n1[i] <= 'Z' ) ) )\r
+ {\r
+ continue;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ return( -1 );\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ return( 0 );\r
+}\r
+\r
+/*\r
+ * Return 0 if name matches wildcard, -1 otherwise\r
+ */\r
+static int x509_check_wildcard( const char *cn, const mbedtls_x509_buf *name )\r
+{\r
+ size_t i;\r
+ size_t cn_idx = 0, cn_len = strlen( cn );\r
+\r
+ /* We can't have a match if there is no wildcard to match */\r
+ if( name->len < 3 || name->p[0] != '*' || name->p[1] != '.' )\r
+ return( -1 );\r
+\r
+ for( i = 0; i < cn_len; ++i )\r
+ {\r
+ if( cn[i] == '.' )\r
+ {\r
+ cn_idx = i;\r
+ break;\r
+ }\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if( cn_idx == 0 )\r
+ return( -1 );\r
+\r
+ if( cn_len - cn_idx == name->len - 1 &&\r
+ x509_memcasecmp( name->p + 1, cn + cn_idx, name->len - 1 ) == 0 )\r
+ {\r
+ return( 0 );\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ return( -1 );\r
+}\r
+\r
+/*\r
+ * Compare two X.509 strings, case-insensitive, and allowing for some encoding\r
+ * variations (but not all).\r
+ *\r
+ * Return 0 if equal, -1 otherwise.\r
+ */\r
+static int x509_string_cmp( const mbedtls_x509_buf *a, const mbedtls_x509_buf *b )\r
+{\r
+ if( a->tag == b->tag &&\r
+ a->len == b->len &&\r
+ memcmp( a->p, b->p, b->len ) == 0 )\r
+ {\r
+ return( 0 );\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if( ( a->tag == MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING || a->tag == MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING ) &&\r
+ ( b->tag == MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING || b->tag == MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING ) &&\r
+ a->len == b->len &&\r
+ x509_memcasecmp( a->p, b->p, b->len ) == 0 )\r
+ {\r
+ return( 0 );\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ return( -1 );\r
+}\r
+\r
+/*\r
+ * Compare two X.509 Names (aka rdnSequence).\r
+ *\r
+ * See RFC 5280 section 7.1, though we don't implement the whole algorithm:\r
+ * we sometimes return unequal when the full algorithm would return equal,\r
+ * but never the other way. (In particular, we don't do Unicode normalisation\r
+ * or space folding.)\r
+ *\r
+ * Return 0 if equal, -1 otherwise.\r
+ */\r
+static int x509_name_cmp( const mbedtls_x509_name *a, const mbedtls_x509_name *b )\r
+{\r
+ /* Avoid recursion, it might not be optimised by the compiler */\r
+ while( a != NULL || b != NULL )\r
+ {\r
+ if( a == NULL || b == NULL )\r
+ return( -1 );\r
+\r
+ /* type */\r
+ if( a->oid.tag != b->oid.tag ||\r
+ a->oid.len != b->oid.len ||\r
+ memcmp( a->oid.p, b->oid.p, b->oid.len ) != 0 )\r
+ {\r
+ return( -1 );\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ /* value */\r
+ if( x509_string_cmp( &a->val, &b->val ) != 0 )\r
+ return( -1 );\r
+\r
+ /* structure of the list of sets */\r
+ if( a->next_merged != b->next_merged )\r
+ return( -1 );\r
+\r
+ a = a->next;\r
+ b = b->next;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ /* a == NULL == b */\r
+ return( 0 );\r
+}\r
+\r
+/*\r
+ * Reset (init or clear) a verify_chain\r
+ */\r
+static void x509_crt_verify_chain_reset(\r
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain *ver_chain )\r
+{\r
+ size_t i;\r
+\r
+ for( i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_VERIFY_CHAIN_SIZE; i++ )\r
+ {\r
+ ver_chain->items[i].crt = NULL;\r
+ ver_chain->items[i].flags = (uint32_t) -1;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ ver_chain->len = 0;\r
+\r
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK)\r
+ ver_chain->trust_ca_cb_result = NULL;\r
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */\r
+}\r
+\r
+/*\r
+ * Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0), v2(1), v3(2) }\r
+ */\r
+static int x509_get_version( unsigned char **p,\r
+ const unsigned char *end,\r
+ int *ver )\r
+{\r
+ int ret;\r
+ size_t len;\r
+\r
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len,\r
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 0 ) ) != 0 )\r
+ {\r
+ if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG )\r
+ {\r
+ *ver = 0;\r
+ return( 0 );\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ return( ret );\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ end = *p + len;\r
+\r
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( p, end, ver ) ) != 0 )\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION + ret );\r
+\r
+ if( *p != end )\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION +\r
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH );\r
+\r
+ return( 0 );\r
+}\r
+\r
+/*\r
+ * Validity ::= SEQUENCE {\r
+ * notBefore Time,\r
+ * notAfter Time }\r
+ */\r
+static int x509_get_dates( unsigned char **p,\r
+ const unsigned char *end,\r
+ mbedtls_x509_time *from,\r
+ mbedtls_x509_time *to )\r
+{\r
+ int ret;\r
+ size_t len;\r
+\r
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len,\r
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 )\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE + ret );\r
+\r
+ end = *p + len;\r
+\r
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_time( p, end, from ) ) != 0 )\r
+ return( ret );\r
+\r
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_time( p, end, to ) ) != 0 )\r
+ return( ret );\r
+\r
+ if( *p != end )\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE +\r
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH );\r
+\r
+ return( 0 );\r
+}\r
+\r
+/*\r
+ * X.509 v2/v3 unique identifier (not parsed)\r
+ */\r
+static int x509_get_uid( unsigned char **p,\r
+ const unsigned char *end,\r
+ mbedtls_x509_buf *uid, int n )\r
+{\r
+ int ret;\r
+\r
+ if( *p == end )\r
+ return( 0 );\r
+\r
+ uid->tag = **p;\r
+\r
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &uid->len,\r
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | n ) ) != 0 )\r
+ {\r
+ if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG )\r
+ return( 0 );\r
+\r
+ return( ret );\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ uid->p = *p;\r
+ *p += uid->len;\r
+\r
+ return( 0 );\r
+}\r
+\r
+static int x509_get_basic_constraints( unsigned char **p,\r
+ const unsigned char *end,\r
+ int *ca_istrue,\r
+ int *max_pathlen )\r
+{\r
+ int ret;\r
+ size_t len;\r
+\r
+ /*\r
+ * BasicConstraints ::= SEQUENCE {\r
+ * cA BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,\r
+ * pathLenConstraint INTEGER (0..MAX) OPTIONAL }\r
+ */\r
+ *ca_istrue = 0; /* DEFAULT FALSE */\r
+ *max_pathlen = 0; /* endless */\r
+\r
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len,\r
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 )\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret );\r
+\r
+ if( *p == end )\r
+ return( 0 );\r
+\r
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bool( p, end, ca_istrue ) ) != 0 )\r
+ {\r
+ if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG )\r
+ ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( p, end, ca_istrue );\r
+\r
+ if( ret != 0 )\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret );\r
+\r
+ if( *ca_istrue != 0 )\r
+ *ca_istrue = 1;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if( *p == end )\r
+ return( 0 );\r
+\r
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int( p, end, max_pathlen ) ) != 0 )\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret );\r
+\r
+ if( *p != end )\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS +\r
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH );\r
+\r
+ (*max_pathlen)++;\r
+\r
+ return( 0 );\r
+}\r
+\r
+static int x509_get_ns_cert_type( unsigned char **p,\r
+ const unsigned char *end,\r
+ unsigned char *ns_cert_type)\r
+{\r
+ int ret;\r
+ mbedtls_x509_bitstring bs = { 0, 0, NULL };\r
+\r
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring( p, end, &bs ) ) != 0 )\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret );\r
+\r
+ if( bs.len != 1 )\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS +\r
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH );\r
+\r
+ /* Get actual bitstring */\r
+ *ns_cert_type = *bs.p;\r
+ return( 0 );\r
+}\r
+\r
+static int x509_get_key_usage( unsigned char **p,\r
+ const unsigned char *end,\r
+ unsigned int *key_usage)\r
+{\r
+ int ret;\r
+ size_t i;\r
+ mbedtls_x509_bitstring bs = { 0, 0, NULL };\r
+\r
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring( p, end, &bs ) ) != 0 )\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret );\r
+\r
+ if( bs.len < 1 )\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS +\r
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH );\r
+\r
+ /* Get actual bitstring */\r
+ *key_usage = 0;\r
+ for( i = 0; i < bs.len && i < sizeof( unsigned int ); i++ )\r
+ {\r
+ *key_usage |= (unsigned int) bs.p[i] << (8*i);\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ return( 0 );\r
+}\r
+\r
+/*\r
+ * ExtKeyUsageSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF KeyPurposeId\r
+ *\r
+ * KeyPurposeId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER\r
+ */\r
+static int x509_get_ext_key_usage( unsigned char **p,\r
+ const unsigned char *end,\r
+ mbedtls_x509_sequence *ext_key_usage)\r
+{\r
+ int ret;\r
+\r
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_sequence_of( p, end, ext_key_usage, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) ) != 0 )\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret );\r
+\r
+ /* Sequence length must be >= 1 */\r
+ if( ext_key_usage->buf.p == NULL )\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS +\r
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH );\r
+\r
+ return( 0 );\r
+}\r
+\r
+/*\r
+ * SubjectAltName ::= GeneralNames\r
+ *\r
+ * GeneralNames ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralName\r
+ *\r
+ * GeneralName ::= CHOICE {\r
+ * otherName [0] OtherName,\r
+ * rfc822Name [1] IA5String,\r
+ * dNSName [2] IA5String,\r
+ * x400Address [3] ORAddress,\r
+ * directoryName [4] Name,\r
+ * ediPartyName [5] EDIPartyName,\r
+ * uniformResourceIdentifier [6] IA5String,\r
+ * iPAddress [7] OCTET STRING,\r
+ * registeredID [8] OBJECT IDENTIFIER }\r
+ *\r
+ * OtherName ::= SEQUENCE {\r
+ * type-id OBJECT IDENTIFIER,\r
+ * value [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY type-id }\r
+ *\r
+ * EDIPartyName ::= SEQUENCE {\r
+ * nameAssigner [0] DirectoryString OPTIONAL,\r
+ * partyName [1] DirectoryString }\r
+ *\r
+ * NOTE: we list all types, but only use dNSName and otherName\r
+ * of type HwModuleName, as defined in RFC 4108, at this point.\r
+ */\r
+static int x509_get_subject_alt_name( unsigned char **p,\r
+ const unsigned char *end,\r
+ mbedtls_x509_sequence *subject_alt_name )\r
+{\r
+ int ret;\r
+ size_t len, tag_len;\r
+ mbedtls_asn1_buf *buf;\r
+ unsigned char tag;\r
+ mbedtls_asn1_sequence *cur = subject_alt_name;\r
+\r
+ /* Get main sequence tag */\r
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len,\r
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 )\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret );\r
+\r
+ if( *p + len != end )\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS +\r
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH );\r
+\r
+ while( *p < end )\r
+ {\r
+ mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name dummy_san_buf;\r
+ memset( &dummy_san_buf, 0, sizeof( dummy_san_buf ) );\r
+\r
+ if( ( end - *p ) < 1 )\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS +\r
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA );\r
+\r
+ tag = **p;\r
+ (*p)++;\r
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_len( p, end, &tag_len ) ) != 0 )\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret );\r
+\r
+ if( ( tag & MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_CLASS_MASK ) !=\r
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC )\r
+ {\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS +\r
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG );\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ /*\r
+ * Check that the SAN are structured correct.\r
+ */\r
+ ret = mbedtls_x509_parse_subject_alt_name( &(cur->buf), &dummy_san_buf );\r
+ /*\r
+ * In case the extension is malformed, return an error,\r
+ * and clear the allocated sequences.\r
+ */\r
+ if( ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE )\r
+ {\r
+ mbedtls_x509_sequence *seq_cur = subject_alt_name->next;\r
+ mbedtls_x509_sequence *seq_prv;\r
+ while( seq_cur != NULL )\r
+ {\r
+ seq_prv = seq_cur;\r
+ seq_cur = seq_cur->next;\r
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize( seq_prv,\r
+ sizeof( mbedtls_x509_sequence ) );\r
+ mbedtls_free( seq_prv );\r
+ }\r
+ subject_alt_name->next = NULL;\r
+ return( ret );\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ /* Allocate and assign next pointer */\r
+ if( cur->buf.p != NULL )\r
+ {\r
+ if( cur->next != NULL )\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS );\r
+\r
+ cur->next = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_asn1_sequence ) );\r
+\r
+ if( cur->next == NULL )\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS +\r
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED );\r
+\r
+ cur = cur->next;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ buf = &(cur->buf);\r
+ buf->tag = tag;\r
+ buf->p = *p;\r
+ buf->len = tag_len;\r
+ *p += buf->len;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ /* Set final sequence entry's next pointer to NULL */\r
+ cur->next = NULL;\r
+\r
+ if( *p != end )\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS +\r
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH );\r
+\r
+ return( 0 );\r
+}\r
+\r
+/*\r
+ * id-ce-certificatePolicies OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 32 }\r
+ *\r
+ * anyPolicy OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce-certificatePolicies 0 }\r
+ *\r
+ * certificatePolicies ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PolicyInformation\r
+ *\r
+ * PolicyInformation ::= SEQUENCE {\r
+ * policyIdentifier CertPolicyId,\r
+ * policyQualifiers SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF\r
+ * PolicyQualifierInfo OPTIONAL }\r
+ *\r
+ * CertPolicyId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER\r
+ *\r
+ * PolicyQualifierInfo ::= SEQUENCE {\r
+ * policyQualifierId PolicyQualifierId,\r
+ * qualifier ANY DEFINED BY policyQualifierId }\r
+ *\r
+ * -- policyQualifierIds for Internet policy qualifiers\r
+ *\r
+ * id-qt OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 2 }\r
+ * id-qt-cps OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-qt 1 }\r
+ * id-qt-unotice OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-qt 2 }\r
+ *\r
+ * PolicyQualifierId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER ( id-qt-cps | id-qt-unotice )\r
+ *\r
+ * Qualifier ::= CHOICE {\r
+ * cPSuri CPSuri,\r
+ * userNotice UserNotice }\r
+ *\r
+ * CPSuri ::= IA5String\r
+ *\r
+ * UserNotice ::= SEQUENCE {\r
+ * noticeRef NoticeReference OPTIONAL,\r
+ * explicitText DisplayText OPTIONAL }\r
+ *\r
+ * NoticeReference ::= SEQUENCE {\r
+ * organization DisplayText,\r
+ * noticeNumbers SEQUENCE OF INTEGER }\r
+ *\r
+ * DisplayText ::= CHOICE {\r
+ * ia5String IA5String (SIZE (1..200)),\r
+ * visibleString VisibleString (SIZE (1..200)),\r
+ * bmpString BMPString (SIZE (1..200)),\r
+ * utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..200)) }\r
+ *\r
+ * NOTE: we only parse and use anyPolicy without qualifiers at this point\r
+ * as defined in RFC 5280.\r
+ */\r
+static int x509_get_certificate_policies( unsigned char **p,\r
+ const unsigned char *end,\r
+ mbedtls_x509_sequence *certificate_policies )\r
+{\r
+ int ret, parse_ret = 0;\r
+ size_t len;\r
+ mbedtls_asn1_buf *buf;\r
+ mbedtls_asn1_sequence *cur = certificate_policies;\r
+\r
+ /* Get main sequence tag */\r
+ ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len,\r
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE );\r
+ if( ret != 0 )\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret );\r
+\r
+ if( *p + len != end )\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS +\r
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH );\r
+\r
+ /*\r
+ * Cannot be an empty sequence.\r
+ */\r
+ if( len == 0 )\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS +\r
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH );\r
+\r
+ while( *p < end )\r
+ {\r
+ mbedtls_x509_buf policy_oid;\r
+ const unsigned char *policy_end;\r
+\r
+ /*\r
+ * Get the policy sequence\r
+ */\r
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len,\r
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 )\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret );\r
+\r
+ policy_end = *p + len;\r
+\r
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, policy_end, &len,\r
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) ) != 0 )\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret );\r
+\r
+ policy_oid.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID;\r
+ policy_oid.len = len;\r
+ policy_oid.p = *p;\r
+\r
+ /*\r
+ * Only AnyPolicy is currently supported when enforcing policy.\r
+ */\r
+ if( MBEDTLS_OID_CMP( MBEDTLS_OID_ANY_POLICY, &policy_oid ) != 0 )\r
+ {\r
+ /*\r
+ * Set the parsing return code but continue parsing, in case this\r
+ * extension is critical and MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION\r
+ * is configured.\r
+ */\r
+ parse_ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ /* Allocate and assign next pointer */\r
+ if( cur->buf.p != NULL )\r
+ {\r
+ if( cur->next != NULL )\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS );\r
+\r
+ cur->next = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_asn1_sequence ) );\r
+\r
+ if( cur->next == NULL )\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS +\r
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED );\r
+\r
+ cur = cur->next;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ buf = &( cur->buf );\r
+ buf->tag = policy_oid.tag;\r
+ buf->p = policy_oid.p;\r
+ buf->len = policy_oid.len;\r
+\r
+ *p += len;\r
+\r
+ /*\r
+ * If there is an optional qualifier, then *p < policy_end\r
+ * Check the Qualifier len to verify it doesn't exceed policy_end.\r
+ */\r
+ if( *p < policy_end )\r
+ {\r
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, policy_end, &len,\r
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 )\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret );\r
+ /*\r
+ * Skip the optional policy qualifiers.\r
+ */\r
+ *p += len;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if( *p != policy_end )\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS +\r
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH );\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ /* Set final sequence entry's next pointer to NULL */\r
+ cur->next = NULL;\r
+\r
+ if( *p != end )\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS +\r
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH );\r
+\r
+ return( parse_ret );\r
+}\r
+\r
+/*\r
+ * X.509 v3 extensions\r
+ *\r
+ */\r
+static int x509_get_crt_ext( unsigned char **p,\r
+ const unsigned char *end,\r
+ mbedtls_x509_crt *crt )\r
+{\r
+ int ret;\r
+ size_t len;\r
+ unsigned char *end_ext_data, *end_ext_octet;\r
+\r
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_ext( p, end, &crt->v3_ext, 3 ) ) != 0 )\r
+ {\r
+ if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG )\r
+ return( 0 );\r
+\r
+ return( ret );\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ while( *p < end )\r
+ {\r
+ /*\r
+ * Extension ::= SEQUENCE {\r
+ * extnID OBJECT IDENTIFIER,\r
+ * critical BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,\r
+ * extnValue OCTET STRING }\r
+ */\r
+ mbedtls_x509_buf extn_oid = {0, 0, NULL};\r
+ int is_critical = 0; /* DEFAULT FALSE */\r
+ int ext_type = 0;\r
+\r
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &len,\r
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 )\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret );\r
+\r
+ end_ext_data = *p + len;\r
+\r
+ /* Get extension ID */\r
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end_ext_data, &extn_oid.len,\r
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) ) != 0 )\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret );\r
+\r
+ extn_oid.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID;\r
+ extn_oid.p = *p;\r
+ *p += extn_oid.len;\r
+\r
+ /* Get optional critical */\r
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bool( p, end_ext_data, &is_critical ) ) != 0 &&\r
+ ( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) )\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret );\r
+\r
+ /* Data should be octet string type */\r
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end_ext_data, &len,\r
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ) != 0 )\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret );\r
+\r
+ end_ext_octet = *p + len;\r
+\r
+ if( end_ext_octet != end_ext_data )\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS +\r
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH );\r
+\r
+ /*\r
+ * Detect supported extensions\r
+ */\r
+ ret = mbedtls_oid_get_x509_ext_type( &extn_oid, &ext_type );\r
+\r
+ if( ret != 0 )\r
+ {\r
+ /* No parser found, skip extension */\r
+ *p = end_ext_octet;\r
+\r
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION)\r
+ if( is_critical )\r
+ {\r
+ /* Data is marked as critical: fail */\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS +\r
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG );\r
+ }\r
+#endif\r
+ continue;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ /* Forbid repeated extensions */\r
+ if( ( crt->ext_types & ext_type ) != 0 )\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS );\r
+\r
+ crt->ext_types |= ext_type;\r
+\r
+ switch( ext_type )\r
+ {\r
+ case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS:\r
+ /* Parse basic constraints */\r
+ if( ( ret = x509_get_basic_constraints( p, end_ext_octet,\r
+ &crt->ca_istrue, &crt->max_pathlen ) ) != 0 )\r
+ return( ret );\r
+ break;\r
+\r
+ case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE:\r
+ /* Parse key usage */\r
+ if( ( ret = x509_get_key_usage( p, end_ext_octet,\r
+ &crt->key_usage ) ) != 0 )\r
+ return( ret );\r
+ break;\r
+\r
+ case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE:\r
+ /* Parse extended key usage */\r
+ if( ( ret = x509_get_ext_key_usage( p, end_ext_octet,\r
+ &crt->ext_key_usage ) ) != 0 )\r
+ return( ret );\r
+ break;\r
+\r
+ case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME:\r
+ /* Parse subject alt name */\r
+ if( ( ret = x509_get_subject_alt_name( p, end_ext_octet,\r
+ &crt->subject_alt_names ) ) != 0 )\r
+ return( ret );\r
+ break;\r
+\r
+ case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE:\r
+ /* Parse netscape certificate type */\r
+ if( ( ret = x509_get_ns_cert_type( p, end_ext_octet,\r
+ &crt->ns_cert_type ) ) != 0 )\r
+ return( ret );\r
+ break;\r
+\r
+ case MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES:\r
+ /* Parse certificate policies type */\r
+ if( ( ret = x509_get_certificate_policies( p, end_ext_octet,\r
+ &crt->certificate_policies ) ) != 0 )\r
+ {\r
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION)\r
+ if( is_critical )\r
+ return( ret );\r
+ else\r
+#endif\r
+ /*\r
+ * If MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE is returned, then we\r
+ * cannot interpret or enforce the policy. However, it is up to\r
+ * the user to choose how to enforce the policies,\r
+ * unless the extension is critical.\r
+ */\r
+ if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE )\r
+ return( ret );\r
+ }\r
+ break;\r
+\r
+ default:\r
+ /*\r
+ * If this is a non-critical extension, which the oid layer\r
+ * supports, but there isn't an x509 parser for it,\r
+ * skip the extension.\r
+ */\r
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION)\r
+ if( is_critical )\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );\r
+ else\r
+#endif\r
+ *p = end_ext_octet;\r
+ }\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if( *p != end )\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS +\r
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH );\r
+\r
+ return( 0 );\r
+}\r
+\r
+/*\r
+ * Parse and fill a single X.509 certificate in DER format\r
+ */\r
+static int x509_crt_parse_der_core( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,\r
+ const unsigned char *buf,\r
+ size_t buflen,\r
+ int make_copy )\r
+{\r
+ int ret;\r
+ size_t len;\r
+ unsigned char *p, *end, *crt_end;\r
+ mbedtls_x509_buf sig_params1, sig_params2, sig_oid2;\r
+\r
+ memset( &sig_params1, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_buf ) );\r
+ memset( &sig_params2, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_buf ) );\r
+ memset( &sig_oid2, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_buf ) );\r
+\r
+ /*\r
+ * Check for valid input\r
+ */\r
+ if( crt == NULL || buf == NULL )\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA );\r
+\r
+ /* Use the original buffer until we figure out actual length. */\r
+ p = (unsigned char*) buf;\r
+ len = buflen;\r
+ end = p + len;\r
+\r
+ /*\r
+ * Certificate ::= SEQUENCE {\r
+ * tbsCertificate TBSCertificate,\r
+ * signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,\r
+ * signatureValue BIT STRING }\r
+ */\r
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len,\r
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 )\r
+ {\r
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt );\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT );\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ end = crt_end = p + len;\r
+ crt->raw.len = crt_end - buf;\r
+ if( make_copy != 0 )\r
+ {\r
+ /* Create and populate a new buffer for the raw field. */\r
+ crt->raw.p = p = mbedtls_calloc( 1, crt->raw.len );\r
+ if( crt->raw.p == NULL )\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED );\r
+\r
+ memcpy( crt->raw.p, buf, crt->raw.len );\r
+ crt->own_buffer = 1;\r
+\r
+ p += crt->raw.len - len;\r
+ end = crt_end = p + len;\r
+ }\r
+ else\r
+ {\r
+ crt->raw.p = (unsigned char*) buf;\r
+ crt->own_buffer = 0;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ /*\r
+ * TBSCertificate ::= SEQUENCE {\r
+ */\r
+ crt->tbs.p = p;\r
+\r
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len,\r
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 )\r
+ {\r
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt );\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + ret );\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ end = p + len;\r
+ crt->tbs.len = end - crt->tbs.p;\r
+\r
+ /*\r
+ * Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0), v2(1), v3(2) }\r
+ *\r
+ * CertificateSerialNumber ::= INTEGER\r
+ *\r
+ * signature AlgorithmIdentifier\r
+ */\r
+ if( ( ret = x509_get_version( &p, end, &crt->version ) ) != 0 ||\r
+ ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_serial( &p, end, &crt->serial ) ) != 0 ||\r
+ ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_alg( &p, end, &crt->sig_oid,\r
+ &sig_params1 ) ) != 0 )\r
+ {\r
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt );\r
+ return( ret );\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if( crt->version < 0 || crt->version > 2 )\r
+ {\r
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt );\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION );\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ crt->version++;\r
+\r
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_sig_alg( &crt->sig_oid, &sig_params1,\r
+ &crt->sig_md, &crt->sig_pk,\r
+ &crt->sig_opts ) ) != 0 )\r
+ {\r
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt );\r
+ return( ret );\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ /*\r
+ * issuer Name\r
+ */\r
+ crt->issuer_raw.p = p;\r
+\r
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len,\r
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 )\r
+ {\r
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt );\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + ret );\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_name( &p, p + len, &crt->issuer ) ) != 0 )\r
+ {\r
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt );\r
+ return( ret );\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ crt->issuer_raw.len = p - crt->issuer_raw.p;\r
+\r
+ /*\r
+ * Validity ::= SEQUENCE {\r
+ * notBefore Time,\r
+ * notAfter Time }\r
+ *\r
+ */\r
+ if( ( ret = x509_get_dates( &p, end, &crt->valid_from,\r
+ &crt->valid_to ) ) != 0 )\r
+ {\r
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt );\r
+ return( ret );\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ /*\r
+ * subject Name\r
+ */\r
+ crt->subject_raw.p = p;\r
+\r
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len,\r
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 )\r
+ {\r
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt );\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT + ret );\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if( len && ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_name( &p, p + len, &crt->subject ) ) != 0 )\r
+ {\r
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt );\r
+ return( ret );\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ crt->subject_raw.len = p - crt->subject_raw.p;\r
+\r
+ /*\r
+ * SubjectPublicKeyInfo\r
+ */\r
+ crt->pk_raw.p = p;\r
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey( &p, end, &crt->pk ) ) != 0 )\r
+ {\r
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt );\r
+ return( ret );\r
+ }\r
+ crt->pk_raw.len = p - crt->pk_raw.p;\r
+\r
+ /*\r
+ * issuerUniqueID [1] IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL,\r
+ * -- If present, version shall be v2 or v3\r
+ * subjectUniqueID [2] IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL,\r
+ * -- If present, version shall be v2 or v3\r
+ * extensions [3] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL\r
+ * -- If present, version shall be v3\r
+ */\r
+ if( crt->version == 2 || crt->version == 3 )\r
+ {\r
+ ret = x509_get_uid( &p, end, &crt->issuer_id, 1 );\r
+ if( ret != 0 )\r
+ {\r
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt );\r
+ return( ret );\r
+ }\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if( crt->version == 2 || crt->version == 3 )\r
+ {\r
+ ret = x509_get_uid( &p, end, &crt->subject_id, 2 );\r
+ if( ret != 0 )\r
+ {\r
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt );\r
+ return( ret );\r
+ }\r
+ }\r
+\r
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_ALLOW_EXTENSIONS_NON_V3)\r
+ if( crt->version == 3 )\r
+#endif\r
+ {\r
+ ret = x509_get_crt_ext( &p, end, crt );\r
+ if( ret != 0 )\r
+ {\r
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt );\r
+ return( ret );\r
+ }\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if( p != end )\r
+ {\r
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt );\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT +\r
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH );\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ end = crt_end;\r
+\r
+ /*\r
+ * }\r
+ * -- end of TBSCertificate\r
+ *\r
+ * signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,\r
+ * signatureValue BIT STRING\r
+ */\r
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_alg( &p, end, &sig_oid2, &sig_params2 ) ) != 0 )\r
+ {\r
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt );\r
+ return( ret );\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if( crt->sig_oid.len != sig_oid2.len ||\r
+ memcmp( crt->sig_oid.p, sig_oid2.p, crt->sig_oid.len ) != 0 ||\r
+ sig_params1.len != sig_params2.len ||\r
+ ( sig_params1.len != 0 &&\r
+ memcmp( sig_params1.p, sig_params2.p, sig_params1.len ) != 0 ) )\r
+ {\r
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt );\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_SIG_MISMATCH );\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_get_sig( &p, end, &crt->sig ) ) != 0 )\r
+ {\r
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt );\r
+ return( ret );\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if( p != end )\r
+ {\r
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_free( crt );\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT +\r
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH );\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ return( 0 );\r
+}\r
+\r
+/*\r
+ * Parse one X.509 certificate in DER format from a buffer and add them to a\r
+ * chained list\r
+ */\r
+static int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_internal( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain,\r
+ const unsigned char *buf,\r
+ size_t buflen,\r
+ int make_copy )\r
+{\r
+ int ret;\r
+ mbedtls_x509_crt *crt = chain, *prev = NULL;\r
+\r
+ /*\r
+ * Check for valid input\r
+ */\r
+ if( crt == NULL || buf == NULL )\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA );\r
+\r
+ while( crt->version != 0 && crt->next != NULL )\r
+ {\r
+ prev = crt;\r
+ crt = crt->next;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ /*\r
+ * Add new certificate on the end of the chain if needed.\r
+ */\r
+ if( crt->version != 0 && crt->next == NULL )\r
+ {\r
+ crt->next = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_crt ) );\r
+\r
+ if( crt->next == NULL )\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED );\r
+\r
+ prev = crt;\r
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_init( crt->next );\r
+ crt = crt->next;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if( ( ret = x509_crt_parse_der_core( crt, buf, buflen, make_copy ) ) != 0 )\r
+ {\r
+ if( prev )\r
+ prev->next = NULL;\r
+\r
+ if( crt != chain )\r
+ mbedtls_free( crt );\r
+\r
+ return( ret );\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ return( 0 );\r
+}\r
+\r
+int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_nocopy( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain,\r
+ const unsigned char *buf,\r
+ size_t buflen )\r
+{\r
+ return( mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_internal( chain, buf, buflen, 0 ) );\r
+}\r
+\r
+int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain,\r
+ const unsigned char *buf,\r
+ size_t buflen )\r
+{\r
+ return( mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_internal( chain, buf, buflen, 1 ) );\r
+}\r
+\r
+/*\r
+ * Parse one or more PEM certificates from a buffer and add them to the chained\r
+ * list\r
+ */\r
+int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain,\r
+ const unsigned char *buf,\r
+ size_t buflen )\r
+{\r
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C)\r
+ int success = 0, first_error = 0, total_failed = 0;\r
+ int buf_format = MBEDTLS_X509_FORMAT_DER;\r
+#endif\r
+\r
+ /*\r
+ * Check for valid input\r
+ */\r
+ if( chain == NULL || buf == NULL )\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA );\r
+\r
+ /*\r
+ * Determine buffer content. Buffer contains either one DER certificate or\r
+ * one or more PEM certificates.\r
+ */\r
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C)\r
+ if( buflen != 0 && buf[buflen - 1] == '\0' &&\r
+ strstr( (const char *) buf, "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----" ) != NULL )\r
+ {\r
+ buf_format = MBEDTLS_X509_FORMAT_PEM;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if( buf_format == MBEDTLS_X509_FORMAT_DER )\r
+ return mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( chain, buf, buflen );\r
+#else\r
+ return mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( chain, buf, buflen );\r
+#endif\r
+\r
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C)\r
+ if( buf_format == MBEDTLS_X509_FORMAT_PEM )\r
+ {\r
+ int ret;\r
+ mbedtls_pem_context pem;\r
+\r
+ /* 1 rather than 0 since the terminating NULL byte is counted in */\r
+ while( buflen > 1 )\r
+ {\r
+ size_t use_len;\r
+ mbedtls_pem_init( &pem );\r
+\r
+ /* If we get there, we know the string is null-terminated */\r
+ ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer( &pem,\r
+ "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----",\r
+ "-----END CERTIFICATE-----",\r
+ buf, NULL, 0, &use_len );\r
+\r
+ if( ret == 0 )\r
+ {\r
+ /*\r
+ * Was PEM encoded\r
+ */\r
+ buflen -= use_len;\r
+ buf += use_len;\r
+ }\r
+ else if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_BAD_INPUT_DATA )\r
+ {\r
+ return( ret );\r
+ }\r
+ else if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT )\r
+ {\r
+ mbedtls_pem_free( &pem );\r
+\r
+ /*\r
+ * PEM header and footer were found\r
+ */\r
+ buflen -= use_len;\r
+ buf += use_len;\r
+\r
+ if( first_error == 0 )\r
+ first_error = ret;\r
+\r
+ total_failed++;\r
+ continue;\r
+ }\r
+ else\r
+ break;\r
+\r
+ ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( chain, pem.buf, pem.buflen );\r
+\r
+ mbedtls_pem_free( &pem );\r
+\r
+ if( ret != 0 )\r
+ {\r
+ /*\r
+ * Quit parsing on a memory error\r
+ */\r
+ if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED )\r
+ return( ret );\r
+\r
+ if( first_error == 0 )\r
+ first_error = ret;\r
+\r
+ total_failed++;\r
+ continue;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ success = 1;\r
+ }\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if( success )\r
+ return( total_failed );\r
+ else if( first_error )\r
+ return( first_error );\r
+ else\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_UNKNOWN_FORMAT );\r
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */\r
+}\r
+\r
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)\r
+/*\r
+ * Load one or more certificates and add them to the chained list\r
+ */\r
+int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path )\r
+{\r
+ int ret;\r
+ size_t n;\r
+ unsigned char *buf;\r
+\r
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_load_file( path, &buf, &n ) ) != 0 )\r
+ return( ret );\r
+\r
+ ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse( chain, buf, n );\r
+\r
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, n );\r
+ mbedtls_free( buf );\r
+\r
+ return( ret );\r
+}\r
+\r
+int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path( mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path )\r
+{\r
+ int ret = 0;\r
+#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32)\r
+ int w_ret;\r
+ WCHAR szDir[MAX_PATH];\r
+ char filename[MAX_PATH];\r
+ char *p;\r
+ size_t len = strlen( path );\r
+\r
+ WIN32_FIND_DATAW file_data;\r
+ HANDLE hFind;\r
+\r
+ if( len > MAX_PATH - 3 )\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA );\r
+\r
+ memset( szDir, 0, sizeof(szDir) );\r
+ memset( filename, 0, MAX_PATH );\r
+ memcpy( filename, path, len );\r
+ filename[len++] = '\\';\r
+ p = filename + len;\r
+ filename[len++] = '*';\r
+\r
+ w_ret = MultiByteToWideChar( CP_ACP, 0, filename, (int)len, szDir,\r
+ MAX_PATH - 3 );\r
+ if( w_ret == 0 )\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA );\r
+\r
+ hFind = FindFirstFileW( szDir, &file_data );\r
+ if( hFind == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE )\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR );\r
+\r
+ len = MAX_PATH - len;\r
+ do\r
+ {\r
+ memset( p, 0, len );\r
+\r
+ if( file_data.dwFileAttributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY )\r
+ continue;\r
+\r
+ w_ret = WideCharToMultiByte( CP_ACP, 0, file_data.cFileName,\r
+ lstrlenW( file_data.cFileName ),\r
+ p, (int) len - 1,\r
+ NULL, NULL );\r
+ if( w_ret == 0 )\r
+ {\r
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR;\r
+ goto cleanup;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ w_ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( chain, filename );\r
+ if( w_ret < 0 )\r
+ ret++;\r
+ else\r
+ ret += w_ret;\r
+ }\r
+ while( FindNextFileW( hFind, &file_data ) != 0 );\r
+\r
+ if( GetLastError() != ERROR_NO_MORE_FILES )\r
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR;\r
+\r
+cleanup:\r
+ FindClose( hFind );\r
+#else /* _WIN32 */\r
+ int t_ret;\r
+ int snp_ret;\r
+ struct stat sb;\r
+ struct dirent *entry;\r
+ char entry_name[MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_FILE_PATH_LEN];\r
+ DIR *dir = opendir( path );\r
+\r
+ if( dir == NULL )\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR );\r
+\r
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)\r
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock( &mbedtls_threading_readdir_mutex ) ) != 0 )\r
+ {\r
+ closedir( dir );\r
+ return( ret );\r
+ }\r
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */\r
+\r
+ while( ( entry = readdir( dir ) ) != NULL )\r
+ {\r
+ snp_ret = mbedtls_snprintf( entry_name, sizeof entry_name,\r
+ "%s/%s", path, entry->d_name );\r
+\r
+ if( snp_ret < 0 || (size_t)snp_ret >= sizeof entry_name )\r
+ {\r
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;\r
+ goto cleanup;\r
+ }\r
+ else if( stat( entry_name, &sb ) == -1 )\r
+ {\r
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR;\r
+ goto cleanup;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if( !S_ISREG( sb.st_mode ) )\r
+ continue;\r
+\r
+ // Ignore parse errors\r
+ //\r
+ t_ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file( chain, entry_name );\r
+ if( t_ret < 0 )\r
+ ret++;\r
+ else\r
+ ret += t_ret;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+cleanup:\r
+ closedir( dir );\r
+\r
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)\r
+ if( mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &mbedtls_threading_readdir_mutex ) != 0 )\r
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR;\r
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */\r
+\r
+#endif /* _WIN32 */\r
+\r
+ return( ret );\r
+}\r
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */\r
+\r
+/*\r
+ * OtherName ::= SEQUENCE {\r
+ * type-id OBJECT IDENTIFIER,\r
+ * value [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY type-id }\r
+ *\r
+ * HardwareModuleName ::= SEQUENCE {\r
+ * hwType OBJECT IDENTIFIER,\r
+ * hwSerialNum OCTET STRING }\r
+ *\r
+ * NOTE: we currently only parse and use otherName of type HwModuleName,\r
+ * as defined in RFC 4108.\r
+ */\r
+static int x509_get_other_name( const mbedtls_x509_buf *subject_alt_name,\r
+ mbedtls_x509_san_other_name *other_name )\r
+{\r
+ int ret = 0;\r
+ size_t len;\r
+ unsigned char *p = subject_alt_name->p;\r
+ const unsigned char *end = p + subject_alt_name->len;\r
+ mbedtls_x509_buf cur_oid;\r
+\r
+ if( ( subject_alt_name->tag &\r
+ ( MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_CLASS_MASK | MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_VALUE_MASK ) ) !=\r
+ ( MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_OTHER_NAME ) )\r
+ {\r
+ /*\r
+ * The given subject alternative name is not of type "othername".\r
+ */\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA );\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len,\r
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) ) != 0 )\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret );\r
+\r
+ cur_oid.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID;\r
+ cur_oid.p = p;\r
+ cur_oid.len = len;\r
+\r
+ /*\r
+ * Only HwModuleName is currently supported.\r
+ */\r
+ if( MBEDTLS_OID_CMP( MBEDTLS_OID_ON_HW_MODULE_NAME, &cur_oid ) != 0 )\r
+ {\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if( p + len >= end )\r
+ {\r
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize( other_name, sizeof( other_name ) );\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS +\r
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH );\r
+ }\r
+ p += len;\r
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len,\r
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC ) ) != 0 )\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret );\r
+\r
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len,\r
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 )\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret );\r
+\r
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) ) != 0 )\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret );\r
+\r
+ other_name->value.hardware_module_name.oid.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID;\r
+ other_name->value.hardware_module_name.oid.p = p;\r
+ other_name->value.hardware_module_name.oid.len = len;\r
+\r
+ if( p + len >= end )\r
+ {\r
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize( other_name, sizeof( other_name ) );\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS +\r
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH );\r
+ }\r
+ p += len;\r
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len,\r
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ) != 0 )\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret );\r
+\r
+ other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;\r
+ other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.p = p;\r
+ other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.len = len;\r
+ p += len;\r
+ if( p != end )\r
+ {\r
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize( other_name,\r
+ sizeof( other_name ) );\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS +\r
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH );\r
+ }\r
+ return( 0 );\r
+}\r
+\r
+static int x509_info_subject_alt_name( char **buf, size_t *size,\r
+ const mbedtls_x509_sequence\r
+ *subject_alt_name,\r
+ const char *prefix )\r
+{\r
+ int ret;\r
+ size_t n = *size;\r
+ char *p = *buf;\r
+ const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur = subject_alt_name;\r
+ mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name san;\r
+ int parse_ret;\r
+\r
+ while( cur != NULL )\r
+ {\r
+ memset( &san, 0, sizeof( san ) );\r
+ parse_ret = mbedtls_x509_parse_subject_alt_name( &cur->buf, &san );\r
+ if( parse_ret != 0 )\r
+ {\r
+ if( parse_ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE )\r
+ {\r
+ ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%s <unsupported>", prefix );\r
+ MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;\r
+ }\r
+ else\r
+ {\r
+ ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%s <malformed>", prefix );\r
+ MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;\r
+ }\r
+ cur = cur->next;\r
+ continue;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ switch( san.type )\r
+ {\r
+ /*\r
+ * otherName\r
+ */\r
+ case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_OTHER_NAME:\r
+ {\r
+ mbedtls_x509_san_other_name *other_name = &san.san.other_name;\r
+\r
+ ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%s otherName :", prefix );\r
+ MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;\r
+\r
+ if( MBEDTLS_OID_CMP( MBEDTLS_OID_ON_HW_MODULE_NAME,\r
+ &other_name->value.hardware_module_name.oid ) != 0 )\r
+ {\r
+ ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%s hardware module name :", prefix );\r
+ MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;\r
+ ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%s hardware type : ", prefix );\r
+ MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;\r
+\r
+ ret = mbedtls_oid_get_numeric_string( p, n, &other_name->value.hardware_module_name.oid );\r
+ MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;\r
+\r
+ ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%s hardware serial number : ", prefix );\r
+ MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;\r
+\r
+ if( other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.len >= n )\r
+ {\r
+ *p = '\0';\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ memcpy( p, other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.p,\r
+ other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.len );\r
+ p += other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.len;\r
+\r
+ n -= other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.len;\r
+\r
+ }/* MBEDTLS_OID_ON_HW_MODULE_NAME */\r
+ }\r
+ break;\r
+\r
+ /*\r
+ * dNSName\r
+ */\r
+ case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME:\r
+ {\r
+ ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%s dNSName : ", prefix );\r
+ MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;\r
+ if( san.san.unstructured_name.len >= n )\r
+ {\r
+ *p = '\0';\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ memcpy( p, san.san.unstructured_name.p, san.san.unstructured_name.len );\r
+ p += san.san.unstructured_name.len;\r
+ n -= san.san.unstructured_name.len;\r
+ }\r
+ break;\r
+\r
+ /*\r
+ * Type not supported, skip item.\r
+ */\r
+ default:\r
+ ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%s <unsupported>", prefix );\r
+ MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;\r
+ break;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ cur = cur->next;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ *p = '\0';\r
+\r
+ *size = n;\r
+ *buf = p;\r
+\r
+ return( 0 );\r
+}\r
+\r
+int mbedtls_x509_parse_subject_alt_name( const mbedtls_x509_buf *san_buf,\r
+ mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name *san )\r
+{\r
+ int ret;\r
+ switch( san_buf->tag &\r
+ ( MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_CLASS_MASK |\r
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_VALUE_MASK ) )\r
+ {\r
+ /*\r
+ * otherName\r
+ */\r
+ case( MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_OTHER_NAME ):\r
+ {\r
+ mbedtls_x509_san_other_name other_name;\r
+\r
+ ret = x509_get_other_name( san_buf, &other_name );\r
+ if( ret != 0 )\r
+ return( ret );\r
+\r
+ memset( san, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name ) );\r
+ san->type = MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_OTHER_NAME;\r
+ memcpy( &san->san.other_name,\r
+ &other_name, sizeof( other_name ) );\r
+\r
+ }\r
+ break;\r
+\r
+ /*\r
+ * dNSName\r
+ */\r
+ case( MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME ):\r
+ {\r
+ memset( san, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name ) );\r
+ san->type = MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME;\r
+\r
+ memcpy( &san->san.unstructured_name,\r
+ san_buf, sizeof( *san_buf ) );\r
+\r
+ }\r
+ break;\r
+\r
+ /*\r
+ * Type not supported\r
+ */\r
+ default:\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );\r
+ }\r
+ return( 0 );\r
+}\r
+\r
+#define PRINT_ITEM(i) \\r
+ { \\r
+ ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%s" i, sep ); \\r
+ MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; \\r
+ sep = ", "; \\r
+ }\r
+\r
+#define CERT_TYPE(type,name) \\r
+ if( ns_cert_type & (type) ) \\r
+ PRINT_ITEM( name );\r
+\r
+static int x509_info_cert_type( char **buf, size_t *size,\r
+ unsigned char ns_cert_type )\r
+{\r
+ int ret;\r
+ size_t n = *size;\r
+ char *p = *buf;\r
+ const char *sep = "";\r
+\r
+ CERT_TYPE( MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CLIENT, "SSL Client" );\r
+ CERT_TYPE( MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_SERVER, "SSL Server" );\r
+ CERT_TYPE( MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL, "Email" );\r
+ CERT_TYPE( MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_OBJECT_SIGNING, "Object Signing" );\r
+ CERT_TYPE( MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_RESERVED, "Reserved" );\r
+ CERT_TYPE( MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CA, "SSL CA" );\r
+ CERT_TYPE( MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL_CA, "Email CA" );\r
+ CERT_TYPE( MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_OBJECT_SIGNING_CA, "Object Signing CA" );\r
+\r
+ *size = n;\r
+ *buf = p;\r
+\r
+ return( 0 );\r
+}\r
+\r
+#define KEY_USAGE(code,name) \\r
+ if( key_usage & (code) ) \\r
+ PRINT_ITEM( name );\r
+\r
+static int x509_info_key_usage( char **buf, size_t *size,\r
+ unsigned int key_usage )\r
+{\r
+ int ret;\r
+ size_t n = *size;\r
+ char *p = *buf;\r
+ const char *sep = "";\r
+\r
+ KEY_USAGE( MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE, "Digital Signature" );\r
+ KEY_USAGE( MBEDTLS_X509_KU_NON_REPUDIATION, "Non Repudiation" );\r
+ KEY_USAGE( MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT, "Key Encipherment" );\r
+ KEY_USAGE( MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT, "Data Encipherment" );\r
+ KEY_USAGE( MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT, "Key Agreement" );\r
+ KEY_USAGE( MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN, "Key Cert Sign" );\r
+ KEY_USAGE( MBEDTLS_X509_KU_CRL_SIGN, "CRL Sign" );\r
+ KEY_USAGE( MBEDTLS_X509_KU_ENCIPHER_ONLY, "Encipher Only" );\r
+ KEY_USAGE( MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DECIPHER_ONLY, "Decipher Only" );\r
+\r
+ *size = n;\r
+ *buf = p;\r
+\r
+ return( 0 );\r
+}\r
+\r
+static int x509_info_ext_key_usage( char **buf, size_t *size,\r
+ const mbedtls_x509_sequence *extended_key_usage )\r
+{\r
+ int ret;\r
+ const char *desc;\r
+ size_t n = *size;\r
+ char *p = *buf;\r
+ const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur = extended_key_usage;\r
+ const char *sep = "";\r
+\r
+ while( cur != NULL )\r
+ {\r
+ if( mbedtls_oid_get_extended_key_usage( &cur->buf, &desc ) != 0 )\r
+ desc = "???";\r
+\r
+ ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%s%s", sep, desc );\r
+ MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;\r
+\r
+ sep = ", ";\r
+\r
+ cur = cur->next;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ *size = n;\r
+ *buf = p;\r
+\r
+ return( 0 );\r
+}\r
+\r
+static int x509_info_cert_policies( char **buf, size_t *size,\r
+ const mbedtls_x509_sequence *certificate_policies )\r
+{\r
+ int ret;\r
+ const char *desc;\r
+ size_t n = *size;\r
+ char *p = *buf;\r
+ const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur = certificate_policies;\r
+ const char *sep = "";\r
+\r
+ while( cur != NULL )\r
+ {\r
+ if( mbedtls_oid_get_certificate_policies( &cur->buf, &desc ) != 0 )\r
+ desc = "???";\r
+\r
+ ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%s%s", sep, desc );\r
+ MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;\r
+\r
+ sep = ", ";\r
+\r
+ cur = cur->next;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ *size = n;\r
+ *buf = p;\r
+\r
+ return( 0 );\r
+}\r
+\r
+/*\r
+ * Return an informational string about the certificate.\r
+ */\r
+#define BEFORE_COLON 18\r
+#define BC "18"\r
+int mbedtls_x509_crt_info( char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix,\r
+ const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt )\r
+{\r
+ int ret;\r
+ size_t n;\r
+ char *p;\r
+ char key_size_str[BEFORE_COLON];\r
+\r
+ p = buf;\r
+ n = size;\r
+\r
+ if( NULL == crt )\r
+ {\r
+ ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\nCertificate is uninitialised!\n" );\r
+ MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;\r
+\r
+ return( (int) ( size - n ) );\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%scert. version : %d\n",\r
+ prefix, crt->version );\r
+ MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;\r
+ ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%sserial number : ",\r
+ prefix );\r
+ MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;\r
+\r
+ ret = mbedtls_x509_serial_gets( p, n, &crt->serial );\r
+ MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;\r
+\r
+ ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%sissuer name : ", prefix );\r
+ MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;\r
+ ret = mbedtls_x509_dn_gets( p, n, &crt->issuer );\r
+ MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;\r
+\r
+ ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%ssubject name : ", prefix );\r
+ MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;\r
+ ret = mbedtls_x509_dn_gets( p, n, &crt->subject );\r
+ MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;\r
+\r
+ ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%sissued on : " \\r
+ "%04d-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d", prefix,\r
+ crt->valid_from.year, crt->valid_from.mon,\r
+ crt->valid_from.day, crt->valid_from.hour,\r
+ crt->valid_from.min, crt->valid_from.sec );\r
+ MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;\r
+\r
+ ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%sexpires on : " \\r
+ "%04d-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d", prefix,\r
+ crt->valid_to.year, crt->valid_to.mon,\r
+ crt->valid_to.day, crt->valid_to.hour,\r
+ crt->valid_to.min, crt->valid_to.sec );\r
+ MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;\r
+\r
+ ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%ssigned using : ", prefix );\r
+ MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;\r
+\r
+ ret = mbedtls_x509_sig_alg_gets( p, n, &crt->sig_oid, crt->sig_pk,\r
+ crt->sig_md, crt->sig_opts );\r
+ MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;\r
+\r
+ /* Key size */\r
+ if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_key_size_helper( key_size_str, BEFORE_COLON,\r
+ mbedtls_pk_get_name( &crt->pk ) ) ) != 0 )\r
+ {\r
+ return( ret );\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%s%-" BC "s: %d bits", prefix, key_size_str,\r
+ (int) mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen( &crt->pk ) );\r
+ MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;\r
+\r
+ /*\r
+ * Optional extensions\r
+ */\r
+\r
+ if( crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS )\r
+ {\r
+ ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%sbasic constraints : CA=%s", prefix,\r
+ crt->ca_istrue ? "true" : "false" );\r
+ MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;\r
+\r
+ if( crt->max_pathlen > 0 )\r
+ {\r
+ ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, ", max_pathlen=%d", crt->max_pathlen - 1 );\r
+ MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;\r
+ }\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if( crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME )\r
+ {\r
+ ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%ssubject alt name :", prefix );\r
+ MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;\r
+\r
+ if( ( ret = x509_info_subject_alt_name( &p, &n,\r
+ &crt->subject_alt_names,\r
+ prefix ) ) != 0 )\r
+ return( ret );\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if( crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE )\r
+ {\r
+ ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%scert. type : ", prefix );\r
+ MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;\r
+\r
+ if( ( ret = x509_info_cert_type( &p, &n, crt->ns_cert_type ) ) != 0 )\r
+ return( ret );\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if( crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE )\r
+ {\r
+ ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%skey usage : ", prefix );\r
+ MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;\r
+\r
+ if( ( ret = x509_info_key_usage( &p, &n, crt->key_usage ) ) != 0 )\r
+ return( ret );\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if( crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE )\r
+ {\r
+ ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%sext key usage : ", prefix );\r
+ MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;\r
+\r
+ if( ( ret = x509_info_ext_key_usage( &p, &n,\r
+ &crt->ext_key_usage ) ) != 0 )\r
+ return( ret );\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if( crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES )\r
+ {\r
+ ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n%scertificate policies : ", prefix );\r
+ MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;\r
+\r
+ if( ( ret = x509_info_cert_policies( &p, &n,\r
+ &crt->certificate_policies ) ) != 0 )\r
+ return( ret );\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "\n" );\r
+ MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;\r
+\r
+ return( (int) ( size - n ) );\r
+}\r
+\r
+struct x509_crt_verify_string {\r
+ int code;\r
+ const char *string;\r
+};\r
+\r
+static const struct x509_crt_verify_string x509_crt_verify_strings[] = {\r
+ { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED, "The certificate validity has expired" },\r
+ { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED, "The certificate has been revoked (is on a CRL)" },\r
+ { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH, "The certificate Common Name (CN) does not match with the expected CN" },\r
+ { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED, "The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" },\r
+ { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED, "The CRL is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" },\r
+ { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_EXPIRED, "The CRL is expired" },\r
+ { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_MISSING, "Certificate was missing" },\r
+ { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_SKIP_VERIFY, "Certificate verification was skipped" },\r
+ { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_OTHER, "Other reason (can be used by verify callback)" },\r
+ { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_FUTURE, "The certificate validity starts in the future" },\r
+ { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_FUTURE, "The CRL is from the future" },\r
+ { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE, "Usage does not match the keyUsage extension" },\r
+ { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE, "Usage does not match the extendedKeyUsage extension" },\r
+ { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NS_CERT_TYPE, "Usage does not match the nsCertType extension" },\r
+ { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_MD, "The certificate is signed with an unacceptable hash." },\r
+ { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK, "The certificate is signed with an unacceptable PK alg (eg RSA vs ECDSA)." },\r
+ { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY, "The certificate is signed with an unacceptable key (eg bad curve, RSA too short)." },\r
+ { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_MD, "The CRL is signed with an unacceptable hash." },\r
+ { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_PK, "The CRL is signed with an unacceptable PK alg (eg RSA vs ECDSA)." },\r
+ { MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_KEY, "The CRL is signed with an unacceptable key (eg bad curve, RSA too short)." },\r
+ { 0, NULL }\r
+};\r
+\r
+int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_info( char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix,\r
+ uint32_t flags )\r
+{\r
+ int ret;\r
+ const struct x509_crt_verify_string *cur;\r
+ char *p = buf;\r
+ size_t n = size;\r
+\r
+ for( cur = x509_crt_verify_strings; cur->string != NULL ; cur++ )\r
+ {\r
+ if( ( flags & cur->code ) == 0 )\r
+ continue;\r
+\r
+ ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%s%s\n", prefix, cur->string );\r
+ MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;\r
+ flags ^= cur->code;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if( flags != 0 )\r
+ {\r
+ ret = mbedtls_snprintf( p, n, "%sUnknown reason "\r
+ "(this should not happen)\n", prefix );\r
+ MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ return( (int) ( size - n ) );\r
+}\r
+\r
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE)\r
+int mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage( const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,\r
+ unsigned int usage )\r
+{\r
+ unsigned int usage_must, usage_may;\r
+ unsigned int may_mask = MBEDTLS_X509_KU_ENCIPHER_ONLY\r
+ | MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DECIPHER_ONLY;\r
+\r
+ if( ( crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE ) == 0 )\r
+ return( 0 );\r
+\r
+ usage_must = usage & ~may_mask;\r
+\r
+ if( ( ( crt->key_usage & ~may_mask ) & usage_must ) != usage_must )\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA );\r
+\r
+ usage_may = usage & may_mask;\r
+\r
+ if( ( ( crt->key_usage & may_mask ) | usage_may ) != usage_may )\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA );\r
+\r
+ return( 0 );\r
+}\r
+#endif\r
+\r
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE)\r
+int mbedtls_x509_crt_check_extended_key_usage( const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,\r
+ const char *usage_oid,\r
+ size_t usage_len )\r
+{\r
+ const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur;\r
+\r
+ /* Extension is not mandatory, absent means no restriction */\r
+ if( ( crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE ) == 0 )\r
+ return( 0 );\r
+\r
+ /*\r
+ * Look for the requested usage (or wildcard ANY) in our list\r
+ */\r
+ for( cur = &crt->ext_key_usage; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next )\r
+ {\r
+ const mbedtls_x509_buf *cur_oid = &cur->buf;\r
+\r
+ if( cur_oid->len == usage_len &&\r
+ memcmp( cur_oid->p, usage_oid, usage_len ) == 0 )\r
+ {\r
+ return( 0 );\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if( MBEDTLS_OID_CMP( MBEDTLS_OID_ANY_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE, cur_oid ) == 0 )\r
+ return( 0 );\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA );\r
+}\r
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE */\r
+\r
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C)\r
+/*\r
+ * Return 1 if the certificate is revoked, or 0 otherwise.\r
+ */\r
+int mbedtls_x509_crt_is_revoked( const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, const mbedtls_x509_crl *crl )\r
+{\r
+ const mbedtls_x509_crl_entry *cur = &crl->entry;\r
+\r
+ while( cur != NULL && cur->serial.len != 0 )\r
+ {\r
+ if( crt->serial.len == cur->serial.len &&\r
+ memcmp( crt->serial.p, cur->serial.p, crt->serial.len ) == 0 )\r
+ {\r
+ if( mbedtls_x509_time_is_past( &cur->revocation_date ) )\r
+ return( 1 );\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ cur = cur->next;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ return( 0 );\r
+}\r
+\r
+/*\r
+ * Check that the given certificate is not revoked according to the CRL.\r
+ * Skip validation if no CRL for the given CA is present.\r
+ */\r
+static int x509_crt_verifycrl( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, mbedtls_x509_crt *ca,\r
+ mbedtls_x509_crl *crl_list,\r
+ const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile )\r
+{\r
+ int flags = 0;\r
+ unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];\r
+ const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;\r
+\r
+ if( ca == NULL )\r
+ return( flags );\r
+\r
+ while( crl_list != NULL )\r
+ {\r
+ if( crl_list->version == 0 ||\r
+ x509_name_cmp( &crl_list->issuer, &ca->subject ) != 0 )\r
+ {\r
+ crl_list = crl_list->next;\r
+ continue;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ /*\r
+ * Check if the CA is configured to sign CRLs\r
+ */\r
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE)\r
+ if( mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage( ca,\r
+ MBEDTLS_X509_KU_CRL_SIGN ) != 0 )\r
+ {\r
+ flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED;\r
+ break;\r
+ }\r
+#endif\r
+\r
+ /*\r
+ * Check if CRL is correctly signed by the trusted CA\r
+ */\r
+ if( x509_profile_check_md_alg( profile, crl_list->sig_md ) != 0 )\r
+ flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_MD;\r
+\r
+ if( x509_profile_check_pk_alg( profile, crl_list->sig_pk ) != 0 )\r
+ flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_PK;\r
+\r
+ md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( crl_list->sig_md );\r
+ if( mbedtls_md( md_info, crl_list->tbs.p, crl_list->tbs.len, hash ) != 0 )\r
+ {\r
+ /* Note: this can't happen except after an internal error */\r
+ flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED;\r
+ break;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if( x509_profile_check_key( profile, &ca->pk ) != 0 )\r
+ flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY;\r
+\r
+ if( mbedtls_pk_verify_ext( crl_list->sig_pk, crl_list->sig_opts, &ca->pk,\r
+ crl_list->sig_md, hash, mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ),\r
+ crl_list->sig.p, crl_list->sig.len ) != 0 )\r
+ {\r
+ flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED;\r
+ break;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ /*\r
+ * Check for validity of CRL (Do not drop out)\r
+ */\r
+ if( mbedtls_x509_time_is_past( &crl_list->next_update ) )\r
+ flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_EXPIRED;\r
+\r
+ if( mbedtls_x509_time_is_future( &crl_list->this_update ) )\r
+ flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_FUTURE;\r
+\r
+ /*\r
+ * Check if certificate is revoked\r
+ */\r
+ if( mbedtls_x509_crt_is_revoked( crt, crl_list ) )\r
+ {\r
+ flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED;\r
+ break;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ crl_list = crl_list->next;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ return( flags );\r
+}\r
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C */\r
+\r
+/*\r
+ * Check the signature of a certificate by its parent\r
+ */\r
+static int x509_crt_check_signature( const mbedtls_x509_crt *child,\r
+ mbedtls_x509_crt *parent,\r
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx )\r
+{\r
+ unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];\r
+ size_t hash_len;\r
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)\r
+ const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;\r
+ md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( child->sig_md );\r
+ hash_len = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info );\r
+\r
+ /* Note: hash errors can happen only after an internal error */\r
+ if( mbedtls_md( md_info, child->tbs.p, child->tbs.len, hash ) != 0 )\r
+ return( -1 );\r
+#else\r
+ psa_hash_operation_t hash_operation = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT;\r
+ psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = mbedtls_psa_translate_md( child->sig_md );\r
+\r
+ if( psa_hash_setup( &hash_operation, hash_alg ) != PSA_SUCCESS )\r
+ return( -1 );\r
+\r
+ if( psa_hash_update( &hash_operation, child->tbs.p, child->tbs.len )\r
+ != PSA_SUCCESS )\r
+ {\r
+ return( -1 );\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if( psa_hash_finish( &hash_operation, hash, sizeof( hash ), &hash_len )\r
+ != PSA_SUCCESS )\r
+ {\r
+ return( -1 );\r
+ }\r
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */\r
+ /* Skip expensive computation on obvious mismatch */\r
+ if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( &parent->pk, child->sig_pk ) )\r
+ return( -1 );\r
+\r
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)\r
+ if( rs_ctx != NULL && child->sig_pk == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA )\r
+ {\r
+ return( mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable( &parent->pk,\r
+ child->sig_md, hash, hash_len,\r
+ child->sig.p, child->sig.len, &rs_ctx->pk ) );\r
+ }\r
+#else\r
+ (void) rs_ctx;\r
+#endif\r
+\r
+ return( mbedtls_pk_verify_ext( child->sig_pk, child->sig_opts, &parent->pk,\r
+ child->sig_md, hash, hash_len,\r
+ child->sig.p, child->sig.len ) );\r
+}\r
+\r
+/*\r
+ * Check if 'parent' is a suitable parent (signing CA) for 'child'.\r
+ * Return 0 if yes, -1 if not.\r
+ *\r
+ * top means parent is a locally-trusted certificate\r
+ */\r
+static int x509_crt_check_parent( const mbedtls_x509_crt *child,\r
+ const mbedtls_x509_crt *parent,\r
+ int top )\r
+{\r
+ int need_ca_bit;\r
+\r
+ /* Parent must be the issuer */\r
+ if( x509_name_cmp( &child->issuer, &parent->subject ) != 0 )\r
+ return( -1 );\r
+\r
+ /* Parent must have the basicConstraints CA bit set as a general rule */\r
+ need_ca_bit = 1;\r
+\r
+ /* Exception: v1/v2 certificates that are locally trusted. */\r
+ if( top && parent->version < 3 )\r
+ need_ca_bit = 0;\r
+\r
+ if( need_ca_bit && ! parent->ca_istrue )\r
+ return( -1 );\r
+\r
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE)\r
+ if( need_ca_bit &&\r
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage( parent, MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN ) != 0 )\r
+ {\r
+ return( -1 );\r
+ }\r
+#endif\r
+\r
+ return( 0 );\r
+}\r
+\r
+/*\r
+ * Find a suitable parent for child in candidates, or return NULL.\r
+ *\r
+ * Here suitable is defined as:\r
+ * 1. subject name matches child's issuer\r
+ * 2. if necessary, the CA bit is set and key usage allows signing certs\r
+ * 3. for trusted roots, the signature is correct\r
+ * (for intermediates, the signature is checked and the result reported)\r
+ * 4. pathlen constraints are satisfied\r
+ *\r
+ * If there's a suitable candidate which is also time-valid, return the first\r
+ * such. Otherwise, return the first suitable candidate (or NULL if there is\r
+ * none).\r
+ *\r
+ * The rationale for this rule is that someone could have a list of trusted\r
+ * roots with two versions on the same root with different validity periods.\r
+ * (At least one user reported having such a list and wanted it to just work.)\r
+ * The reason we don't just require time-validity is that generally there is\r
+ * only one version, and if it's expired we want the flags to state that\r
+ * rather than NOT_TRUSTED, as would be the case if we required it here.\r
+ *\r
+ * The rationale for rule 3 (signature for trusted roots) is that users might\r
+ * have two versions of the same CA with different keys in their list, and the\r
+ * way we select the correct one is by checking the signature (as we don't\r
+ * rely on key identifier extensions). (This is one way users might choose to\r
+ * handle key rollover, another relies on self-issued certs, see [SIRO].)\r
+ *\r
+ * Arguments:\r
+ * - [in] child: certificate for which we're looking for a parent\r
+ * - [in] candidates: chained list of potential parents\r
+ * - [out] r_parent: parent found (or NULL)\r
+ * - [out] r_signature_is_good: 1 if child signature by parent is valid, or 0\r
+ * - [in] top: 1 if candidates consists of trusted roots, ie we're at the top\r
+ * of the chain, 0 otherwise\r
+ * - [in] path_cnt: number of intermediates seen so far\r
+ * - [in] self_cnt: number of self-signed intermediates seen so far\r
+ * (will never be greater than path_cnt)\r
+ * - [in-out] rs_ctx: context for restarting operations\r
+ *\r
+ * Return value:\r
+ * - 0 on success\r
+ * - MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS otherwise\r
+ */\r
+static int x509_crt_find_parent_in(\r
+ mbedtls_x509_crt *child,\r
+ mbedtls_x509_crt *candidates,\r
+ mbedtls_x509_crt **r_parent,\r
+ int *r_signature_is_good,\r
+ int top,\r
+ unsigned path_cnt,\r
+ unsigned self_cnt,\r
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx )\r
+{\r
+ int ret;\r
+ mbedtls_x509_crt *parent, *fallback_parent;\r
+ int signature_is_good, fallback_signature_is_good;\r
+\r
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)\r
+ /* did we have something in progress? */\r
+ if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->parent != NULL )\r
+ {\r
+ /* restore saved state */\r
+ parent = rs_ctx->parent;\r
+ fallback_parent = rs_ctx->fallback_parent;\r
+ fallback_signature_is_good = rs_ctx->fallback_signature_is_good;\r
+\r
+ /* clear saved state */\r
+ rs_ctx->parent = NULL;\r
+ rs_ctx->fallback_parent = NULL;\r
+ rs_ctx->fallback_signature_is_good = 0;\r
+\r
+ /* resume where we left */\r
+ goto check_signature;\r
+ }\r
+#endif\r
+\r
+ fallback_parent = NULL;\r
+ fallback_signature_is_good = 0;\r
+\r
+ for( parent = candidates; parent != NULL; parent = parent->next )\r
+ {\r
+ /* basic parenting skills (name, CA bit, key usage) */\r
+ if( x509_crt_check_parent( child, parent, top ) != 0 )\r
+ continue;\r
+\r
+ /* +1 because stored max_pathlen is 1 higher that the actual value */\r
+ if( parent->max_pathlen > 0 &&\r
+ (size_t) parent->max_pathlen < 1 + path_cnt - self_cnt )\r
+ {\r
+ continue;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ /* Signature */\r
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)\r
+check_signature:\r
+#endif\r
+ ret = x509_crt_check_signature( child, parent, rs_ctx );\r
+\r
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)\r
+ if( rs_ctx != NULL && ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS )\r
+ {\r
+ /* save state */\r
+ rs_ctx->parent = parent;\r
+ rs_ctx->fallback_parent = fallback_parent;\r
+ rs_ctx->fallback_signature_is_good = fallback_signature_is_good;\r
+\r
+ return( ret );\r
+ }\r
+#else\r
+ (void) ret;\r
+#endif\r
+\r
+ signature_is_good = ret == 0;\r
+ if( top && ! signature_is_good )\r
+ continue;\r
+\r
+ /* optional time check */\r
+ if( mbedtls_x509_time_is_past( &parent->valid_to ) ||\r
+ mbedtls_x509_time_is_future( &parent->valid_from ) )\r
+ {\r
+ if( fallback_parent == NULL )\r
+ {\r
+ fallback_parent = parent;\r
+ fallback_signature_is_good = signature_is_good;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ continue;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ break;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if( parent != NULL )\r
+ {\r
+ *r_parent = parent;\r
+ *r_signature_is_good = signature_is_good;\r
+ }\r
+ else\r
+ {\r
+ *r_parent = fallback_parent;\r
+ *r_signature_is_good = fallback_signature_is_good;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ return( 0 );\r
+}\r
+\r
+/*\r
+ * Find a parent in trusted CAs or the provided chain, or return NULL.\r
+ *\r
+ * Searches in trusted CAs first, and return the first suitable parent found\r
+ * (see find_parent_in() for definition of suitable).\r
+ *\r
+ * Arguments:\r
+ * - [in] child: certificate for which we're looking for a parent, followed\r
+ * by a chain of possible intermediates\r
+ * - [in] trust_ca: list of locally trusted certificates\r
+ * - [out] parent: parent found (or NULL)\r
+ * - [out] parent_is_trusted: 1 if returned `parent` is trusted, or 0\r
+ * - [out] signature_is_good: 1 if child signature by parent is valid, or 0\r
+ * - [in] path_cnt: number of links in the chain so far (EE -> ... -> child)\r
+ * - [in] self_cnt: number of self-signed certs in the chain so far\r
+ * (will always be no greater than path_cnt)\r
+ * - [in-out] rs_ctx: context for restarting operations\r
+ *\r
+ * Return value:\r
+ * - 0 on success\r
+ * - MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS otherwise\r
+ */\r
+static int x509_crt_find_parent(\r
+ mbedtls_x509_crt *child,\r
+ mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca,\r
+ mbedtls_x509_crt **parent,\r
+ int *parent_is_trusted,\r
+ int *signature_is_good,\r
+ unsigned path_cnt,\r
+ unsigned self_cnt,\r
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx )\r
+{\r
+ int ret;\r
+ mbedtls_x509_crt *search_list;\r
+\r
+ *parent_is_trusted = 1;\r
+\r
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)\r
+ /* restore then clear saved state if we have some stored */\r
+ if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->parent_is_trusted != -1 )\r
+ {\r
+ *parent_is_trusted = rs_ctx->parent_is_trusted;\r
+ rs_ctx->parent_is_trusted = -1;\r
+ }\r
+#endif\r
+\r
+ while( 1 ) {\r
+ search_list = *parent_is_trusted ? trust_ca : child->next;\r
+\r
+ ret = x509_crt_find_parent_in( child, search_list,\r
+ parent, signature_is_good,\r
+ *parent_is_trusted,\r
+ path_cnt, self_cnt, rs_ctx );\r
+\r
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)\r
+ if( rs_ctx != NULL && ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS )\r
+ {\r
+ /* save state */\r
+ rs_ctx->parent_is_trusted = *parent_is_trusted;\r
+ return( ret );\r
+ }\r
+#else\r
+ (void) ret;\r
+#endif\r
+\r
+ /* stop here if found or already in second iteration */\r
+ if( *parent != NULL || *parent_is_trusted == 0 )\r
+ break;\r
+\r
+ /* prepare second iteration */\r
+ *parent_is_trusted = 0;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ /* extra precaution against mistakes in the caller */\r
+ if( *parent == NULL )\r
+ {\r
+ *parent_is_trusted = 0;\r
+ *signature_is_good = 0;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ return( 0 );\r
+}\r
+\r
+/*\r
+ * Check if an end-entity certificate is locally trusted\r
+ *\r
+ * Currently we require such certificates to be self-signed (actually only\r
+ * check for self-issued as self-signatures are not checked)\r
+ */\r
+static int x509_crt_check_ee_locally_trusted(\r
+ mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,\r
+ mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca )\r
+{\r
+ mbedtls_x509_crt *cur;\r
+\r
+ /* must be self-issued */\r
+ if( x509_name_cmp( &crt->issuer, &crt->subject ) != 0 )\r
+ return( -1 );\r
+\r
+ /* look for an exact match with trusted cert */\r
+ for( cur = trust_ca; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next )\r
+ {\r
+ if( crt->raw.len == cur->raw.len &&\r
+ memcmp( crt->raw.p, cur->raw.p, crt->raw.len ) == 0 )\r
+ {\r
+ return( 0 );\r
+ }\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ /* too bad */\r
+ return( -1 );\r
+}\r
+\r
+/*\r
+ * Build and verify a certificate chain\r
+ *\r
+ * Given a peer-provided list of certificates EE, C1, ..., Cn and\r
+ * a list of trusted certs R1, ... Rp, try to build and verify a chain\r
+ * EE, Ci1, ... Ciq [, Rj]\r
+ * such that every cert in the chain is a child of the next one,\r
+ * jumping to a trusted root as early as possible.\r
+ *\r
+ * Verify that chain and return it with flags for all issues found.\r
+ *\r
+ * Special cases:\r
+ * - EE == Rj -> return a one-element list containing it\r
+ * - EE, Ci1, ..., Ciq cannot be continued with a trusted root\r
+ * -> return that chain with NOT_TRUSTED set on Ciq\r
+ *\r
+ * Tests for (aspects of) this function should include at least:\r
+ * - trusted EE\r
+ * - EE -> trusted root\r
+ * - EE -> intermediate CA -> trusted root\r
+ * - if relevant: EE untrusted\r
+ * - if relevant: EE -> intermediate, untrusted\r
+ * with the aspect under test checked at each relevant level (EE, int, root).\r
+ * For some aspects longer chains are required, but usually length 2 is\r
+ * enough (but length 1 is not in general).\r
+ *\r
+ * Arguments:\r
+ * - [in] crt: the cert list EE, C1, ..., Cn\r
+ * - [in] trust_ca: the trusted list R1, ..., Rp\r
+ * - [in] ca_crl, profile: as in verify_with_profile()\r
+ * - [out] ver_chain: the built and verified chain\r
+ * Only valid when return value is 0, may contain garbage otherwise!\r
+ * Restart note: need not be the same when calling again to resume.\r
+ * - [in-out] rs_ctx: context for restarting operations\r
+ *\r
+ * Return value:\r
+ * - non-zero if the chain could not be fully built and examined\r
+ * - 0 is the chain was successfully built and examined,\r
+ * even if it was found to be invalid\r
+ */\r
+static int x509_crt_verify_chain(\r
+ mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,\r
+ mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca,\r
+ mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl,\r
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t f_ca_cb,\r
+ void *p_ca_cb,\r
+ const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile,\r
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain *ver_chain,\r
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx )\r
+{\r
+ /* Don't initialize any of those variables here, so that the compiler can\r
+ * catch potential issues with jumping ahead when restarting */\r
+ int ret;\r
+ uint32_t *flags;\r
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain_item *cur;\r
+ mbedtls_x509_crt *child;\r
+ mbedtls_x509_crt *parent;\r
+ int parent_is_trusted;\r
+ int child_is_trusted;\r
+ int signature_is_good;\r
+ unsigned self_cnt;\r
+ mbedtls_x509_crt *cur_trust_ca = NULL;\r
+\r
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)\r
+ /* resume if we had an operation in progress */\r
+ if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->in_progress == x509_crt_rs_find_parent )\r
+ {\r
+ /* restore saved state */\r
+ *ver_chain = rs_ctx->ver_chain; /* struct copy */\r
+ self_cnt = rs_ctx->self_cnt;\r
+\r
+ /* restore derived state */\r
+ cur = &ver_chain->items[ver_chain->len - 1];\r
+ child = cur->crt;\r
+ flags = &cur->flags;\r
+\r
+ goto find_parent;\r
+ }\r
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */\r
+\r
+ child = crt;\r
+ self_cnt = 0;\r
+ parent_is_trusted = 0;\r
+ child_is_trusted = 0;\r
+\r
+ while( 1 ) {\r
+ /* Add certificate to the verification chain */\r
+ cur = &ver_chain->items[ver_chain->len];\r
+ cur->crt = child;\r
+ cur->flags = 0;\r
+ ver_chain->len++;\r
+ flags = &cur->flags;\r
+\r
+ /* Check time-validity (all certificates) */\r
+ if( mbedtls_x509_time_is_past( &child->valid_to ) )\r
+ *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED;\r
+\r
+ if( mbedtls_x509_time_is_future( &child->valid_from ) )\r
+ *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_FUTURE;\r
+\r
+ /* Stop here for trusted roots (but not for trusted EE certs) */\r
+ if( child_is_trusted )\r
+ return( 0 );\r
+\r
+ /* Check signature algorithm: MD & PK algs */\r
+ if( x509_profile_check_md_alg( profile, child->sig_md ) != 0 )\r
+ *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_MD;\r
+\r
+ if( x509_profile_check_pk_alg( profile, child->sig_pk ) != 0 )\r
+ *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK;\r
+\r
+ /* Special case: EE certs that are locally trusted */\r
+ if( ver_chain->len == 1 &&\r
+ x509_crt_check_ee_locally_trusted( child, trust_ca ) == 0 )\r
+ {\r
+ return( 0 );\r
+ }\r
+\r
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)\r
+find_parent:\r
+#endif\r
+\r
+ /* Obtain list of potential trusted signers from CA callback,\r
+ * or use statically provided list. */\r
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK)\r
+ if( f_ca_cb != NULL )\r
+ {\r
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_free( ver_chain->trust_ca_cb_result );\r
+ mbedtls_free( ver_chain->trust_ca_cb_result );\r
+ ver_chain->trust_ca_cb_result = NULL;\r
+\r
+ ret = f_ca_cb( p_ca_cb, child, &ver_chain->trust_ca_cb_result );\r
+ if( ret != 0 )\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR );\r
+\r
+ cur_trust_ca = ver_chain->trust_ca_cb_result;\r
+ }\r
+ else\r
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */\r
+ {\r
+ ((void) f_ca_cb);\r
+ ((void) p_ca_cb);\r
+ cur_trust_ca = trust_ca;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ /* Look for a parent in trusted CAs or up the chain */\r
+ ret = x509_crt_find_parent( child, cur_trust_ca, &parent,\r
+ &parent_is_trusted, &signature_is_good,\r
+ ver_chain->len - 1, self_cnt, rs_ctx );\r
+\r
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)\r
+ if( rs_ctx != NULL && ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS )\r
+ {\r
+ /* save state */\r
+ rs_ctx->in_progress = x509_crt_rs_find_parent;\r
+ rs_ctx->self_cnt = self_cnt;\r
+ rs_ctx->ver_chain = *ver_chain; /* struct copy */\r
+\r
+ return( ret );\r
+ }\r
+#else\r
+ (void) ret;\r
+#endif\r
+\r
+ /* No parent? We're done here */\r
+ if( parent == NULL )\r
+ {\r
+ *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED;\r
+ return( 0 );\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ /* Count intermediate self-issued (not necessarily self-signed) certs.\r
+ * These can occur with some strategies for key rollover, see [SIRO],\r
+ * and should be excluded from max_pathlen checks. */\r
+ if( ver_chain->len != 1 &&\r
+ x509_name_cmp( &child->issuer, &child->subject ) == 0 )\r
+ {\r
+ self_cnt++;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ /* path_cnt is 0 for the first intermediate CA,\r
+ * and if parent is trusted it's not an intermediate CA */\r
+ if( ! parent_is_trusted &&\r
+ ver_chain->len > MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA )\r
+ {\r
+ /* return immediately to avoid overflow the chain array */\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR );\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ /* signature was checked while searching parent */\r
+ if( ! signature_is_good )\r
+ *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED;\r
+\r
+ /* check size of signing key */\r
+ if( x509_profile_check_key( profile, &parent->pk ) != 0 )\r
+ *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY;\r
+\r
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C)\r
+ /* Check trusted CA's CRL for the given crt */\r
+ *flags |= x509_crt_verifycrl( child, parent, ca_crl, profile );\r
+#else\r
+ (void) ca_crl;\r
+#endif\r
+\r
+ /* prepare for next iteration */\r
+ child = parent;\r
+ parent = NULL;\r
+ child_is_trusted = parent_is_trusted;\r
+ signature_is_good = 0;\r
+ }\r
+}\r
+\r
+/*\r
+ * Check for CN match\r
+ */\r
+static int x509_crt_check_cn( const mbedtls_x509_buf *name,\r
+ const char *cn, size_t cn_len )\r
+{\r
+ /* try exact match */\r
+ if( name->len == cn_len &&\r
+ x509_memcasecmp( cn, name->p, cn_len ) == 0 )\r
+ {\r
+ return( 0 );\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ /* try wildcard match */\r
+ if( x509_check_wildcard( cn, name ) == 0 )\r
+ {\r
+ return( 0 );\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ return( -1 );\r
+}\r
+\r
+/*\r
+ * Verify the requested CN - only call this if cn is not NULL!\r
+ */\r
+static void x509_crt_verify_name( const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,\r
+ const char *cn,\r
+ uint32_t *flags )\r
+{\r
+ const mbedtls_x509_name *name;\r
+ const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur;\r
+ size_t cn_len = strlen( cn );\r
+\r
+ if( crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME )\r
+ {\r
+ for( cur = &crt->subject_alt_names; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next )\r
+ {\r
+ if( x509_crt_check_cn( &cur->buf, cn, cn_len ) == 0 )\r
+ break;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if( cur == NULL )\r
+ *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH;\r
+ }\r
+ else\r
+ {\r
+ for( name = &crt->subject; name != NULL; name = name->next )\r
+ {\r
+ if( MBEDTLS_OID_CMP( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_CN, &name->oid ) == 0 &&\r
+ x509_crt_check_cn( &name->val, cn, cn_len ) == 0 )\r
+ {\r
+ break;\r
+ }\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if( name == NULL )\r
+ *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH;\r
+ }\r
+}\r
+\r
+/*\r
+ * Merge the flags for all certs in the chain, after calling callback\r
+ */\r
+static int x509_crt_merge_flags_with_cb(\r
+ uint32_t *flags,\r
+ const mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain *ver_chain,\r
+ int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *),\r
+ void *p_vrfy )\r
+{\r
+ int ret;\r
+ unsigned i;\r
+ uint32_t cur_flags;\r
+ const mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain_item *cur;\r
+\r
+ for( i = ver_chain->len; i != 0; --i )\r
+ {\r
+ cur = &ver_chain->items[i-1];\r
+ cur_flags = cur->flags;\r
+\r
+ if( NULL != f_vrfy )\r
+ if( ( ret = f_vrfy( p_vrfy, cur->crt, (int) i-1, &cur_flags ) ) != 0 )\r
+ return( ret );\r
+\r
+ *flags |= cur_flags;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ return( 0 );\r
+}\r
+\r
+/*\r
+ * Verify the certificate validity, with profile, restartable version\r
+ *\r
+ * This function:\r
+ * - checks the requested CN (if any)\r
+ * - checks the type and size of the EE cert's key,\r
+ * as that isn't done as part of chain building/verification currently\r
+ * - builds and verifies the chain\r
+ * - then calls the callback and merges the flags\r
+ *\r
+ * The parameters pairs `trust_ca`, `ca_crl` and `f_ca_cb`, `p_ca_cb`\r
+ * are mutually exclusive: If `f_ca_cb != NULL`, it will be used by the\r
+ * verification routine to search for trusted signers, and CRLs will\r
+ * be disabled. Otherwise, `trust_ca` will be used as the static list\r
+ * of trusted signers, and `ca_crl` will be use as the static list\r
+ * of CRLs.\r
+ */\r
+static int x509_crt_verify_restartable_ca_cb( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,\r
+ mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca,\r
+ mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl,\r
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t f_ca_cb,\r
+ void *p_ca_cb,\r
+ const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile,\r
+ const char *cn, uint32_t *flags,\r
+ int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *),\r
+ void *p_vrfy,\r
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx )\r
+{\r
+ int ret;\r
+ mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type;\r
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain ver_chain;\r
+ uint32_t ee_flags;\r
+\r
+ *flags = 0;\r
+ ee_flags = 0;\r
+ x509_crt_verify_chain_reset( &ver_chain );\r
+\r
+ if( profile == NULL )\r
+ {\r
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA;\r
+ goto exit;\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ /* check name if requested */\r
+ if( cn != NULL )\r
+ x509_crt_verify_name( crt, cn, &ee_flags );\r
+\r
+ /* Check the type and size of the key */\r
+ pk_type = mbedtls_pk_get_type( &crt->pk );\r
+\r
+ if( x509_profile_check_pk_alg( profile, pk_type ) != 0 )\r
+ ee_flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK;\r
+\r
+ if( x509_profile_check_key( profile, &crt->pk ) != 0 )\r
+ ee_flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY;\r
+\r
+ /* Check the chain */\r
+ ret = x509_crt_verify_chain( crt, trust_ca, ca_crl,\r
+ f_ca_cb, p_ca_cb, profile,\r
+ &ver_chain, rs_ctx );\r
+\r
+ if( ret != 0 )\r
+ goto exit;\r
+\r
+ /* Merge end-entity flags */\r
+ ver_chain.items[0].flags |= ee_flags;\r
+\r
+ /* Build final flags, calling callback on the way if any */\r
+ ret = x509_crt_merge_flags_with_cb( flags, &ver_chain, f_vrfy, p_vrfy );\r
+\r
+exit:\r
+\r
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK)\r
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_free( ver_chain.trust_ca_cb_result );\r
+ mbedtls_free( ver_chain.trust_ca_cb_result );\r
+ ver_chain.trust_ca_cb_result = NULL;\r
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */\r
+\r
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)\r
+ if( rs_ctx != NULL && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS )\r
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_free( rs_ctx );\r
+#endif\r
+\r
+ /* prevent misuse of the vrfy callback - VERIFY_FAILED would be ignored by\r
+ * the SSL module for authmode optional, but non-zero return from the\r
+ * callback means a fatal error so it shouldn't be ignored */\r
+ if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED )\r
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR;\r
+\r
+ if( ret != 0 )\r
+ {\r
+ *flags = (uint32_t) -1;\r
+ return( ret );\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if( *flags != 0 )\r
+ return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED );\r
+\r
+ return( 0 );\r
+}\r
+\r
+\r
+/*\r
+ * Verify the certificate validity (default profile, not restartable)\r
+ */\r
+int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,\r
+ mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca,\r
+ mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl,\r
+ const char *cn, uint32_t *flags,\r
+ int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *),\r
+ void *p_vrfy )\r
+{\r
+ return( x509_crt_verify_restartable_ca_cb( crt, trust_ca, ca_crl,\r
+ NULL, NULL,\r
+ &mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default,\r
+ cn, flags,\r
+ f_vrfy, p_vrfy, NULL ) );\r
+}\r
+\r
+/*\r
+ * Verify the certificate validity (user-chosen profile, not restartable)\r
+ */\r
+int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,\r
+ mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca,\r
+ mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl,\r
+ const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile,\r
+ const char *cn, uint32_t *flags,\r
+ int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *),\r
+ void *p_vrfy )\r
+{\r
+ return( x509_crt_verify_restartable_ca_cb( crt, trust_ca, ca_crl,\r
+ NULL, NULL,\r
+ profile, cn, flags,\r
+ f_vrfy, p_vrfy, NULL ) );\r
+}\r
+\r
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK)\r
+/*\r
+ * Verify the certificate validity (user-chosen profile, CA callback,\r
+ * not restartable).\r
+ */\r
+int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_ca_cb( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,\r
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t f_ca_cb,\r
+ void *p_ca_cb,\r
+ const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile,\r
+ const char *cn, uint32_t *flags,\r
+ int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *),\r
+ void *p_vrfy )\r
+{\r
+ return( x509_crt_verify_restartable_ca_cb( crt, NULL, NULL,\r
+ f_ca_cb, p_ca_cb,\r
+ profile, cn, flags,\r
+ f_vrfy, p_vrfy, NULL ) );\r
+}\r
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */\r
+\r
+int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_restartable( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,\r
+ mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca,\r
+ mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl,\r
+ const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile,\r
+ const char *cn, uint32_t *flags,\r
+ int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *),\r
+ void *p_vrfy,\r
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx )\r
+{\r
+ return( x509_crt_verify_restartable_ca_cb( crt, trust_ca, ca_crl,\r
+ NULL, NULL,\r
+ profile, cn, flags,\r
+ f_vrfy, p_vrfy, rs_ctx ) );\r
+}\r
+\r
+\r
+/*\r
+ * Initialize a certificate chain\r
+ */\r
+void mbedtls_x509_crt_init( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt )\r
+{\r
+ memset( crt, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crt) );\r
+}\r
+\r
+/*\r
+ * Unallocate all certificate data\r
+ */\r
+void mbedtls_x509_crt_free( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt )\r
+{\r
+ mbedtls_x509_crt *cert_cur = crt;\r
+ mbedtls_x509_crt *cert_prv;\r
+ mbedtls_x509_name *name_cur;\r
+ mbedtls_x509_name *name_prv;\r
+ mbedtls_x509_sequence *seq_cur;\r
+ mbedtls_x509_sequence *seq_prv;\r
+\r
+ if( crt == NULL )\r
+ return;\r
+\r
+ do\r
+ {\r
+ mbedtls_pk_free( &cert_cur->pk );\r
+\r
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT)\r
+ mbedtls_free( cert_cur->sig_opts );\r
+#endif\r
+\r
+ name_cur = cert_cur->issuer.next;\r
+ while( name_cur != NULL )\r
+ {\r
+ name_prv = name_cur;\r
+ name_cur = name_cur->next;\r
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize( name_prv, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_name ) );\r
+ mbedtls_free( name_prv );\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ name_cur = cert_cur->subject.next;\r
+ while( name_cur != NULL )\r
+ {\r
+ name_prv = name_cur;\r
+ name_cur = name_cur->next;\r
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize( name_prv, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_name ) );\r
+ mbedtls_free( name_prv );\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ seq_cur = cert_cur->ext_key_usage.next;\r
+ while( seq_cur != NULL )\r
+ {\r
+ seq_prv = seq_cur;\r
+ seq_cur = seq_cur->next;\r
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize( seq_prv,\r
+ sizeof( mbedtls_x509_sequence ) );\r
+ mbedtls_free( seq_prv );\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ seq_cur = cert_cur->subject_alt_names.next;\r
+ while( seq_cur != NULL )\r
+ {\r
+ seq_prv = seq_cur;\r
+ seq_cur = seq_cur->next;\r
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize( seq_prv,\r
+ sizeof( mbedtls_x509_sequence ) );\r
+ mbedtls_free( seq_prv );\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ seq_cur = cert_cur->certificate_policies.next;\r
+ while( seq_cur != NULL )\r
+ {\r
+ seq_prv = seq_cur;\r
+ seq_cur = seq_cur->next;\r
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize( seq_prv,\r
+ sizeof( mbedtls_x509_sequence ) );\r
+ mbedtls_free( seq_prv );\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ if( cert_cur->raw.p != NULL && cert_cur->own_buffer )\r
+ {\r
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize( cert_cur->raw.p, cert_cur->raw.len );\r
+ mbedtls_free( cert_cur->raw.p );\r
+ }\r
+\r
+ cert_cur = cert_cur->next;\r
+ }\r
+ while( cert_cur != NULL );\r
+\r
+ cert_cur = crt;\r
+ do\r
+ {\r
+ cert_prv = cert_cur;\r
+ cert_cur = cert_cur->next;\r
+\r
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize( cert_prv, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_crt ) );\r
+ if( cert_prv != crt )\r
+ mbedtls_free( cert_prv );\r
+ }\r
+ while( cert_cur != NULL );\r
+}\r
+\r
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)\r
+/*\r
+ * Initialize a restart context\r
+ */\r
+void mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_init( mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *ctx )\r
+{\r
+ mbedtls_pk_restart_init( &ctx->pk );\r
+\r
+ ctx->parent = NULL;\r
+ ctx->fallback_parent = NULL;\r
+ ctx->fallback_signature_is_good = 0;\r
+\r
+ ctx->parent_is_trusted = -1;\r
+\r
+ ctx->in_progress = x509_crt_rs_none;\r
+ ctx->self_cnt = 0;\r
+ x509_crt_verify_chain_reset( &ctx->ver_chain );\r
+}\r
+\r
+/*\r
+ * Free the components of a restart context\r
+ */\r
+void mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_free( mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *ctx )\r
+{\r
+ if( ctx == NULL )\r
+ return;\r
+\r
+ mbedtls_pk_restart_free( &ctx->pk );\r
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_init( ctx );\r
+}\r
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */\r
+\r
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */\r
projects / freertos / blobdiff