regmatch_t *matches );
#ifdef SLAPD_ACI_ENABLED
-static int aci_access_allowed(
+static int aci_mask(
Backend *be,
Operation *op,
- Entry *e, char *attr, struct berval *aci,
- regmatch_t *matches );
+ Entry *e, char *attr, struct berval *val, struct berval *aci,
+ regmatch_t *matches, slap_access_t *grant, slap_access_t *deny );
+
+char *supportedACIMechs[] = {
+ "1.3.6.1.4.1.4203.666.7.1", /* experimental draft aci family */
+ "1.3.6.1.4.1.4203.666.7.2", /* experimental OpenLDAP aci family */
+ NULL
+ };
#endif
static int regex_matches(char *pat, char *str, char *buf, regmatch_t *matches);
{
int count;
AccessControl *a;
+ char accessmaskbuf[ACCESSMASK_MAXLEN];
slap_access_mask_t mask;
slap_control_t control;
}
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
- "=> access_allowed: %s access %s to \"%s\"\n",
+ "=> access_allowed: %s access %s by %s\n",
access2str( access ),
- ACL_GRANT(mask, access) ? "granted" : "denied", op->o_dn );
+ ACL_GRANT(mask, access) ? "granted" : "denied",
+ accessmask2str( mask, accessmaskbuf ) );
return ACL_GRANT(mask, access);
}
regmatch_t *matches
)
{
- AccessControl *next;
-
assert( e != NULL );
assert( count != NULL );
continue;
} else {
- Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "=> acl_get: ACL [%d] matched\n",
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "=> acl_get: [%d] matched\n",
*count, 0, 0);
}
}
{
int i;
Access *b;
+ char accessmaskbuf[ACCESSMASK_MAXLEN];
assert( a != NULL );
assert( mask != NULL );
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
- "=> acl_mask: access to entry \"%s\", attr \"%s\"\n requested\n",
+ "=> acl_mask: access to entry \"%s\", attr \"%s\" requested\n",
e->e_dn, attr, 0 );
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
"=> acl_mask: to value \"%s\" by \"%s\", (%s) \n",
- val ? val->bv_val : "any",
+ val ? val->bv_val : "*",
op->o_ndn ? op->o_ndn : "",
- accessmask2str( *mask ) );
+ accessmask2str( *mask, accessmaskbuf ) );
for ( i = 1, b = a->acl_access; b != NULL; b = b->a_next, i++ ) {
slap_access_mask_t oldmask, modmask;
* user is bound as somebody in the same namespace as
* the entry, OR the given dn matches the dn pattern
*/
- if ( strcasecmp( b->a_dn_pat, "anonymous" ) == 0 ) {
+ if ( strcmp( b->a_dn_pat, "anonymous" ) == 0 ) {
if (op->o_ndn != NULL && op->o_ndn[0] != '\0' ) {
continue;
}
- } else if ( strcasecmp( b->a_dn_pat, "self" ) == 0 ) {
+ } else if ( strcmp( b->a_dn_pat, "users" ) == 0 ) {
+ if (op->o_ndn == NULL || op->o_ndn[0] == '\0' ) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ } else if ( strcmp( b->a_dn_pat, "self" ) == 0 ) {
if( op->o_ndn == NULL || op->o_ndn[0] == '\0' ) {
continue;
}
continue;
}
- } else if ( strcmp( b->a_dn_pat, ".*" ) != 0 &&
- !regex_matches( b->a_dn_pat, op->o_ndn, e->e_ndn, matches ) )
- {
- continue;
+ } else if ( strcmp( b->a_dn_pat, "*" ) != 0 ) {
+ int ret = regex_matches( b->a_dn_pat,
+ op->o_ndn, e->e_ndn, matches );
+
+ if( ret == 0 ) {
+ continue;
+ }
}
}
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= check a_sockurl_pat: %s\n",
b->a_sockurl_pat, 0, 0 );
- if ( strcmp( b->a_sockurl_pat, ".*" ) != 0 &&
+ if ( strcmp( b->a_sockurl_pat, "*" ) != 0 &&
!regex_matches( b->a_sockurl_pat, conn->c_listener_url,
e->e_ndn, matches ) )
{
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= check a_domain_pat: %s\n",
b->a_domain_pat, 0, 0 );
- if ( strcmp( b->a_domain_pat, ".*" ) != 0 &&
+ if ( strcmp( b->a_domain_pat, "*" ) != 0 &&
!regex_matches( b->a_domain_pat, conn->c_peer_domain,
e->e_ndn, matches ) )
{
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= check a_peername_path: %s\n",
b->a_peername_pat, 0, 0 );
- if ( strcmp( b->a_peername_pat, ".*" ) != 0 &&
+ if ( strcmp( b->a_peername_pat, "*" ) != 0 &&
!regex_matches( b->a_peername_pat, conn->c_peer_name,
e->e_ndn, matches ) )
{
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "<= check a_sockname_path: %s\n",
b->a_sockname_pat, 0, 0 );
- if ( strcmp( b->a_sockname_pat, ".*" ) != 0 &&
+ if ( strcmp( b->a_sockname_pat, "*" ) != 0 &&
!regex_matches( b->a_sockname_pat, conn->c_sock_name,
e->e_ndn, matches ) )
{
#ifdef SLAPD_ACI_ENABLED
if ( b->a_aci_at != NULL ) {
Attribute *at;
+ slap_access_t grant, deny, tgrant, tdeny;
/* this case works different from the others above.
* since aci's themselves give permissions, we need
continue;
}
- /* first check if the right being requested is
- * higher than allowed by the ACL clause.
+ /* first check if the right being requested
+ * is allowed by the ACL clause.
*/
- if ( ! ACL_GRANT( b->a_mask, access ) ) {
+ if ( ! ACL_GRANT( b->a_mask, *mask ) ) {
continue;
}
continue;
}
+ /* start out with nothing granted, nothing denied */
+ ACL_INIT(tgrant);
+ ACL_INIT(tdeny);
+
/* the aci is an multi-valued attribute. The
* rights are determined by OR'ing the individual
* rights given by the acis.
*/
for ( i = 0; at->a_vals[i] != NULL; i++ ) {
- if ( aci_access_allowed( be, op,
- e, attr, at->a_vals[i],
- matches ) )
+ if (aci_mask( be, op,
+ e, attr, val, at->a_vals[i],
+ matches, &grant, &deny ) != 0)
{
- Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
- "<= acl_mask: matched by clause #%d access granted\n",
- i, 0, 0 );
- break;
+ tgrant |= grant;
+ tdeny |= deny;
}
}
- if( ACL_IS_INVALID( modmask ) ) {
+ /* remove anything that the ACL clause does not allow */
+ tgrant &= b->a_mask & ACL_PRIV_MASK;
+ tdeny &= ACL_PRIV_MASK;
+
+ /* see if we have anything to contribute */
+ if( ACL_IS_INVALID(tgrant) && ACL_IS_INVALID(tdeny) ) {
continue;
}
+ /* this could be improved by changing acl_mask so that it can deal with
+ * by clauses that return grant/deny pairs. Right now, it does either
+ * additive or subtractive rights, but not both at the same time. So,
+ * we need to combine the grant/deny pair into a single rights mask in
+ * a smart way: if either grant or deny is "empty", then we use the
+ * opposite as is, otherwise we remove any denied rights from the grant
+ * rights mask and construct an additive mask.
+ */
+ if (ACL_IS_INVALID(tdeny)) {
+ modmask = tgrant | ACL_PRIV_ADDITIVE;
+
+ } else if (ACL_IS_INVALID(tgrant)) {
+ modmask = tdeny | ACL_PRIV_SUBSTRACTIVE;
+
+ } else {
+ modmask = (tgrant & ~tdeny) | ACL_PRIV_ADDITIVE;
+ }
+
} else
#endif
{
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
- "<= acl_mask: matched clause #%d\n",
- i, 0, 0 );
-
+ "<= acl_mask: [%d] applying %s (%s)\n",
+ i, accessmask2str( modmask, accessmaskbuf ),
+ b->a_type == ACL_CONTINUE
+ ? "continue"
+ : b->a_type == ACL_BREAK
+ ? "break"
+ : "stop" );
+
+ /* save old mask */
oldmask = *mask;
if( ACL_IS_ADDITIVE(modmask) ) {
- ACL_PRIV_CLR( *mask, ACL_PRIV_LEVEL );
+ /* add privs */
ACL_PRIV_SET( *mask, modmask );
-
+
+ /* cleanup */
+ ACL_PRIV_CLR( *mask, ~ACL_PRIV_MASK );
+
} else if( ACL_IS_SUBTRACTIVE(modmask) ) {
- ACL_PRIV_CLR( *mask, ACL_PRIV_LEVEL );
+ /* substract privs */
ACL_PRIV_CLR( *mask, modmask );
+ /* cleanup */
+ ACL_PRIV_CLR( *mask, ~ACL_PRIV_MASK );
+
} else {
- ACL_PRIV_ASSIGN( *mask, modmask );
+ /* assign privs */
+ *mask = modmask;
}
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
- "<= acl_mask: old (%s) mod (%s) new (%s)\n",
- accessmask2str(oldmask),
- accessmask2str(modmask),
- accessmask2str(*mask) );
+ "<= acl_mask: [%d] mask: %s\n",
+ i, accessmask2str(*mask, accessmaskbuf), 0 );
if( b->a_type == ACL_CONTINUE ) {
continue;
return ACL_BREAK;
} else {
- break;
+ return ACL_STOP;
}
}
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
+ "<= acl_mask: no more <who> clauses, returning %s (stop)\n",
+ accessmask2str(*mask, accessmaskbuf), 0, 0 );
return ACL_STOP;
}
}
for ( ; mlist != NULL; mlist = mlist->ml_next ) {
- regmatch_t matches[MAXREMATCHES];
-
/* the lastmod attributes are ignored by ACL checking */
if ( oc_check_no_usermod_attr( mlist->ml_type ) ) {
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL, "Operational attribute: %s access allowed\n",
if (res)
return(res);
len = strlen(s);
- if (len > bv->bv_len)
+ if (len > (int)bv->bv_len)
return(1);
- if (len < bv->bv_len)
+ if (len < (int)bv->bv_len)
return(-1);
return(0);
}
}
static int
-aci_list_has_right(
- struct berval *list,
- slap_access_t access,
- int action)
+aci_list_map_rights (
+ struct berval *list)
{
struct berval bv;
+ slap_access_t mask;
int i;
- slap_access_t right;
+ ACL_INIT(mask);
for (i = 0; aci_get_part(list, i, ',', &bv) >= 0; i++) {
if (bv.bv_len <= 0)
continue;
switch (*bv.bv_val) {
case 'c':
- right = ACL_COMPARE;
+ ACL_PRIV_SET(mask, ACL_PRIV_COMPARE);
break;
case 's':
/* **** NOTE: draft-ietf-ldapext-aci-model-0.3.txt defines
* that the right 's' means "search". The latter definition
* is used here.
*/
- right = ACL_SEARCH;
+ ACL_PRIV_SET(mask, ACL_PRIV_SEARCH);
break;
case 'r':
- right = ACL_READ;
+ ACL_PRIV_SET(mask, ACL_PRIV_READ);
break;
case 'w':
- right = ACL_WRITE;
+ ACL_PRIV_SET(mask, ACL_PRIV_WRITE);
break;
case 'x':
/* **** NOTE: draft-ietf-ldapext-aci-model-0.3.txt does not
* define any equivalent to the AUTH right, so I've just used
* 'x' for now.
*/
- right = ACL_AUTH;
+ ACL_PRIV_SET(mask, ACL_PRIV_AUTH);
break;
default:
- right = 0;
break;
}
-#ifdef SLAPD_ACI_DISCRETE_RIGHTS
- if (right & access) {
- return(action);
- }
-#else
- if (action != 0) {
- /* check granted */
- if (ACL_GRANT(right, access))
- return(1);
- } else {
- /* check denied */
- if (right <= access)
- return(1);
- }
-#endif
}
-
-#ifdef SLAPD_ACI_DISCRETE_RIGHTS
- return(!action);
-#else
- return(0);
-#endif
+ return(mask);
}
static int
-aci_list_has_attr (struct berval *list, char *attr)
+aci_list_has_attr (struct berval *list, char *attr, struct berval *val)
{
- struct berval bv;
+ struct berval bv, left, right;
int i;
for (i = 0; aci_get_part(list, i, ',', &bv) >= 0; i++) {
- if (aci_strbvcmp(attr, &bv) == 0) {
- return(1);
+ if (aci_get_part(&bv, 0, '=', &left) < 0
+ || aci_get_part(&bv, 1, '=', &right) < 0)
+ {
+ if (aci_strbvcmp(attr, &bv) == 0)
+ return(1);
+ } else if (val == NULL) {
+ if (aci_strbvcmp(attr, &left) == 0)
+ return(1);
+ } else {
+ if (aci_strbvcmp(attr, &left) == 0) {
+ /* this is experimental code that implements a
+ * simple (prefix) match of the attribute value.
+ * the ACI draft does not provide for aci's that
+ * apply to specific values, but it would be
+ * nice to have. If the <attr> part of an aci's
+ * rights list is of the form <attr>=<value>,
+ * that means the aci applies only to attrs with
+ * the given value. Furthermore, if the attr is
+ * of the form <attr>=<value>*, then <value> is
+ * treated as a prefix, and the aci applies to
+ * any value with that prefix.
+ *
+ * Ideally, this would allow r.e. matches.
+ */
+ if (aci_get_part(&right, 0, '*', &left) < 0
+ || right.bv_len <= left.bv_len)
+ {
+ if (aci_strbvcmp(val->bv_val, &right) == 0)
+ return(1);
+ } else if (val->bv_len >= left.bv_len) {
+ if (strncasecmp( val->bv_val, left.bv_val, left.bv_len ) == 0)
+ return(1);
+ }
+ }
}
}
return(0);
}
-static int
-aci_list_has_attr_right (struct berval *list, char *attr, int access, int action)
+static slap_access_t
+aci_list_get_attr_rights (struct berval *list, char *attr, struct berval *val)
{
struct berval bv;
- int i, found;
+ slap_access_t mask;
+ int i;
/* loop through each rights/attr pair, skip first part (action) */
- found = -1;
+ ACL_INIT(mask);
for (i = 1; aci_get_part(list, i + 1, ';', &bv) >= 0; i += 2) {
- if (aci_list_has_attr(&bv, attr) == 0)
+ if (aci_list_has_attr(&bv, attr, val) == 0)
continue;
- found = 0;
if (aci_get_part(list, i, ';', &bv) < 0)
continue;
- if (aci_list_has_right(&bv, access, action) != 0)
- return(1);
+ mask |= aci_list_map_rights(&bv);
}
- return(found);
+ return(mask);
}
static int
-aci_list_has_permission(
+aci_list_get_rights (
struct berval *list,
char *attr,
- slap_access_t access)
+ struct berval *val,
+ slap_access_t *grant,
+ slap_access_t *deny)
{
struct berval perm, actn;
- int i, action, specific, general;
+ slap_access_t *mask;
+ int i, found;
if (attr == NULL || *attr == 0 || strcasecmp(attr, "entry") == 0) {
attr = "[entry]";
}
+ found = 0;
+ ACL_INIT(*grant);
+ ACL_INIT(*deny);
/* loop through each permissions clause */
for (i = 0; aci_get_part(list, i, '$', &perm) >= 0; i++) {
if (aci_get_part(&perm, 0, ';', &actn) < 0)
continue;
if (aci_strbvcmp( "grant", &actn ) == 0) {
- action = 1;
+ mask = grant;
} else if (aci_strbvcmp( "deny", &actn ) == 0) {
- action = 0;
+ mask = deny;
} else {
continue;
}
- specific = aci_list_has_attr_right(&perm, attr, access, action);
- if (specific >= 0)
- return(specific);
-
- general = aci_list_has_attr_right(&perm, "[all]", access, action);
- if (general >= 0)
- return(general);
+ found = 1;
+ *mask |= aci_list_get_attr_rights(&perm, attr, val);
+ *mask |= aci_list_get_attr_rights(&perm, "[all]", NULL);
}
- return(0);
+ return(found);
}
static int
}
static int
-aci_access_allowed (
- struct berval *aci,
- char *attr,
+aci_mask (
Backend *be,
- Entry *e,
Operation *op,
- slap_access_t access,
- regmatch_t *matches
+ Entry *e,
+ char *attr,
+ struct berval *val,
+ struct berval *aci,
+ regmatch_t *matches,
+ slap_access_t *grant,
+ slap_access_t *deny
)
{
struct berval bv, perms, sdn;
char *subjdn;
- int rc;
-
- Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
- "=> aci_access_allowed: %s access to entry \"%s\"\n",
- access2str( access ), e->e_dn, 0 );
-
- Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ACL,
- "=> aci_access_allowed: %s access to attribute \"%s\" by \"%s\"\n",
- access2str( access ),
- attr,
- op->o_ndn ? op->o_ndn : "" );
+ int rc, i;
/* parse an aci of the form:
oid#scope#action;rights;attr;rights;attr$action;rights;attr;rights;attr#dnType#subjectDN
- See draft-ietf-ldapext-aci-model-0.3.txt section 9.1 for
+ See draft-ietf-ldapext-aci-model-04.txt section 9.1 for
a full description of the format for this attribute.
For now, this routine only supports scope=entry.
if (aci_get_part(aci, 4, '#', NULL) < 0)
return(0);
+ /* check that the aci family is supported */
+ if (aci_get_part(aci, 0, '#', &bv) < 0)
+ return(0);
+ for (i = 0; supportedACIMechs[i] != NULL; i++) {
+ if (aci_strbvcmp( supportedACIMechs[i], &bv ) == 0)
+ break;
+ }
+ if (supportedACIMechs[i] == NULL)
+ return(0);
+
/* check that the scope is "entry" */
if (aci_get_part(aci, 1, '#', &bv) < 0
|| aci_strbvcmp( "entry", &bv ) != 0)
return(0);
/* check if any permissions allow desired access */
- if (aci_list_has_permission(&perms, attr, access) == 0)
+ if (aci_list_get_rights(&perms, attr, val, grant, deny) == 0)
return(0);
/* see if we have a DN match */
if (aci_get_part(aci, 4, '#', &sdn) < 0)
return(0);
+
if (aci_strbvcmp( "access-id", &bv ) == 0) {
subjdn = aci_bvstrdup(&sdn);
if (subjdn == NULL)
return(0);
- rc = 0;
+ rc = 1;
if ( dn_normalize(subjdn) != NULL )
- rc = (strcasecmp(op->o_ndn, subjdn) == 0);
+ if (strcasecmp(op->o_ndn, subjdn) != 0)
+ rc = 0;
ch_free(subjdn);
return(rc);
}
if (aci_strbvcmp( "self", &bv ) == 0) {
- return(strcasecmp(op->o_ndn, e->e_ndn) == 0);
- }
+ if (strcasecmp(op->o_ndn, e->e_ndn) == 0)
+ return(1);
- if (aci_strbvcmp( "group", &bv ) == 0) {
- return(aci_group_member(&sdn, "groupOfNames", "member", be, e, op, matches));
- }
+ } else if (aci_strbvcmp( "dnattr", &bv ) == 0) {
+ Attribute *at;
+ char *attrname;
- if (aci_strbvcmp( "role", &bv ) == 0) {
- return(aci_group_member(&sdn, "organizationalRole", "roleOccupant", be, e, op, matches));
+ attrname = aci_bvstrdup(&sdn);
+ at = attr_find(e->e_attrs, attrname);
+ ch_free(attrname);
+
+ if (at != NULL) {
+ bv.bv_val = op->o_ndn;
+ bv.bv_len = strlen( bv.bv_val );
+
+ if (value_find( at->a_vals, &bv, at->a_syntax, 3 ) == 0 )
+ return(1);
+ }
+
+ } else if (aci_strbvcmp( "group", &bv ) == 0) {
+ if (aci_group_member(&sdn, "groupOfNames", "member", be, e, op, matches))
+ return(1);
+
+ } else if (aci_strbvcmp( "role", &bv ) == 0) {
+ if (aci_group_member(&sdn, "organizationalRole", "roleOccupant", be, e, op, matches))
+ return(1);
}
return(0);
}
+
+char *
+get_supported_acimech (int index)
+{
+ if (index < 0 || index >= (sizeof(supportedACIMechs) / sizeof(char *)))
+ return(NULL);
+ return(supportedACIMechs[index]);
+}
+
#endif /* SLAPD_ACI_ENABLED */
static void
size = 0;
newbuf[0] = '\0';
+ bufsiz--; /* leave space for lone $ */
flag = 0;
for ( dp = newbuf, sp = pat; size < bufsiz && *sp ; sp++) {
}
}
}
+
+ if (flag) {
+ /* must have ended with a single $ */
+ *dp++ = '$';
+ size++;
+ }
+
*dp = '\0';
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, "=> string_expand: pattern: %s\n", pat, 0, 0 );
projects / openldap / blobdiff