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INTERNET-DRAFT Kurt D. Zeilenga
Intended Category: Standard Track OpenLDAP Foundation
-Expires: 11 January 2001 11 July 2000
+Expires: 20 July 2001 20 January 2001
- LDAP Authentication Password Attribute
- <draft-zeilenga-ldap-authpasswd-03.txt>
+ LDAP Authentication Password Attribute
+ <draft-zeilenga-ldap-authpasswd-04.txt>
1. Status of this Memo
provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.
This document is intended to be, after appropriate review and
- revision, submitted to the RFC Editor as a Standard Track document.
+ revision, submitted to the RFC Editor as an Standard Track document.
Distribution of this memo is unlimited. Technical discussion of this
document will take place on the IETF LDAP Extension Working Group
mailing list <ietf-ldapext@netscape.com>. Please send editorial
http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt The list of Internet-Draft
Shadow Directories can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
- Copyright 2000, The Internet Society. All Rights Reserved.
+ Copyright 2001, The Internet Society. All Rights Reserved.
Please see the Copyright section near the end of this document for
more information.
2. Abstract
- This document describes schema for storing information in support of
- user/password authentication in a LDAP [RFC2251] directory. The
- document defines the authPassword attribute type and related schema.
- The attribute type is used to store values derived from the user's
- password(s) (commonly using cryptographic strength one-way hash).
- authPassword is intended to used instead of clear text password
+ This document describes schema in support of user/password
+ authentication in a LDAP directory including the authPassword
+ attribute type. This attribute type holds values derived from the
+ user's password(s) (commonly using cryptographic strength one-way
+ hash). authPassword is intended to used instead of userPassword.
+
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+INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP AuthPassword 20 January 2001
- storage mechanisms such as userPassword [RFC2256]. The values of
- authPassword may be used to support both LDAP "simple" and SASL
- [RFC2222] password authentication mechanisms [RFC2829].
The key words ``MUST'', ``MUST NOT'', ``REQUIRED'', ``SHALL'', ``SHALL
NOT'', ``SHOULD'', ``SHOULD NOT'', ``RECOMMENDED'', and ``MAY'' in
of actual passwords.
The authPassword attribute type is intended to be used to store
- information used to implement password based authentication. The
- attribute type may be used by LDAP servers to implement user/password
- authentication operations [RFC2829] such "simple" and SASL [RFC2222] /
- DIGEST-MD5 [RFC2831].
+ information used to implement simple password based authentication.
+ The attribute type may be used by LDAP servers to implement the LDAP
+ Bind operation's "simple" authentication method.
The attribute type supports multiple storage schemes. A matching rule
is provided for use with extensible search filters to allow clients to
assert that a clear text password "matches" one of the attribute's
- values. Storage schemes often use of cryptographic strength one-way
- hashing.
+ values.
+
+ Storage schemes often use of cryptographic strength one-way hashing.
+ Though the use of one-way hashing reduces the potential that exposed
+ values will allow unauthorized access to the Directory (unless the
+ hash algorithm/implementation is flawed), the hashing of passwords is
+ intended to be as an additional layer of protection. It is
+ RECOMMENDED that hashed values be protected as if they were clear text
+ passwords.
This attribute may be used in conjunction with server side password
generation mechanisms (such as [PW-EXOP]).
Editor's Note: object identifiers (OIDs) will be assigned before this
document is published as an RFC.
-4.1. authPasswordSyntax
-
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+
+4.1. authPasswordSyntax
( authPasswordSyntaxOID
DESC 'authentication password syntax' )
- Values of this syntax are encoded according to the following BNF:
+ Values of this syntax are encoded according to:
authPasswordValue = w scheme s [authInfo] s authValue w
- scheme = <an IA5 string of uppercase letters, numbers,
- and "-", "_", and "/">
+ scheme = %x30-39 / %x41-5A / %x2D-2F / %x5F
+ ; 0-9, A-Z, "-", ".", "/", or "_"
authInfo = schemeSpecificValue
- authValue = schemeSpecfiicValue
- schemeSpecificValue = <an IA5 printable string
- not containing "$" or " ">
+ authValue = schemeSpecificValue
+ schemeSpecificValue = *( %x21-23 / %25-7E )
+ ; printable ascii less "$" and " "
s = w sep w
w = *sp
- sep = "$" ; an IA5 dollar sign (36)
- sp = " " ; an IA5 space (20)
+ sep = %x24 ; dollar sign
+ sp = %x20 ; space
- where scheme describes the storage mechanism, authInfo and authValue
- are a scheme specific. The authInfo field is often a base64 encoded
- salt. The authValue field is often a base64 encoded value derived
- from a user's password(s). Values of this attribute are case
- sensitive.
+ where scheme describes the mechanism and authInfo and authValue are a
+ scheme specific. The authInfo field is often a base64 encoded salt.
+ The authValue field is often a base64 encoded value derived from a
+ user's password(s). Values of this attribute are case sensitive.
This document describes a number of schemes, as well as requirements
for the scheme naming, in section 5.
-
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4.3. supportedAuthPasswordSchemes
The values of this attribute are names of supported authentication
password schemes which the server supports. The syntax of a scheme
name is described in section 4.1. This attribute may only be present
- in the root DSE. If the server does not support any mechanisms this
- attribute will not be present.
+ in the root DSE. If the server does not support any password schemes,
+ this attribute will not be present.
4.4. authPassword
5. Schemes
- This section describes the "MD5", "SHA1", and "SASL/DIGEST-MD5".
- Other schemes may be defined by other documents. Schemes starting
- with string "SASL/" indicate association with a SASL mechanism.
+ This section describes the "MD5" and "SHA1". Other schemes may be
+ defined by other documents. Schemes which are not described by
+ standard track documents SHOULD be named with a leading "X-" to
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- Schemes which are not described by standard track documents SHOULD be
- named with a leading "X-" or, if associated with a SASL mechanism,
- "SASL/X-" to indicate they are a private or implementation specific
- mechanism, or may be named using the dotted-decimal representation
- [RFC2252] of an OID assigned to the mechanism.
+ indicate they are a private or implementation specific scheme, or may
+ be named using the dotted-decimal representation [RFC2252] of an OID
+ assigned to the scheme.
5.1. MD5 scheme
The MD5 [RFC1321] scheme name is "MD5".
The authValue is the base64 encoding of an MD5 digest of the
- concatenation the user password and optional salt. The base64
- encoding of the salt is provided in the authInfo field.
- Implementations of this scheme must support salts up to 128-bit in
- length. Use with a 64-bit or larger salt is RECOMMENDED.
+ concatenation the user password and salt. The base64 encoding of the
+ salt is provided in the authInfo field. The salt MUST be at least
+ 64-bits long. Implementations of this scheme MUST support salts up to
+ 128-bit in length.
Example:
Given a user "joe" who's password is "mary" and a salt of "salt",
Values of this scheme SHOULD only be used to implement simple
user/password authentication.
- It is RECOMMENDED that values of this scheme be protected as if they
- were clear text passwords.
-
5.2. SHA1 scheme
The SHA1 [SHA1] scheme name is "SHA1".
The authValue is the base64 encoding of an SHA1 digest of the
- concatenation the user password and the optional salt. The base64
- encoding of the salt is provided in the authInfo field.
- Implementations of this scheme must support salts up to 128-bit in
- length. Use with a 64-bit or larger salt is RECOMMENDED.
+ concatenation the user password and the salt. The base64 encoding of
+ the salt is provided in the authInfo field. The salt MUST be at least
+ 64-bits long. Implementations of this scheme MUST support salts up to
+ 128-bit in length.
Example:
+ Given a user "joe" who's password is "mary" and a salt of "salt",
+ the authInfo field would be the base64 encoding of "salt" and the
+ authValue field would be the base64 encoding of the SHA1 digest of
+ "marysalt".
+
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- Given a user "joe" who's password is "mary" and a salt of "salt",
- the authInfo field would be the base64 encoding of "salt" and the
- authValue field would be the base64 encoding of the SHA1 digest of
- "marysalt".
-
A match against an asserted password and an attribute value of this
scheme SHALL be true if and only if the SHA1 digest of concatenation
of the asserted value and the salt is equal to the SHA1 digest
Values of this scheme SHOULD only be used to implement simple
user/password authentication.
- It is RECOMMENDED that values of this scheme be protected as if they
- were clear text passwords.
-
-
-5.3. DIGEST-MD5 scheme
-
- The DIGEST-MD5 scheme name is "SASL/DIGEST-MD5".
-
- The authValue is the base64 encoding of
- H( { username-value, ":", realm-value, ":", passwd } )
-
- and authInfo is the base64 encoding of
- { username-value, ":", realm-value }
-
- as defined by RFC2831.
-
- Example:
- Given a user "joe" within the realm "localhost" who's password is
- "mary", the info field would be the base64 encoding of
- "joe:localhost" and the authValue field would be the base64 encoding
- of the MD5 digest of "joe:localhost:mary".
-
- Values of this scheme SHOULD only be used to implement the
- SASL/DIGEST-MD5 as described by the Authentication Methods for LDAP
- [RFC2829]. A simple password assertion against a value of this scheme
- SHALL be considered undefined.
-
- Values of this scheme MUST be protected as if it the values were clear
- text passwords per reasons detailed in DIGEST-MD5, Section 3.9,
- "Storing Passwords."
-
6. Implementation Issues
-
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For implementations of this specification:
Servers MAY restrict which schemes are used in conjunction with a
userPassword or an external password store, in conjunction with
authPassword to support the authentication process.
- Servers that support simple bind MUST support the MD5 scheme and
- SHOULD support the SHA1 scheme.
+ Servers that support simple bind MUST support the SHA1 scheme and
+ SHOULD support the MD5 scheme.
Servers SHOULD not publish values of authPassword nor allow
operations which expose authPassword or AuthPasswordMatch values to
7. Security Considerations
This document describes how authentication information may be stored
- in a directory. Authentication information must be adequately
+ in a directory. Authentication information MUST be adequately
protected as unintended disclosure will allow attackers to gain
immediate access to the directory as described by [RFC2829].
- Values of authPassword SHOULD be protected as if they were clear text
- passwords. When values are transferred, privacy protections, such as
- IPSEC or TLS, SHOULD be in place.
+ As flaws may be discovered in the hashing algorithm or with a
+
+
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+ particular implementation of the algorithm or may be subjected to
+ dictionary or other attacks if exposed, values of AuthPassword SHOULD
+ be protected as if they were clear text passwords. When values are
+ transferred, privacy protections, such as IPSEC or TLS, SHOULD be in
+ place.
Clients SHOULD use strong authentication mechanisms [RFC2829].
AuthPasswordMatch matching rule allows applications to test the
- validity of a user password and, hence, may be used to mount a
- dictionary attack. Servers SHOULD take appropriate measures to
- protect the directory from such attacks.
+ validity of a user password and, hence, may be used to mount an
+ attack. Servers SHOULD take appropriate measures to protect the
+ directory from such attacks.
Some password schemes may require CPU intensive operations. Servers
SHOULD take appropriate measures to protect against Denial of Service
attacks.
-
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AuthPassword does not restrict an authentication identity to a single
password. An attacker who gains write access to this attribute may
store additional values without disabling the user's true password(s).
8. Copyright
- Copyright 2000, The Internet Society. All Rights Reserved.
+ Copyright 2001, The Internet Society. All Rights Reserved.
This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.
+
+
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+
This document and the information contained herein is provided on an
"AS IS" basis and THE AUTHORS, THE INTERNET SOCIETY, AND THE INTERNET
ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
10. Bibliography
[RFC1321] R. Rivest, "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm", RFC 1321,
-
-
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-
-
April 1992
[RFC2219] S. Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
with LDAPv3", RFC 2256, December 1997.
[RFC2307] L. Howard, "An Approach for Using LDAP as a Network
- Information Service", RFC 2307, March 1998.
+ Information Service", RFC 2307, March 1998. (not normative)
[RFC2829] M. Wahl, H. Alvestrand, J. Hodges, RL "Bob" Morgan,
"Authentication Methods for LDAP", RFC 2829, June 2000.
- [RFC2831] P. Leach, C. Newman, "Using Digest Authentication as a SASL
- Mechanism", RFC 2831, June 2000.
-
[PW-EXOP] K. Zeilenga, "LDAP Password Modify Extended Operation"
draft-zeilenga-ldap-passwd-exop-xx.txt, a work in progress.
[SHA1] NIST, FIPS PUB 180-1: Secure Hash Standard, April 1995.
+
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11. Author's Address
Kurt D. Zeilenga
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INTERNET-DRAFT Kurt D. Zeilenga
Intended Category: Standard Track OpenLDAP Foundation
-Expires: 13 December 2000 13 June 2000
+Expires: 3 May 2001 3 Novemeber 2000
LDAP Password Modify Extended Operation
- <draft-zeilenga-ldap-passwd-exop-03.txt>
+ <draft-zeilenga-ldap-passwd-exop-05.txt>
1. Status of this Memo
2. Abstract
- The integration of LDAP [RFC2251] and external authentication services
- has introduced non-DN authentication identities and allowed for
+ The integration of LDAP and external authentication services has
+ introduced non-DN authentication identities and allowed for
non-directory storage of passwords. As such, mechanisms which update
- the directory, such as Modify operation, cannot be used to change a
- user's password. This document describes an LDAP extended operation
- to allow allow modification of user passwords which is not dependent
- upon the form of the authentication identity nor the password storage
+ the directory (e.g. Modify) cannot be used to change a user's
+ password. This document describes an LDAP extended operation to allow
+ modification of user passwords which is not dependent upon the form of
+ the authentication identity nor the password storage mechanism used.
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-
+INTERNET-DRAFT draft-zeilenga-ldap-passwd-exop-05 3 Novemeber 2000
- mechanism used.
The key words ``MUST'', ``MUST NOT'', ``REQUIRED'', ``SHALL'', ``SHALL
NOT'', ``SHOULD'', ``SHOULD NOT'', ``RECOMMENDED'', and ``MAY'' in
The protocol does not mandate that passwords associated with a user be
stored in the directory server. The server may use any attribute
- suitable for password storage, such as userPassword or authPassword
- [AuthPasswd], or use non-directory storage.
+ suitable for password storage (e.g. userPassword), or use
+ non-directory storage.
- The integration of application neutral SASL [RFC2222] services which
- support simple username/password mechanisms (such as DIGEST-MD5) has
- introduced non-LDAP DN authentication identity forms and made storage
- of passwords the responsibility of the SASL service provider.
+ The integration [RFC2829] of application neutral SASL [RFC2222]
+ services which support simple username/password mechanisms (such as
+ DIGEST-MD5) has introduced non-LDAP DN authentication identity forms
+ and made storage of passwords the responsibility of the SASL service
+ provider.
LDAP update operations are designed to act upon attributes of an entry
within the directory. LDAP update operations cannot be used to modify
a user's password when the user is not represented by a DN, does not
have a entry, or when that password used by the server is not stored
- as an attribute of an entry. An alternative mechanism are needed.
+ as an attribute of an entry. An alternative mechanism is needed.
- This document describes an LDAP Extended Operation intended to be
- allow directory clients to update user passwords. The user may or may
- not have be associated with a directory entry. The user may or may not
- be represented as an LDAP DN. The user's password may or may not be
+ This document describes an LDAP Extended Operation intended to allow
+ directory clients to update user passwords. The user may or may not
+ be associated with a directory entry. The user may or may not be
+ represented as an LDAP DN. The user's password may or may not be
stored in the directory.
The operation SHOULD NOT be used without adequate security protection
as the operation affords no privacy or integrity protect itself. This
- operation SHOULD NOT be used by "anonymous" clients.
+ operation SHALL NOT be used anonymously.
4. Password Modify Request and Response
The Password Modify operation is an LDAPv3 Extended Operation
[RFC2251, Section 4.12] and is identified by the OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ passwdModifyOID. This section details the syntax of the protocol
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+INTERNET-DRAFT draft-zeilenga-ldap-passwd-exop-05 3 Novemeber 2000
- passwdModifyOID. This section details the syntax of the protocol
request and response.
- passwdModifyOID OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= 1.3.6.1.4.1.4203.666.6.1
-
- [Editor's Note: this OID is temporary. A permanent OID
- will be assigned to this object before this document is
- progressed as an RFC.]
+ passwdModifyOID OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= 1.3.6.1.4.1.4203.1.11.1
PasswdModifyRequestValue ::= SEQUENCE {
userIdentity [0] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
oldPasswd [1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
newPasswd [2] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL }
- PasswordModifyResponseValue ::= SEQUENCE {
+ PasswdModifyResponseValue ::= SEQUENCE {
genPasswd [0] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL }
The genPasswd field, if present, SHALL contain a generated password
for the user.
+ If an resultCode other than success (0) is indicated in the response,
+ the response field MUST be absent.
-
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+5. Operation Requirements
- If an resultCode other than success (0) is indicated in the response,
- the response field MUST be absent.
+Zeilenga [Page 3]
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+INTERNET-DRAFT draft-zeilenga-ldap-passwd-exop-05 3 Novemeber 2000
-5. Operation Requirements
Clients SHOULD NOT submit a Password Modification request without
ensuring adequate security safeguards are in place. Servers SHOULD
not in place.
Servers SHOULD indicate their support for this extended operation by
- providing PasswordModifyOID as a value of the supportedExtensions
- attribute type in their root DSE. Clients SHOULD verify the server
- implements this extended operation prior to attempting the operation
- by asserting the supportedExtensions attribute contains a value of
- PasswordModifyOID.
+ providing PasswdModifyOID as a value of the supportedExtension
+ attribute type in their root DSE. A server MAY choose to advertise
+ this extension only when the client is authorized and/or has
+ established the necessary security protections to use this operation.
+ Clients SHOULD verify the server implements this extended operation
+ prior to attempting the operation by asserting the supportedExtension
+ attribute contains a value of PasswdModifyOID.
The server SHALL only return success upon successfully changing the
user's password. The server SHALL leave the password unmodified and
the combination of fields provided, it SHALL NOT change the user
password.
- If the provided oldPasswd value cannot be verified or is incorrect,
- the server SHALL NOT change the user password.
+ If oldPasswd is present and the provided value cannot be verified or
+ is incorrect, the server SHALL NOT change the user password. If
+ oldPasswd is not present, the server MAY use other policy to determine
+ whether or not to change the password.
The server SHALL NOT generate a password on behalf of the client if
- the client has provided a newPassword. In absence of a client
- provided newPassword, the server SHALL either generate a password on
- behalf of the client or return a non-success result code. The server
- MUST provide the generated password upon success as the value of the
+ the client has provided a newPasswd. In absence of a client provided
+ newPasswd, the server SHALL either generate a password on behalf of
+ the client or return a non-success result code. The server MUST
+ provide the generated password upon success as the value of the
genPasswd field.
The server MAY return adminLimitExceeded, busy,
operation.
-6. Other requirements
+6. Security Considerations
- A server which supports this operation SHOULD provide a
+ This operation is used to modify user passwords. The operation itself
+ does not provide any security protection to ensure integrity and/or
+ confidentiality of the information. Use of this operation is strongly
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-
-
- supportedExtension attribute in the Root DSE which contains as one of
- its values the passwdModifyOID OID. A server MAY advertise the
- extension only when the client is authorized and/or has established
- the necessary security protections to use this operation. Clients
- SHOULD verify the server has advertised the extension before
- attempting the operation.
-
+INTERNET-DRAFT draft-zeilenga-ldap-passwd-exop-05 3 Novemeber 2000
-7. Security Considerations
- This operation is used to modify user passwords. The operation itself
- does not provide any security protection to ensure integrity and/or
- confidentiality of the information. Use of this operation is strongly
discouraged when privacy protections are not in place to guarantee
confidentiality and may result in the disclosure of the password to
- unauthorized parties.
+ unauthorized parties. Use of Start TLS [RFC 2830] is highly
+ recommended.
-8. Copyright
+7. Copyright
Copyright 2000, The Internet Society. All Rights Reserved.
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
-9. Bibliography
-
-
-
-
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-
+8. Bibliography
[RFC2219] S. Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2252] M. Wahl, A. Coulbeck, T. Howes, S. Kille,
"Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (v3):
+
+
+
+Zeilenga [Page 5]
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+INTERNET-DRAFT draft-zeilenga-ldap-passwd-exop-05 3 Novemeber 2000
+
+
Attribute Syntax Definitions", RFC 2252,
December 1997.
[RFC2256] M. Wahl, "A Summary of the X.500(96) User Schema
for use with LDAPv3", RFC 2256, December 1997.
- [AuthPasswd] K. Zeilenga, "LDAP Authentication Password
- Attribute", draft-zeilenga-ldap-authpasswd-xx.txt,
- a work in progress.
+ [RFC2829] M. Wahl, H. Alvestrand, J. Hodges, and R. Morgan,
+ "Authentication Methods for LDAP", RFC 2829,
+ May 2000.
-10. Acknowledgment
+ [RFC2830] Hodges, J., R. Morgan, and M. Wahl, "Lightweight
+ Directory Access Protocol (v3): Extension for
+ Transport Layer Security", RFC 2830, May 2000.
+
+9. Acknowledgment
This document borrows from a number of IETF documents and is based
upon input from the IETF LDAPext working group.
-11. Author's Address
+10. Author's Address
Kurt D. Zeilenga
OpenLDAP Foundation
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