/* $OpenLDAP$ */
/* This work is part of OpenLDAP Software <http://www.openldap.org/>.
*
- * Copyright 1998-2004 The OpenLDAP Foundation.
+ * Copyright 1998-2005 The OpenLDAP Foundation.
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
#include "slap.h"
#include "sets.h"
#include "lber_pvt.h"
-
-#ifdef LDAP_SLAPI
-#include "slapi/slapi.h"
-#endif /* LDAPI_SLAPI */
+#include "lutil.h"
#define ACL_BUF_SIZE 1024 /* use most appropriate size */
/*
* speed up compares
*/
-static struct berval
- aci_bv_entry = BER_BVC("entry"),
- aci_bv_children = BER_BVC("children"),
- aci_bv_onelevel = BER_BVC("onelevel"),
- aci_bv_subtree = BER_BVC("subtree"),
- aci_bv_br_entry = BER_BVC("[entry]"),
- aci_bv_br_all = BER_BVC("[all]"),
- aci_bv_access_id = BER_BVC("access-id"),
- aci_bv_anonymous = BER_BVC("anonymous"),
- aci_bv_public = BER_BVC("public"),
- aci_bv_users = BER_BVC("users"),
- aci_bv_self = BER_BVC("self"),
- aci_bv_dnattr = BER_BVC("dnattr"),
- aci_bv_group = BER_BVC("group"),
- aci_bv_role = BER_BVC("role"),
- aci_bv_set = BER_BVC("set"),
- aci_bv_set_ref = BER_BVC("set-ref"),
- aci_bv_grant = BER_BVC("grant"),
- aci_bv_deny = BER_BVC("deny"),
-
- aci_bv_ip_eq = BER_BVC("IP="),
+const struct berval aci_bv[] = {
+ BER_BVC("entry"),
+ BER_BVC("children"),
+ BER_BVC("onelevel"),
+ BER_BVC("subtree"),
+ BER_BVC("[entry]"),
+ BER_BVC("[all]"),
+ BER_BVC("access-id"),
+#if 0
+ BER_BVC("anonymous"),
+#endif
+ BER_BVC("public"),
+ BER_BVC("users"),
+ BER_BVC("self"),
+ BER_BVC("dnattr"),
+ BER_BVC("group"),
+ BER_BVC("role"),
+ BER_BVC("set"),
+ BER_BVC("set-ref"),
+ BER_BVC("grant"),
+ BER_BVC("deny"),
+
+ BER_BVC("IP="),
#ifdef LDAP_PF_LOCAL
- aci_bv_path_eq = BER_BVC("PATH="),
- aci_bv_dirsep = BER_BVC(LDAP_DIRSEP),
+ BER_BVC("PATH="),
+#if 0
+ BER_BVC(LDAP_DIRSEP),
+#endif
#endif /* LDAP_PF_LOCAL */
- aci_bv_group_class = BER_BVC(SLAPD_GROUP_CLASS),
- aci_bv_group_attr = BER_BVC(SLAPD_GROUP_ATTR),
- aci_bv_role_class = BER_BVC(SLAPD_ROLE_CLASS),
- aci_bv_role_attr = BER_BVC(SLAPD_ROLE_ATTR),
- aci_bv_set_attr = BER_BVC(SLAPD_ACI_SET_ATTR);
-
-typedef enum slap_aci_scope_t {
- SLAP_ACI_SCOPE_ENTRY = 0x1,
- SLAP_ACI_SCOPE_CHILDREN = 0x2,
- SLAP_ACI_SCOPE_SUBTREE = ( SLAP_ACI_SCOPE_ENTRY | SLAP_ACI_SCOPE_CHILDREN )
-} slap_aci_scope_t;
-
-static AccessControl * acl_get(
+ BER_BVC(SLAPD_GROUP_CLASS),
+ BER_BVC(SLAPD_GROUP_ATTR),
+ BER_BVC(SLAPD_ROLE_CLASS),
+ BER_BVC(SLAPD_ROLE_ATTR),
+
+ BER_BVC(SLAPD_ACI_SET_ATTR)
+};
+
+static AccessControl * slap_acl_get(
AccessControl *ac, int *count,
Operation *op, Entry *e,
AttributeDescription *desc,
int nmatch, regmatch_t *matches,
AccessControlState *state );
-static slap_control_t acl_mask(
+static slap_control_t slap_acl_mask(
AccessControl *ac, slap_mask_t *mask,
Operation *op, Entry *e,
AttributeDescription *desc,
int count,
AccessControlState *state );
-#ifdef SLAPD_ACI_ENABLED
-static int aci_mask(
- Operation *op, Entry *e,
- AttributeDescription *desc,
- struct berval *val,
- struct berval *aci,
- int nmatch,
- regmatch_t *matches,
- slap_access_t *grant,
- slap_access_t *deny,
- slap_aci_scope_t scope);
-#endif
-
static int regex_matches(
struct berval *pat, char *str, char *buf,
int nmatch, regmatch_t *matches);
-static int string_expand(
- struct berval *newbuf, struct berval *pattern,
- char *match, int nmatch, regmatch_t *matches);
-typedef struct AciSetCookie {
- Operation *op;
- Entry *e;
-} AciSetCookie;
+typedef struct AclSetCookie {
+ SetCookie asc_cookie;
+#define asc_op asc_cookie.set_op
+ Entry *asc_e;
+} AclSetCookie;
-SLAP_SET_GATHER aci_set_gather;
-SLAP_SET_GATHER aci_set_gather2;
-static int aci_match_set ( struct berval *subj, Operation *op,
- Entry *e, int setref );
+SLAP_SET_GATHER acl_set_gather;
+SLAP_SET_GATHER acl_set_gather2;
/*
* access_allowed - check whether op->o_ndn is allowed the requested access
* the whole attribute is assumed (all values).
*
* This routine loops through all access controls and calls
- * acl_mask() on each applicable access control.
+ * slap_acl_mask() on each applicable access control.
* The loop exits when a definitive answer is reached or
* or no more controls remain.
*
* - can be legally called with op->o_bd == NULL
*/
+#ifdef SLAP_OVERLAY_ACCESS
int
-access_allowed_mask(
+slap_access_always_allowed(
+ Operation *op,
+ Entry *e,
+ AttributeDescription *desc,
+ struct berval *val,
+ slap_access_t access,
+ AccessControlState *state,
+ slap_mask_t *maskp )
+{
+ assert( maskp != NULL );
+
+ /* assign all */
+ ACL_LVL_ASSIGN_MANAGE( *maskp );
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int
+slap_access_allowed(
Operation *op,
Entry *e,
AttributeDescription *desc,
int ret = 1;
int count;
AccessControl *a = NULL;
- Backend *be;
- int be_null = 0;
#ifdef LDAP_DEBUG
- char accessmaskbuf[ACCESSMASK_MAXLEN];
+ char accessmaskbuf[ACCESSMASK_MAXLEN];
#endif
- slap_mask_t mask;
- slap_control_t control;
- const char *attr;
- regmatch_t matches[MAXREMATCHES];
- int st_same_attr = 0;
- static AccessControlState state_init = ACL_STATE_INIT;
-
+ slap_mask_t mask;
+ slap_control_t control;
+ slap_access_t access_level;
+ const char *attr;
+ regmatch_t matches[MAXREMATCHES];
+ int st_same_attr = 0;
+
+ assert( op != NULL );
assert( e != NULL );
assert( desc != NULL );
- assert( access > ACL_NONE );
- if ( maskp ) ACL_INVALIDATE( *maskp );
+ assert( maskp != NULL );
+ access_level = ACL_LEVEL( access );
attr = desc->ad_cname.bv_val;
assert( attr != NULL );
- if( op && op->o_is_auth_check &&
- ( access == ACL_SEARCH || access == ACL_READ ))
- {
- access = ACL_AUTH;
- }
-
- if( state ) {
- if ( state->as_vd_ad==desc) {
- if ( state->as_recorded ) {
- if( state->as_recorded & ACL_STATE_RECORDED_NV &&
- val == NULL )
- {
- return state->as_result;
- } else if ( state->as_recorded & ACL_STATE_RECORDED_VD &&
- val != NULL && state->as_vd_acl == NULL )
- {
- return state->as_result;
- }
- }
- st_same_attr = 1;
- } else {
- *state = state_init;
- }
-
- state->as_vd_ad=desc;
- }
-
- Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
- "=> access_allowed: %s access to \"%s\" \"%s\" requested\n",
- access2str( access ), e->e_dn, attr );
-
- if ( op == NULL ) {
- /* no-op call */
- goto done;
- }
-
- be = op->o_bd;
- if ( be == NULL ) {
- be = &backends[0];
- be_null = 1;
-#ifdef LDAP_DEVEL
- /*
- * FIXME: experimental; use first backend rules
- * iff there is no global_acl (ITS#3100) */
- if ( frontendDB->be_acl == NULL )
-#endif
- {
- op->o_bd = be;
- }
- }
- assert( be != NULL );
-
-#ifdef LDAP_SLAPI
- if ( op->o_pb != NULL ) {
- ret = slapi_int_access_allowed( op, e, desc, val, access, state );
- if ( ret == 0 ) {
- /* ACL plugin denied access */
- goto done;
- }
- }
-#endif /* LDAP_SLAPI */
+ ACL_INIT( mask );
/* grant database root access */
- if ( be != NULL && be_isroot( op ) ) {
- Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
- "<= root access granted\n",
- 0, 0, 0 );
- if ( maskp ) {
- mask = ACL_LVL_WRITE;
- }
-
+ if ( be_isroot( op ) ) {
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= root access granted\n", 0, 0, 0 );
+ mask = ACL_LVL_MANAGE;
goto done;
}
* no-user-modification operational attributes are ignored
* by ACL_WRITE checking as any found here are not provided
* by the user
+ *
+ * NOTE: but they are not ignored for ACL_MANAGE, because
+ * if we get here it means a non-root user is trying to
+ * manage data, so we need to check its privileges.
*/
- if ( access >= ACL_WRITE && is_at_no_user_mod( desc->ad_type )
+ if ( access_level == ACL_WRITE
+ && is_at_no_user_mod( desc->ad_type )
&& desc != slap_schema.si_ad_entry
&& desc != slap_schema.si_ad_children )
{
}
/* use backend default access if no backend acls */
- if( be != NULL && be->be_acl == NULL ) {
- Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
- "=> access_allowed: backend default %s access %s to \"%s\"\n",
- access2str( access ),
- be->be_dfltaccess >= access ? "granted" : "denied",
- op->o_dn.bv_val ? op->o_dn.bv_val : "(anonymous)" );
- ret = be->be_dfltaccess >= access;
-
- if ( maskp ) {
- int i;
-
- mask = ACL_PRIV_LEVEL;
- for ( i = ACL_NONE; i <= be->be_dfltaccess; i++ ) {
- mask |= ACL_ACCESS2PRIV( i );
- }
- }
-
- goto done;
+ if ( op->o_bd->be_acl == NULL ) {
+ int i;
-#ifdef notdef
- /* be is always non-NULL */
- /* use global default access if no global acls */
- } else if ( be == NULL && frontendDB->be_acl == NULL ) {
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
- "=> access_allowed: global default %s access %s to \"%s\"\n",
+ "=> slap_access_allowed: backend default %s "
+ "access %s to \"%s\"\n",
access2str( access ),
- frontendDB->be_dfltaccess >= access ? "granted" : "denied", op->o_dn.bv_val );
- ret = frontendDB->be_dfltaccess >= access;
-
- if ( maskp ) {
- int i;
+ op->o_bd->be_dfltaccess >= access_level ? "granted" : "denied",
+ op->o_dn.bv_val ? op->o_dn.bv_val : "(anonymous)" );
+ ret = op->o_bd->be_dfltaccess >= access_level;
- mask = ACL_PRIV_LEVEL;
- for ( i = ACL_NONE; i <= global_default_access; i++ ) {
- mask |= ACL_ACCESS2PRIV( i );
- }
+ mask = ACL_PRIV_LEVEL;
+ for ( i = ACL_NONE; i <= op->o_bd->be_dfltaccess; i++ ) {
+ ACL_PRIV_SET( mask, ACL_ACCESS2PRIV( i ) );
}
goto done;
-#endif
}
ret = 0;
control = ACL_BREAK;
- if( st_same_attr ) {
+ if ( st_same_attr ) {
assert( state->as_vd_acl != NULL );
a = state->as_vd_acl;
count = state->as_vd_acl_count;
- if ( !ACL_IS_INVALID( state->as_vd_acl_mask )) {
+ if ( !ACL_IS_INVALID( state->as_vd_acl_mask ) ) {
mask = state->as_vd_acl_mask;
AC_MEMCPY( matches, state->as_vd_acl_matches, sizeof(matches) );
goto vd_access;
} else {
if ( state ) state->as_vi_acl = NULL;
a = NULL;
- ACL_INIT(mask);
+ ACL_PRIV_ASSIGN( mask, *maskp );
count = 0;
- memset(matches, '\0', sizeof(matches));
+ memset( matches, '\0', sizeof( matches ) );
}
- while((a = acl_get( a, &count, op, e, desc, val,
- MAXREMATCHES, matches, state )) != NULL)
+ while ( ( a = slap_acl_get( a, &count, op, e, desc, val,
+ MAXREMATCHES, matches, state ) ) != NULL )
{
int i;
- for (i = 0; i < MAXREMATCHES && matches[i].rm_so > 0; i++) {
+ for ( i = 0; i < MAXREMATCHES && matches[i].rm_so > 0; i++ ) {
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "=> match[%d]: %d %d ", i,
- (int)matches[i].rm_so, (int)matches[i].rm_eo );
- if( matches[i].rm_so <= matches[0].rm_eo ) {
+ (int)matches[i].rm_so, (int)matches[i].rm_eo );
+ if ( matches[i].rm_so <= matches[0].rm_eo ) {
int n;
- for ( n = matches[i].rm_so; n < matches[i].rm_eo; n++) {
+ for ( n = matches[i].rm_so; n < matches[i].rm_eo; n++ ) {
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "%c", e->e_ndn[n], 0, 0 );
}
}
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ARGS, "\n", 0, 0, 0 );
}
- if (state) {
- if (state->as_vi_acl == a && (state->as_recorded & ACL_STATE_RECORDED_NV)) {
- Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "access_allowed: result from state (%s)\n", attr, 0, 0 );
+ if ( state ) {
+ if ( state->as_vi_acl == a &&
+ ( state->as_recorded & ACL_STATE_RECORDED_NV ) )
+ {
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
+ "=> slap_access_allowed: result from state (%s)\n",
+ attr, 0, 0 );
ret = state->as_result;
goto done;
} else {
- Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "access_allowed: no res from state (%s)\n", attr, 0, 0);
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
+ "=> slap_access_allowed: no res from state (%s)\n",
+ attr, 0, 0 );
}
}
vd_access:
- control = acl_mask( a, &mask, op,
+ control = slap_acl_mask( a, &mask, op,
e, desc, val, MAXREMATCHES, matches, count, state );
if ( control != ACL_BREAK ) {
break;
}
- memset(matches, '\0', sizeof(matches));
+ memset( matches, '\0', sizeof( matches ) );
}
if ( ACL_IS_INVALID( mask ) ) {
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
- "=> access_allowed: \"%s\" (%s) invalid!\n",
+ "=> slap_access_allowed: \"%s\" (%s) invalid!\n",
e->e_dn, attr, 0 );
- ACL_INIT(mask);
+ ACL_PRIV_ASSIGN( mask, *maskp );
} else if ( control == ACL_BREAK ) {
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
- "=> access_allowed: no more rules\n", 0, 0, 0);
+ "=> slap_access_allowed: no more rules\n", 0, 0, 0 );
goto done;
}
- Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
- "=> access_allowed: %s access %s by %s\n",
- access2str( access ),
- ACL_GRANT(mask, access) ? "granted" : "denied",
- accessmask2str( mask, accessmaskbuf ) );
+ ret = ACL_GRANT( mask, access );
- ret = ACL_GRANT(mask, access);
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
+ "=> slap_access_allowed: %s access %s by %s\n",
+ access2str( access ), ret ? "granted" : "denied",
+ accessmask2str( mask, accessmaskbuf, 1 ) );
done:
- if( state != NULL ) {
- /* If not value-dependent, save ACL in case of more attrs */
- if ( !(state->as_recorded & ACL_STATE_RECORDED_VD) ) {
- state->as_vi_acl = a;
- state->as_result = ret;
- }
- state->as_recorded |= ACL_STATE_RECORDED;
- }
- if (be_null) op->o_bd = NULL;
- if ( maskp ) *maskp = mask;
+ ACL_PRIV_ASSIGN( *maskp, mask );
return ret;
}
+int
+fe_access_allowed(
+ Operation *op,
+ Entry *e,
+ AttributeDescription *desc,
+ struct berval *val,
+ slap_access_t access,
+ AccessControlState *state,
+ slap_mask_t *maskp )
+{
+ BackendDB *be_orig;
+ int rc;
-/*
- * acl_get - return the acl applicable to entry e, attribute
- * attr. the acl returned is suitable for use in subsequent calls to
- * acl_access_allowed().
- */
+ /*
+ * NOTE: control gets here if FIXME
+ * if an appropriate backend cannot be selected for the operation,
+ * we assume that the frontend should handle this
+ * FIXME: should select_backend() take care of this,
+ * and return frontendDB instead of NULL? maybe for some value
+ * of the flags?
+ */
+ be_orig = op->o_bd;
-static AccessControl *
-acl_get(
- AccessControl *a,
- int *count,
- Operation *op,
- Entry *e,
- AttributeDescription *desc,
- struct berval *val,
- int nmatch,
- regmatch_t *matches,
- AccessControlState *state )
+ op->o_bd = select_backend( &op->o_req_ndn, 0, 0 );
+ if ( op->o_bd == NULL ) {
+ op->o_bd = frontendDB;
+ }
+ rc = slap_access_allowed( op, e, desc, val, access, state, maskp );
+ op->o_bd = be_orig;
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+int
+access_allowed_mask(
+ Operation *op,
+ Entry *e,
+ AttributeDescription *desc,
+ struct berval *val,
+ slap_access_t access,
+ AccessControlState *state,
+ slap_mask_t *maskp )
{
- const char *attr;
- int dnlen, patlen;
- AccessControl *prev;
+ int ret = 1;
+ AccessControl *a = NULL;
+ int be_null = 0;
+
+#ifdef LDAP_DEBUG
+ char accessmaskbuf[ACCESSMASK_MAXLEN];
+#endif
+ slap_mask_t mask;
+ slap_access_t access_level;
+ const char *attr;
+ int st_same_attr = 0;
+ static AccessControlState state_init = ACL_STATE_INIT;
assert( e != NULL );
- assert( count != NULL );
assert( desc != NULL );
+ access_level = ACL_LEVEL( access );
+
+ assert( access_level > ACL_NONE );
+
+ ACL_INIT( mask );
+ if ( maskp ) ACL_INVALIDATE( *maskp );
+
attr = desc->ad_cname.bv_val;
assert( attr != NULL );
- if( a == NULL ) {
- if( op->o_bd == NULL ) {
- a = frontendDB->be_acl;
+ if ( op ) {
+ if ( op->o_is_auth_check &&
+ ( access_level == ACL_SEARCH || access_level == ACL_READ ) )
+ {
+ access = ACL_AUTH;
+
+ } else if ( get_manageDIT( op ) && access_level == ACL_WRITE &&
+ desc == slap_schema.si_ad_entry )
+ {
+ access = ACL_MANAGE;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ( state ) {
+ if ( state->as_vd_ad == desc ) {
+ if ( state->as_recorded ) {
+ if ( ( state->as_recorded & ACL_STATE_RECORDED_NV ) &&
+ val == NULL )
+ {
+ return state->as_result;
+
+ } else if ( ( state->as_recorded & ACL_STATE_RECORDED_VD ) &&
+ val != NULL && state->as_vd_acl == NULL )
+ {
+ return state->as_result;
+ }
+ }
+ st_same_attr = 1;
} else {
- a = op->o_bd->be_acl;
+ *state = state_init;
}
- prev = NULL;
- assert( a != NULL );
+ state->as_vd_ad = desc;
+ }
- } else {
- prev = a;
- a = a->acl_next;
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
+ "=> access_allowed: %s access to \"%s\" \"%s\" requested\n",
+ access2str( access ), e->e_dn, attr );
+
+ if ( op == NULL ) {
+ /* no-op call */
+ goto done;
}
- dnlen = e->e_nname.bv_len;
+ if ( op->o_bd == NULL ) {
+ op->o_bd = LDAP_STAILQ_FIRST( &backendDB );
+ be_null = 1;
- for ( ; a != NULL; a = a->acl_next ) {
- (*count) ++;
+#ifdef LDAP_DEVEL
+ /*
+ * FIXME: experimental; use first backend rules
+ * iff there is no global_acl (ITS#3100) */
+ if ( frontendDB->be_acl != NULL ) {
+ op->o_bd = frontendDB;
+ }
+#endif /* LDAP_DEVEL */
+ }
+ assert( op->o_bd != NULL );
- if ( a->acl_dn_pat.bv_len || ( a->acl_dn_style != ACL_STYLE_REGEX )) {
- if ( a->acl_dn_style == ACL_STYLE_REGEX ) {
- Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "=> dnpat: [%d] %s nsub: %d\n",
- *count, a->acl_dn_pat.bv_val, (int) a->acl_dn_re.re_nsub );
- if (regexec(&a->acl_dn_re, e->e_ndn, nmatch, matches, 0))
- continue;
+ /* this is enforced in backend_add() */
+ if ( op->o_bd->bd_info->bi_access_allowed ) {
+ /* delegate to backend */
+ ret = op->o_bd->bd_info->bi_access_allowed( op, e,
+ desc, val, access, state, &mask );
- } else {
- Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "=> dn: [%d] %s\n",
- *count, a->acl_dn_pat.bv_val, 0 );
- patlen = a->acl_dn_pat.bv_len;
- if ( dnlen < patlen )
- continue;
+ } else {
+ BackendDB *be_orig = op->o_bd;
- if ( a->acl_dn_style == ACL_STYLE_BASE ) {
- /* base dn -- entire object DN must match */
- if ( dnlen != patlen )
- continue;
+ /* use default (but pass through frontend
+ * for global ACL overlays) */
+ op->o_bd = frontendDB;
+ ret = frontendDB->bd_info->bi_access_allowed( op, e,
+ desc, val, access, state, &mask );
+ op->o_bd = be_orig;
+ }
- } else if ( a->acl_dn_style == ACL_STYLE_ONE ) {
- int rdnlen = -1, sep = 0;
+ if ( !ret ) {
+ if ( ACL_IS_INVALID( mask ) ) {
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
+ "=> access_allowed: \"%s\" (%s) invalid!\n",
+ e->e_dn, attr, 0 );
+ ACL_INIT( mask );
- if ( dnlen <= patlen )
- continue;
+ } else {
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
+ "=> access_allowed: no more rules\n", 0, 0, 0 );
- if ( patlen > 0 ) {
- if ( !DN_SEPARATOR( e->e_ndn[dnlen - patlen - 1] ) )
- continue;
- sep = 1;
- }
-
- rdnlen = dn_rdnlen( NULL, &e->e_nname );
- if ( rdnlen != dnlen - patlen - sep )
- continue;
-
- } else if ( a->acl_dn_style == ACL_STYLE_SUBTREE ) {
- if ( dnlen > patlen && !DN_SEPARATOR( e->e_ndn[dnlen - patlen - 1] ) )
- continue;
-
- } else if ( a->acl_dn_style == ACL_STYLE_CHILDREN ) {
- if ( dnlen <= patlen )
- continue;
- if ( !DN_SEPARATOR( e->e_ndn[dnlen - patlen - 1] ) )
- continue;
- }
-
- if ( strcmp( a->acl_dn_pat.bv_val, e->e_ndn + dnlen - patlen ) != 0 )
- continue;
- }
-
- Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "=> acl_get: [%d] matched\n",
- *count, 0, 0 );
- }
-
- if ( a->acl_attrs && !ad_inlist( desc, a->acl_attrs ) ) {
- matches[0].rm_so = matches[0].rm_eo = -1;
- continue;
+ goto done;
}
+ }
- /* Is this ACL only for a specific value? */
- if ( a->acl_attrval.bv_len ) {
- if ( val == NULL ) {
- continue;
- }
-
- if( state && !( state->as_recorded & ACL_STATE_RECORDED_VD )) {
- state->as_recorded |= ACL_STATE_RECORDED_VD;
- state->as_vd_acl = prev;
- state->as_vd_acl_count = *count;
- state->as_vd_access = a->acl_access;
- state->as_vd_access_count = 1;
- ACL_INVALIDATE( state->as_vd_acl_mask );
- }
-
- if ( a->acl_attrval_style == ACL_STYLE_REGEX ) {
- Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
- "acl_get: valpat %s\n",
- a->acl_attrval.bv_val, 0, 0 );
- if (regexec(&a->acl_attrval_re, val->bv_val, 0, NULL, 0))
- continue;
- } else {
- int match = 0;
- const char *text;
- Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
- "acl_get: val %s\n",
- a->acl_attrval.bv_val, 0, 0 );
-
- if ( a->acl_attrs[0].an_desc->ad_type->sat_syntax != slap_schema.si_syn_distinguishedName ) {
- if (value_match( &match, desc,
- desc->ad_type->sat_equality, 0,
- val, &a->acl_attrval, &text ) != LDAP_SUCCESS ||
- match )
- continue;
-
- } else {
- int patlen, vdnlen;
-
- patlen = a->acl_attrval.bv_len;
- vdnlen = val->bv_len;
-
- if ( vdnlen < patlen )
- continue;
-
- if ( a->acl_dn_style == ACL_STYLE_BASE ) {
- if ( vdnlen > patlen )
- continue;
-
- } else if ( a->acl_dn_style == ACL_STYLE_ONE ) {
- int rdnlen = -1;
-
- if ( !DN_SEPARATOR( val->bv_val[vdnlen - patlen - 1] ) )
- continue;
-
- rdnlen = dn_rdnlen( NULL, val );
- if ( rdnlen != vdnlen - patlen - 1 )
- continue;
-
- } else if ( a->acl_dn_style == ACL_STYLE_SUBTREE ) {
- if ( vdnlen > patlen && !DN_SEPARATOR( val->bv_val[vdnlen - patlen - 1] ) )
- continue;
-
- } else if ( a->acl_dn_style == ACL_STYLE_CHILDREN ) {
- if ( vdnlen <= patlen )
- continue;
-
- if ( !DN_SEPARATOR( val->bv_val[vdnlen - patlen - 1] ) )
- continue;
- }
-
- if ( strcmp( a->acl_attrval.bv_val, val->bv_val + vdnlen - patlen ))
- continue;
- }
- }
- }
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
+ "=> access_allowed: %s access %s by %s\n",
+ access2str( access ), ret ? "granted" : "denied",
+ accessmask2str( mask, accessmaskbuf, 1 ) );
- if ( a->acl_filter != NULL ) {
- ber_int_t rc = test_filter( NULL, e, a->acl_filter );
- if ( rc != LDAP_COMPARE_TRUE ) {
- continue;
- }
+done:
+ if ( state != NULL ) {
+ /* If not value-dependent, save ACL in case of more attrs */
+ if ( !( state->as_recorded & ACL_STATE_RECORDED_VD ) ) {
+ state->as_vi_acl = a;
+ state->as_result = ret;
}
-
- Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "=> acl_get: [%d] attr %s\n",
- *count, attr, 0);
- return a;
+ state->as_recorded |= ACL_STATE_RECORDED;
}
-
- Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= acl_get: done.\n", 0, 0, 0 );
- return( NULL );
+ if ( be_null ) op->o_bd = NULL;
+ if ( maskp ) ACL_PRIV_ASSIGN( *maskp, mask );
+ return ret;
}
-/*
- * Record value-dependent access control state
- */
-#define ACL_RECORD_VALUE_STATE do { \
- if( state && !( state->as_recorded & ACL_STATE_RECORDED_VD )) { \
- state->as_recorded |= ACL_STATE_RECORDED_VD; \
- state->as_vd_acl = a; \
- AC_MEMCPY( state->as_vd_acl_matches, matches, \
- sizeof( state->as_vd_acl_matches )) ; \
- state->as_vd_acl_count = count; \
- state->as_vd_access = b; \
- state->as_vd_access_count = i; \
- } \
- } while( 0 )
-
-/*
- * acl_mask - modifies mask based upon the given acl and the
- * requested access to entry e, attribute attr, value val. if val
- * is null, access to the whole attribute is assumed (all values).
- *
- * returns 0 access NOT allowed
- * 1 access allowed
- */
+#else /* !SLAP_OVERLAY_ACCESS */
-static slap_control_t
-acl_mask(
- AccessControl *a,
- slap_mask_t *mask,
+int
+access_allowed_mask(
Operation *op,
Entry *e,
AttributeDescription *desc,
struct berval *val,
- int nmatch,
- regmatch_t *matches,
- int count,
- AccessControlState *state )
+ slap_access_t access,
+ AccessControlState *state,
+ slap_mask_t *maskp )
{
- int i, odnlen, patlen;
- Access *b;
+ int ret = 1;
+ int count;
+ AccessControl *a = NULL;
+ Backend *be;
+ int be_null = 0;
+
#ifdef LDAP_DEBUG
- char accessmaskbuf[ACCESSMASK_MAXLEN];
- char accessmaskbuf1[ACCESSMASK_MAXLEN];
+ char accessmaskbuf[ACCESSMASK_MAXLEN];
#endif
- const char *attr;
+ slap_mask_t mask;
+ slap_control_t control;
+ slap_access_t access_level;
+ const char *attr;
+ regmatch_t matches[MAXREMATCHES];
+ int st_same_attr = 0;
+ static AccessControlState state_init = ACL_STATE_INIT;
- assert( a != NULL );
- assert( mask != NULL );
+ assert( e != NULL );
assert( desc != NULL );
- attr = desc->ad_cname.bv_val;
-
- assert( attr != NULL );
+ access_level = ACL_LEVEL( access );
- Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
- "=> acl_mask: access to entry \"%s\", attr \"%s\" requested\n",
- e->e_dn, attr, 0 );
+ assert( access_level > ACL_NONE );
+ if ( maskp ) ACL_INVALIDATE( *maskp );
- Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
- "=> acl_mask: to %s by \"%s\", (%s) \n",
- val ? "value" : "all values",
- op->o_ndn.bv_val ? op->o_ndn.bv_val : "",
- accessmask2str( *mask, accessmaskbuf ) );
+ attr = desc->ad_cname.bv_val;
+ assert( attr != NULL );
- if( state && ( state->as_recorded & ACL_STATE_RECORDED_VD )
- && state->as_vd_acl == a )
- {
- b = state->as_vd_access;
- i = state->as_vd_access_count;
+ if ( op ) {
+ if ( op->o_is_auth_check &&
+ ( access_level == ACL_SEARCH || access_level == ACL_READ ) )
+ {
+ access = ACL_AUTH;
- } else {
- b = a->acl_access;
- i = 1;
+ } else if ( get_manageDIT( op ) && access_level == ACL_WRITE &&
+ desc == slap_schema.si_ad_entry )
+ {
+ access = ACL_MANAGE;
+ }
}
- for ( ; b != NULL; b = b->a_next, i++ ) {
- slap_mask_t oldmask, modmask;
-
- ACL_INVALIDATE( modmask );
-
- /* AND <who> clauses */
- if ( !BER_BVISEMPTY( &b->a_dn_pat ) ) {
- Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= check a_dn_pat: %s\n",
- b->a_dn_pat.bv_val, 0, 0);
- /*
- * if access applies to the entry itself, and the
- * user is bound as somebody in the same namespace as
- * the entry, OR the given dn matches the dn pattern
- */
- /*
- * NOTE: styles "anonymous", "users" and "self"
- * have been moved to an enumeration, * whose value
- * is set in a_dn_style; however, the string
- * is maintaned in a_dn_pat.
- */
- if ( b->a_dn_style == ACL_STYLE_ANONYMOUS /* bvmatch( &b->a_dn_pat, &aci_bv_anonymous ) */ ) {
- if ( op->o_ndn.bv_len != 0 ) {
- continue;
- }
+ if ( state ) {
+ if ( state->as_vd_ad == desc ) {
+ if ( state->as_recorded ) {
+ if ( ( state->as_recorded & ACL_STATE_RECORDED_NV ) &&
+ val == NULL )
+ {
+ return state->as_result;
- } else if ( b->a_dn_style == ACL_STYLE_USERS /* bvmatch( &b->a_dn_pat, &aci_bv_users ) */ ) {
- if ( op->o_ndn.bv_len == 0 ) {
- continue;
+ } else if ( ( state->as_recorded & ACL_STATE_RECORDED_VD ) &&
+ val != NULL && state->as_vd_acl == NULL )
+ {
+ return state->as_result;
}
+ }
+ st_same_attr = 1;
+ } else {
+ *state = state_init;
+ }
- } else if ( b->a_dn_style == ACL_STYLE_SELF /* bvmatch( &b->a_dn_pat, &aci_bv_self ) */ ) {
- if ( op->o_ndn.bv_len == 0 ) {
- continue;
- }
-
- if ( e->e_dn == NULL || !dn_match( &e->e_nname, &op->o_ndn ) ) {
- continue;
- }
+ state->as_vd_ad=desc;
+ }
- } else if ( b->a_dn_style == ACL_STYLE_REGEX ) {
- if ( !ber_bvccmp( &b->a_dn_pat, '*' ) ) {
- int tmp_nmatch;
- regmatch_t tmp_matches[2],
- *tmp_matchesp = tmp_matches;
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
+ "=> access_allowed: %s access to \"%s\" \"%s\" requested\n",
+ access2str( access ), e->e_dn, attr );
- int rc = 0;
+ if ( op == NULL ) {
+ /* no-op call */
+ goto done;
+ }
- switch ( a->acl_dn_style ) {
- case ACL_STYLE_REGEX:
- if ( !BER_BVISNULL( &a->acl_dn_pat ) ) {
- tmp_matchesp = matches;
- tmp_nmatch = nmatch;
- break;
- }
- /* FALLTHRU: applies also to ACL_STYLE_REGEX when pattern is "*" */
+ be = op->o_bd;
+ if ( be == NULL ) {
+ be = LDAP_STAILQ_FIRST(&backendDB);
+ be_null = 1;
+#ifdef LDAP_DEVEL
+ /*
+ * FIXME: experimental; use first backend rules
+ * iff there is no global_acl (ITS#3100) */
+ if ( frontendDB->be_acl == NULL )
+#endif
+ {
+ op->o_bd = be;
+ }
+ }
+ assert( be != NULL );
- case ACL_STYLE_BASE:
- tmp_matches[0].rm_so = 0;
- tmp_matches[0].rm_eo = e->e_nname.bv_len;
- tmp_nmatch = 1;
- break;
+ /* grant database root access */
+ if ( be_isroot( op ) ) {
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= root access granted\n", 0, 0, 0 );
+ if ( maskp ) {
+ mask = ACL_LVL_MANAGE;
+ }
- case ACL_STYLE_ONE:
- case ACL_STYLE_SUBTREE:
- case ACL_STYLE_CHILDREN:
- tmp_matches[0].rm_so = 0;
- tmp_matches[0].rm_eo = e->e_nname.bv_len;
- tmp_matches[1].rm_so = e->e_nname.bv_len - a->acl_dn_pat.bv_len;
- tmp_matches[1].rm_eo = e->e_nname.bv_len;
- tmp_nmatch = 2;
- break;
+ goto done;
+ }
- default:
- /* error */
- rc = 1;
- break;
- }
+ /*
+ * no-user-modification operational attributes are ignored
+ * by ACL_WRITE checking as any found here are not provided
+ * by the user
+ *
+ * NOTE: but they are not ignored for ACL_MANAGE, because
+ * if we get here it means a non-root user is trying to
+ * manage data, so we need to check its privileges.
+ */
+ if ( access_level == ACL_WRITE && is_at_no_user_mod( desc->ad_type )
+ && desc != slap_schema.si_ad_entry
+ && desc != slap_schema.si_ad_children )
+ {
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "NoUserMod Operational attribute:"
+ " %s access granted\n",
+ attr, 0, 0 );
+ goto done;
+ }
- if ( rc ) {
- continue;
- }
+ /* use backend default access if no backend acls */
+ if ( be->be_acl == NULL ) {
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
+ "=> access_allowed: backend default %s "
+ "access %s to \"%s\"\n",
+ access2str( access ),
+ be->be_dfltaccess >= access_level ? "granted" : "denied",
+ op->o_dn.bv_val ? op->o_dn.bv_val : "(anonymous)" );
+ ret = be->be_dfltaccess >= access_level;
- if ( !regex_matches( &b->a_dn_pat,
- op->o_ndn.bv_val, e->e_ndn,
- tmp_nmatch, tmp_matchesp ) )
- {
- continue;
- }
- }
+ if ( maskp ) {
+ int i;
- } else {
- struct berval pat;
- int got_match = 0;
+ mask = ACL_PRIV_LEVEL;
+ for ( i = ACL_NONE; i <= be->be_dfltaccess; i++ ) {
+ mask |= ACL_ACCESS2PRIV( i );
+ }
+ }
- if ( e->e_dn == NULL )
- continue;
+ goto done;
- if ( b->a_dn_expand ) {
- struct berval bv;
- char buf[ACL_BUF_SIZE];
-
- int tmp_nmatch;
- regmatch_t tmp_matches[2],
- *tmp_matchesp = tmp_matches;
+#ifdef notdef
+ /* be is always non-NULL */
+ /* use global default access if no global acls */
+ } else if ( be == NULL && frontendDB->be_acl == NULL ) {
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
+ "=> access_allowed: global default %s access %s to \"%s\"\n",
+ access2str( access ),
+ frontendDB->be_dfltaccess >= access_level ?
+ "granted" : "denied", op->o_dn.bv_val );
+ ret = frontendDB->be_dfltaccess >= access_level;
- int rc = 0;
+ if ( maskp ) {
+ int i;
- bv.bv_len = sizeof( buf ) - 1;
- bv.bv_val = buf;
+ mask = ACL_PRIV_LEVEL;
+ for ( i = ACL_NONE; i <= global_default_access; i++ ) {
+ mask |= ACL_ACCESS2PRIV( i );
+ }
+ }
- switch ( a->acl_dn_style ) {
- case ACL_STYLE_REGEX:
- if ( !BER_BVISNULL( &a->acl_dn_pat ) ) {
- tmp_matchesp = matches;
- tmp_nmatch = nmatch;
- break;
- }
- /* FALLTHRU: applies also to ACL_STYLE_REGEX when pattern is "*" */
+ goto done;
+#endif
+ }
- case ACL_STYLE_BASE:
- tmp_matches[0].rm_so = 0;
- tmp_matches[0].rm_eo = e->e_nname.bv_len;
- tmp_nmatch = 1;
- break;
+ ret = 0;
+ control = ACL_BREAK;
- case ACL_STYLE_ONE:
- case ACL_STYLE_SUBTREE:
- case ACL_STYLE_CHILDREN:
- tmp_matches[0].rm_so = 0;
- tmp_matches[0].rm_eo = e->e_nname.bv_len;
- tmp_matches[1].rm_so = e->e_nname.bv_len - a->acl_dn_pat.bv_len;
- tmp_matches[1].rm_eo = e->e_nname.bv_len;
- tmp_nmatch = 2;
- break;
+ if ( st_same_attr ) {
+ assert( state->as_vd_acl != NULL );
- default:
- /* error */
- rc = 1;
- break;
- }
+ a = state->as_vd_acl;
+ count = state->as_vd_acl_count;
+ if ( !ACL_IS_INVALID( state->as_vd_acl_mask ) ) {
+ mask = state->as_vd_acl_mask;
+ AC_MEMCPY( matches, state->as_vd_acl_matches, sizeof(matches) );
+ goto vd_access;
+ }
- if ( rc ) {
- continue;
- }
+ } else {
+ if ( state ) state->as_vi_acl = NULL;
+ a = NULL;
+ ACL_INIT(mask);
+ count = 0;
+ memset( matches, '\0', sizeof(matches) );
+ }
- if ( string_expand( &bv, &b->a_dn_pat,
- e->e_nname.bv_val,
- tmp_nmatch, tmp_matchesp ) )
- {
- continue;
- }
-
- if ( dnNormalize(0, NULL, NULL, &bv,
- &pat, op->o_tmpmemctx )
- != LDAP_SUCCESS )
- {
- /* did not expand to a valid dn */
- continue;
- }
+ while ( ( a = slap_acl_get( a, &count, op, e, desc, val,
+ MAXREMATCHES, matches, state ) ) != NULL )
+ {
+ int i;
- } else {
- pat = b->a_dn_pat;
+ for ( i = 0; i < MAXREMATCHES && matches[i].rm_so > 0; i++ ) {
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "=> match[%d]: %d %d ", i,
+ (int)matches[i].rm_so, (int)matches[i].rm_eo );
+ if ( matches[i].rm_so <= matches[0].rm_eo ) {
+ int n;
+ for ( n = matches[i].rm_so; n < matches[i].rm_eo; n++ ) {
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "%c", e->e_ndn[n], 0, 0 );
}
+ }
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ARGS, "\n", 0, 0, 0 );
+ }
- patlen = pat.bv_len;
- odnlen = op->o_ndn.bv_len;
- if ( odnlen < patlen ) {
- goto dn_match_cleanup;
+ if ( state ) {
+ if ( state->as_vi_acl == a &&
+ ( state->as_recorded & ACL_STATE_RECORDED_NV ) )
+ {
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
+ "access_allowed: result from state (%s)\n",
+ attr, 0, 0 );
+ ret = state->as_result;
+ goto done;
+ } else {
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
+ "access_allowed: no res from state (%s)\n",
+ attr, 0, 0 );
+ }
+ }
- }
+vd_access:
+ control = slap_acl_mask( a, &mask, op,
+ e, desc, val, MAXREMATCHES, matches, count, state );
- if ( b->a_dn_style == ACL_STYLE_BASE ) {
- /* base dn -- entire object DN must match */
- if ( odnlen != patlen ) {
- goto dn_match_cleanup;
- }
+ if ( control != ACL_BREAK ) {
+ break;
+ }
- } else if ( b->a_dn_style == ACL_STYLE_ONE ) {
- int rdnlen = -1;
+ memset( matches, '\0', sizeof(matches) );
+ }
- if ( odnlen <= patlen ) {
- goto dn_match_cleanup;
- }
+ if ( ACL_IS_INVALID( mask ) ) {
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
+ "=> access_allowed: \"%s\" (%s) invalid!\n",
+ e->e_dn, attr, 0 );
+ ACL_INIT(mask);
- if ( !DN_SEPARATOR( op->o_ndn.bv_val[odnlen - patlen - 1] ) ) {
- goto dn_match_cleanup;
- }
+ } else if ( control == ACL_BREAK ) {
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
+ "=> access_allowed: no more rules\n", 0, 0, 0 );
- rdnlen = dn_rdnlen( NULL, &op->o_ndn );
- if ( rdnlen != odnlen - patlen - 1 ) {
- goto dn_match_cleanup;
- }
+ goto done;
+ }
- } else if ( b->a_dn_style == ACL_STYLE_SUBTREE ) {
- if ( odnlen > patlen && !DN_SEPARATOR( op->o_ndn.bv_val[odnlen - patlen - 1] ) ) {
- goto dn_match_cleanup;
- }
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
+ "=> access_allowed: %s access %s by %s\n",
+ access2str( access ),
+ ACL_GRANT(mask, access) ? "granted" : "denied",
+ accessmask2str( mask, accessmaskbuf, 1 ) );
- } else if ( b->a_dn_style == ACL_STYLE_CHILDREN ) {
- if ( odnlen <= patlen ) {
- goto dn_match_cleanup;
- }
+ ret = ACL_GRANT(mask, access);
- if ( !DN_SEPARATOR( op->o_ndn.bv_val[odnlen - patlen - 1] ) ) {
- goto dn_match_cleanup;
- }
- }
+done:
+ if ( state != NULL ) {
+ /* If not value-dependent, save ACL in case of more attrs */
+ if ( !( state->as_recorded & ACL_STATE_RECORDED_VD ) ) {
+ state->as_vi_acl = a;
+ state->as_result = ret;
+ }
+ state->as_recorded |= ACL_STATE_RECORDED;
+ }
+ if ( be_null ) op->o_bd = NULL;
+ if ( maskp ) *maskp = mask;
+ return ret;
+}
- got_match = !strcmp( pat.bv_val, op->o_ndn.bv_val + odnlen - patlen );
+#endif /* SLAP_OVERLAY_ACCESS */
-dn_match_cleanup:;
- if ( pat.bv_val != b->a_dn_pat.bv_val ) {
- slap_sl_free( pat.bv_val, op->o_tmpmemctx );
- }
+/*
+ * slap_acl_get - return the acl applicable to entry e, attribute
+ * attr. the acl returned is suitable for use in subsequent calls to
+ * acl_access_allowed().
+ */
- if ( !got_match ) {
- continue;
- }
- }
+static AccessControl *
+slap_acl_get(
+ AccessControl *a,
+ int *count,
+ Operation *op,
+ Entry *e,
+ AttributeDescription *desc,
+ struct berval *val,
+ int nmatch,
+ regmatch_t *matches,
+ AccessControlState *state )
+{
+ const char *attr;
+ int dnlen, patlen;
+ AccessControl *prev;
+
+ assert( e != NULL );
+ assert( count != NULL );
+ assert( desc != NULL );
+
+ attr = desc->ad_cname.bv_val;
+
+ assert( attr != NULL );
+
+ if( a == NULL ) {
+ if( op->o_bd == NULL ) {
+ a = frontendDB->be_acl;
+ } else {
+ a = op->o_bd->be_acl;
}
+ prev = NULL;
- if ( !BER_BVISEMPTY( &b->a_sockurl_pat ) ) {
- if ( ! op->o_conn->c_listener ) {
- continue;
- }
- Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= check a_sockurl_pat: %s\n",
- b->a_sockurl_pat.bv_val, 0, 0 );
+ assert( a != NULL );
- if ( !ber_bvccmp( &b->a_sockurl_pat, '*' ) ) {
- if ( b->a_sockurl_style == ACL_STYLE_REGEX) {
- if (!regex_matches( &b->a_sockurl_pat, op->o_conn->c_listener_url.bv_val,
- e->e_ndn, nmatch, matches ) )
- {
+ } else {
+ prev = a;
+ a = a->acl_next;
+ }
+
+ dnlen = e->e_nname.bv_len;
+
+ for ( ; a != NULL; a = a->acl_next ) {
+ (*count) ++;
+
+ if ( a->acl_dn_pat.bv_len || ( a->acl_dn_style != ACL_STYLE_REGEX )) {
+ if ( a->acl_dn_style == ACL_STYLE_REGEX ) {
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "=> dnpat: [%d] %s nsub: %d\n",
+ *count, a->acl_dn_pat.bv_val, (int) a->acl_dn_re.re_nsub );
+ if (regexec(&a->acl_dn_re, e->e_ndn, nmatch, matches, 0))
+ continue;
+
+ } else {
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "=> dn: [%d] %s\n",
+ *count, a->acl_dn_pat.bv_val, 0 );
+ patlen = a->acl_dn_pat.bv_len;
+ if ( dnlen < patlen )
+ continue;
+
+ if ( a->acl_dn_style == ACL_STYLE_BASE ) {
+ /* base dn -- entire object DN must match */
+ if ( dnlen != patlen )
continue;
- }
- } else if ( b->a_sockurl_style == ACL_STYLE_EXPAND ) {
- struct berval bv;
- char buf[ACL_BUF_SIZE];
+ } else if ( a->acl_dn_style == ACL_STYLE_ONE ) {
+ ber_len_t rdnlen = 0;
+ int sep = 0;
- bv.bv_len = sizeof( buf ) - 1;
- bv.bv_val = buf;
- if ( string_expand( &bv, &b->a_sockurl_pat,
- e->e_ndn, nmatch, matches ) )
- {
+ if ( dnlen <= patlen )
continue;
+
+ if ( patlen > 0 ) {
+ if ( !DN_SEPARATOR( e->e_ndn[dnlen - patlen - 1] ) )
+ continue;
+ sep = 1;
}
- if ( ber_bvstrcasecmp( &bv, &op->o_conn->c_listener_url ) != 0 )
- {
+ rdnlen = dn_rdnlen( NULL, &e->e_nname );
+ if ( rdnlen != dnlen - patlen - sep )
continue;
- }
- } else {
- if ( ber_bvstrcasecmp( &b->a_sockurl_pat, &op->o_conn->c_listener_url ) != 0 )
- {
+ } else if ( a->acl_dn_style == ACL_STYLE_SUBTREE ) {
+ if ( dnlen > patlen && !DN_SEPARATOR( e->e_ndn[dnlen - patlen - 1] ) )
continue;
- }
- }
- }
- }
- if ( !BER_BVISEMPTY( &b->a_domain_pat ) ) {
- if ( !op->o_conn->c_peer_domain.bv_val ) {
- continue;
- }
- Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= check a_domain_pat: %s\n",
- b->a_domain_pat.bv_val, 0, 0 );
- if ( !ber_bvccmp( &b->a_domain_pat, '*' ) ) {
- if ( b->a_domain_style == ACL_STYLE_REGEX) {
- if (!regex_matches( &b->a_domain_pat, op->o_conn->c_peer_domain.bv_val,
- e->e_ndn, nmatch, matches ) )
- {
+ } else if ( a->acl_dn_style == ACL_STYLE_CHILDREN ) {
+ if ( dnlen <= patlen )
continue;
- }
- } else {
- char buf[ACL_BUF_SIZE];
+ if ( !DN_SEPARATOR( e->e_ndn[dnlen - patlen - 1] ) )
+ continue;
+ }
- struct berval cmp = op->o_conn->c_peer_domain;
- struct berval pat = b->a_domain_pat;
+ if ( strcmp( a->acl_dn_pat.bv_val, e->e_ndn + dnlen - patlen ) != 0 )
+ continue;
+ }
- if ( b->a_domain_expand ) {
- struct berval bv;
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "=> acl_get: [%d] matched\n",
+ *count, 0, 0 );
+ }
- bv.bv_len = sizeof(buf) - 1;
- bv.bv_val = buf;
+ if ( a->acl_attrs && !ad_inlist( desc, a->acl_attrs ) ) {
+ matches[0].rm_so = matches[0].rm_eo = -1;
+ continue;
+ }
- if ( string_expand(&bv, &b->a_domain_pat,
- e->e_ndn, nmatch, matches) )
- {
- continue;
- }
- pat = bv;
- }
+ /* Is this ACL only for a specific value? */
+ if ( a->acl_attrval.bv_len ) {
+ if ( val == NULL ) {
+ continue;
+ }
- if ( b->a_domain_style == ACL_STYLE_SUBTREE ) {
- int offset = cmp.bv_len - pat.bv_len;
- if ( offset < 0 ) {
- continue;
- }
+ if( state && !( state->as_recorded & ACL_STATE_RECORDED_VD )) {
+ state->as_recorded |= ACL_STATE_RECORDED_VD;
+ state->as_vd_acl = a;
+ state->as_vd_acl_count = *count;
+ state->as_vd_access = a->acl_access;
+ state->as_vd_access_count = 1;
+ ACL_INVALIDATE( state->as_vd_acl_mask );
+ }
- if ( offset == 1 || ( offset > 1 && cmp.bv_val[ offset - 1 ] != '.' ) ) {
- continue;
- }
+ if ( a->acl_attrval_style == ACL_STYLE_REGEX ) {
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
+ "acl_get: valpat %s\n",
+ a->acl_attrval.bv_val, 0, 0 );
+ if ( regexec( &a->acl_attrval_re, val->bv_val, 0, NULL, 0 ) )
+ {
+ continue;
+ }
- /* trim the domain */
- cmp.bv_val = &cmp.bv_val[ offset ];
- cmp.bv_len -= offset;
- }
+ } else {
+ int match = 0;
+ const char *text;
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
+ "acl_get: val %s\n",
+ a->acl_attrval.bv_val, 0, 0 );
+
+ if ( a->acl_attrs[0].an_desc->ad_type->sat_syntax != slap_schema.si_syn_distinguishedName ) {
+ if (value_match( &match, desc,
+ /* desc->ad_type->sat_equality */ a->acl_attrval_mr, 0,
+ val, &a->acl_attrval, &text ) != LDAP_SUCCESS ||
+ match )
+ continue;
- if ( ber_bvstrcasecmp( &pat, &cmp ) != 0 ) {
+ } else {
+ int patlen, vdnlen;
+
+ patlen = a->acl_attrval.bv_len;
+ vdnlen = val->bv_len;
+
+ if ( vdnlen < patlen )
continue;
+
+ if ( a->acl_attrval_style == ACL_STYLE_BASE ) {
+ if ( vdnlen > patlen )
+ continue;
+
+ } else if ( a->acl_attrval_style == ACL_STYLE_ONE ) {
+ ber_len_t rdnlen = 0;
+
+ if ( !DN_SEPARATOR( val->bv_val[vdnlen - patlen - 1] ) )
+ continue;
+
+ rdnlen = dn_rdnlen( NULL, val );
+ if ( rdnlen != vdnlen - patlen - 1 )
+ continue;
+
+ } else if ( a->acl_attrval_style == ACL_STYLE_SUBTREE ) {
+ if ( vdnlen > patlen && !DN_SEPARATOR( val->bv_val[vdnlen - patlen - 1] ) )
+ continue;
+
+ } else if ( a->acl_attrval_style == ACL_STYLE_CHILDREN ) {
+ if ( vdnlen <= patlen )
+ continue;
+
+ if ( !DN_SEPARATOR( val->bv_val[vdnlen - patlen - 1] ) )
+ continue;
}
+
+ if ( strcmp( a->acl_attrval.bv_val, val->bv_val + vdnlen - patlen ))
+ continue;
}
}
}
- if ( !BER_BVISEMPTY( &b->a_peername_pat ) ) {
- if ( !op->o_conn->c_peer_name.bv_val ) {
+ if ( a->acl_filter != NULL ) {
+ ber_int_t rc = test_filter( NULL, e, a->acl_filter );
+ if ( rc != LDAP_COMPARE_TRUE ) {
continue;
}
- Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= check a_peername_path: %s\n",
- b->a_peername_pat.bv_val, 0, 0 );
- if ( !ber_bvccmp( &b->a_peername_pat, '*' ) ) {
- if ( b->a_peername_style == ACL_STYLE_REGEX ) {
- if (!regex_matches( &b->a_peername_pat, op->o_conn->c_peer_name.bv_val,
- e->e_ndn, nmatch, matches ) )
- {
- continue;
- }
+ }
- } else {
- /* try exact match */
- if ( b->a_peername_style == ACL_STYLE_BASE ) {
- if ( ber_bvstrcasecmp( &b->a_peername_pat, &op->o_conn->c_peer_name ) != 0 ) {
- continue;
- }
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "=> acl_get: [%d] attr %s\n",
+ *count, attr, 0);
+ return a;
+ }
- } else if ( b->a_peername_style == ACL_STYLE_EXPAND ) {
- struct berval bv;
- char buf[ACL_BUF_SIZE];
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= acl_get: done.\n", 0, 0, 0 );
+ return( NULL );
+}
- bv.bv_len = sizeof( buf ) - 1;
- bv.bv_val = buf;
- if ( string_expand( &bv, &b->a_peername_pat,
- e->e_ndn, nmatch, matches ) )
- {
- continue;
- }
+static int
+acl_mask_dn(
+ Operation *op,
+ Entry *e,
+ AccessControl *a,
+ int nmatch,
+ regmatch_t *matches,
+ slap_dn_access *b,
+ struct berval *opndn )
+{
+ /*
+ * if access applies to the entry itself, and the
+ * user is bound as somebody in the same namespace as
+ * the entry, OR the given dn matches the dn pattern
+ */
+ /*
+ * NOTE: styles "anonymous", "users" and "self"
+ * have been moved to enum slap_style_t, whose
+ * value is set in a_dn_style; however, the string
+ * is maintaned in a_dn_pat.
+ */
+ if ( b->a_style == ACL_STYLE_ANONYMOUS ) {
+ if ( !BER_BVISEMPTY( opndn ) ) {
+ return 1;
+ }
- if ( ber_bvstrcasecmp( &bv, &op->o_conn->c_peer_name ) != 0 ) {
- continue;
- }
+ } else if ( b->a_style == ACL_STYLE_USERS ) {
+ if ( BER_BVISEMPTY( opndn ) ) {
+ return 1;
+ }
- /* extract IP and try exact match */
- } else if ( b->a_peername_style == ACL_STYLE_IP ) {
- char *port;
- char buf[] = "255.255.255.255";
- struct berval ip;
- unsigned long addr;
- int port_number = -1;
-
- if ( strncasecmp( op->o_conn->c_peer_name.bv_val,
- aci_bv_ip_eq.bv_val, aci_bv_ip_eq.bv_len ) != 0 )
- continue;
+ } else if ( b->a_style == ACL_STYLE_SELF ) {
+ struct berval ndn, selfndn;
+ int level;
- ip.bv_val = op->o_conn->c_peer_name.bv_val + aci_bv_ip_eq.bv_len;
- ip.bv_len = op->o_conn->c_peer_name.bv_len - aci_bv_ip_eq.bv_len;
+ if ( BER_BVISEMPTY( opndn ) || BER_BVISNULL( &e->e_nname ) ) {
+ return 1;
+ }
- port = strrchr( ip.bv_val, ':' );
- if ( port ) {
- char *next;
-
- ip.bv_len = port - ip.bv_val;
- ++port;
- port_number = strtol( port, &next, 10 );
- if ( next[0] != '\0' )
- continue;
- }
-
- /* the port check can be anticipated here */
- if ( b->a_peername_port != -1 && port_number != b->a_peername_port )
- continue;
-
- /* address longer than expected? */
- if ( ip.bv_len >= sizeof(buf) )
- continue;
+ level = b->a_self_level;
+ if ( level < 0 ) {
+ selfndn = *opndn;
+ ndn = e->e_nname;
+ level = -level;
- AC_MEMCPY( buf, ip.bv_val, ip.bv_len );
- buf[ ip.bv_len ] = '\0';
+ } else {
+ ndn = *opndn;
+ selfndn = e->e_nname;
+ }
- addr = inet_addr( buf );
+ for ( ; level > 0; level-- ) {
+ if ( BER_BVISEMPTY( &ndn ) ) {
+ break;
+ }
+ dnParent( &ndn, &ndn );
+ }
+
+ if ( BER_BVISEMPTY( &ndn ) || !dn_match( &ndn, &selfndn ) )
+ {
+ return 1;
+ }
- /* unable to convert? */
- if ( addr == (unsigned long)(-1) )
- continue;
+ } else if ( b->a_style == ACL_STYLE_REGEX ) {
+ if ( !ber_bvccmp( &b->a_pat, '*' ) ) {
+ int tmp_nmatch;
+ regmatch_t tmp_matches[2],
+ *tmp_matchesp = tmp_matches;
- if ( (addr & b->a_peername_mask) != b->a_peername_addr )
- continue;
+ int rc = 0;
-#ifdef LDAP_PF_LOCAL
- /* extract path and try exact match */
- } else if ( b->a_peername_style == ACL_STYLE_PATH ) {
- struct berval path;
-
- if ( strncmp( op->o_conn->c_peer_name.bv_val,
- aci_bv_path_eq.bv_val, aci_bv_path_eq.bv_len ) != 0 )
- continue;
+ switch ( a->acl_dn_style ) {
+ case ACL_STYLE_REGEX:
+ if ( !BER_BVISNULL( &a->acl_dn_pat ) ) {
+ tmp_matchesp = matches;
+ tmp_nmatch = nmatch;
+ break;
+ }
+ /* FALLTHRU: applies also to ACL_STYLE_REGEX when pattern is "*" */
- path.bv_val = op->o_conn->c_peer_name.bv_val + aci_bv_path_eq.bv_len;
- path.bv_len = op->o_conn->c_peer_name.bv_len - aci_bv_path_eq.bv_len;
+ case ACL_STYLE_BASE:
+ tmp_matches[0].rm_so = 0;
+ tmp_matches[0].rm_eo = e->e_nname.bv_len;
+ tmp_nmatch = 1;
+ break;
- if ( ber_bvcmp( &b->a_peername_pat, &path ) != 0 )
- continue;
+ case ACL_STYLE_ONE:
+ case ACL_STYLE_SUBTREE:
+ case ACL_STYLE_CHILDREN:
+ tmp_matches[0].rm_so = 0;
+ tmp_matches[0].rm_eo = e->e_nname.bv_len;
+ tmp_matches[1].rm_so = e->e_nname.bv_len - a->acl_dn_pat.bv_len;
+ tmp_matches[1].rm_eo = e->e_nname.bv_len;
+ tmp_nmatch = 2;
+ break;
-#endif /* LDAP_PF_LOCAL */
+ default:
+ /* error */
+ rc = 1;
+ break;
+ }
- /* exact match (very unlikely...) */
- } else if ( ber_bvcmp( &op->o_conn->c_peer_name, &b->a_peername_pat ) != 0 ) {
- continue;
- }
- }
+ if ( rc ) {
+ return 1;
}
- }
- if ( !BER_BVISEMPTY( &b->a_sockname_pat ) ) {
- if ( BER_BVISNULL( &op->o_conn->c_sock_name ) ) {
- continue;
+ if ( !regex_matches( &b->a_pat, opndn->bv_val,
+ e->e_ndn, tmp_nmatch, tmp_matchesp ) )
+ {
+ return 1;
}
- Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= check a_sockname_path: %s\n",
- b->a_sockname_pat.bv_val, 0, 0 );
- if ( !ber_bvccmp( &b->a_sockname_pat, '*' ) ) {
- if ( b->a_sockname_style == ACL_STYLE_REGEX) {
- if (!regex_matches( &b->a_sockname_pat, op->o_conn->c_sock_name.bv_val,
- e->e_ndn, nmatch, matches ) )
- {
- continue;
- }
+ }
- } else if ( b->a_sockname_style == ACL_STYLE_EXPAND ) {
- struct berval bv;
- char buf[ACL_BUF_SIZE];
+ } else {
+ struct berval pat;
+ ber_len_t patlen, odnlen;
+ int got_match = 0;
- bv.bv_len = sizeof( buf ) - 1;
- bv.bv_val = buf;
- if ( string_expand( &bv, &b->a_sockname_pat,
- e->e_ndn, nmatch, matches ) )
- {
- continue;
- }
-
- if ( ber_bvstrcasecmp( &bv, &op->o_conn->c_sock_name ) != 0 ) {
- continue;
- }
-
- } else {
- if ( ber_bvstrcasecmp( &b->a_sockname_pat, &op->o_conn->c_sock_name ) != 0 ) {
- continue;
- }
- }
- }
- }
+ if ( e->e_dn == NULL )
+ return 1;
- if ( b->a_dn_at != NULL ) {
- Attribute *at;
+ if ( b->a_expand ) {
struct berval bv;
- int rc, match = 0;
- const char *text;
- const char *attr = b->a_dn_at->ad_cname.bv_val;
-
- assert( attr != NULL );
+ char buf[ACL_BUF_SIZE];
+
+ int tmp_nmatch;
+ regmatch_t tmp_matches[2],
+ *tmp_matchesp = tmp_matches;
- if ( op->o_ndn.bv_len == 0 ) {
- continue;
- }
+ int rc = 0;
- Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= check a_dn_at: %s\n",
- attr, 0, 0);
- bv = op->o_ndn;
+ bv.bv_len = sizeof( buf ) - 1;
+ bv.bv_val = buf;
- /* see if asker is listed in dnattr */
- for( at = attrs_find( e->e_attrs, b->a_dn_at );
- at != NULL;
- at = attrs_find( at->a_next, b->a_dn_at ) )
- {
- if( value_find_ex( b->a_dn_at,
- SLAP_MR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_NORMALIZED_MATCH |
- SLAP_MR_ASSERTED_VALUE_NORMALIZED_MATCH,
- at->a_nvals,
- &bv, op->o_tmpmemctx ) == 0 )
- {
- /* found it */
- match = 1;
+ switch ( a->acl_dn_style ) {
+ case ACL_STYLE_REGEX:
+ if ( !BER_BVISNULL( &a->acl_dn_pat ) ) {
+ tmp_matchesp = matches;
+ tmp_nmatch = nmatch;
break;
}
- }
-
- if( match ) {
- /* have a dnattr match. if this is a self clause then
- * the target must also match the op dn.
- */
- if ( b->a_dn_self ) {
- /* check if the target is an attribute. */
- if ( val == NULL ) continue;
-
- /* target is attribute, check if the attribute value
- * is the op dn.
- */
- rc = value_match( &match, b->a_dn_at,
- b->a_dn_at->ad_type->sat_equality, 0,
- val, &bv, &text );
- /* on match error or no match, fail the ACL clause */
- if (rc != LDAP_SUCCESS || match != 0 )
- continue;
- }
- } else {
- /* no dnattr match, check if this is a self clause */
- if ( ! b->a_dn_self )
- continue;
+ /* FALLTHRU: applies also to ACL_STYLE_REGEX when pattern is "*" */
- ACL_RECORD_VALUE_STATE;
-
- /* this is a self clause, check if the target is an
- * attribute.
- */
- if ( val == NULL )
- continue;
+ case ACL_STYLE_BASE:
+ tmp_matches[0].rm_so = 0;
+ tmp_matches[0].rm_eo = e->e_nname.bv_len;
+ tmp_nmatch = 1;
+ break;
- /* target is attribute, check if the attribute value
- * is the op dn.
- */
- rc = value_match( &match, b->a_dn_at,
- b->a_dn_at->ad_type->sat_equality, 0,
- val, &bv, &text );
+ case ACL_STYLE_ONE:
+ case ACL_STYLE_SUBTREE:
+ case ACL_STYLE_CHILDREN:
+ tmp_matches[0].rm_so = 0;
+ tmp_matches[0].rm_eo = e->e_nname.bv_len;
+ tmp_matches[1].rm_so = e->e_nname.bv_len - a->acl_dn_pat.bv_len;
+ tmp_matches[1].rm_eo = e->e_nname.bv_len;
+ tmp_nmatch = 2;
+ break;
- /* on match error or no match, fail the ACL clause */
- if (rc != LDAP_SUCCESS || match != 0 )
- continue;
+ default:
+ /* error */
+ rc = 1;
+ break;
}
- }
- if ( !BER_BVISEMPTY( &b->a_group_pat ) ) {
- struct berval bv;
- struct berval ndn = BER_BVNULL;
- int rc;
+ if ( rc ) {
+ return 1;
+ }
- if ( op->o_ndn.bv_len == 0 ) {
- continue;
+ if ( acl_string_expand( &bv, &b->a_pat,
+ e->e_nname.bv_val,
+ tmp_nmatch, tmp_matchesp ) )
+ {
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if ( dnNormalize(0, NULL, NULL, &bv,
+ &pat, op->o_tmpmemctx )
+ != LDAP_SUCCESS )
+ {
+ /* did not expand to a valid dn */
+ return 1;
}
- /* b->a_group is an unexpanded entry name, expanded it should be an
- * entry with objectclass group* and we test to see if odn is one of
- * the values in the attribute group
- */
- /* see if asker is listed in dnattr */
- if ( b->a_group_style == ACL_STYLE_EXPAND ) {
- char buf[ACL_BUF_SIZE];
- int tmp_nmatch;
- regmatch_t tmp_matches[2],
- *tmp_matchesp = tmp_matches;
+ } else {
+ pat = b->a_pat;
+ }
- bv.bv_len = sizeof(buf) - 1;
- bv.bv_val = buf;
+ patlen = pat.bv_len;
+ odnlen = opndn->bv_len;
+ if ( odnlen < patlen ) {
+ goto dn_match_cleanup;
- rc = 0;
+ }
- switch ( a->acl_dn_style ) {
- case ACL_STYLE_REGEX:
- if ( !BER_BVISNULL( &a->acl_dn_pat ) ) {
- tmp_matchesp = matches;
- tmp_nmatch = nmatch;
- break;
- }
+ if ( b->a_style == ACL_STYLE_BASE ) {
+ /* base dn -- entire object DN must match */
+ if ( odnlen != patlen ) {
+ goto dn_match_cleanup;
+ }
- /* FALLTHRU: applies also to ACL_STYLE_REGEX when pattern is "*" */
- case ACL_STYLE_BASE:
- tmp_matches[0].rm_so = 0;
- tmp_matches[0].rm_eo = e->e_nname.bv_len;
- tmp_nmatch = 1;
- break;
+ } else if ( b->a_style == ACL_STYLE_ONE ) {
+ ber_len_t rdnlen = 0;
- case ACL_STYLE_ONE:
- case ACL_STYLE_SUBTREE:
- case ACL_STYLE_CHILDREN:
- tmp_matches[0].rm_so = 0;
- tmp_matches[0].rm_eo = e->e_nname.bv_len;
- tmp_matches[1].rm_so = e->e_nname.bv_len - a->acl_dn_pat.bv_len;
- tmp_matches[1].rm_eo = e->e_nname.bv_len;
- tmp_nmatch = 2;
- break;
+ if ( odnlen <= patlen ) {
+ goto dn_match_cleanup;
+ }
- default:
- /* error */
- rc = 1;
- break;
- }
+ if ( !DN_SEPARATOR( opndn->bv_val[odnlen - patlen - 1] ) ) {
+ goto dn_match_cleanup;
+ }
- if ( rc ) {
- continue;
- }
-
- if ( string_expand( &bv, &b->a_group_pat,
- e->e_nname.bv_val,
- tmp_nmatch, tmp_matchesp ) )
- {
- continue;
- }
+ rdnlen = dn_rdnlen( NULL, opndn );
+ if ( rdnlen - ( odnlen - patlen - 1 ) != 0 ) {
+ goto dn_match_cleanup;
+ }
- if ( dnNormalize( 0, NULL, NULL, &bv, &ndn,
- op->o_tmpmemctx ) != LDAP_SUCCESS )
- {
- /* did not expand to a valid dn */
- continue;
- }
+ } else if ( b->a_style == ACL_STYLE_SUBTREE ) {
+ if ( odnlen > patlen && !DN_SEPARATOR( opndn->bv_val[odnlen - patlen - 1] ) ) {
+ goto dn_match_cleanup;
+ }
- bv = ndn;
+ } else if ( b->a_style == ACL_STYLE_CHILDREN ) {
+ if ( odnlen <= patlen ) {
+ goto dn_match_cleanup;
+ }
- } else {
- bv = b->a_group_pat;
+ if ( !DN_SEPARATOR( opndn->bv_val[odnlen - patlen - 1] ) ) {
+ goto dn_match_cleanup;
}
- rc = backend_group( op, e, &bv, &op->o_ndn,
- b->a_group_oc, b->a_group_at );
+ } else if ( b->a_style == ACL_STYLE_LEVEL ) {
+ int level = b->a_level;
+ struct berval ndn;
- if ( ndn.bv_val ) {
- slap_sl_free( ndn.bv_val, op->o_tmpmemctx );
+ if ( odnlen <= patlen ) {
+ goto dn_match_cleanup;
}
- if ( rc != 0 ) {
- continue;
+ if ( level > 0 && !DN_SEPARATOR( opndn->bv_val[odnlen - patlen - 1] ) )
+ {
+ goto dn_match_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ ndn = *opndn;
+ for ( ; level > 0; level-- ) {
+ if ( BER_BVISEMPTY( &ndn ) ) {
+ goto dn_match_cleanup;
+ }
+ dnParent( &ndn, &ndn );
+ if ( ndn.bv_len < patlen ) {
+ goto dn_match_cleanup;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ( ndn.bv_len != patlen ) {
+ goto dn_match_cleanup;
}
}
- if ( !BER_BVISEMPTY( &b->a_set_pat ) ) {
- struct berval bv;
- char buf[ACL_BUF_SIZE];
+ got_match = !strcmp( pat.bv_val, &opndn->bv_val[ odnlen - patlen ] );
- if ( b->a_set_style == ACL_STYLE_EXPAND ) {
- int tmp_nmatch;
- regmatch_t tmp_matches[2],
- *tmp_matchesp = tmp_matches;
- int rc = 0;
+dn_match_cleanup:;
+ if ( pat.bv_val != b->a_pat.bv_val ) {
+ slap_sl_free( pat.bv_val, op->o_tmpmemctx );
+ }
- bv.bv_len = sizeof( buf ) - 1;
- bv.bv_val = buf;
+ if ( !got_match ) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
- rc = 0;
+ return 0;
+}
- switch ( a->acl_dn_style ) {
- case ACL_STYLE_REGEX:
- if ( !BER_BVISNULL( &a->acl_dn_pat ) ) {
- tmp_matchesp = matches;
- tmp_nmatch = nmatch;
- break;
- }
+/*
+ * Record value-dependent access control state
+ */
+#define ACL_RECORD_VALUE_STATE do { \
+ if( state && !( state->as_recorded & ACL_STATE_RECORDED_VD )) { \
+ state->as_recorded |= ACL_STATE_RECORDED_VD; \
+ state->as_vd_acl = a; \
+ AC_MEMCPY( state->as_vd_acl_matches, matches, \
+ sizeof( state->as_vd_acl_matches )) ; \
+ state->as_vd_acl_count = count; \
+ state->as_vd_access = b; \
+ state->as_vd_access_count = i; \
+ } \
+ } while( 0 )
- /* FALLTHRU: applies also to ACL_STYLE_REGEX when pattern is "*" */
- case ACL_STYLE_BASE:
- tmp_matches[0].rm_so = 0;
- tmp_matches[0].rm_eo = e->e_nname.bv_len;
- tmp_nmatch = 1;
- break;
+static int
+acl_mask_dnattr(
+ Operation *op,
+ Entry *e,
+ struct berval *val,
+ AccessControl *a,
+ Access *b,
+ int i,
+ regmatch_t *matches,
+ int count,
+ AccessControlState *state,
+ slap_dn_access *bdn,
+ struct berval *opndn )
+{
+ Attribute *at;
+ struct berval bv;
+ int rc, match = 0;
+ const char *text;
+ const char *attr = bdn->a_at->ad_cname.bv_val;
- case ACL_STYLE_ONE:
- case ACL_STYLE_SUBTREE:
- case ACL_STYLE_CHILDREN:
- tmp_matches[0].rm_so = 0;
- tmp_matches[0].rm_eo = e->e_nname.bv_len;
- tmp_matches[1].rm_so = e->e_nname.bv_len - a->acl_dn_pat.bv_len;
- tmp_matches[1].rm_eo = e->e_nname.bv_len;
- tmp_nmatch = 2;
- break;
+ assert( attr != NULL );
- default:
- /* error */
- rc = 1;
- break;
- }
+ if ( BER_BVISEMPTY( opndn ) ) {
+ return 1;
+ }
- if ( rc ) {
- continue;
- }
-
- if ( string_expand( &bv, &b->a_set_pat,
- e->e_nname.bv_val,
- tmp_nmatch, tmp_matchesp ) )
- {
- continue;
- }
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= check a_dn_at: %s\n", attr, 0, 0 );
+ bv = *opndn;
- } else {
- bv = b->a_set_pat;
- }
-
- if ( aci_match_set( &bv, op, e, 0 ) == 0 ) {
- continue;
- }
+ /* see if asker is listed in dnattr */
+ for ( at = attrs_find( e->e_attrs, bdn->a_at );
+ at != NULL;
+ at = attrs_find( at->a_next, bdn->a_at ) )
+ {
+ if ( value_find_ex( bdn->a_at,
+ SLAP_MR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_NORMALIZED_MATCH |
+ SLAP_MR_ASSERTED_VALUE_NORMALIZED_MATCH,
+ at->a_nvals,
+ &bv, op->o_tmpmemctx ) == 0 )
+ {
+ /* found it */
+ match = 1;
+ break;
}
+ }
- if ( b->a_authz.sai_ssf ) {
- Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= check a_authz.sai_ssf: ACL %u > OP %u\n",
- b->a_authz.sai_ssf, op->o_ssf, 0 );
- if ( b->a_authz.sai_ssf > op->o_ssf ) {
- continue;
- }
- }
+ if ( match ) {
+ /* have a dnattr match. if this is a self clause then
+ * the target must also match the op dn.
+ */
+ if ( bdn->a_self ) {
+ /* check if the target is an attribute. */
+ if ( val == NULL ) return 1;
- if ( b->a_authz.sai_transport_ssf ) {
- Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
- "<= check a_authz.sai_transport_ssf: ACL %u > OP %u\n",
- b->a_authz.sai_transport_ssf, op->o_transport_ssf, 0 );
- if ( b->a_authz.sai_transport_ssf > op->o_transport_ssf ) {
- continue;
- }
+ /* target is attribute, check if the attribute value
+ * is the op dn.
+ */
+ rc = value_match( &match, bdn->a_at,
+ bdn->a_at->ad_type->sat_equality, 0,
+ val, &bv, &text );
+ /* on match error or no match, fail the ACL clause */
+ if ( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS || match != 0 )
+ return 1;
}
- if ( b->a_authz.sai_tls_ssf ) {
- Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
- "<= check a_authz.sai_tls_ssf: ACL %u > OP %u\n",
- b->a_authz.sai_tls_ssf, op->o_tls_ssf, 0 );
- if ( b->a_authz.sai_tls_ssf > op->o_tls_ssf ) {
- continue;
- }
- }
+ } else {
+ /* no dnattr match, check if this is a self clause */
+ if ( ! bdn->a_self )
+ return 1;
- if ( b->a_authz.sai_sasl_ssf ) {
- Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
- "<= check a_authz.sai_sasl_ssf: ACL %u > OP %u\n",
- b->a_authz.sai_sasl_ssf, op->o_sasl_ssf, 0 );
- if ( b->a_authz.sai_sasl_ssf > op->o_sasl_ssf ) {
- continue;
- }
- }
+ ACL_RECORD_VALUE_STATE;
+
+ /* this is a self clause, check if the target is an
+ * attribute.
+ */
+ if ( val == NULL )
+ return 1;
-#ifdef SLAP_DYNACL
- if ( b->a_dynacl ) {
- slap_dynacl_t *da;
- slap_access_t tgrant, tdeny;
+ /* target is attribute, check if the attribute value
+ * is the op dn.
+ */
+ rc = value_match( &match, bdn->a_at,
+ bdn->a_at->ad_type->sat_equality, 0,
+ val, &bv, &text );
- /* this case works different from the others above.
- * since aci's themselves give permissions, we need
- * to first check b->a_access_mask, the ACL's access level.
- */
- if ( BER_BVISEMPTY( &e->e_nname ) ) {
- /* no ACIs in the root DSE */
- continue;
- }
+ /* on match error or no match, fail the ACL clause */
+ if ( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS || match != 0 )
+ return 1;
+ }
- /* first check if the right being requested
- * is allowed by the ACL clause.
- */
- if ( ! ACL_GRANT( b->a_access_mask, *mask ) ) {
- continue;
- }
+ return 0;
+}
- /* start out with nothing granted, nothing denied */
- ACL_INIT(tgrant);
- ACL_INIT(tdeny);
- for ( da = b->a_dynacl; da; da = da->da_next ) {
- slap_access_t grant, deny;
+/*
+ * slap_acl_mask - modifies mask based upon the given acl and the
+ * requested access to entry e, attribute attr, value val. if val
+ * is null, access to the whole attribute is assumed (all values).
+ *
+ * returns 0 access NOT allowed
+ * 1 access allowed
+ */
- (void)( *da->da_mask )( da->da_private, op, e, desc, val, nmatch, matches, &grant, &deny );
+static slap_control_t
+slap_acl_mask(
+ AccessControl *a,
+ slap_mask_t *mask,
+ Operation *op,
+ Entry *e,
+ AttributeDescription *desc,
+ struct berval *val,
+ int nmatch,
+ regmatch_t *matches,
+ int count,
+ AccessControlState *state )
+{
+ int i;
+ Access *b;
+#ifdef LDAP_DEBUG
+ char accessmaskbuf[ACCESSMASK_MAXLEN];
+#if !defined( SLAP_DYNACL ) && defined( SLAPD_ACI_ENABLED )
+ char accessmaskbuf1[ACCESSMASK_MAXLEN];
+#endif /* !SLAP_DYNACL && SLAPD_ACI_ENABLED */
+#endif /* DEBUG */
+ const char *attr;
+ slap_mask_t a2pmask = ACL_ACCESS2PRIV( *mask );
- tgrant |= grant;
- tdeny |= deny;
- }
+ assert( a != NULL );
+ assert( mask != NULL );
+ assert( desc != NULL );
- /* remove anything that the ACL clause does not allow */
- tgrant &= b->a_access_mask & ACL_PRIV_MASK;
- tdeny &= ACL_PRIV_MASK;
+ attr = desc->ad_cname.bv_val;
- /* see if we have anything to contribute */
- if( ACL_IS_INVALID(tgrant) && ACL_IS_INVALID(tdeny) ) {
- continue;
- }
+ assert( attr != NULL );
- /* this could be improved by changing acl_mask so that it can deal with
- * by clauses that return grant/deny pairs. Right now, it does either
- * additive or subtractive rights, but not both at the same time. So,
- * we need to combine the grant/deny pair into a single rights mask in
- * a smart way: if either grant or deny is "empty", then we use the
- * opposite as is, otherwise we remove any denied rights from the grant
- * rights mask and construct an additive mask.
- */
- if (ACL_IS_INVALID(tdeny)) {
- modmask = tgrant | ACL_PRIV_ADDITIVE;
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
+ "=> acl_mask: access to entry \"%s\", attr \"%s\" requested\n",
+ e->e_dn, attr, 0 );
- } else if (ACL_IS_INVALID(tgrant)) {
- modmask = tdeny | ACL_PRIV_SUBSTRACTIVE;
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
+ "=> acl_mask: to %s by \"%s\", (%s) \n",
+ val ? "value" : "all values",
+ op->o_ndn.bv_val ? op->o_ndn.bv_val : "",
+ accessmask2str( *mask, accessmaskbuf, 1 ) );
- } else {
- modmask = (tgrant & ~tdeny) | ACL_PRIV_ADDITIVE;
- }
- } else
-#else /* !SLAP_DYNACL */
+ if( state && ( state->as_recorded & ACL_STATE_RECORDED_VD )
+ && state->as_vd_acl == a )
+ {
+ b = state->as_vd_access;
+ i = state->as_vd_access_count;
-#ifdef SLAPD_ACI_ENABLED
- if ( b->a_aci_at != NULL ) {
- Attribute *at;
- slap_access_t grant, deny, tgrant, tdeny;
- struct berval parent_ndn,
- old_parent_ndn = BER_BVNULL;
- BerVarray bvals = NULL;
- int ret, stop;
+ } else {
+ b = a->acl_access;
+ i = 1;
+ }
- /* this case works different from the others above.
- * since aci's themselves give permissions, we need
- * to first check b->a_access_mask, the ACL's access level.
- */
+ for ( ; b != NULL; b = b->a_next, i++ ) {
+ slap_mask_t oldmask, modmask;
- if ( BER_BVISEMPTY( &e->e_nname ) ) {
- /* no ACIs in the root DSE */
- continue;
- }
+ ACL_INVALIDATE( modmask );
- /* first check if the right being requested
- * is allowed by the ACL clause.
+ /* AND <who> clauses */
+ if ( !BER_BVISEMPTY( &b->a_dn_pat ) ) {
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= check a_dn_pat: %s\n",
+ b->a_dn_pat.bv_val, 0, 0);
+ /*
+ * if access applies to the entry itself, and the
+ * user is bound as somebody in the same namespace as
+ * the entry, OR the given dn matches the dn pattern
*/
- if ( ! ACL_GRANT( b->a_access_mask, *mask ) ) {
+ /*
+ * NOTE: styles "anonymous", "users" and "self"
+ * have been moved to enum slap_style_t, whose
+ * value is set in a_dn_style; however, the string
+ * is maintaned in a_dn_pat.
+ */
+
+ if ( acl_mask_dn( op, e, a, nmatch, matches,
+ &b->a_dn, &op->o_ndn ) )
+ {
continue;
}
- /* start out with nothing granted, nothing denied */
- ACL_INIT(tgrant);
- ACL_INIT(tdeny);
+ }
- /* get the aci attribute */
- at = attr_find( e->e_attrs, b->a_aci_at );
- if ( at != NULL ) {
-#if 0
- /* FIXME: this breaks acl caching;
- * see also ACL_RECORD_VALUE_STATE below */
- ACL_RECORD_VALUE_STATE;
-#endif
- /* the aci is an multi-valued attribute. The
- * rights are determined by OR'ing the individual
- * rights given by the acis.
- */
- for ( i = 0; !BER_BVISNULL( &at->a_nvals[i] ); i++ ) {
- if (aci_mask( op,
- e, desc, val,
- &at->a_nvals[i],
- nmatch, matches,
- &grant, &deny, SLAP_ACI_SCOPE_ENTRY ) != 0)
- {
- tgrant |= grant;
- tdeny |= deny;
- }
- }
- Debug(LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= aci_mask grant %s deny %s\n",
- accessmask2str(tgrant,accessmaskbuf),
- accessmask2str(tdeny, accessmaskbuf1), 0);
+ if ( !BER_BVISEMPTY( &b->a_realdn_pat ) ) {
+ struct berval ndn;
- }
- /* If the entry level aci didn't contain anything valid for the
- * current operation, climb up the tree and evaluate the
- * acis with scope set to subtree
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= check a_realdn_pat: %s\n",
+ b->a_realdn_pat.bv_val, 0, 0);
+ /*
+ * if access applies to the entry itself, and the
+ * user is bound as somebody in the same namespace as
+ * the entry, OR the given dn matches the dn pattern
+ */
+ /*
+ * NOTE: styles "anonymous", "users" and "self"
+ * have been moved to enum slap_style_t, whose
+ * value is set in a_dn_style; however, the string
+ * is maintaned in a_dn_pat.
*/
- if ( (tgrant == ACL_PRIV_NONE) && (tdeny == ACL_PRIV_NONE) ) {
- dnParent(&(e->e_nname), &parent_ndn);
- while ( parent_ndn.bv_val != old_parent_ndn.bv_val ) {
- old_parent_ndn = parent_ndn;
- Debug(LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "checking ACI of %s\n", parent_ndn.bv_val, 0, 0);
- ret = backend_attribute(op, NULL, &parent_ndn, b->a_aci_at, &bvals, ACL_AUTH);
- switch(ret){
- case LDAP_SUCCESS :
- stop = 0;
- if (!bvals){
- break;
- }
- for( i = 0; bvals[i].bv_val != NULL; i++){
-#if 0
- /* FIXME: this breaks acl caching;
- * see also ACL_RECORD_VALUE_STATE above */
- ACL_RECORD_VALUE_STATE;
-#endif
- if (aci_mask(op, e, desc, val, &bvals[i],
- nmatch, matches,
- &grant, &deny, SLAP_ACI_SCOPE_CHILDREN ) != 0 )
- {
- tgrant |= grant;
- tdeny |= deny;
- /* evaluation stops as soon as either a "deny" or a
- * "grant" directive matches.
- */
- if( (tgrant != ACL_PRIV_NONE) || (tdeny != ACL_PRIV_NONE) ){
- stop = 1;
- }
- }
- Debug(LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= aci_mask grant %s deny %s\n",
- accessmask2str(tgrant,accessmaskbuf),
- accessmask2str(tdeny, accessmaskbuf1), 0);
- }
- break;
+ if ( op->o_conn && !BER_BVISNULL( &op->o_conn->c_ndn ) )
+ {
+ ndn = op->o_conn->c_ndn;
+ } else {
+ ndn = op->o_ndn;
+ }
- case LDAP_NO_SUCH_ATTRIBUTE:
- /* just go on if the aci-Attribute is not present in
- * the current entry
- */
- Debug(LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "no such attribute\n", 0, 0, 0);
- stop = 0;
- break;
+ if ( acl_mask_dn( op, e, a, nmatch, matches,
+ &b->a_realdn, &ndn ) )
+ {
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
- case LDAP_NO_SUCH_OBJECT:
- /* We have reached the base object */
- Debug(LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "no such object\n", 0, 0, 0);
- stop = 1;
- break;
+ if ( !BER_BVISEMPTY( &b->a_sockurl_pat ) ) {
+ if ( ! op->o_conn->c_listener ) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= check a_sockurl_pat: %s\n",
+ b->a_sockurl_pat.bv_val, 0, 0 );
- default:
- stop = 1;
- break;
- }
- if (stop){
- break;
+ if ( !ber_bvccmp( &b->a_sockurl_pat, '*' ) ) {
+ if ( b->a_sockurl_style == ACL_STYLE_REGEX) {
+ if (!regex_matches( &b->a_sockurl_pat, op->o_conn->c_listener_url.bv_val,
+ e->e_ndn, nmatch, matches ) )
+ {
+ continue;
}
- dnParent(&old_parent_ndn, &parent_ndn);
- }
- }
+ } else if ( b->a_sockurl_style == ACL_STYLE_EXPAND ) {
+ struct berval bv;
+ char buf[ACL_BUF_SIZE];
- /* remove anything that the ACL clause does not allow */
- tgrant &= b->a_access_mask & ACL_PRIV_MASK;
- tdeny &= ACL_PRIV_MASK;
+ bv.bv_len = sizeof( buf ) - 1;
+ bv.bv_val = buf;
+ if ( acl_string_expand( &bv, &b->a_sockurl_pat,
+ e->e_ndn, nmatch, matches ) )
+ {
+ continue;
+ }
- /* see if we have anything to contribute */
- if( ACL_IS_INVALID(tgrant) && ACL_IS_INVALID(tdeny) ) {
- continue;
- }
-
- /* this could be improved by changing acl_mask so that it can deal with
- * by clauses that return grant/deny pairs. Right now, it does either
- * additive or subtractive rights, but not both at the same time. So,
- * we need to combine the grant/deny pair into a single rights mask in
- * a smart way: if either grant or deny is "empty", then we use the
- * opposite as is, otherwise we remove any denied rights from the grant
- * rights mask and construct an additive mask.
- */
- if (ACL_IS_INVALID(tdeny)) {
- modmask = tgrant | ACL_PRIV_ADDITIVE;
+ if ( ber_bvstrcasecmp( &bv, &op->o_conn->c_listener_url ) != 0 )
+ {
+ continue;
+ }
- } else if (ACL_IS_INVALID(tgrant)) {
- modmask = tdeny | ACL_PRIV_SUBSTRACTIVE;
+ } else {
+ if ( ber_bvstrcasecmp( &b->a_sockurl_pat, &op->o_conn->c_listener_url ) != 0 )
+ {
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
- } else {
- modmask = (tgrant & ~tdeny) | ACL_PRIV_ADDITIVE;
+ if ( !BER_BVISEMPTY( &b->a_domain_pat ) ) {
+ if ( !op->o_conn->c_peer_domain.bv_val ) {
+ continue;
}
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= check a_domain_pat: %s\n",
+ b->a_domain_pat.bv_val, 0, 0 );
+ if ( !ber_bvccmp( &b->a_domain_pat, '*' ) ) {
+ if ( b->a_domain_style == ACL_STYLE_REGEX) {
+ if (!regex_matches( &b->a_domain_pat, op->o_conn->c_peer_domain.bv_val,
+ e->e_ndn, nmatch, matches ) )
+ {
+ continue;
+ }
+ } else {
+ char buf[ACL_BUF_SIZE];
- } else
-#endif /* SLAPD_ACI_ENABLED */
-#endif /* !SLAP_DYNACL */
- {
- modmask = b->a_access_mask;
- }
+ struct berval cmp = op->o_conn->c_peer_domain;
+ struct berval pat = b->a_domain_pat;
- Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
- "<= acl_mask: [%d] applying %s (%s)\n",
- i, accessmask2str( modmask, accessmaskbuf ),
- b->a_type == ACL_CONTINUE
- ? "continue"
- : b->a_type == ACL_BREAK
- ? "break"
- : "stop" );
- /* save old mask */
- oldmask = *mask;
+ if ( b->a_domain_expand ) {
+ struct berval bv;
- if( ACL_IS_ADDITIVE(modmask) ) {
- /* add privs */
- ACL_PRIV_SET( *mask, modmask );
+ bv.bv_len = sizeof(buf) - 1;
+ bv.bv_val = buf;
- /* cleanup */
- ACL_PRIV_CLR( *mask, ~ACL_PRIV_MASK );
+ if ( acl_string_expand(&bv, &b->a_domain_pat,
+ e->e_ndn, nmatch, matches) )
+ {
+ continue;
+ }
+ pat = bv;
+ }
- } else if( ACL_IS_SUBTRACTIVE(modmask) ) {
- /* substract privs */
- ACL_PRIV_CLR( *mask, modmask );
+ if ( b->a_domain_style == ACL_STYLE_SUBTREE ) {
+ int offset = cmp.bv_len - pat.bv_len;
+ if ( offset < 0 ) {
+ continue;
+ }
- /* cleanup */
- ACL_PRIV_CLR( *mask, ~ACL_PRIV_MASK );
+ if ( offset == 1 || ( offset > 1 && cmp.bv_val[ offset - 1 ] != '.' ) ) {
+ continue;
+ }
- } else {
- /* assign privs */
- *mask = modmask;
+ /* trim the domain */
+ cmp.bv_val = &cmp.bv_val[ offset ];
+ cmp.bv_len -= offset;
+ }
+
+ if ( ber_bvstrcasecmp( &pat, &cmp ) != 0 ) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+ }
}
- Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
- "<= acl_mask: [%d] mask: %s\n",
- i, accessmask2str(*mask, accessmaskbuf), 0 );
-
- if( b->a_type == ACL_CONTINUE ) {
- continue;
+ if ( !BER_BVISEMPTY( &b->a_peername_pat ) ) {
+ if ( !op->o_conn->c_peer_name.bv_val ) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= check a_peername_path: %s\n",
+ b->a_peername_pat.bv_val, 0, 0 );
+ if ( !ber_bvccmp( &b->a_peername_pat, '*' ) ) {
+ if ( b->a_peername_style == ACL_STYLE_REGEX ) {
+ if (!regex_matches( &b->a_peername_pat, op->o_conn->c_peer_name.bv_val,
+ e->e_ndn, nmatch, matches ) )
+ {
+ continue;
+ }
- } else if ( b->a_type == ACL_BREAK ) {
- return ACL_BREAK;
+ } else {
+ /* try exact match */
+ if ( b->a_peername_style == ACL_STYLE_BASE ) {
+ if ( ber_bvstrcasecmp( &b->a_peername_pat, &op->o_conn->c_peer_name ) != 0 ) {
+ continue;
+ }
- } else {
- return ACL_STOP;
- }
- }
+ } else if ( b->a_peername_style == ACL_STYLE_EXPAND ) {
+ struct berval bv;
+ char buf[ACL_BUF_SIZE];
- /* implicit "by * none" clause */
- ACL_INIT(*mask);
+ bv.bv_len = sizeof( buf ) - 1;
+ bv.bv_val = buf;
+ if ( acl_string_expand( &bv, &b->a_peername_pat,
+ e->e_ndn, nmatch, matches ) )
+ {
+ continue;
+ }
- Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
- "<= acl_mask: no more <who> clauses, returning %s (stop)\n",
- accessmask2str(*mask, accessmaskbuf), 0, 0 );
- return ACL_STOP;
-}
+ if ( ber_bvstrcasecmp( &bv, &op->o_conn->c_peer_name ) != 0 ) {
+ continue;
+ }
-/*
- * acl_check_modlist - check access control on the given entry to see if
- * it allows the given modifications by the user associated with op.
- * returns 1 if mods allowed ok
- * 0 mods not allowed
- */
+ /* extract IP and try exact match */
+ } else if ( b->a_peername_style == ACL_STYLE_IP ) {
+ char *port;
+ char buf[] = "255.255.255.255";
+ struct berval ip;
+ unsigned long addr;
+ int port_number = -1;
+
+ if ( strncasecmp( op->o_conn->c_peer_name.bv_val,
+ aci_bv[ ACI_BV_IP_EQ ].bv_val,
+ aci_bv[ ACI_BV_IP_EQ ].bv_len ) != 0 )
+ continue;
-int
-acl_check_modlist(
- Operation *op,
- Entry *e,
- Modifications *mlist
-)
-{
- struct berval *bv;
- AccessControlState state = ACL_STATE_INIT;
- Backend *be;
- int be_null = 0;
- int ret = 1; /* default is access allowed */
+ ip.bv_val = op->o_conn->c_peer_name.bv_val + aci_bv[ ACI_BV_IP_EQ ].bv_len;
+ ip.bv_len = op->o_conn->c_peer_name.bv_len - aci_bv[ ACI_BV_IP_EQ ].bv_len;
- be = op->o_bd;
- if ( be == NULL ) {
- be = &backends[0];
- be_null = 1;
- op->o_bd = be;
- }
- assert( be != NULL );
+ port = strrchr( ip.bv_val, ':' );
+ if ( port ) {
+ char *next;
+
+ ip.bv_len = port - ip.bv_val;
+ ++port;
+ port_number = strtol( port, &next, 10 );
+ if ( next[0] != '\0' )
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* the port check can be anticipated here */
+ if ( b->a_peername_port != -1 && port_number != b->a_peername_port )
+ continue;
+
+ /* address longer than expected? */
+ if ( ip.bv_len >= sizeof(buf) )
+ continue;
- /* short circuit root database access */
- if ( be_isroot( op ) ) {
- Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
- "<= acl_access_allowed: granted to database root\n",
- 0, 0, 0 );
- goto done;
- }
+ AC_MEMCPY( buf, ip.bv_val, ip.bv_len );
+ buf[ ip.bv_len ] = '\0';
- /* use backend default access if no backend acls */
- if( op->o_bd != NULL && op->o_bd->be_acl == NULL ) {
- Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
- "=> access_allowed: backend default %s access %s to \"%s\"\n",
- access2str( ACL_WRITE ),
- op->o_bd->be_dfltaccess >= ACL_WRITE ? "granted" : "denied", op->o_dn.bv_val );
- ret = (op->o_bd->be_dfltaccess >= ACL_WRITE);
- goto done;
- }
+ addr = inet_addr( buf );
- for ( ; mlist != NULL; mlist = mlist->sml_next ) {
- /*
- * no-user-modification operational attributes are ignored
- * by ACL_WRITE checking as any found here are not provided
- * by the user
- */
- if ( is_at_no_user_mod( mlist->sml_desc->ad_type ) ) {
- Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "acl: no-user-mod %s:"
- " modify access granted\n",
- mlist->sml_desc->ad_cname.bv_val, 0, 0 );
- continue;
- }
+ /* unable to convert? */
+ if ( addr == (unsigned long)(-1) )
+ continue;
- switch ( mlist->sml_op ) {
- case LDAP_MOD_REPLACE:
- /*
- * We must check both permission to delete the whole
- * attribute and permission to add the specific attributes.
- * This prevents abuse from selfwriters.
- */
- if ( ! access_allowed( op, e,
- mlist->sml_desc, NULL, ACL_WRITE, &state ) )
- {
- ret = 0;
- goto done;
- }
+ if ( (addr & b->a_peername_mask) != b->a_peername_addr )
+ continue;
- if ( mlist->sml_values == NULL ) break;
+#ifdef LDAP_PF_LOCAL
+ /* extract path and try exact match */
+ } else if ( b->a_peername_style == ACL_STYLE_PATH ) {
+ struct berval path;
+
+ if ( strncmp( op->o_conn->c_peer_name.bv_val,
+ aci_bv[ ACI_BV_PATH_EQ ].bv_val,
+ aci_bv[ ACI_BV_PATH_EQ ].bv_len ) != 0 )
+ continue;
- /* fall thru to check value to add */
+ path.bv_val = op->o_conn->c_peer_name.bv_val
+ + aci_bv[ ACI_BV_PATH_EQ ].bv_len;
+ path.bv_len = op->o_conn->c_peer_name.bv_len
+ - aci_bv[ ACI_BV_PATH_EQ ].bv_len;
- case LDAP_MOD_ADD:
- assert( mlist->sml_values != NULL );
+ if ( ber_bvcmp( &b->a_peername_pat, &path ) != 0 )
+ continue;
- for ( bv = mlist->sml_nvalues
- ? mlist->sml_nvalues : mlist->sml_values;
- bv->bv_val != NULL; bv++ )
- {
- if ( ! access_allowed( op, e,
- mlist->sml_desc, bv, ACL_WRITE, &state ) )
- {
- ret = 0;
- goto done;
- }
- }
- break;
+#endif /* LDAP_PF_LOCAL */
- case LDAP_MOD_DELETE:
- if ( mlist->sml_values == NULL ) {
- if ( ! access_allowed( op, e,
- mlist->sml_desc, NULL, ACL_WRITE, NULL ) )
- {
- ret = 0;
- goto done;
- }
- break;
- }
- for ( bv = mlist->sml_nvalues
- ? mlist->sml_nvalues : mlist->sml_values;
- bv->bv_val != NULL; bv++ )
- {
- if ( ! access_allowed( op, e,
- mlist->sml_desc, bv, ACL_WRITE, &state ) )
- {
- ret = 0;
- goto done;
+ /* exact match (very unlikely...) */
+ } else if ( ber_bvcmp( &op->o_conn->c_peer_name, &b->a_peername_pat ) != 0 ) {
+ continue;
+ }
}
}
- break;
-
- case SLAP_MOD_SOFTADD:
- /* allow adding attribute via modrdn thru */
- break;
-
- default:
- assert( 0 );
- /* not reached */
- ret = 0;
- break;
}
- }
-
-done:
- if (be_null) op->o_bd = NULL;
- return( ret );
-}
-static int
-aci_get_part(
- struct berval *list,
- int ix,
- char sep,
- struct berval *bv )
-{
- int len;
- char *p;
+ if ( !BER_BVISEMPTY( &b->a_sockname_pat ) ) {
+ if ( BER_BVISNULL( &op->o_conn->c_sock_name ) ) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= check a_sockname_path: %s\n",
+ b->a_sockname_pat.bv_val, 0, 0 );
+ if ( !ber_bvccmp( &b->a_sockname_pat, '*' ) ) {
+ if ( b->a_sockname_style == ACL_STYLE_REGEX) {
+ if (!regex_matches( &b->a_sockname_pat, op->o_conn->c_sock_name.bv_val,
+ e->e_ndn, nmatch, matches ) )
+ {
+ continue;
+ }
- if ( bv ) {
- BER_BVZERO( bv );
- }
- len = list->bv_len;
- p = list->bv_val;
- while ( len >= 0 && --ix >= 0 ) {
- while ( --len >= 0 && *p++ != sep )
- ;
- }
- while ( len >= 0 && *p == ' ' ) {
- len--;
- p++;
- }
- if ( len < 0 ) {
- return -1;
- }
+ } else if ( b->a_sockname_style == ACL_STYLE_EXPAND ) {
+ struct berval bv;
+ char buf[ACL_BUF_SIZE];
- if ( !bv ) {
- return 0;
- }
+ bv.bv_len = sizeof( buf ) - 1;
+ bv.bv_val = buf;
+ if ( acl_string_expand( &bv, &b->a_sockname_pat,
+ e->e_ndn, nmatch, matches ) )
+ {
+ continue;
+ }
- bv->bv_val = p;
- while ( --len >= 0 && *p != sep ) {
- bv->bv_len++;
- p++;
- }
- while ( bv->bv_len > 0 && *--p == ' ' ) {
- bv->bv_len--;
- }
-
- return bv->bv_len;
-}
+ if ( ber_bvstrcasecmp( &bv, &op->o_conn->c_sock_name ) != 0 ) {
+ continue;
+ }
-typedef struct aci_set_gather_t {
- SetCookie *cookie;
- BerVarray bvals;
-} aci_set_gather_t;
+ } else {
+ if ( ber_bvstrcasecmp( &b->a_sockname_pat, &op->o_conn->c_sock_name ) != 0 ) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
-static int
-aci_set_cb_gather( Operation *op, SlapReply *rs )
-{
- aci_set_gather_t *p = (aci_set_gather_t *)op->o_callback->sc_private;
-
- if ( rs->sr_type == REP_SEARCH ) {
- BerValue bvals[ 2 ];
- BerVarray bvalsp = NULL;
- int j;
+ if ( b->a_dn_at != NULL ) {
+ if ( acl_mask_dnattr( op, e, val, a, b, i,
+ matches, count, state,
+ &b->a_dn, &op->o_ndn ) )
+ {
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
- for ( j = 0; !BER_BVISNULL( &rs->sr_attrs[ j ].an_name ); j++ ) {
- AttributeDescription *desc = rs->sr_attrs[ j ].an_desc;
-
- if ( desc == slap_schema.si_ad_entryDN ) {
- bvalsp = bvals;
- bvals[ 0 ] = rs->sr_entry->e_nname;
- BER_BVZERO( &bvals[ 1 ] );
+ if ( b->a_realdn_at != NULL ) {
+ struct berval ndn;
+ if ( op->o_conn && !BER_BVISNULL( &op->o_conn->c_ndn ) )
+ {
+ ndn = op->o_conn->c_ndn;
} else {
- Attribute *a;
+ ndn = op->o_ndn;
+ }
- a = attr_find( rs->sr_entry->e_attrs, desc );
- if ( a != NULL ) {
- int i;
+ if ( acl_mask_dnattr( op, e, val, a, b, i,
+ matches, count, state,
+ &b->a_realdn, &ndn ) )
+ {
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
- for ( i = 0; !BER_BVISNULL( &a->a_nvals[ i ] ); i++ )
- ;
+ if ( !BER_BVISEMPTY( &b->a_group_pat ) ) {
+ struct berval bv;
+ struct berval ndn = BER_BVNULL;
+ int rc;
- bvalsp = a->a_nvals;
- }
+ if ( op->o_ndn.bv_len == 0 ) {
+ continue;
}
- }
- if ( bvals ) {
- p->bvals = slap_set_join( p->cookie, p->bvals,
- ( '|' | SLAP_SET_RREF ), bvalsp );
- }
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= check a_group_pat: %s\n",
+ b->a_group_pat.bv_val, 0, 0 );
- } else {
- assert( rs->sr_type == REP_RESULT );
- }
+ /* b->a_group is an unexpanded entry name, expanded it should be an
+ * entry with objectclass group* and we test to see if odn is one of
+ * the values in the attribute group
+ */
+ /* see if asker is listed in dnattr */
+ if ( b->a_group_style == ACL_STYLE_EXPAND ) {
+ char buf[ACL_BUF_SIZE];
+ int tmp_nmatch;
+ regmatch_t tmp_matches[2],
+ *tmp_matchesp = tmp_matches;
- return 0;
-}
+ bv.bv_len = sizeof(buf) - 1;
+ bv.bv_val = buf;
-BerVarray
-aci_set_gather( SetCookie *cookie, struct berval *name, AttributeDescription *desc )
-{
- AciSetCookie *cp = (AciSetCookie *)cookie;
- int rc = 0;
- LDAPURLDesc *ludp = NULL;
- Operation op2 = { 0 };
- SlapReply rs = {REP_RESULT};
- AttributeName anlist[ 2 ], *anlistp = NULL;
- int nattrs = 0;
- slap_callback cb = { NULL, aci_set_cb_gather, NULL, NULL };
- aci_set_gather_t p = { 0 };
- const char *text = NULL;
- static struct berval defaultFilter_bv = BER_BVC( "(objectClass=*)" );
+ rc = 0;
- /* this routine needs to return the bervals instead of
- * plain strings, since syntax is not known. It should
- * also return the syntax or some "comparison cookie".
- */
- if ( strncasecmp( name->bv_val, "ldap:///", STRLENOF( "ldap:///" ) ) != 0 ) {
- return aci_set_gather2( cookie, name, desc );
- }
+ switch ( a->acl_dn_style ) {
+ case ACL_STYLE_REGEX:
+ if ( !BER_BVISNULL( &a->acl_dn_pat ) ) {
+ tmp_matchesp = matches;
+ tmp_nmatch = nmatch;
+ break;
+ }
- rc = ldap_url_parse( name->bv_val, &ludp );
- if ( rc != LDAP_URL_SUCCESS ) {
- rc = LDAP_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
- goto url_done;
- }
-
- if ( ( ludp->lud_host && ludp->lud_host[0] ) || ludp->lud_exts )
- {
- /* host part must be empty */
- /* extensions parts must be empty */
- rc = LDAP_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
- goto url_done;
- }
+ /* FALLTHRU: applies also to ACL_STYLE_REGEX when pattern is "*" */
+ case ACL_STYLE_BASE:
+ tmp_matches[0].rm_so = 0;
+ tmp_matches[0].rm_eo = e->e_nname.bv_len;
+ tmp_nmatch = 1;
+ break;
+
+ case ACL_STYLE_ONE:
+ case ACL_STYLE_SUBTREE:
+ case ACL_STYLE_CHILDREN:
+ tmp_matches[0].rm_so = 0;
+ tmp_matches[0].rm_eo = e->e_nname.bv_len;
+ tmp_matches[1].rm_so = e->e_nname.bv_len - a->acl_dn_pat.bv_len;
+ tmp_matches[1].rm_eo = e->e_nname.bv_len;
+ tmp_nmatch = 2;
+ break;
- /* Grab the searchbase and see if an appropriate database can be found */
- ber_str2bv( ludp->lud_dn, 0, 0, &op2.o_req_dn );
- rc = dnNormalize( 0, NULL, NULL, &op2.o_req_dn,
- &op2.o_req_ndn, cp->op->o_tmpmemctx );
- BER_BVZERO( &op2.o_req_dn );
- if ( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
- goto url_done;
- }
+ default:
+ /* error */
+ rc = 1;
+ break;
+ }
- op2.o_bd = select_backend( &op2.o_req_ndn, 0, 1 );
- if ( ( op2.o_bd == NULL ) || ( op2.o_bd->be_search == NULL ) ) {
- rc = LDAP_NO_SUCH_OBJECT;
- goto url_done;
- }
+ if ( rc ) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if ( acl_string_expand( &bv, &b->a_group_pat,
+ e->e_nname.bv_val,
+ tmp_nmatch, tmp_matchesp ) )
+ {
+ continue;
+ }
- /* Grab the filter */
- if ( ludp->lud_filter ) {
- ber_str2bv_x( ludp->lud_filter, 0, 0, &op2.ors_filterstr,
- cp->op->o_tmpmemctx );
-
- } else {
- op2.ors_filterstr = defaultFilter_bv;
- }
+ if ( dnNormalize( 0, NULL, NULL, &bv, &ndn,
+ op->o_tmpmemctx ) != LDAP_SUCCESS )
+ {
+ /* did not expand to a valid dn */
+ continue;
+ }
- op2.ors_filter = str2filter_x( cp->op, op2.ors_filterstr.bv_val );
- if ( op2.ors_filter == NULL ) {
- rc = LDAP_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
- goto url_done;
- }
+ bv = ndn;
- /* Grab the scope */
- op2.ors_scope = ludp->lud_scope;
+ } else {
+ bv = b->a_group_pat;
+ }
- /* Grap the attributes */
- if ( ludp->lud_attrs ) {
- for ( ; ludp->lud_attrs[ nattrs ]; nattrs++ )
- ;
+ rc = backend_group( op, e, &bv, &op->o_ndn,
+ b->a_group_oc, b->a_group_at );
- anlistp = slap_sl_malloc( sizeof( AttributeName ) * ( nattrs + 2 ),
- cp->op->o_tmpmemctx );
+ if ( ndn.bv_val ) {
+ slap_sl_free( ndn.bv_val, op->o_tmpmemctx );
+ }
- for ( ; ludp->lud_attrs[ nattrs ]; nattrs++ ) {
- ber_str2bv( ludp->lud_attrs[ nattrs ], 0, 0, &anlistp[ nattrs ].an_name );
- anlistp[ nattrs ].an_desc = NULL;
- rc = slap_bv2ad( &anlistp[ nattrs ].an_name,
- &anlistp[ nattrs ].an_desc, &text );
- if ( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
- goto url_done;
+ if ( rc != 0 ) {
+ continue;
}
}
- } else {
- anlistp = anlist;
- }
+ if ( !BER_BVISEMPTY( &b->a_set_pat ) ) {
+ struct berval bv;
+ char buf[ACL_BUF_SIZE];
- anlistp[ nattrs ].an_name = desc->ad_cname;
- anlistp[ nattrs ].an_desc = desc;
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= check a_set_pat: %s\n",
+ b->a_set_pat.bv_val, 0, 0 );
- BER_BVZERO( &anlistp[ nattrs + 1 ].an_name );
-
- p.cookie = cookie;
-
- op2.o_tag = LDAP_REQ_SEARCH;
- op2.o_protocol = LDAP_VERSION3;
- op2.o_ndn = op2.o_bd->be_rootndn;
- op2.o_callback = &cb;
- op2.o_time = slap_get_time();
- op2.o_do_not_cache = 1;
- op2.o_is_auth_check = 0;
- op2.o_threadctx = cp->op->o_threadctx;
- op2.o_tmpmemctx = cp->op->o_tmpmemctx;
- op2.o_tmpmfuncs = cp->op->o_tmpmfuncs;
-#ifdef LDAP_SLAPI
- op2.o_pb = cp->op->o_pb;
-#endif
- op2.o_conn = cp->op->o_conn;
- op2.o_connid = cp->op->o_connid;
- ber_dupbv_x( &op2.o_req_dn, &op2.o_req_ndn, cp->op->o_tmpmemctx );
- op2.ors_slimit = SLAP_NO_LIMIT;
- op2.ors_tlimit = SLAP_NO_LIMIT;
- op2.ors_attrs = anlistp;
- op2.ors_attrsonly = 0;
- op2.o_sync_slog_size = -1;
+ if ( b->a_set_style == ACL_STYLE_EXPAND ) {
+ int tmp_nmatch;
+ regmatch_t tmp_matches[2],
+ *tmp_matchesp = tmp_matches;
+ int rc = 0;
- cb.sc_private = &p;
+ bv.bv_len = sizeof( buf ) - 1;
+ bv.bv_val = buf;
- rc = op2.o_bd->be_search( &op2, &rs );
- if ( rc != 0 ) {
- goto url_done;
- }
+ rc = 0;
-url_done:;
- if ( op2.ors_filter ) {
- filter_free_x( cp->op, op2.ors_filter );
- }
- if ( !BER_BVISNULL( &op2.o_req_ndn ) ) {
- slap_sl_free( op2.o_req_ndn.bv_val, cp->op->o_tmpmemctx );
- }
- if ( !BER_BVISNULL( &op2.o_req_dn ) ) {
- slap_sl_free( op2.o_req_dn.bv_val, cp->op->o_tmpmemctx );
- }
- if ( ludp ) {
- ldap_free_urldesc( ludp );
- }
- if ( anlistp && anlistp != anlist ) {
- slap_sl_free( anlistp, cp->op->o_tmpmemctx );
- }
+ switch ( a->acl_dn_style ) {
+ case ACL_STYLE_REGEX:
+ if ( !BER_BVISNULL( &a->acl_dn_pat ) ) {
+ tmp_matchesp = matches;
+ tmp_nmatch = nmatch;
+ break;
+ }
- return p.bvals;
-}
+ /* FALLTHRU: applies also to ACL_STYLE_REGEX when pattern is "*" */
+ case ACL_STYLE_BASE:
+ tmp_matches[0].rm_so = 0;
+ tmp_matches[0].rm_eo = e->e_nname.bv_len;
+ tmp_nmatch = 1;
+ break;
-BerVarray
-aci_set_gather2( SetCookie *cookie, struct berval *name, AttributeDescription *desc )
-{
- AciSetCookie *cp = (AciSetCookie *)cookie;
- BerVarray bvals = NULL;
- struct berval ndn;
- int rc = 0;
+ case ACL_STYLE_ONE:
+ case ACL_STYLE_SUBTREE:
+ case ACL_STYLE_CHILDREN:
+ tmp_matches[0].rm_so = 0;
+ tmp_matches[0].rm_eo = e->e_nname.bv_len;
+ tmp_matches[1].rm_so = e->e_nname.bv_len - a->acl_dn_pat.bv_len;
+ tmp_matches[1].rm_eo = e->e_nname.bv_len;
+ tmp_nmatch = 2;
+ break;
- /* this routine needs to return the bervals instead of
- * plain strings, since syntax is not known. It should
- * also return the syntax or some "comparison cookie".
- */
- rc = dnNormalize( 0, NULL, NULL, name, &ndn, cp->op->o_tmpmemctx );
- if ( rc == LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
- if ( desc == slap_schema.si_ad_entryDN ) {
- bvals = (BerVarray)slap_sl_malloc( sizeof( BerValue ) * 2,
- cp->op->o_tmpmemctx );
- bvals[ 0 ] = ndn;
- BER_BVZERO( &bvals[ 1 ] );
- BER_BVZERO( &ndn );
+ default:
+ /* error */
+ rc = 1;
+ break;
+ }
- } else {
- backend_attribute( cp->op,
- cp->e, &ndn, desc, &bvals, ACL_NONE );
+ if ( rc ) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if ( acl_string_expand( &bv, &b->a_set_pat,
+ e->e_nname.bv_val,
+ tmp_nmatch, tmp_matchesp ) )
+ {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ } else {
+ bv = b->a_set_pat;
+ }
+
+ if ( acl_match_set( &bv, op, e, 0 ) == 0 ) {
+ continue;
+ }
}
- if ( !BER_BVISNULL( &ndn ) ) {
- slap_sl_free( ndn.bv_val, cp->op->o_tmpmemctx );
+ if ( b->a_authz.sai_ssf ) {
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= check a_authz.sai_ssf: ACL %u > OP %u\n",
+ b->a_authz.sai_ssf, op->o_ssf, 0 );
+ if ( b->a_authz.sai_ssf > op->o_ssf ) {
+ continue;
+ }
}
- }
- return bvals;
-}
+ if ( b->a_authz.sai_transport_ssf ) {
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
+ "<= check a_authz.sai_transport_ssf: ACL %u > OP %u\n",
+ b->a_authz.sai_transport_ssf, op->o_transport_ssf, 0 );
+ if ( b->a_authz.sai_transport_ssf > op->o_transport_ssf ) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
-static int
-aci_match_set (
- struct berval *subj,
- Operation *op,
- Entry *e,
- int setref
-)
-{
- struct berval set = BER_BVNULL;
- int rc = 0;
- AciSetCookie cookie;
+ if ( b->a_authz.sai_tls_ssf ) {
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
+ "<= check a_authz.sai_tls_ssf: ACL %u > OP %u\n",
+ b->a_authz.sai_tls_ssf, op->o_tls_ssf, 0 );
+ if ( b->a_authz.sai_tls_ssf > op->o_tls_ssf ) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
- if (setref == 0) {
- ber_dupbv_x( &set, subj, op->o_tmpmemctx );
- } else {
- struct berval subjdn, ndn = BER_BVNULL;
- struct berval setat;
- BerVarray bvals;
- const char *text;
- AttributeDescription *desc = NULL;
+ if ( b->a_authz.sai_sasl_ssf ) {
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
+ "<= check a_authz.sai_sasl_ssf: ACL %u > OP %u\n",
+ b->a_authz.sai_sasl_ssf, op->o_sasl_ssf, 0 );
+ if ( b->a_authz.sai_sasl_ssf > op->o_sasl_ssf ) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+
+#ifdef SLAP_DYNACL
+ if ( b->a_dynacl ) {
+ slap_dynacl_t *da;
+ slap_access_t tgrant, tdeny;
+
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= check a_dynacl\n",
+ 0, 0, 0 );
+
+ /* this case works different from the others above.
+ * since aci's themselves give permissions, we need
+ * to first check b->a_access_mask, the ACL's access level.
+ */
+ if ( BER_BVISEMPTY( &e->e_nname ) ) {
+ /* no ACIs in the root DSE */
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* first check if the right being requested
+ * is allowed by the ACL clause.
+ */
+ if ( ! ACL_PRIV_ISSET( b->a_access_mask, a2pmask ) ) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* start out with nothing granted, nothing denied */
+ ACL_INIT(tgrant);
+ ACL_INIT(tdeny);
- /* format of string is "entry/setAttrName" */
- if ( aci_get_part( subj, 0, '/', &subjdn ) < 0 ) {
- return(0);
- }
+ for ( da = b->a_dynacl; da; da = da->da_next ) {
+ slap_access_t grant,
+ deny;
- if ( aci_get_part( subj, 1, '/', &setat ) < 0 ) {
- setat = aci_bv_set_attr;
- }
+ ACL_INIT(grant);
+ ACL_INIT(deny);
- /*
- * NOTE: dnNormalize honors the ber_len field
- * as the length of the dn to be normalized
- */
- if ( slap_bv2ad( &setat, &desc, &text ) == LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
- if ( dnNormalize( 0, NULL, NULL, &subjdn, &ndn, op->o_tmpmemctx ) == LDAP_SUCCESS )
- {
- backend_attribute( op, e, &ndn, desc, &bvals, ACL_NONE );
- if ( bvals != NULL && !BER_BVISNULL( &bvals[0] ) ) {
- int i;
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, " <= check a_dynacl: %s\n",
+ da->da_name, 0, 0 );
- set = bvals[0];
- BER_BVZERO( &bvals[0] );
- for ( i = 1; !BER_BVISNULL( &bvals[i] ); i++ )
- /* count */ ;
- bvals[0].bv_val = bvals[i-1].bv_val;
- BER_BVZERO( &bvals[i-1] );
- }
- ber_bvarray_free_x( bvals, op->o_tmpmemctx );
- slap_sl_free( ndn.bv_val, op->o_tmpmemctx );
+ (void)( *da->da_mask )( da->da_private, op, e, desc, val, nmatch, matches, &grant, &deny );
+
+ tgrant |= grant;
+ tdeny |= deny;
}
- }
- }
- if ( !BER_BVISNULL( &set ) ) {
- cookie.op = op;
- cookie.e = e;
- rc = ( slap_set_filter( aci_set_gather, (SetCookie *)&cookie, &set,
- &op->o_ndn, &e->e_nname, NULL ) > 0 );
- slap_sl_free( set.bv_val, op->o_tmpmemctx );
- }
+ /* remove anything that the ACL clause does not allow */
+ tgrant &= b->a_access_mask & ACL_PRIV_MASK;
+ tdeny &= ACL_PRIV_MASK;
- return(rc);
-}
+ /* see if we have anything to contribute */
+ if( ACL_IS_INVALID(tgrant) && ACL_IS_INVALID(tdeny) ) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* this could be improved by changing slap_acl_mask so that it can deal with
+ * by clauses that return grant/deny pairs. Right now, it does either
+ * additive or subtractive rights, but not both at the same time. So,
+ * we need to combine the grant/deny pair into a single rights mask in
+ * a smart way: if either grant or deny is "empty", then we use the
+ * opposite as is, otherwise we remove any denied rights from the grant
+ * rights mask and construct an additive mask.
+ */
+ if (ACL_IS_INVALID(tdeny)) {
+ modmask = tgrant | ACL_PRIV_ADDITIVE;
+
+ } else if (ACL_IS_INVALID(tgrant)) {
+ modmask = tdeny | ACL_PRIV_SUBSTRACTIVE;
+
+ } else {
+ modmask = (tgrant & ~tdeny) | ACL_PRIV_ADDITIVE;
+ }
+
+ } else
+#else /* !SLAP_DYNACL */
#ifdef SLAPD_ACI_ENABLED
-static int
-aci_list_map_rights(
- struct berval *list )
-{
- struct berval bv;
- slap_access_t mask;
- int i;
+ if ( b->a_aci_at != NULL ) {
+ Attribute *at;
+ slap_access_t grant, deny, tgrant, tdeny;
+ struct berval parent_ndn;
+ BerVarray bvals = NULL;
+ int ret, stop;
- ACL_INIT(mask);
- for (i = 0; aci_get_part(list, i, ',', &bv) >= 0; i++) {
- if (bv.bv_len <= 0)
- continue;
- switch (*bv.bv_val) {
- case 'c':
- ACL_PRIV_SET(mask, ACL_PRIV_COMPARE);
- break;
- case 's':
- /* **** NOTE: draft-ietf-ldapext-aci-model-0.3.txt defines
- * the right 's' to mean "set", but in the examples states
- * that the right 's' means "search". The latter definition
- * is used here.
- */
- ACL_PRIV_SET(mask, ACL_PRIV_SEARCH);
- break;
- case 'r':
- ACL_PRIV_SET(mask, ACL_PRIV_READ);
- break;
- case 'w':
- ACL_PRIV_SET(mask, ACL_PRIV_WRITE);
- break;
- case 'x':
- /* **** NOTE: draft-ietf-ldapext-aci-model-0.3.txt does not
- * define any equivalent to the AUTH right, so I've just used
- * 'x' for now.
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, " <= check a_aci_at: %s\n",
+ b->a_aci_at->ad_cname.bv_val, 0, 0 );
+
+ /* this case works different from the others above.
+ * since aci's themselves give permissions, we need
+ * to first check b->a_access_mask, the ACL's access level.
*/
- ACL_PRIV_SET(mask, ACL_PRIV_AUTH);
- break;
- default:
- break;
- }
- }
- return(mask);
-}
+ if ( BER_BVISEMPTY( &e->e_nname ) ) {
+ /* no ACIs in the root DSE */
+ continue;
+ }
-static int
-aci_list_has_attr(
- struct berval *list,
- const struct berval *attr,
- struct berval *val )
-{
- struct berval bv, left, right;
- int i;
+ /* first check if the right being requested
+ * is allowed by the ACL clause.
+ */
+ if ( ! ACL_GRANT( b->a_access_mask, *mask ) ) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* start out with nothing granted, nothing denied */
+ ACL_INIT(tgrant);
+ ACL_INIT(tdeny);
- for (i = 0; aci_get_part(list, i, ',', &bv) >= 0; i++) {
- if (aci_get_part(&bv, 0, '=', &left) < 0
- || aci_get_part(&bv, 1, '=', &right) < 0)
- {
- if (ber_bvstrcasecmp(attr, &bv) == 0)
- return(1);
- } else if (val == NULL) {
- if (ber_bvstrcasecmp(attr, &left) == 0)
- return(1);
- } else {
- if (ber_bvstrcasecmp(attr, &left) == 0) {
- /* this is experimental code that implements a
- * simple (prefix) match of the attribute value.
- * the ACI draft does not provide for aci's that
- * apply to specific values, but it would be
- * nice to have. If the <attr> part of an aci's
- * rights list is of the form <attr>=<value>,
- * that means the aci applies only to attrs with
- * the given value. Furthermore, if the attr is
- * of the form <attr>=<value>*, then <value> is
- * treated as a prefix, and the aci applies to
- * any value with that prefix.
- *
- * Ideally, this would allow r.e. matches.
- */
- if (aci_get_part(&right, 0, '*', &left) < 0
- || right.bv_len <= left.bv_len)
- {
- if (ber_bvstrcasecmp(val, &right) == 0)
- return(1);
- } else if (val->bv_len >= left.bv_len) {
- if (strncasecmp( val->bv_val, left.bv_val, left.bv_len ) == 0)
- return(1);
+ /* get the aci attribute */
+ at = attr_find( e->e_attrs, b->a_aci_at );
+ if ( at != NULL ) {
+#if 0
+ /* FIXME: this breaks acl caching;
+ * see also ACL_RECORD_VALUE_STATE below */
+ ACL_RECORD_VALUE_STATE;
+#endif
+ /* the aci is an multi-valued attribute. The
+ * rights are determined by OR'ing the individual
+ * rights given by the acis.
+ */
+ for ( i = 0; !BER_BVISNULL( &at->a_nvals[i] ); i++ ) {
+ if ( aci_mask( op,
+ e, desc, val,
+ &at->a_nvals[i],
+ nmatch, matches,
+ &grant, &deny, SLAP_ACI_SCOPE_ENTRY ) != 0 )
+ {
+ tgrant |= grant;
+ tdeny |= deny;
+ }
}
- }
- }
- }
- return(0);
-}
+ Debug(LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= aci_mask grant %s deny %s\n",
+ accessmask2str(tgrant, accessmaskbuf, 1),
+ accessmask2str(tdeny, accessmaskbuf1, 1), 0);
-static slap_access_t
-aci_list_get_attr_rights(
- struct berval *list,
- const struct berval *attr,
- struct berval *val )
-{
- struct berval bv;
- slap_access_t mask;
- int i;
-
- /* loop through each rights/attr pair, skip first part (action) */
- ACL_INIT(mask);
- for (i = 1; aci_get_part(list, i + 1, ';', &bv) >= 0; i += 2) {
- if (aci_list_has_attr(&bv, attr, val) == 0)
- continue;
- if (aci_get_part(list, i, ';', &bv) < 0)
- continue;
- mask |= aci_list_map_rights(&bv);
- }
- return(mask);
-}
+ }
+ /* If the entry level aci didn't contain anything valid for the
+ * current operation, climb up the tree and evaluate the
+ * acis with scope set to subtree
+ */
+ if ( (tgrant == ACL_PRIV_NONE) && (tdeny == ACL_PRIV_NONE) ) {
+ dnParent( &e->e_nname, &parent_ndn );
+ while ( !BER_BVISEMPTY( &parent_ndn ) ) {
+ Debug(LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "checking ACI of %s\n", parent_ndn.bv_val, 0, 0);
+ ret = backend_attribute(op, NULL, &parent_ndn, b->a_aci_at, &bvals, ACL_AUTH);
+ switch(ret){
+ case LDAP_SUCCESS :
+ stop = 0;
+ if (!bvals){
+ break;
+ }
-static int
-aci_list_get_rights(
- struct berval *list,
- const struct berval *attr,
- struct berval *val,
- slap_access_t *grant,
- slap_access_t *deny )
-{
- struct berval perm, actn;
- slap_access_t *mask;
- int i, found;
+ for ( i = 0; !BER_BVISNULL( &bvals[i] ); i++ ) {
+#if 0
+ /* FIXME: this breaks acl caching;
+ * see also ACL_RECORD_VALUE_STATE above */
+ ACL_RECORD_VALUE_STATE;
+#endif
+ if ( aci_mask( op, e, desc, val, &bvals[i],
+ nmatch, matches,
+ &grant, &deny, SLAP_ACI_SCOPE_CHILDREN ) != 0 )
+ {
+ tgrant |= grant;
+ tdeny |= deny;
+ /* evaluation stops as soon as either a "deny" or a
+ * "grant" directive matches.
+ */
+ if( (tgrant != ACL_PRIV_NONE) || (tdeny != ACL_PRIV_NONE) ){
+ stop = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ Debug(LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= aci_mask grant %s deny %s\n",
+ accessmask2str(tgrant, accessmaskbuf, 1),
+ accessmask2str(tdeny, accessmaskbuf1, 1), 0);
+ }
+ break;
- if (attr == NULL || attr->bv_len == 0
- || ber_bvstrcasecmp( attr, &aci_bv_entry ) == 0) {
- attr = &aci_bv_br_entry;
- }
+ case LDAP_NO_SUCH_ATTRIBUTE:
+ /* just go on if the aci-Attribute is not present in
+ * the current entry
+ */
+ Debug(LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "no such attribute\n", 0, 0, 0);
+ stop = 0;
+ break;
- found = 0;
- ACL_INIT(*grant);
- ACL_INIT(*deny);
- /* loop through each permissions clause */
- for (i = 0; aci_get_part(list, i, '$', &perm) >= 0; i++) {
- if (aci_get_part(&perm, 0, ';', &actn) < 0)
- continue;
- if (ber_bvstrcasecmp( &aci_bv_grant, &actn ) == 0) {
- mask = grant;
- } else if (ber_bvstrcasecmp( &aci_bv_deny, &actn ) == 0) {
- mask = deny;
- } else {
- continue;
- }
+ case LDAP_NO_SUCH_OBJECT:
+ /* We have reached the base object */
+ Debug(LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "no such object\n", 0, 0, 0);
+ stop = 1;
+ break;
- found = 1;
- *mask |= aci_list_get_attr_rights(&perm, attr, val);
- *mask |= aci_list_get_attr_rights(&perm, &aci_bv_br_all, NULL);
- }
- return(found);
-}
+ default:
+ stop = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (stop){
+ break;
+ }
+ dnParent( &parent_ndn, &parent_ndn );
+ }
+ }
-static int
-aci_group_member (
- struct berval *subj,
- struct berval *defgrpoc,
- struct berval *defgrpat,
- Operation *op,
- Entry *e,
- int nmatch,
- regmatch_t *matches
-)
-{
- struct berval subjdn;
- struct berval grpoc;
- struct berval grpat;
- ObjectClass *grp_oc = NULL;
- AttributeDescription *grp_ad = NULL;
- const char *text;
- int rc;
- /* format of string is "group/objectClassValue/groupAttrName" */
- if (aci_get_part(subj, 0, '/', &subjdn) < 0) {
- return(0);
- }
+ /* remove anything that the ACL clause does not allow */
+ tgrant &= b->a_access_mask & ACL_PRIV_MASK;
+ tdeny &= ACL_PRIV_MASK;
- if (aci_get_part(subj, 1, '/', &grpoc) < 0) {
- grpoc = *defgrpoc;
- }
+ /* see if we have anything to contribute */
+ if( ACL_IS_INVALID(tgrant) && ACL_IS_INVALID(tdeny) ) {
+ continue;
+ }
- if (aci_get_part(subj, 2, '/', &grpat) < 0) {
- grpat = *defgrpat;
- }
+ /* this could be improved by changing slap_acl_mask so that it can deal with
+ * by clauses that return grant/deny pairs. Right now, it does either
+ * additive or subtractive rights, but not both at the same time. So,
+ * we need to combine the grant/deny pair into a single rights mask in
+ * a smart way: if either grant or deny is "empty", then we use the
+ * opposite as is, otherwise we remove any denied rights from the grant
+ * rights mask and construct an additive mask.
+ */
+ if (ACL_IS_INVALID(tdeny)) {
+ modmask = tgrant | ACL_PRIV_ADDITIVE;
- rc = slap_bv2ad( &grpat, &grp_ad, &text );
- if( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
- rc = 0;
- goto done;
- }
- rc = 0;
+ } else if (ACL_IS_INVALID(tgrant)) {
+ modmask = tdeny | ACL_PRIV_SUBSTRACTIVE;
- grp_oc = oc_bvfind( &grpoc );
+ } else {
+ modmask = (tgrant & ~tdeny) | ACL_PRIV_ADDITIVE;
+ }
- if (grp_oc != NULL && grp_ad != NULL ) {
- char buf[ACL_BUF_SIZE];
- struct berval bv, ndn;
- bv.bv_len = sizeof( buf ) - 1;
- bv.bv_val = (char *)&buf;
- if ( string_expand(&bv, &subjdn,
- e->e_ndn, nmatch, matches) )
+ } else
+#endif /* SLAPD_ACI_ENABLED */
+#endif /* !SLAP_DYNACL */
{
- rc = LDAP_OTHER;
- goto done;
- }
- if ( dnNormalize( 0, NULL, NULL, &bv, &ndn, op->o_tmpmemctx ) == LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
- rc = ( backend_group( op, e, &ndn, &op->o_ndn,
- grp_oc, grp_ad ) == 0 );
- slap_sl_free( ndn.bv_val, op->o_tmpmemctx );
+ modmask = b->a_access_mask;
}
- }
-
-done:
- return(rc);
-}
-static int
-aci_mask(
- Operation *op,
- Entry *e,
- AttributeDescription *desc,
- struct berval *val,
- struct berval *aci,
- int nmatch,
- regmatch_t *matches,
- slap_access_t *grant,
- slap_access_t *deny,
- slap_aci_scope_t asserted_scope
-)
-{
- struct berval bv, scope, perms, type, sdn;
- int rc;
-
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
+ "<= acl_mask: [%d] applying %s (%s)\n",
+ i, accessmask2str( modmask, accessmaskbuf, 1 ),
+ b->a_type == ACL_CONTINUE
+ ? "continue"
+ : b->a_type == ACL_BREAK
+ ? "break"
+ : "stop" );
+ /* save old mask */
+ oldmask = *mask;
- assert( !BER_BVISNULL( &desc->ad_cname ) );
+ if( ACL_IS_ADDITIVE(modmask) ) {
+ /* add privs */
+ ACL_PRIV_SET( *mask, modmask );
- /* parse an aci of the form:
- oid # scope # action;rights;attr;rights;attr
- $ action;rights;attr;rights;attr # type # subject
+ /* cleanup */
+ ACL_PRIV_CLR( *mask, ~ACL_PRIV_MASK );
- [NOTE: the following comment is very outdated,
- as the draft version it refers to (Ando, 2004-11-20)].
+ } else if( ACL_IS_SUBTRACTIVE(modmask) ) {
+ /* substract privs */
+ ACL_PRIV_CLR( *mask, modmask );
- See draft-ietf-ldapext-aci-model-04.txt section 9.1 for
- a full description of the format for this attribute.
- Differences: "this" in the draft is "self" here, and
- "self" and "public" is in the position of type.
+ /* cleanup */
+ ACL_PRIV_CLR( *mask, ~ACL_PRIV_MASK );
- <scope> = {entry|children|subtree}
- <type> = {public|users|access-id|subtree|onelevel|children|
- self|dnattr|group|role|set|set-ref}
+ } else {
+ /* assign privs */
+ *mask = modmask;
+ }
- This routine now supports scope={ENTRY,CHILDREN}
- with the semantics:
- - ENTRY applies to "entry" and "subtree";
- - CHILDREN aplies to "children" and "subtree"
- */
+ a2pmask = *mask;
- /* check that the aci has all 5 components */
- if ( aci_get_part( aci, 4, '#', NULL ) < 0 ) {
- return 0;
- }
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
+ "<= acl_mask: [%d] mask: %s\n",
+ i, accessmask2str(*mask, accessmaskbuf, 1), 0 );
- /* check that the aci family is supported */
- if ( aci_get_part( aci, 0, '#', &bv ) < 0 ) {
- return 0;
- }
+ if( b->a_type == ACL_CONTINUE ) {
+ continue;
- /* check that the scope matches */
- if ( aci_get_part( aci, 1, '#', &scope ) < 0 ) {
- return 0;
- }
+ } else if ( b->a_type == ACL_BREAK ) {
+ return ACL_BREAK;
- /* note: scope can be either ENTRY or CHILDREN;
- * they respectively match "entry" and "children" in bv
- * both match "subtree" */
- switch ( asserted_scope ) {
- case SLAP_ACI_SCOPE_ENTRY:
- if ( ber_bvstrcasecmp( &scope, &aci_bv_entry ) != 0
- && ber_bvstrcasecmp( &scope, &aci_bv_subtree ) != 0 )
- {
- return 0;
+ } else {
+ return ACL_STOP;
}
- break;
+ }
- case SLAP_ACI_SCOPE_CHILDREN:
- if ( ber_bvstrcasecmp( &scope, &aci_bv_children ) != 0
- && ber_bvstrcasecmp( &scope, &aci_bv_subtree ) != 0 )
- {
- return 0;
- }
- break;
+ /* implicit "by * none" clause */
+ ACL_INIT(*mask);
- default:
- return 0;
- }
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
+ "<= acl_mask: no more <who> clauses, returning %s (stop)\n",
+ accessmask2str(*mask, accessmaskbuf, 1), 0, 0 );
+ return ACL_STOP;
+}
- /* get the list of permissions clauses, bail if empty */
- if ( aci_get_part( aci, 2, '#', &perms ) <= 0 ) {
- return 0;
- }
+/*
+ * acl_check_modlist - check access control on the given entry to see if
+ * it allows the given modifications by the user associated with op.
+ * returns 1 if mods allowed ok
+ * 0 mods not allowed
+ */
- /* check if any permissions allow desired access */
- if ( aci_list_get_rights( &perms, &desc->ad_cname, val, grant, deny ) == 0 ) {
- return 0;
- }
+int
+acl_check_modlist(
+ Operation *op,
+ Entry *e,
+ Modifications *mlist )
+{
+ struct berval *bv;
+ AccessControlState state = ACL_STATE_INIT;
+ Backend *be;
+ int be_null = 0;
+ int ret = 1; /* default is access allowed */
- /* see if we have a DN match */
- if ( aci_get_part( aci, 3, '#', &type ) < 0 ) {
- return 0;
+ be = op->o_bd;
+ if ( be == NULL ) {
+ be = LDAP_STAILQ_FIRST(&backendDB);
+ be_null = 1;
+ op->o_bd = be;
}
+ assert( be != NULL );
- /* see if we have a public (i.e. anonymous) access */
- if ( ber_bvstrcasecmp( &aci_bv_public, &type ) == 0 ) {
- return 1;
- }
-
- /* otherwise require an identity */
- if ( BER_BVISNULL( &op->o_ndn ) || BER_BVISEMPTY( &op->o_ndn ) ) {
- return 0;
+ /* short circuit root database access */
+ if ( be_isroot( op ) ) {
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
+ "<= acl_access_allowed: granted to database root\n",
+ 0, 0, 0 );
+ goto done;
}
- /* see if we have a users access */
- if ( ber_bvstrcasecmp( &aci_bv_users, &type ) == 0 ) {
- return 1;
- }
-
- /* NOTE: this may fail if a DN contains a valid '#' (unescaped);
- * just grab all the berval up to its end (ITS#3303).
- * NOTE: the problem could be solved by providing the DN with
- * the embedded '#' encoded as hexpairs: "cn=Foo#Bar" would
- * become "cn=Foo\23Bar" and be safely used by aci_mask(). */
-#if 0
- if ( aci_get_part( aci, 4, '#', &sdn ) < 0 ) {
- return 0;
+ /* use backend default access if no backend acls */
+ if( op->o_bd != NULL && op->o_bd->be_acl == NULL ) {
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
+ "=> access_allowed: backend default %s access %s to \"%s\"\n",
+ access2str( ACL_WRITE ),
+ op->o_bd->be_dfltaccess >= ACL_WRITE
+ ? "granted" : "denied",
+ op->o_dn.bv_val );
+ ret = (op->o_bd->be_dfltaccess >= ACL_WRITE);
+ goto done;
}
-#endif
- sdn.bv_val = type.bv_val + type.bv_len + STRLENOF( "#" );
- sdn.bv_len = aci->bv_len - ( sdn.bv_val - aci->bv_val );
- if ( ber_bvstrcasecmp( &aci_bv_access_id, &type ) == 0 ) {
- struct berval ndn;
-
- rc = dnNormalize( 0, NULL, NULL, &sdn, &ndn, op->o_tmpmemctx );
- if ( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
- return 0;
+ for ( ; mlist != NULL; mlist = mlist->sml_next ) {
+ /*
+ * Internal mods are ignored by ACL_WRITE checking
+ */
+ if ( mlist->sml_flags & SLAP_MOD_INTERNAL ) {
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "acl: internal mod %s:"
+ " modify access granted\n",
+ mlist->sml_desc->ad_cname.bv_val, 0, 0 );
+ continue;
}
- if ( dn_match( &op->o_ndn, &ndn ) ) {
- rc = 1;
+ /*
+ * no-user-modification operational attributes are ignored
+ * by ACL_WRITE checking as any found here are not provided
+ * by the user
+ */
+ if ( is_at_no_user_mod( mlist->sml_desc->ad_type )
+ && ! ( mlist->sml_flags & SLAP_MOD_MANAGING ) )
+ {
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "acl: no-user-mod %s:"
+ " modify access granted\n",
+ mlist->sml_desc->ad_cname.bv_val, 0, 0 );
+ continue;
}
- slap_sl_free( ndn.bv_val, op->o_tmpmemctx );
-
- return rc;
- } else if ( ber_bvstrcasecmp( &aci_bv_subtree, &type ) == 0 ) {
- struct berval ndn;
-
- rc = dnNormalize( 0, NULL, NULL, &sdn, &ndn, op->o_tmpmemctx );
- if ( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
- return 0;
- }
+ switch ( mlist->sml_op ) {
+ case LDAP_MOD_REPLACE:
+ /*
+ * We must check both permission to delete the whole
+ * attribute and permission to add the specific attributes.
+ * This prevents abuse from selfwriters.
+ */
+ if ( ! access_allowed( op, e,
+ mlist->sml_desc, NULL,
+ ( mlist->sml_flags & SLAP_MOD_MANAGING ) ? ACL_MANAGE : ACL_WDEL,
+ &state ) )
+ {
+ ret = 0;
+ goto done;
+ }
- if ( dnIsSuffix( &op->o_ndn, &ndn ) ) {
- rc = 1;
- }
- slap_sl_free( ndn.bv_val, op->o_tmpmemctx );
+ if ( mlist->sml_values == NULL ) break;
- return rc;
+ /* fall thru to check value to add */
- } else if ( ber_bvstrcasecmp( &aci_bv_onelevel, &type ) == 0 ) {
- struct berval ndn, pndn;
-
- rc = dnNormalize( 0, NULL, NULL, &sdn, &ndn, op->o_tmpmemctx );
- if ( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
- return 0;
- }
+ case LDAP_MOD_ADD:
+ assert( mlist->sml_values != NULL );
- dnParent( &ndn, &pndn );
+ for ( bv = mlist->sml_nvalues
+ ? mlist->sml_nvalues : mlist->sml_values;
+ bv->bv_val != NULL; bv++ )
+ {
+ if ( ! access_allowed( op, e,
+ mlist->sml_desc, bv,
+ ( mlist->sml_flags & SLAP_MOD_MANAGING ) ? ACL_MANAGE : ACL_WADD,
+ &state ) )
+ {
+ ret = 0;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ }
+ break;
- if ( dn_match( &op->o_ndn, &pndn ) ) {
- rc = 1;
- }
- slap_sl_free( ndn.bv_val, op->o_tmpmemctx );
+ case LDAP_MOD_DELETE:
+ if ( mlist->sml_values == NULL ) {
+ if ( ! access_allowed( op, e,
+ mlist->sml_desc, NULL,
+ ( mlist->sml_flags & SLAP_MOD_MANAGING ) ? ACL_MANAGE : ACL_WDEL,
+ NULL ) )
+ {
+ ret = 0;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ for ( bv = mlist->sml_nvalues
+ ? mlist->sml_nvalues : mlist->sml_values;
+ bv->bv_val != NULL; bv++ )
+ {
+ if ( ! access_allowed( op, e,
+ mlist->sml_desc, bv,
+ ( mlist->sml_flags & SLAP_MOD_MANAGING ) ? ACL_MANAGE : ACL_WDEL,
+ &state ) )
+ {
+ ret = 0;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ }
+ break;
- return rc;
+ case SLAP_MOD_SOFTADD:
+ /* allow adding attribute via modrdn thru */
+ break;
- } else if ( ber_bvstrcasecmp( &aci_bv_children, &type ) == 0 ) {
- struct berval ndn;
-
- rc = dnNormalize( 0, NULL, NULL, &sdn, &ndn, op->o_tmpmemctx );
- if ( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
- return 0;
+ default:
+ assert( 0 );
+ /* not reached */
+ ret = 0;
+ break;
}
+ }
- if ( !dn_match( &op->o_ndn, &ndn )
- && dnIsSuffix( &op->o_ndn, &ndn ) )
- {
- rc = 1;
- }
- slap_sl_free( ndn.bv_val, op->o_tmpmemctx );
+done:
+ if (be_null) op->o_bd = NULL;
+ return( ret );
+}
- return rc;
+int
+acl_get_part(
+ struct berval *list,
+ int ix,
+ char sep,
+ struct berval *bv )
+{
+ int len;
+ char *p;
- } else if ( ber_bvstrcasecmp( &aci_bv_self, &type ) == 0 ) {
- if ( dn_match( &op->o_ndn, &e->e_nname ) ) {
- return 1;
- }
+ if ( bv ) {
+ BER_BVZERO( bv );
+ }
+ len = list->bv_len;
+ p = list->bv_val;
+ while ( len >= 0 && --ix >= 0 ) {
+ while ( --len >= 0 && *p++ != sep )
+ ;
+ }
+ while ( len >= 0 && *p == ' ' ) {
+ len--;
+ p++;
+ }
+ if ( len < 0 ) {
+ return -1;
+ }
- } else if ( ber_bvstrcasecmp( &aci_bv_dnattr, &type ) == 0 ) {
- Attribute *at;
- AttributeDescription *ad = NULL;
- const char *text;
+ if ( !bv ) {
+ return 0;
+ }
- rc = slap_bv2ad( &sdn, &ad, &text );
+ bv->bv_val = p;
+ while ( --len >= 0 && *p != sep ) {
+ bv->bv_len++;
+ p++;
+ }
+ while ( bv->bv_len > 0 && *--p == ' ' ) {
+ bv->bv_len--;
+ }
+
+ return bv->bv_len;
+}
- if( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
- return 0;
- }
+typedef struct acl_set_gather_t {
+ SetCookie *cookie;
+ BerVarray bvals;
+} acl_set_gather_t;
- rc = 0;
+static int
+acl_set_cb_gather( Operation *op, SlapReply *rs )
+{
+ acl_set_gather_t *p = (acl_set_gather_t *)op->o_callback->sc_private;
+
+ if ( rs->sr_type == REP_SEARCH ) {
+ BerValue bvals[ 2 ];
+ BerVarray bvalsp = NULL;
+ int j;
- for ( at = attrs_find( e->e_attrs, ad );
- at != NULL;
- at = attrs_find( at->a_next, ad ) )
- {
- if ( value_find_ex( ad,
- SLAP_MR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_NORMALIZED_MATCH |
- SLAP_MR_ASSERTED_VALUE_NORMALIZED_MATCH,
- at->a_nvals,
- &op->o_ndn, op->o_tmpmemctx ) == 0 )
- {
- rc = 1;
- break;
- }
- }
+ for ( j = 0; !BER_BVISNULL( &rs->sr_attrs[ j ].an_name ); j++ ) {
+ AttributeDescription *desc = rs->sr_attrs[ j ].an_desc;
+
+ if ( desc == slap_schema.si_ad_entryDN ) {
+ bvalsp = bvals;
+ bvals[ 0 ] = rs->sr_entry->e_nname;
+ BER_BVZERO( &bvals[ 1 ] );
- return rc;
+ } else {
+ Attribute *a;
- } else if ( ber_bvstrcasecmp( &aci_bv_group, &type ) == 0 ) {
- if ( aci_group_member( &sdn, &aci_bv_group_class,
- &aci_bv_group_attr, op, e, nmatch, matches ) )
- {
- return 1;
- }
+ a = attr_find( rs->sr_entry->e_attrs, desc );
+ if ( a != NULL ) {
+ int i;
- } else if ( ber_bvstrcasecmp( &aci_bv_role, &type ) == 0 ) {
- if ( aci_group_member( &sdn, &aci_bv_role_class,
- &aci_bv_role_attr, op, e, nmatch, matches ) )
- {
- return 1;
- }
+ for ( i = 0; !BER_BVISNULL( &a->a_nvals[ i ] ); i++ )
+ ;
- } else if ( ber_bvstrcasecmp( &aci_bv_set, &type ) == 0 ) {
- if ( aci_match_set( &sdn, op, e, 0 ) ) {
- return 1;
+ bvalsp = a->a_nvals;
+ }
+ }
}
- } else if ( ber_bvstrcasecmp( &aci_bv_set_ref, &type ) == 0 ) {
- if ( aci_match_set( &sdn, op, e, 1 ) ) {
- return 1;
+ if ( bvals ) {
+ p->bvals = slap_set_join( p->cookie, p->bvals,
+ ( '|' | SLAP_SET_RREF ), bvalsp );
}
+
+ } else {
+ assert( rs->sr_type == REP_RESULT );
}
return 0;
}
-#endif /* SLAPD_ACI_ENABLED */
-
-#ifdef SLAP_DYNACL
-static int
-dynacl_aci_parse( const char *fname, int lineno, slap_style_t sty, const char *right, void **privp )
+BerVarray
+acl_set_gather( SetCookie *cookie, struct berval *name, AttributeDescription *desc )
{
- AttributeDescription *ad = NULL;
+ AclSetCookie *cp = (AclSetCookie *)cookie;
+ int rc = 0;
+ LDAPURLDesc *ludp = NULL;
+ Operation op2 = { 0 };
+ SlapReply rs = {REP_RESULT};
+ AttributeName anlist[ 2 ], *anlistp = NULL;
+ int nattrs = 0;
+ slap_callback cb = { NULL, acl_set_cb_gather, NULL, NULL };
+ acl_set_gather_t p = { 0 };
const char *text = NULL;
+ static struct berval defaultFilter_bv = BER_BVC( "(objectClass=*)" );
- if ( sty != ACL_STYLE_REGEX && sty != ACL_STYLE_BASE ) {
- fprintf( stderr, "%s: line %d: "
- "inappropriate style \"%s\" in \"aci\" by clause\n",
- fname, lineno, sty );
- return -1;
+ /* this routine needs to return the bervals instead of
+ * plain strings, since syntax is not known. It should
+ * also return the syntax or some "comparison cookie".
+ */
+ if ( strncasecmp( name->bv_val, "ldap:///", STRLENOF( "ldap:///" ) ) != 0 ) {
+ return acl_set_gather2( cookie, name, desc );
}
- if ( right != NULL && *right != '\0' ) {
- if ( slap_str2ad( right, &ad, &text ) != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
- fprintf( stderr,
- "%s: line %d: aci \"%s\": %s\n",
- fname, lineno, right, text );
- return -1;
- }
+ rc = ldap_url_parse( name->bv_val, &ludp );
+ if ( rc != LDAP_URL_SUCCESS ) {
+ rc = LDAP_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
+ goto url_done;
+ }
+
+ if ( ( ludp->lud_host && ludp->lud_host[0] ) || ludp->lud_exts )
+ {
+ /* host part must be empty */
+ /* extensions parts must be empty */
+ rc = LDAP_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
+ goto url_done;
+ }
+
+ /* Grab the searchbase and see if an appropriate database can be found */
+ ber_str2bv( ludp->lud_dn, 0, 0, &op2.o_req_dn );
+ rc = dnNormalize( 0, NULL, NULL, &op2.o_req_dn,
+ &op2.o_req_ndn, cp->asc_op->o_tmpmemctx );
+ BER_BVZERO( &op2.o_req_dn );
+ if ( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
+ goto url_done;
+ }
+
+ op2.o_bd = select_backend( &op2.o_req_ndn, 0, 1 );
+ if ( ( op2.o_bd == NULL ) || ( op2.o_bd->be_search == NULL ) ) {
+ rc = LDAP_NO_SUCH_OBJECT;
+ goto url_done;
+ }
+ /* Grab the filter */
+ if ( ludp->lud_filter ) {
+ ber_str2bv_x( ludp->lud_filter, 0, 0, &op2.ors_filterstr,
+ cp->asc_op->o_tmpmemctx );
+
} else {
- ad = slap_schema.si_ad_aci;
+ op2.ors_filterstr = defaultFilter_bv;
}
- if ( !is_at_syntax( ad->ad_type, SLAPD_ACI_SYNTAX) ) {
- fprintf( stderr, "%s: line %d: "
- "aci \"%s\": inappropriate syntax: %s\n",
- fname, lineno, right,
- ad->ad_type->sat_syntax_oid );
- return -1;
+ op2.ors_filter = str2filter_x( cp->asc_op, op2.ors_filterstr.bv_val );
+ if ( op2.ors_filter == NULL ) {
+ rc = LDAP_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
+ goto url_done;
}
- *privp = (void *)ad;
+ /* Grab the scope */
+ op2.ors_scope = ludp->lud_scope;
- return 0;
-}
+ /* Grap the attributes */
+ if ( ludp->lud_attrs ) {
+ for ( ; ludp->lud_attrs[ nattrs ]; nattrs++ )
+ ;
-static int
-dynacl_aci_print( void *priv )
-{
- AttributeDescription *ad = ( AttributeDescription * )priv;
+ anlistp = slap_sl_malloc( sizeof( AttributeName ) * ( nattrs + 2 ),
+ cp->asc_op->o_tmpmemctx );
- assert( ad );
+ for ( ; ludp->lud_attrs[ nattrs ]; nattrs++ ) {
+ ber_str2bv( ludp->lud_attrs[ nattrs ], 0, 0, &anlistp[ nattrs ].an_name );
+ anlistp[ nattrs ].an_desc = NULL;
+ rc = slap_bv2ad( &anlistp[ nattrs ].an_name,
+ &anlistp[ nattrs ].an_desc, &text );
+ if ( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
+ goto url_done;
+ }
+ }
- fprintf( stderr, " aci=%s", ad->ad_cname.bv_val );
+ } else {
+ anlistp = anlist;
+ }
- return 0;
-}
+ anlistp[ nattrs ].an_name = desc->ad_cname;
+ anlistp[ nattrs ].an_desc = desc;
+ BER_BVZERO( &anlistp[ nattrs + 1 ].an_name );
+
+ p.cookie = cookie;
+
+ op2.o_hdr = cp->asc_op->o_hdr;
+ op2.o_tag = LDAP_REQ_SEARCH;
+ op2.o_ndn = op2.o_bd->be_rootndn;
+ op2.o_callback = &cb;
+ slap_op_time( &op2.o_time, &op2.o_tincr );
+ op2.o_do_not_cache = 1;
+ op2.o_is_auth_check = 0;
+ ber_dupbv_x( &op2.o_req_dn, &op2.o_req_ndn, cp->asc_op->o_tmpmemctx );
+ op2.ors_slimit = SLAP_NO_LIMIT;
+ op2.ors_tlimit = SLAP_NO_LIMIT;
+ op2.ors_attrs = anlistp;
+ op2.ors_attrsonly = 0;
+ op2.o_private = cp->asc_op->o_private;
-static int
-dynacl_aci_mask(
- void *priv,
- Operation *op,
- Entry *e,
- AttributeDescription *desc,
- struct berval *val,
- int nmatch,
- regmatch_t *matches,
- slap_access_t *grantp,
- slap_access_t *denyp )
-{
- AttributeDescription *ad = ( AttributeDescription * )priv;
- Attribute *at;
- slap_access_t tgrant, tdeny, grant, deny;
-#ifdef LDAP_DEBUG
- char accessmaskbuf[ACCESSMASK_MAXLEN];
- char accessmaskbuf1[ACCESSMASK_MAXLEN];
-#endif /* LDAP_DEBUG */
-
- /* start out with nothing granted, nothing denied */
- ACL_INIT(tgrant);
- ACL_INIT(tdeny);
-
- /* get the aci attribute */
- at = attr_find( e->e_attrs, ad );
- if ( at != NULL ) {
- int i;
-
- /* the aci is an multi-valued attribute. The
- * rights are determined by OR'ing the individual
- * rights given by the acis.
- */
- for ( i = 0; !BER_BVISNULL( &at->a_nvals[i] ); i++ ) {
- if ( aci_mask( op, e, desc, val, &at->a_nvals[i],
- nmatch, matches, &grant, &deny,
- SLAP_ACI_SCOPE_ENTRY ) != 0 )
- {
- tgrant |= grant;
- tdeny |= deny;
- }
- }
-
- Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= aci_mask grant %s deny %s\n",
- accessmask2str( tgrant, accessmaskbuf ),
- accessmask2str( tdeny, accessmaskbuf1 ), 0 );
+ cb.sc_private = &p;
+
+ rc = op2.o_bd->be_search( &op2, &rs );
+ if ( rc != 0 ) {
+ goto url_done;
+ }
+
+url_done:;
+ if ( op2.ors_filter ) {
+ filter_free_x( cp->asc_op, op2.ors_filter );
+ }
+ if ( !BER_BVISNULL( &op2.o_req_ndn ) ) {
+ slap_sl_free( op2.o_req_ndn.bv_val, cp->asc_op->o_tmpmemctx );
+ }
+ if ( !BER_BVISNULL( &op2.o_req_dn ) ) {
+ slap_sl_free( op2.o_req_dn.bv_val, cp->asc_op->o_tmpmemctx );
+ }
+ if ( ludp ) {
+ ldap_free_urldesc( ludp );
}
+ if ( anlistp && anlistp != anlist ) {
+ slap_sl_free( anlistp, cp->asc_op->o_tmpmemctx );
+ }
+
+ return p.bvals;
+}
+
+BerVarray
+acl_set_gather2( SetCookie *cookie, struct berval *name, AttributeDescription *desc )
+{
+ AclSetCookie *cp = (AclSetCookie *)cookie;
+ BerVarray bvals = NULL;
+ struct berval ndn;
+ int rc = 0;
- /* If the entry level aci didn't contain anything valid for the
- * current operation, climb up the tree and evaluate the
- * acis with scope set to subtree
+ /* this routine needs to return the bervals instead of
+ * plain strings, since syntax is not known. It should
+ * also return the syntax or some "comparison cookie".
*/
- if ( tgrant == ACL_PRIV_NONE && tdeny == ACL_PRIV_NONE ) {
- struct berval parent_ndn;
- struct berval old_parent_ndn = BER_BVNULL;
-
-#if 1
- /* to solve the chicken'n'egg problem of accessing
- * the OpenLDAPaci attribute, the direct access
- * to the entry's attribute is unchecked; however,
- * further accesses to OpenLDAPaci values in the
- * ancestors occur through backend_attribute(), i.e.
- * with the identity of the operation, requiring
- * further access checking. For uniformity, this
- * makes further requests occur as the rootdn, if
- * any, i.e. searching for the OpenLDAPaci attribute
- * is considered an internal search. If this is not
- * acceptable, then the same check needs be performed
- * when accessing the entry's attribute. */
- Operation op2 = *op;
-
- if ( !BER_BVISNULL( &op->o_bd->be_rootndn ) ) {
- op2.o_dn = op->o_bd->be_rootdn;
- op2.o_ndn = op->o_bd->be_rootndn;
+ rc = dnNormalize( 0, NULL, NULL, name, &ndn, cp->asc_op->o_tmpmemctx );
+ if ( rc == LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
+ if ( desc == slap_schema.si_ad_entryDN ) {
+ bvals = (BerVarray)slap_sl_malloc( sizeof( BerValue ) * 2,
+ cp->asc_op->o_tmpmemctx );
+ bvals[ 0 ] = ndn;
+ BER_BVZERO( &bvals[ 1 ] );
+ BER_BVZERO( &ndn );
+
+ } else {
+ backend_attribute( cp->asc_op,
+ cp->asc_e, &ndn, desc, &bvals, ACL_NONE );
}
-#endif
- dnParent( &e->e_nname, &parent_ndn );
- while ( parent_ndn.bv_val != old_parent_ndn.bv_val ){
- int i;
- BerVarray bvals = NULL;
- int ret, stop;
+ if ( !BER_BVISNULL( &ndn ) ) {
+ slap_sl_free( ndn.bv_val, cp->asc_op->o_tmpmemctx );
+ }
+ }
- old_parent_ndn = parent_ndn;
- Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "checking ACI of \"%s\"\n", parent_ndn.bv_val, 0, 0 );
- ret = backend_attribute( &op2, NULL, &parent_ndn, ad, &bvals, ACL_AUTH );
+ return bvals;
+}
- switch ( ret ) {
- case LDAP_SUCCESS :
- stop = 0;
- if ( !bvals ) {
- break;
- }
+int
+acl_match_set (
+ struct berval *subj,
+ Operation *op,
+ Entry *e,
+ int setref )
+{
+ struct berval set = BER_BVNULL;
+ int rc = 0;
+ AclSetCookie cookie;
- for ( i = 0; !BER_BVISNULL( &bvals[i] ); i++) {
- if ( aci_mask( op, e, desc, val,
- &bvals[i],
- nmatch, matches,
- &grant, &deny,
- SLAP_ACI_SCOPE_CHILDREN ) != 0 )
- {
- tgrant |= grant;
- tdeny |= deny;
- /* evaluation stops as soon as either a "deny" or a
- * "grant" directive matches.
- */
- if ( tgrant != ACL_PRIV_NONE || tdeny != ACL_PRIV_NONE ) {
- stop = 1;
- }
- }
- Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= aci_mask grant %s deny %s\n",
- accessmask2str( tgrant, accessmaskbuf ),
- accessmask2str( tdeny, accessmaskbuf1 ), 0 );
- }
- break;
+ if ( setref == 0 ) {
+ ber_dupbv_x( &set, subj, op->o_tmpmemctx );
- case LDAP_NO_SUCH_ATTRIBUTE:
- /* just go on if the aci-Attribute is not present in
- * the current entry
- */
- Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "no such attribute\n", 0, 0, 0 );
- stop = 0;
- break;
+ } else {
+ struct berval subjdn, ndn = BER_BVNULL;
+ struct berval setat;
+ BerVarray bvals;
+ const char *text;
+ AttributeDescription *desc = NULL;
- case LDAP_NO_SUCH_OBJECT:
- /* We have reached the base object */
- Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "no such object\n", 0, 0, 0 );
- stop = 1;
- break;
+ /* format of string is "entry/setAttrName" */
+ if ( acl_get_part( subj, 0, '/', &subjdn ) < 0 ) {
+ return 0;
+ }
- default:
- stop = 1;
- break;
- }
+ if ( acl_get_part( subj, 1, '/', &setat ) < 0 ) {
+ setat = aci_bv[ ACI_BV_SET_ATTR ];
+ }
- if ( stop ) {
- break;
+ /*
+ * NOTE: dnNormalize honors the ber_len field
+ * as the length of the dn to be normalized
+ */
+ if ( slap_bv2ad( &setat, &desc, &text ) == LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
+ if ( dnNormalize( 0, NULL, NULL, &subjdn, &ndn, op->o_tmpmemctx ) == LDAP_SUCCESS )
+ {
+ backend_attribute( op, e, &ndn, desc, &bvals, ACL_NONE );
+ if ( bvals != NULL && !BER_BVISNULL( &bvals[0] ) ) {
+ int i;
+
+ set = bvals[0];
+ BER_BVZERO( &bvals[0] );
+ for ( i = 1; !BER_BVISNULL( &bvals[i] ); i++ )
+ /* count */ ;
+ bvals[0].bv_val = bvals[i-1].bv_val;
+ BER_BVZERO( &bvals[i-1] );
+ }
+ ber_bvarray_free_x( bvals, op->o_tmpmemctx );
+ slap_sl_free( ndn.bv_val, op->o_tmpmemctx );
}
- dnParent( &old_parent_ndn, &parent_ndn );
}
}
- *grantp = tgrant;
- *denyp = tdeny;
+ if ( !BER_BVISNULL( &set ) ) {
+ cookie.asc_op = op;
+ cookie.asc_e = e;
+ rc = ( slap_set_filter(
+ acl_set_gather,
+ (SetCookie *)&cookie, &set,
+ &op->o_ndn, &e->e_nname, NULL ) > 0 );
+ slap_sl_free( set.bv_val, op->o_tmpmemctx );
+ }
- return 0;
+ return(rc);
}
-/* need to register this at some point */
-static slap_dynacl_t dynacl_aci = {
- "aci",
- dynacl_aci_parse,
- dynacl_aci_print,
- dynacl_aci_mask,
- NULL,
- NULL,
- NULL
-};
-
-int
-aci_init( void )
-{
- return slap_dynacl_register( &dynacl_aci );
-}
+#ifdef SLAP_DYNACL
/*
* dynamic ACL infrastructure
int
acl_init( void )
{
-#ifdef SLAP_DYNACL
- int rc;
-
- da_list = NULL;
+ int rc = 0;
#ifdef SLAPD_ACI_ENABLED
+#ifdef SLAP_DYNACL
+ rc = dynacl_aci_init();
+#else /* !SLAP_DYNACL */
rc = aci_init();
- if ( rc ) {
+#endif /* !SLAP_DYNACL */
+ if ( rc != 0 ) {
return rc;
}
#endif /* SLAPD_ACI_ENABLED */
-#endif /* SLAP_DYNACL */
- return 0;
+ return rc;
}
-
-static int
-string_expand(
+int
+acl_string_expand(
struct berval *bv,
struct berval *pat,
char *match,
*dp = '\0';
bv->bv_len = size;
- Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, "=> string_expand: pattern: %.*s\n", (int)pat->bv_len, pat->bv_val, 0 );
- Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, "=> string_expand: expanded: %s\n", bv->bv_val, 0, 0 );
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, "=> acl_string_expand: pattern: %.*s\n", (int)pat->bv_len, pat->bv_val, 0 );
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, "=> acl_string_expand: expanded: %s\n", bv->bv_val, 0, 0 );
return 0;
}
str = "";
};
- string_expand( &bv, pat, buf, nmatch, matches );
+ acl_string_expand( &bv, pat, buf, nmatch, matches );
rc = regcomp( &re, newbuf, REG_EXTENDED|REG_ICASE );
if ( rc ) {
char error[ACL_BUF_SIZE];