-/*
- * Copyright 1998-2003 The OpenLDAP Foundation, All Rights Reserved.
- * COPYING RESTRICTIONS APPLY, see COPYRIGHT file
- */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2000, Mark Adamson, Carnegie Mellon. All rights reserved.
- * This software is not subject to any license of Carnegie Mellon University.
+/* $OpenLDAP$ */
+/* This work is part of OpenLDAP Software <http://www.openldap.org/>.
*
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms are permitted without
- * restriction or fee of any kind as long as this notice is preserved.
+ * Copyright 1998-2004 The OpenLDAP Foundation.
+ * Portions Copyright 2000 Mark Adamson, Carnegie Mellon.
+ * All rights reserved.
*
- * The name "Carnegie Mellon" must not be used to endorse or promote
- * products derived from this software without prior written permission.
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted only as authorized by the OpenLDAP
+ * Public License.
*
+ * A copy of this license is available in the file LICENSE in the
+ * top-level directory of the distribution or, alternatively, at
+ * <http://www.OpenLDAP.org/license.html>.
*/
#include "portable.h"
#define SASLREGEX_REPLACE 10
+#define LDAP_X_SCOPE_EXACT ((ber_int_t) 0x0010)
+#define LDAP_X_SCOPE_REGEX ((ber_int_t) 0x0020)
+#define LDAP_X_SCOPE_CHILDREN ((ber_int_t) 0x0030)
+#define LDAP_X_SCOPE_SUBTREE ((ber_int_t) 0x0040)
+#define LDAP_X_SCOPE_ONELEVEL ((ber_int_t) 0x0050)
+
+/*
+ * IDs in DNauthzid form can now have a type specifier, that
+ * influences how they are used in related operations.
+ *
+ * syntax: dn[.{exact|regex}]:<val>
+ *
+ * dn.exact: the value must pass normalization and is used
+ * in exact DN match.
+ * dn.regex: the value is treated as a regular expression
+ * in matching DN values in saslAuthz{To|From}
+ * attributes.
+ * dn: for backwards compatibility reasons, the value
+ * is treated as a regular expression, and thus
+ * it is not normalized nor validated; it is used
+ * in exact or regex comparisons based on the
+ * context.
+ *
+ * IDs in DNauthzid form can now have a type specifier, that
+ * influences how they are used in related operations.
+ *
+ * syntax: u[.mech[/realm]]:<val>
+ *
+ * where mech is a SIMPLE, AUTHZ, or a SASL mechanism name
+ * and realm is mechanism specific realm (separate to those
+ * which are representable as part of the principal).
+ */
+
typedef struct sasl_regexp {
- char *sr_match; /* regexp match pattern */
- char *sr_replace; /* regexp replace pattern */
- regex_t sr_workspace; /* workspace for regexp engine */
- regmatch_t sr_strings[SASLREGEX_REPLACE]; /* strings matching $1,$2 ... */
- int sr_offset[SASLREGEX_REPLACE+2]; /* offsets of $1,$2... in *replace */
+ char *sr_match; /* regexp match pattern */
+ char *sr_replace; /* regexp replace pattern */
+ regex_t sr_workspace; /* workspace for regexp engine */
+ int sr_offset[SASLREGEX_REPLACE+2]; /* offsets of $1,$2... in *replace */
} SaslRegexp_t;
static int nSaslRegexp = 0;
static SaslRegexp_t *SaslRegexp = NULL;
/* What SASL proxy authorization policies are allowed? */
-#define SASL_AUTHZ_NONE 0
-#define SASL_AUTHZ_FROM 1
-#define SASL_AUTHZ_TO 2
+#define SASL_AUTHZ_NONE 0x00
+#define SASL_AUTHZ_FROM 0x01
+#define SASL_AUTHZ_TO 0x02
+#define SASL_AUTHZ_AND 0x10
static int authz_policy = SASL_AUTHZ_NONE;
authz_policy = SASL_AUTHZ_FROM;
} else if ( strcasecmp( arg, "to" ) == 0 ) {
authz_policy = SASL_AUTHZ_TO;
- } else if ( strcasecmp( arg, "both" ) == 0 ) {
+ } else if ( strcasecmp( arg, "both" ) == 0 || strcasecmp( arg, "any" ) == 0 ) {
authz_policy = SASL_AUTHZ_FROM | SASL_AUTHZ_TO;
+ } else if ( strcasecmp( arg, "all" ) == 0 ) {
+ authz_policy = SASL_AUTHZ_FROM | SASL_AUTHZ_TO | SASL_AUTHZ_AND;
} else {
rc = LDAP_OTHER;
}
return rc;
}
-/* URI format: ldap://<host>/<base>[?[<attrs>][?[<scope>][?[<filter>]]]] */
+int slap_parse_user( struct berval *id, struct berval *user,
+ struct berval *realm, struct berval *mech )
+{
+ char u;
+
+ assert( id );
+ assert( id->bv_val );
+ assert( user );
+ assert( realm );
+ assert( mech );
+
+ u = id->bv_val[ 0 ];
+
+ if ( u != 'u' && u != 'U' ) {
+ /* called with something other than u: */
+ return LDAP_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ /* uauthzid form:
+ * u[.mech[/realm]]:user
+ */
+
+ user->bv_val = strchr( id->bv_val, ':' );
+ if ( user->bv_val == NULL ) {
+ return LDAP_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
+ }
+ user->bv_val[ 0 ] = '\0';
+ user->bv_val++;
+ user->bv_len = id->bv_len - ( user->bv_val - id->bv_val );
+
+ mech->bv_val = strchr( id->bv_val, '.' );
+ if ( mech->bv_val != NULL ) {
+ mech->bv_val[ 0 ] = '\0';
+ mech->bv_val++;
+
+ realm->bv_val = strchr( mech->bv_val, '/' );
+
+ if ( realm->bv_val ) {
+ realm->bv_val[ 0 ] = '\0';
+ realm->bv_val++;
+ mech->bv_len = realm->bv_val - mech->bv_val - 1;
+ realm->bv_len = user->bv_val - realm->bv_val - 1;
+ } else {
+ mech->bv_len = user->bv_val - mech->bv_val - 1;
+ }
+
+ } else {
+ realm->bv_val = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if ( id->bv_val[ 1 ] != '\0' ) {
+ return LDAP_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ if ( mech->bv_val != NULL ) {
+ assert( mech->bv_val == id->bv_val + 2 );
+
+ AC_MEMCPY( mech->bv_val - 2, mech->bv_val, mech->bv_len + 1 );
+ mech->bv_val -= 2;
+ }
+
+ if ( realm->bv_val ) {
+ assert( realm->bv_val >= id->bv_val + 2 );
+
+ AC_MEMCPY( realm->bv_val - 2, realm->bv_val, realm->bv_len + 1 );
+ realm->bv_val -= 2;
+ }
+
+ /* leave "u:" before user */
+ user->bv_val -= 2;
+ user->bv_len += 2;
+ user->bv_val[ 0 ] = u;
+ user->bv_val[ 1 ] = ':';
+
+ return LDAP_SUCCESS;
+}
static int slap_parseURI( Operation *op, struct berval *uri,
- struct berval *searchbase, int *scope, Filter **filter )
+ struct berval *base, struct berval *nbase,
+ int *scope, Filter **filter, struct berval *fstr )
{
struct berval bv;
int rc;
LDAPURLDesc *ludp;
assert( uri != NULL && uri->bv_val != NULL );
- searchbase->bv_val = NULL;
- searchbase->bv_len = 0;
+ base->bv_val = NULL;
+ base->bv_len = 0;
+ nbase->bv_val = NULL;
+ nbase->bv_len = 0;
+ fstr->bv_val = NULL;
+ fstr->bv_len = 0;
*scope = -1;
*filter = NULL;
LDAP_LOG( TRANSPORT, ENTRY,
"slap_parseURI: parsing %s\n", uri->bv_val, 0, 0 );
#else
- Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, "slap_parseURI: parsing %s\n", uri->bv_val, 0, 0 );
+ Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE,
+ "slap_parseURI: parsing %s\n", uri->bv_val, 0, 0 );
#endif
- /* If it does not look like a URI, assume it is a DN */
- if( !strncasecmp( uri->bv_val, "dn:", sizeof("dn:")-1 ) ) {
- bv.bv_val = uri->bv_val + sizeof("dn:")-1;
+ rc = LDAP_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
+ if ( !strncasecmp( uri->bv_val, "dn", sizeof( "dn" ) - 1 ) ) {
+ bv.bv_val = uri->bv_val + sizeof( "dn" ) - 1;
+
+ if ( bv.bv_val[ 0 ] == '.' ) {
+ bv.bv_val++;
+
+ if ( !strncasecmp( bv.bv_val, "exact:", sizeof( "exact:" ) - 1 ) ) {
+ bv.bv_val += sizeof( "exact:" ) - 1;
+ *scope = LDAP_X_SCOPE_EXACT;
+
+ } else if ( !strncasecmp( bv.bv_val, "regex:", sizeof( "regex:" ) - 1 ) ) {
+ bv.bv_val += sizeof( "regex:" ) - 1;
+ *scope = LDAP_X_SCOPE_REGEX;
+
+ } else if ( !strncasecmp( bv.bv_val, "children:", sizeof( "chldren:" ) - 1 ) ) {
+ bv.bv_val += sizeof( "children:" ) - 1;
+ *scope = LDAP_X_SCOPE_CHILDREN;
+
+ } else if ( !strncasecmp( bv.bv_val, "subtree:", sizeof( "subtree:" ) - 1 ) ) {
+ bv.bv_val += sizeof( "subtree:" ) - 1;
+ *scope = LDAP_X_SCOPE_SUBTREE;
+
+ } else if ( !strncasecmp( bv.bv_val, "onelevel:", sizeof( "onelevel:" ) - 1 ) ) {
+ bv.bv_val += sizeof( "onelevel:" ) - 1;
+ *scope = LDAP_X_SCOPE_ONELEVEL;
+
+ } else {
+ return LDAP_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if ( bv.bv_val[ 0 ] != ':' ) {
+ return LDAP_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
+ }
+ *scope = LDAP_X_SCOPE_EXACT;
+ bv.bv_val++;
+ }
+
bv.bv_val += strspn( bv.bv_val, " " );
+ /* jump here in case no type specification was present
+ * and uir was not an URI... HEADS-UP: assuming EXACT */
+is_dn: bv.bv_len = uri->bv_len - (bv.bv_val - uri->bv_val);
+
+ switch ( *scope ) {
+ case LDAP_X_SCOPE_EXACT:
+ case LDAP_X_SCOPE_CHILDREN:
+ case LDAP_X_SCOPE_SUBTREE:
+ case LDAP_X_SCOPE_ONELEVEL:
+ rc = dnNormalize( 0, NULL, NULL, &bv, nbase, op->o_tmpmemctx );
+ if( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
+ *scope = -1;
+ }
+ break;
-is_dn: bv.bv_len = uri->bv_len - (bv.bv_val - uri->bv_val);
+ case LDAP_X_SCOPE_REGEX:
+ ber_dupbv_x( nbase, &bv, op->o_tmpmemctx );
+ rc = LDAP_SUCCESS;
+ break;
- rc = dnNormalize2( NULL, &bv, searchbase );
- if( rc == LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
- *scope = LDAP_SCOPE_BASE;
+ default:
+ *scope = -1;
+ break;
}
- return( rc );
- }
+ return rc;
+
+ } else if ( ( uri->bv_val[ 0 ] == 'u' || uri->bv_val[ 0 ] == 'U' )
+ && ( uri->bv_val[ 1 ] == ':'
+ || uri->bv_val[ 1 ] == '/'
+ || uri->bv_val[ 1 ] == '.' ) )
+ {
+ Connection c = *op->o_conn;
+ char buf[ SLAP_LDAPDN_MAXLEN ];
+ struct berval id,
+ user = BER_BVNULL,
+ realm = BER_BVNULL,
+ mech = BER_BVNULL;
+
+ if ( sizeof( buf ) <= uri->bv_len ) {
+ return LDAP_INVALID_SYNTAX;
+ }
+
+ id.bv_len = uri->bv_len;
+ id.bv_val = buf;
+ strncpy( buf, uri->bv_val, sizeof( buf ) );
+
+ rc = slap_parse_user( &id, &user, &realm, &mech );
+ if ( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ if ( mech.bv_val ) {
+ c.c_sasl_bind_mech = mech;
+ } else {
+ c.c_sasl_bind_mech.bv_val = "AUTHZ";
+ c.c_sasl_bind_mech.bv_len = sizeof( "AUTHZ" ) - 1;
+ }
+
+ rc = slap_sasl_getdn( &c, op, user.bv_val, user.bv_len,
+ realm.bv_val, nbase, SLAP_GETDN_AUTHZID );
+
+ if ( rc == LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
+ *scope = LDAP_X_SCOPE_EXACT;
+ }
+
+ return rc;
+ }
+
rc = ldap_url_parse( uri->bv_val, &ludp );
if ( rc == LDAP_URL_ERR_BADSCHEME ) {
+ /* last chance: assume it's a(n exact) DN ... */
bv.bv_val = uri->bv_val;
+ *scope = LDAP_X_SCOPE_EXACT;
goto is_dn;
}
if (( ludp->lud_host && *ludp->lud_host )
|| ludp->lud_attrs || ludp->lud_exts )
{
- /* host part should be empty */
- /* attrs and extensions parts should be empty */
- return LDAP_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
+ /* host part must be empty */
+ /* attrs and extensions parts must be empty */
+ rc = LDAP_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
+ goto done;
}
/* Grab the scope */
rc = LDAP_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
goto done;
}
+ ber_str2bv( ludp->lud_filter, 0, 0, fstr );
}
/* Grab the searchbase */
- bv.bv_val = ludp->lud_dn;
- bv.bv_len = strlen( bv.bv_val );
- rc = dnNormalize2( NULL, &bv, searchbase );
+ ber_str2bv( ludp->lud_dn, 0, 0, base );
+ rc = dnNormalize( 0, NULL, NULL, base, nbase, op->o_tmpmemctx );
done:
if( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
if( *filter ) filter_free_x( op, *filter );
+ base->bv_val = NULL;
+ base->bv_len = 0;
+ fstr->bv_val = NULL;
+ fstr->bv_len = 0;
+ } else {
+ /* Don't free these, return them to caller */
+ ludp->lud_filter = NULL;
+ ludp->lud_dn = NULL;
}
ldap_free_urldesc( ludp );
const int *off,
regmatch_t *str,
const char *saslname,
- struct berval *out )
+ struct berval *out,
+ void *ctx )
{
int i, n, len, insert;
len += str[i].rm_eo - str[i].rm_so;
n++;
}
- out->bv_val = ch_malloc( len + 1 );
+ out->bv_val = sl_malloc( len + 1, ctx );
out->bv_len = len;
/* Fill in URI with replace string, replacing $i as we go */
LDAP URI to find the matching LDAP entry, using the pattern matching
strings given in the saslregexp config file directive(s) */
-static int slap_sasl_regexp( struct berval *in, struct berval *out )
+static int slap_sasl_regexp( struct berval *in, struct berval *out,
+ int flags, void *ctx )
{
char *saslname = in->bv_val;
SaslRegexp_t *reg;
+ regmatch_t sr_strings[SASLREGEX_REPLACE]; /* strings matching $1,$2 ... */
int i;
memset( out, 0, sizeof( *out ) );
/* Match the normalized SASL name to the saslregexp patterns */
for( reg = SaslRegexp,i=0; i<nSaslRegexp; i++,reg++ ) {
if ( regexec( ®->sr_workspace, saslname, SASLREGEX_REPLACE,
- reg->sr_strings, 0) == 0 )
+ sr_strings, 0) == 0 )
break;
}
* to replace the $1,$2 with the strings that matched (b.*) and (d.*)
*/
slap_sasl_rx_exp( reg->sr_replace, reg->sr_offset,
- reg->sr_strings, saslname, out );
+ sr_strings, saslname, out, ctx );
#ifdef NEW_LOGGING
LDAP_LOG( TRANSPORT, ENTRY,
/* We only want to be called once */
if( ndn->bv_val ) {
- free(ndn->bv_val);
+ o->o_tmpfree(ndn->bv_val, o->o_tmpmemctx);
ndn->bv_val = NULL;
+ ndn->bv_len = 0;
#ifdef NEW_LOGGING
LDAP_LOG( TRANSPORT, DETAIL1,
- "slap_sasl2dn: search DN returned more than 1 entry\n", 0, 0, 0 );
+ "slap_sc_sasl2dn: search DN returned more than 1 entry\n", 0, 0, 0 );
#else
Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE,
- "slap_sasl2dn: search DN returned more than 1 entry\n", 0,0,0 );
+ "slap_sc_sasl2dn: search DN returned more than 1 entry\n", 0, 0, 0 );
#endif
return -1;
}
- ber_dupbv(ndn, &rs->sr_entry->e_nname);
+ ber_dupbv_x(ndn, &rs->sr_entry->e_nname, o->o_tmpmemctx);
return 0;
}
*/
static
-int slap_sasl_match(Operation *opx, struct berval *rule, struct berval *assertDN, struct berval *authc )
+int slap_sasl_match( Operation *opx, struct berval *rule,
+ struct berval *assertDN, struct berval *authc )
{
int rc;
regex_t reg;
smatch_info sm;
- slap_callback cb = { sasl_sc_smatch };
+ slap_callback cb = { NULL, sasl_sc_smatch, NULL, NULL };
Operation op = {0};
SlapReply rs = {REP_RESULT};
assertDN->bv_val, rule->bv_val, 0 );
#endif
- rc = slap_parseURI( opx, rule, &op.o_req_ndn, &op.oq_search.rs_scope, &op.oq_search.rs_filter );
+ rc = slap_parseURI( opx, rule, &op.o_req_dn,
+ &op.o_req_ndn, &op.oq_search.rs_scope, &op.oq_search.rs_filter,
+ &op.ors_filterstr );
if( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) goto CONCLUDED;
- /* Massive shortcut: search scope == base */
- if( op.oq_search.rs_scope == LDAP_SCOPE_BASE ) {
+ switch ( op.oq_search.rs_scope ) {
+ case LDAP_X_SCOPE_EXACT:
+exact_match:
+ if ( dn_match( &op.o_req_ndn, assertDN ) ) {
+ rc = LDAP_SUCCESS;
+ } else {
+ rc = LDAP_INAPPROPRIATE_AUTH;
+ }
+ goto CONCLUDED;
+
+ case LDAP_X_SCOPE_CHILDREN:
+ case LDAP_X_SCOPE_SUBTREE:
+ case LDAP_X_SCOPE_ONELEVEL:
+ {
+ int d = assertDN->bv_len - op.o_req_ndn.bv_len;
+
+ rc = LDAP_INAPPROPRIATE_AUTH;
+
+ if ( d == 0 && op.oq_search.rs_scope == LDAP_X_SCOPE_SUBTREE ) {
+ goto exact_match;
+
+ } else if ( d > 0 ) {
+ struct berval bv;
+
+ bv.bv_len = op.o_req_ndn.bv_len;
+ bv.bv_val = assertDN->bv_val + d;
+
+ if ( bv.bv_val[ -1 ] == ',' && dn_match( &op.o_req_ndn, &bv ) ) {
+ switch ( op.oq_search.rs_scope ) {
+ case LDAP_X_SCOPE_SUBTREE:
+ case LDAP_X_SCOPE_CHILDREN:
+ rc = LDAP_SUCCESS;
+ break;
+
+ case LDAP_X_SCOPE_ONELEVEL:
+ {
+ struct berval pdn;
+
+ dnParent( assertDN, &pdn );
+ /* the common portion of the DN
+ * already matches, so only check
+ * if parent DN of assertedDN
+ * is all the pattern */
+ if ( pdn.bv_len == op.o_req_ndn.bv_len ) {
+ rc = LDAP_SUCCESS;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ default:
+ /* at present, impossible */
+ assert( 0 );
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ goto CONCLUDED;
+ }
+
+ case LDAP_X_SCOPE_REGEX:
rc = regcomp(®, op.o_req_ndn.bv_val,
REG_EXTENDED|REG_ICASE|REG_NOSUB);
if ( rc == 0 ) {
rc = LDAP_INAPPROPRIATE_AUTH;
}
goto CONCLUDED;
+
+ default:
+ break;
}
/* Must run an internal search. */
+ if ( op.oq_search.rs_filter == NULL ) {
+ rc = LDAP_FILTER_ERROR;
+ goto CONCLUDED;
+ }
#ifdef NEW_LOGGING
LDAP_LOG( TRANSPORT, DETAIL1,
op.o_threadctx = opx->o_threadctx;
op.o_tmpmemctx = opx->o_tmpmemctx;
op.o_tmpmfuncs = opx->o_tmpmfuncs;
+#ifdef LDAP_SLAPI
+ op.o_pb = opx->o_pb;
+#endif
op.o_conn = opx->o_conn;
op.o_connid = opx->o_connid;
+ op.o_req_dn = op.o_req_ndn;
+ op.oq_search.rs_slimit = 1;
+ op.oq_search.rs_tlimit = SLAP_NO_LIMIT;
+ op.o_sync_slog_size = -1;
op.o_bd->be_search( &op, &rs );
}
CONCLUDED:
- if( op.o_req_ndn.bv_len ) ch_free( op.o_req_ndn.bv_val );
+ if( op.o_req_dn.bv_val && op.o_req_dn.bv_val != op.o_req_ndn.bv_val ) ch_free( op.o_req_dn.bv_val );
+ if( op.o_req_ndn.bv_val ) sl_free( op.o_req_ndn.bv_val, opx->o_tmpmemctx );
if( op.oq_search.rs_filter ) filter_free_x( opx, op.oq_search.rs_filter );
+ if( op.ors_filterstr.bv_val ) ch_free( op.ors_filterstr.bv_val );
#ifdef NEW_LOGGING
LDAP_LOG( TRANSPORT, ENTRY,
* The DNs should not have the dn: prefix
*/
static int
-slap_sasl_check_authz( Connection *conn,
+slap_sasl_check_authz( Operation *op,
struct berval *searchDN,
struct berval *assertDN,
AttributeDescription *ad,
assertDN->bv_val, ad->ad_cname.bv_val, searchDN->bv_val);
#endif
- rc = backend_attribute( conn->c_sasl_bindop, NULL,
+ rc = backend_attribute( op, NULL,
searchDN, ad, &vals );
if( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) goto COMPLETE;
/* Check if the *assertDN matches any **vals */
- for( i=0; vals[i].bv_val != NULL; i++ ) {
- rc = slap_sasl_match( conn->c_sasl_bindop, &vals[i], assertDN, authc );
- if ( rc == LDAP_SUCCESS ) goto COMPLETE;
+ if( vals != NULL ) {
+ for( i=0; vals[i].bv_val != NULL; i++ ) {
+ rc = slap_sasl_match( op, &vals[i], assertDN, authc );
+ if ( rc == LDAP_SUCCESS ) goto COMPLETE;
+ }
}
rc = LDAP_INAPPROPRIATE_AUTH;
COMPLETE:
- if( vals ) ber_bvarray_free( vals );
+ if( vals ) ber_bvarray_free_x( vals, op->o_tmpmemctx );
#ifdef NEW_LOGGING
LDAP_LOG( TRANSPORT, RESULTS,
* entry, return the DN of that one entry.
*/
void slap_sasl2dn( Operation *opx,
- struct berval *saslname, struct berval *sasldn )
+ struct berval *saslname, struct berval *sasldn, int flags )
{
int rc;
- slap_callback cb = { sasl_sc_sasl2dn };
+ slap_callback cb = { NULL, sasl_sc_sasl2dn, NULL, NULL };
Operation op = {0};
SlapReply rs = {REP_RESULT};
- struct berval regout = { 0, NULL };
+ struct berval regout = BER_BVNULL;
#ifdef NEW_LOGGING
LDAP_LOG( TRANSPORT, ENTRY,
cb.sc_private = sasldn;
/* Convert the SASL name into a minimal URI */
- if( !slap_sasl_regexp( saslname, ®out ) ) {
+ if( !slap_sasl_regexp( saslname, ®out, flags, opx->o_tmpmemctx ) ) {
goto FINISHED;
}
- rc = slap_parseURI( opx, ®out, &op.o_req_ndn, &op.oq_search.rs_scope, &op.oq_search.rs_filter );
- if( regout.bv_val ) ch_free( regout.bv_val );
+ rc = slap_parseURI( opx, ®out, &op.o_req_dn,
+ &op.o_req_ndn, &op.oq_search.rs_scope, &op.oq_search.rs_filter,
+ &op.ors_filterstr );
+ if( regout.bv_val ) sl_free( regout.bv_val, opx->o_tmpmemctx );
if( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
goto FINISHED;
}
/* Must do an internal search */
op.o_bd = select_backend( &op.o_req_ndn, 0, 1 );
- /* Massive shortcut: search scope == base */
- if( op.oq_search.rs_scope == LDAP_SCOPE_BASE ) {
+ switch ( op.oq_search.rs_scope ) {
+ case LDAP_X_SCOPE_EXACT:
*sasldn = op.o_req_ndn;
op.o_req_ndn.bv_len = 0;
op.o_req_ndn.bv_val = NULL;
+ /* intentionally continue to next case */
+
+ case LDAP_X_SCOPE_REGEX:
+ case LDAP_X_SCOPE_SUBTREE:
+ case LDAP_X_SCOPE_CHILDREN:
+ case LDAP_X_SCOPE_ONELEVEL:
+ /* correctly parsed, but illegal */
goto FINISHED;
+
+ case LDAP_SCOPE_BASE:
+ case LDAP_SCOPE_ONELEVEL:
+ case LDAP_SCOPE_SUBTREE:
+#ifdef LDAP_SCOPE_SUBORDINATE
+ case LDAP_SCOPE_SUBORDINATE:
+#endif
+ /* do a search */
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ /* catch unhandled cases (there shouldn't be) */
+ assert( 0 );
}
#ifdef NEW_LOGGING
op.o_threadctx = opx->o_threadctx;
op.o_tmpmemctx = opx->o_tmpmemctx;
op.o_tmpmfuncs = opx->o_tmpmfuncs;
+#ifdef LDAP_SLAPI
+ op.o_pb = opx->o_pb;
+#endif
op.oq_search.rs_deref = LDAP_DEREF_NEVER;
op.oq_search.rs_slimit = 1;
+ op.oq_search.rs_tlimit = SLAP_NO_LIMIT;
op.oq_search.rs_attrsonly = 1;
+ op.o_req_dn = op.o_req_ndn;
op.o_bd->be_search( &op, &rs );
if( sasldn->bv_len ) {
opx->o_conn->c_authz_backend = op.o_bd;
}
- if( op.o_req_ndn.bv_len ) ch_free( op.o_req_ndn.bv_val );
+ if( op.o_req_dn.bv_len ) ch_free( op.o_req_dn.bv_val );
+ if( op.o_req_ndn.bv_len ) sl_free( op.o_req_ndn.bv_val, opx->o_tmpmemctx );
if( op.oq_search.rs_filter ) filter_free_x( opx, op.oq_search.rs_filter );
+ if( op.ors_filterstr.bv_len ) ch_free( op.ors_filterstr.bv_val );
#ifdef NEW_LOGGING
LDAP_LOG( TRANSPORT, ENTRY,
* The DNs should not have the dn: prefix
*/
-int slap_sasl_authorized( Connection *conn,
+int slap_sasl_authorized( Operation *op,
struct berval *authcDN, struct berval *authzDN )
{
int rc = LDAP_INAPPROPRIATE_AUTH;
}
/* Allow the manager to authorize as any DN. */
- if( conn->c_authz_backend && be_isroot( conn->c_authz_backend, authcDN )) {
+ if( op->o_conn->c_authz_backend &&
+ be_isroot_dn( op->o_conn->c_authz_backend, authcDN ))
+ {
rc = LDAP_SUCCESS;
goto DONE;
}
/* Check source rules */
if( authz_policy & SASL_AUTHZ_TO ) {
- rc = slap_sasl_check_authz( conn, authcDN, authzDN,
+ rc = slap_sasl_check_authz( op, authcDN, authzDN,
slap_schema.si_ad_saslAuthzTo, authcDN );
- if( rc == LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
+ if( rc == LDAP_SUCCESS && !(authz_policy & SASL_AUTHZ_AND) ) {
goto DONE;
}
}
/* Check destination rules */
if( authz_policy & SASL_AUTHZ_FROM ) {
- rc = slap_sasl_check_authz( conn, authzDN, authcDN,
+ rc = slap_sasl_check_authz( op, authzDN, authcDN,
slap_schema.si_ad_saslAuthzFrom, authcDN );
if( rc == LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
goto DONE;
projects / openldap / blobdiff