/* $OpenLDAP$ */
/* This work is part of OpenLDAP Software <http://www.openldap.org/>.
*
- * Copyright 1998-2003 The OpenLDAP Foundation.
+ * Copyright 1998-2004 The OpenLDAP Foundation.
* Portions Copyright 2000 Mark Adamson, Carnegie Mellon.
* All rights reserved.
*
#define LDAP_X_SCOPE_REGEX ((ber_int_t) 0x0020)
#define LDAP_X_SCOPE_CHILDREN ((ber_int_t) 0x0030)
#define LDAP_X_SCOPE_SUBTREE ((ber_int_t) 0x0040)
+#define LDAP_X_SCOPE_ONELEVEL ((ber_int_t) 0x0050)
/*
- * IDs in DN form can now have a type specifier, that influences
- * how they are used in related operations.
+ * IDs in DNauthzid form can now have a type specifier, that
+ * influences how they are used in related operations.
*
- * syntax:
- *
- * dn[.{exact|regex}]:<val>
+ * syntax: dn[.{exact|regex}]:<val>
*
* dn.exact: the value must pass normalization and is used
* in exact DN match.
* it is not normalized nor validated; it is used
* in exact or regex comparisons based on the
* context.
+ *
+ * IDs in DNauthzid form can now have a type specifier, that
+ * influences how they are used in related operations.
+ *
+ * syntax: u[.mech[/realm]]:<val>
+ *
+ * where mech is a SIMPLE, AUTHZ, or a SASL mechanism name
+ * and realm is mechanism specific realm (separate to those
+ * which are representable as part of the principal).
*/
typedef struct sasl_regexp {
- char *sr_match; /* regexp match pattern */
- char *sr_replace; /* regexp replace pattern */
- regex_t sr_workspace; /* workspace for regexp engine */
- int sr_offset[SASLREGEX_REPLACE+2]; /* offsets of $1,$2... in *replace */
+ char *sr_match; /* regexp match pattern */
+ char *sr_replace; /* regexp replace pattern */
+ regex_t sr_workspace; /* workspace for regexp engine */
+ int sr_offset[SASLREGEX_REPLACE+2]; /* offsets of $1,$2... in *replace */
} SaslRegexp_t;
static int nSaslRegexp = 0;
static SaslRegexp_t *SaslRegexp = NULL;
/* What SASL proxy authorization policies are allowed? */
-#define SASL_AUTHZ_NONE 0
-#define SASL_AUTHZ_FROM 1
-#define SASL_AUTHZ_TO 2
+#define SASL_AUTHZ_NONE 0x00
+#define SASL_AUTHZ_FROM 0x01
+#define SASL_AUTHZ_TO 0x02
+#define SASL_AUTHZ_AND 0x10
static int authz_policy = SASL_AUTHZ_NONE;
authz_policy = SASL_AUTHZ_FROM;
} else if ( strcasecmp( arg, "to" ) == 0 ) {
authz_policy = SASL_AUTHZ_TO;
- } else if ( strcasecmp( arg, "both" ) == 0 ) {
+ } else if ( strcasecmp( arg, "both" ) == 0 || strcasecmp( arg, "any" ) == 0 ) {
authz_policy = SASL_AUTHZ_FROM | SASL_AUTHZ_TO;
+ } else if ( strcasecmp( arg, "all" ) == 0 ) {
+ authz_policy = SASL_AUTHZ_FROM | SASL_AUTHZ_TO | SASL_AUTHZ_AND;
} else {
rc = LDAP_OTHER;
}
u = id->bv_val[ 0 ];
- assert( u == 'u' || u == 'U' );
+ if ( u != 'u' && u != 'U' ) {
+ /* called with something other than u: */
+ return LDAP_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
+ }
- user->bv_val = strrchr( id->bv_val, ':' );
+ /* uauthzid form:
+ * u[.mech[/realm]]:user
+ */
+
+ user->bv_val = strchr( id->bv_val, ':' );
if ( user->bv_val == NULL ) {
return LDAP_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
}
user->bv_val++;
user->bv_len = id->bv_len - ( user->bv_val - id->bv_val );
- realm->bv_val = strchr( id->bv_val, '/' );
- if ( realm->bv_val != NULL ) {
- realm->bv_val[ 0 ] = '\0';
- realm->bv_val++;
- realm->bv_len = user->bv_val - realm->bv_val - 1;
- }
-
mech->bv_val = strchr( id->bv_val, '.' );
if ( mech->bv_val != NULL ) {
mech->bv_val[ 0 ] = '\0';
mech->bv_val++;
+
+ realm->bv_val = strchr( mech->bv_val, '/' );
+
if ( realm->bv_val ) {
+ realm->bv_val[ 0 ] = '\0';
+ realm->bv_val++;
mech->bv_len = realm->bv_val - mech->bv_val - 1;
+ realm->bv_len = user->bv_val - realm->bv_val - 1;
} else {
mech->bv_len = user->bv_val - mech->bv_val - 1;
}
+
+ } else {
+ realm->bv_val = NULL;
}
if ( id->bv_val[ 1 ] != '\0' ) {
if ( mech->bv_val != NULL ) {
assert( mech->bv_val == id->bv_val + 2 );
- memmove( mech->bv_val - 2, mech->bv_val, mech->bv_len + 1 );
+ AC_MEMCPY( mech->bv_val - 2, mech->bv_val, mech->bv_len + 1 );
mech->bv_val -= 2;
}
if ( realm->bv_val ) {
assert( realm->bv_val >= id->bv_val + 2 );
- memmove( realm->bv_val - 2, realm->bv_val, realm->bv_len + 1 );
+ AC_MEMCPY( realm->bv_val - 2, realm->bv_val, realm->bv_len + 1 );
realm->bv_val -= 2;
}
- if ( user->bv_val > id->bv_val + 2 ) {
- user->bv_val -= 2;
- user->bv_len += 2;
- user->bv_val[ 0 ] = u;
- user->bv_val[ 1 ] = ':';
- }
+ /* leave "u:" before user */
+ user->bv_val -= 2;
+ user->bv_len += 2;
+ user->bv_val[ 0 ] = u;
+ user->bv_val[ 1 ] = ':';
return LDAP_SUCCESS;
}
bv.bv_val += sizeof( "subtree" ) - 1;
*scope = LDAP_X_SCOPE_SUBTREE;
+ } else if ( !strncasecmp( bv.bv_val, "onelevel:", sizeof( "onelevel:" ) - 1 ) ) {
+ bv.bv_val += sizeof( "onelevel" ) - 1;
+ *scope = LDAP_X_SCOPE_ONELEVEL;
+
} else {
return LDAP_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
}
case LDAP_X_SCOPE_EXACT:
case LDAP_X_SCOPE_CHILDREN:
case LDAP_X_SCOPE_SUBTREE:
+ case LDAP_X_SCOPE_ONELEVEL:
rc = dnNormalize( 0, NULL, NULL, &bv, nbase, op->o_tmpmemctx );
if( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
*scope = -1;
{
Connection c = *op->o_conn;
char buf[ SLAP_LDAPDN_MAXLEN ];
- struct berval id = { uri->bv_len, (char *)buf },
+ struct berval id,
user = { 0, NULL },
realm = { 0, NULL },
mech = { 0, NULL };
return LDAP_INVALID_SYNTAX;
}
+ id.bv_len = uri->bv_len;
+ id.bv_val = buf;
strncpy( buf, uri->bv_val, sizeof( buf ) );
rc = slap_parse_user( &id, &user, &realm, &mech );
LDAP URI to find the matching LDAP entry, using the pattern matching
strings given in the saslregexp config file directive(s) */
-static int slap_sasl_regexp( struct berval *in, struct berval *out, void *ctx )
+static int slap_sasl_regexp( struct berval *in, struct berval *out,
+ int flags, void *ctx )
{
char *saslname = in->bv_val;
SaslRegexp_t *reg;
case LDAP_X_SCOPE_CHILDREN:
case LDAP_X_SCOPE_SUBTREE:
+ case LDAP_X_SCOPE_ONELEVEL:
{
int d = assertDN->bv_len - op.o_req_ndn.bv_len;
goto exact_match;
} else if ( d > 0 ) {
- struct berval bv = { op.o_req_ndn.bv_len, assertDN->bv_val + d };
+ struct berval bv;
+
+ bv.bv_len = op.o_req_ndn.bv_len;
+ bv.bv_val = assertDN->bv_val + d;
if ( bv.bv_val[ -1 ] == ',' && dn_match( &op.o_req_ndn, &bv ) ) {
- rc = LDAP_SUCCESS;
+ switch ( op.oq_search.rs_scope ) {
+ case LDAP_X_SCOPE_CHILDREN:
+ rc = LDAP_SUCCESS;
+ break;
+
+ case LDAP_X_SCOPE_ONELEVEL:
+ {
+ struct berval pdn;
+
+ dnParent( assertDN, &pdn );
+ /* the common portion of the DN
+ * already matches, so only check
+ * if parent DN of assertedDN
+ * is all the pattern */
+ if ( pdn.bv_len == op.o_req_ndn.bv_len ) {
+ rc = LDAP_SUCCESS;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ default:
+ /* at present, impossible */
+ assert( 0 );
+ }
}
}
goto CONCLUDED;
* entry, return the DN of that one entry.
*/
void slap_sasl2dn( Operation *opx,
- struct berval *saslname, struct berval *sasldn )
+ struct berval *saslname, struct berval *sasldn, int flags )
{
int rc;
slap_callback cb = { NULL, sasl_sc_sasl2dn, NULL, NULL };
cb.sc_private = sasldn;
/* Convert the SASL name into a minimal URI */
- if( !slap_sasl_regexp( saslname, ®out, opx->o_tmpmemctx ) ) {
+ if( !slap_sasl_regexp( saslname, ®out, flags, opx->o_tmpmemctx ) ) {
goto FINISHED;
}
case LDAP_X_SCOPE_REGEX:
case LDAP_X_SCOPE_SUBTREE:
case LDAP_X_SCOPE_CHILDREN:
+ case LDAP_X_SCOPE_ONELEVEL:
/* correctly parsed, but illegal */
goto FINISHED;
case LDAP_SCOPE_ONELEVEL:
case LDAP_SCOPE_SUBTREE:
+#ifdef LDAP_SCOPE_SUBORDINATE
+ case LDAP_SCOPE_SUBORDINATE:
+#endif
/* do a search */
break;
if( authz_policy & SASL_AUTHZ_TO ) {
rc = slap_sasl_check_authz( op, authcDN, authzDN,
slap_schema.si_ad_saslAuthzTo, authcDN );
- if( rc == LDAP_SUCCESS ) {
+ if( rc == LDAP_SUCCESS && !(authz_policy & SASL_AUTHZ_AND) ) {
goto DONE;
}
}
projects / openldap / blobdiff