From: Kurt Zeilenga Date: Sat, 9 Jul 2005 19:07:16 +0000 (+0000) Subject: Sync with HEAD X-Git-Tag: OPENLDAP_REL_ENG_2_3_5~34 X-Git-Url: https://git.sur5r.net/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=22282351036ebf6408c0507eb0539e5000db98b0;p=openldap Sync with HEAD --- diff --git a/doc/drafts/draft-behera-ldap-password-policy-xx.txt b/doc/drafts/draft-behera-ldap-password-policy-xx.txt index 8e68484a13..d9978abe04 100644 --- a/doc/drafts/draft-behera-ldap-password-policy-xx.txt +++ b/doc/drafts/draft-behera-ldap-password-policy-xx.txt @@ -1,1940 +1,2046 @@ +Network Working Group J. Sermersheim +Internet-Draft Novell, Inc +Expires: April 24, 2005 L. Poitou + Sun Microsystems + October 24, 2004 -Internet-Draft P. Behera -draft behera-ldap-password-policy-07.txt L. Poitou -Intended Category: Proposed Standard Sun Microsystems -Expires: August 2004 J. Sermersheim - Novell - - February 2004 - - - Password Policy for LDAP Directories - - -Status of this Memo - - This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with - all provisions of Section 10 of RFC 2026. - - Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering - Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that - other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- - Drafts. - - Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six - months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents - at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet- Drafts as - reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." - - The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at - http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt - - The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at - http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. - - Technical discussions of this draft are held on the LDAPEXT Working - Group mailing list at ietf-ldapext@netscape.com. Editorial comments - may be sent to the authors listed in Section 13. - - Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). All rights Reserved. - - Please see the Copyright Section near the end of this document for - more information. - - - -Conventions - - The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", - "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", and "MAY" in this document - are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC-2119]. - - - -Behera, et. al. Expires August 15, 2004 Page 1 + + Password Policy for LDAP Directories + draft-behera-ldap-password-policy-08.txt + +Status of this Memo + + This document is an Internet-Draft and is subject to all provisions + of section 3 of RFC 3667. By submitting this Internet-Draft, each + author represents that any applicable patent or other IPR claims of + which he or she is aware have been or will be disclosed, and any of + which he or she become aware will be disclosed, in accordance with + RFC 3668. + + Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering + Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that + other groups may also distribute working documents as + Internet-Drafts. + + Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months + and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any + time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference + material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." + + The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at + http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt. + + The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at + http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. + + This Internet-Draft will expire on April 24, 2005. + +Copyright Notice + + Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). + +Abstract + + Password policy as described in this document is a set of rules that + controls how passwords are used and administered in Lightweight + Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) based directories. In order to + improve the security of LDAP directories and make it difficult for + password cracking programs to break into directories, it is desirable + to enforce a set of rules on password usage. These rules are made to + + + +Sermersheim & Poitou Expires April 24, 2005 [Page 1] -INTERNET DRAFT LDAP Password Policy 15 February 2004 - - - -1. Abstract - - Password policy as described in this document is a set of rules that - controls how passwords are used and administered in LDAP - directories. In order to improve the security of LDAP directories - and make it difficult for password cracking programs to break into - directories, it is desirable to enforce a set of rules on password - usage. These rules are made to ensure that users change their - passwords periodically, passwords meet construction requirements, - the re-use of old password is restricted, and users are locked out - after a certain number of failed attempts. - - - -2. Overview - - LDAP-based directory services are currently accepted by many - organizations as the access protocol for directories. The ability to - ensure the secure read and update access to directory information - throughout the network is essential to the successful deployment. - Most LDAP implementations support many authentication schemes - the - most basic and widely used is the simple authentication i.e., user - DN and password. In this case, many LDAP servers have implemented - some kind of policy related to the password used to authenticate. - Among other things, this policy includes: - - - Whether and when passwords expire. - - Whether failed bind attempts cause the account to be locked. - - If and how users are able to change their passwords. - - In order to achieve greater security protection and ensure - interoperability in a heterogeneous environment, LDAP needs to - standardize on a common password policy model. This is critical to - the successful deployment of LDAP directories. - -2.1. Application of password policy - - The password policy defined in this document can be applied to any - attribute holding a user's password used for an authenticated LDAP - bind operation. In this document, the term "user" represents any - LDAP client application that has an identity in the directory. - - This policy is typically applied to the userPassword attribute in - the case of the LDAP simple authentication method [RFC-2251] or the - case of password based SASL [RFC-2222] authentication such as CRAM- - MD5 [RFC-2195] and DIGEST-MD5 [RFC-Digest]. - - - - -Behera, et. al. Expires August 15, 2004 Page 2 +Internet-Draft Password Policy for LDAP Directories October 2004 + + + ensure that users change their passwords periodically, passwords meet + construction requirements, the re-use of old password is restricted, + and users are locked out after a certain number of failed attempts. + +Discussion Forum + + Technical discussion of this document will take place on the IETF + LDAP Extensions mailing list . Please send + editorial comments directly to the authors. + +Table of Contents + + 1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 + 2. Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 + 3. Application of password policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 + 4. Articles of password policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 + 4.1 Password Usage Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 + 4.2 Password Modification Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 + 4.3 Restriction of the Password Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 + 5. Schema used for Password Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 + 5.1 The pwdPolicy Object Class . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 + 5.2 Attribute Types used in the pwdPolicy ObjectClass . . . . . . 11 + 5.3 Attribute Types for Password Policy State Information . . . . 16 + 6. Controls used for Password Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 + 6.1 Request Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 + 6.2 Response Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 + 7. Policy Decision Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 + 7.1 Locked Account Check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 + 7.2 Password Must be Changed Now Check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 + 7.3 Password Expiration Check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 + 7.4 Remaining Grace AuthN Check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 + 7.5 Time Before Expiration Check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 + 7.6 Intruder Detection Check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 + 7.7 Password Too Young Check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 + 8. Server Policy Enforcement Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 + 8.1 Password-based Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 + 8.2 Password Update Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 + 8.3 Other Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 + 9. Client Policy Enforcement Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 + 9.1 Bind Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 + 9.2 Modify Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 + 9.3 Add Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 + 9.4 Compare Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 + 9.5 Other Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 + 10. Administration of the Password Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 + 11. Password Policy and Replication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 + 12. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 + 13. Acknowledgement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 + + + +Sermersheim & Poitou Expires April 24, 2005 [Page 2] -INTERNET DRAFT LDAP Password Policy 15 February 2004 - - - The policy described in this document assumes that the password - attribute holds a single value. No considerations are made for - directories or systems that allow a user to maintain multi-valued - password attributes. - - Server implementations MAY institute internal policy whereby certain - identities (such as directory administrators) are not forced to - comply with any of password policy. In this case, the password for a - directory administrator never expires; the account is never locked, - etc. - - The term "directory administrator" refers to a user that has - sufficient access control privileges to modify users' passwords, and - the pwdPolicy object defined in this document. The access control - that is used to determine whether an identity is a directory - administrator is beyond the scope of this document, but typically - implies that the administrator has 'write' privileges to the - password attribute. - -3. Articles of password policy - - The following sections explain in general terms each aspect of the - password policy defined in this document as well as the need for - each. These policies are subdivided into the general groups of - password usage and password modification. Implementation details are - presented in Sections 6 and 7. - -3.1. Password Usage Policy - - This section describes policy enforced when a password is used to - authenticate. The general focus of this policy is to minimize the - threat of intruders once a password is in use. - -3.1.1. Password Guessing limit - - In order to prevent intruders from guessing a user's password, a - mechanism exists to track the number of failed authentication - attempts, and take action when a limit is reached. - - This policy consists of five parts: - - - A configurable limit on failed authentication attempts. - - - A counter to track the number of failed authentication attempts. - - - A timeframe in which the limit of consecutive failed - authentication attempts must happen before action is taken. - - - - -Behera, et. al. Expires August 15, 2004 Page 3 +Internet-Draft Password Policy for LDAP Directories October 2004 + + + 14. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 + Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 + Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . 38 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Sermersheim & Poitou Expires April 24, 2005 [Page 3] -INTERNET DRAFT LDAP Password Policy 15 February 2004 - - - - The action to be taken when the limit is reached. The action will - either be nothing, or the account will be locked. - - - An amount of time the account is locked (if it is to be locked). - This can be indefinite. - -3.2. Password Modification Policy - - This section describes policy enforced while users are modifying - passwords. The general focus of this policy is to ensure that when - users add or change their passwords, the security and effectiveness - of their passwords is maximized. In this document, the term "modify - password operation" refers to any operation that is used to add or - modify a password attribute. Often this is done by updating the - userPassword attribute during an add or modify operation, but MAY be - done by other means such as an extended operation. - - -3.2.1. Password Expiration, Expiration Warning, and Grace binds - - One of the key properties of a password is the fact that it is not - well known. If a password is frequently changed, the chances of that - user's account being broken into are minimized. - - Directory administrators may deploy a password policy that causes - passwords to expire after a given amount of time - thus forcing - users to change their passwords periodically. - - As a side effect, there needs to be a way in which users are made - aware of this need to change their password before actually being - locked out of their accounts. One or both of the following methods - handle this: - - - The user is sent a warning sometime before his password is due to - expire. If the user fails to heed this warning before the - expiration time, his account will be locked. - - - The user may bind to the directory a preset number of times after - her password has expired. If she fails to change her password - during one of her 'grace' binds, her account will be locked. - -3.2.2. Password History - - When the Password Expiration policy is used, an additional mechanism - may be employed to prevent users from simply re-using a previous - password (as this would effectively circumvent the expiration - policy). - - - - -Behera, et. al. Expires August 15, 2004 Page 4 +Internet-Draft Password Policy for LDAP Directories October 2004 + + +1. Overview + + LDAP-based directory services are currently accepted by many + organizations as the access protocol for directories. The ability to + ensure the secure read and update access to directory information + throughout the network is essential to the successful deployment. + Most LDAP implementations support many authentication schemes - the + most basic and widely used is the simple authentication i.e., user DN + and password. In this case, many LDAP servers have implemented some + kind of policy related to the password used to authenticate. Among + other things, this policy includes: + + o Whether and when passwords expire. + o Whether failed bind attempts cause the account to be locked. + o If and how users are able to change their passwords. + + In order to achieve greater security protection and ensure + interoperability in a heterogeneous environment, LDAP needs to + standardize on a common password policy model. This is critical to + the successful deployment of LDAP directories. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Sermersheim & Poitou Expires April 24, 2005 [Page 4] -INTERNET DRAFT LDAP Password Policy 15 February 2004 - - - In order to do this; a history of used passwords is kept. The - directory administrator sets the number of passwords to be stored at - any given time. Passwords are stored in this history whenever the - password is changed. Users aren't allowed to specify any passwords - that are in the history list while changing passwords. - -3.2.3. Password Minimum Age - - Users may circumvent the Password History mechanism by quickly - performing a series of password changes. If they change their - password enough times, their 'favorite' password will be pushed out - of the history list. - - This process may be made less attractive to users by employing a - minimum age for passwords. If users are forced to wait 24 hours - between password changes, they may be less likely to cycle through a - history of 10 passwords. - -3.2.4. Password Quality and Minimum length - - In order to prevent users from creating or updating passwords that - are easy to guess, a password quality policy may be employed. This - policy consists of two general mechanisms - ensuring that passwords - conform to a defined quality criteria and ensuring that they are of - a minimum length. - - Forcing a password to comply with the quality policy may imply a - variety of things including: - - - Disallowing trivial or well-known words make up the password. - - - Forcing a certain number of digits be used. - - - Disallowing anagrams of the user's name. - - The implementation of this policy meets with the following problems: - - - If the password to be added or updated is encrypted by the client - before being sent, the server has no way of enforcing this - policy. Therefore, the onus of enforcing this policy falls upon - client implementations. - - - There are no specific definitions of what 'quality checking' - means. This can lead to unexpected behavior in a heterogeneous - environment. - -3.2.5. User Defined Passwords - - - - -Behera, et. al. Expires August 15, 2004 Page 5 +Internet-Draft Password Policy for LDAP Directories October 2004 + + +2. Conventions + + Imperative keywords defined in [RFC2119] are used in this document, + and carry the meanings described there. + + All Basic Encoding Rules (BER) [X690] encodings follow the + conventions found in Section 5.1 of [RFC2251]. + + The term "password administrator" refers to a user that has + sufficient access control privileges to modify users' passwords. The + term "password policy administrator" refers to a user that has + sufficient access control privileges to modify the pwdPolicy object + defined in this document. The access control that is used to + determine whether an identity is a password administrator or password + policy administrator is beyond the scope of this document, but + typically implies that the password administrator has 'write' + privileges to the password attribute. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Sermersheim & Poitou Expires April 24, 2005 [Page 5] -INTERNET DRAFT LDAP Password Policy 15 February 2004 - - - In some cases, it is desirable to disallow users from adding and - updating their own passwords. This policy makes this functionality - possible. - - This implies that certain other policy, such as password expiration - is not enforced. - -3.2.6. Password Change After Reset - - This policy forces the user to update her password after it has been - set for the first time, or has been reset by the directory - administrator. - - This is needed in scenarios where a directory administrator has set - or reset the password to a well-known value. - -3.2.7. Safe modification - - As directories become more commonly used, it will not be unusual for - clients to connect to a directory and leave the connection open for - an extended period. This opens up the possibility for an intruder to - make modifications to a user's password while that user's computer - is connected but unattended. - - This policy forces the user to prove his identity by specifying the - old password during a password modify operation. - -3.3. Restriction of the Password Policy - - The password policy defined in this document can apply to any - attribute containing a password. Password policy state information - is held in the user's entry, and applies to a password attribute, - not a particular password attribute value. Thus the server SHOULD - enforce that the password attribute subject to password policy, - contains one and only one password value. - - -4. Schema used for Password Policy - - The schema elements defined here fall into two general categories. A - password policy object class is defined which contains a set of - administrative password policy attributes, and a set of operational - attributes are defined that hold general password policy state - information for each user. - -4.1. The pwdPolicy Object Class - - This object class contains the attributes defining a password policy - in effect for a set of users. Section 8 describes the administration - - -Behera, et. al. Expires August 15, 2004 Page 6 +Internet-Draft Password Policy for LDAP Directories October 2004 + + +3. Application of password policy + + The password policy defined in this document can be applied to any + attribute holding a user's password used for an authenticated LDAP + bind operation. In this document, the term "user" represents any + LDAP client application that has an identity in the directory. + + This policy is typically applied to the userPassword attribute in the + case of the LDAP simple authentication method [RFC2251] or the case + of password based SASL [RFC2222] authentication such as CRAM-MD5 + [RFC2195] and DIGEST-MD5 [RFC2831]. + + The policy described in this document assumes that the password + attribute holds a single value. No considerations are made for + directories or systems that allow a user to maintain multi-valued + password attributes. + + Server implementations MAY institute internal policy whereby certain + identities (such as directory administrators) are not forced to + comply with any of password policy. In this case, the password for a + directory administrator never expires; the account is never locked, + etc. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Sermersheim & Poitou Expires April 24, 2005 [Page 6] + +Internet-Draft Password Policy for LDAP Directories October 2004 + + +4. Articles of password policy + + The following sections explain in general terms each aspect of the + password policy defined in this document as well as the need for + each. These policies are subdivided into the general groups of + password usage and password modification. Implementation details are + presented in Section 8 and Section 9. + +4.1 Password Usage Policy + + This section describes policy enforced when a password is used to + authenticate. The general focus of this policy is to minimize the + threat of intruders once a password is in use. + +4.1.1 Password Guessing Limit + + In order to prevent intruders from guessing a user's password, a + mechanism exists to track the number of failed authentication + attempts, and take action when a limit is reached. This policy + consists of five parts: + + o A configurable limit on failed authentication attempts. + o A counter to track the number of failed authentication attempts. + o A timeframe in which the limit of consecutive failed + authentication attempts must happen before action is taken. + o The action to be taken when the limit is reached. The action will + either be nothing, or the account will be locked. + o An amount of time the account is locked (if it is to be locked). + This can be indefinite. + +4.2 Password Modification Policy + + This section describes policy enforced while users are modifying + passwords. The general focus of this policy is to ensure that when + users add or change their passwords, the security and effectiveness + of their passwords is maximized. In this document, the term "modify + password operation" refers to any operation that is used to add or + modify a password attribute. Often this is done by updating the + password attribute during an add or modify operation, but MAY be done + by other means such as an extended operation. + +4.2.1 Password Expiration, Expiration Warning, and Grace + Authentications + + One of the key properties of a password is the fact that it is not + well known. If a password is frequently changed, the chances of that + user's account being broken into are minimized. + + + + +Sermersheim & Poitou Expires April 24, 2005 [Page 7] -INTERNET DRAFT LDAP Password Policy 15 February 2004 - - - of this object, and the relationship between it and particular - objects. - - ( 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.2.1 - NAME 'pwdPolicy' - SUP top - AUXILIARY - MUST ( pwdAttribute ) - MAY ( pwdMinAge $ pwdMaxAge $ pwdInHistory $ pwdCheckQuality $ - pwdMinLength $ pwdExpireWarning $ pwdGraceLoginLimit $ pwdLockout - $ pwdLockoutDuration $ pwdMaxFailure $ pwdFailureCountInterval $ - pwdMustChange $ pwdAllowUserChange $ pwdSafeModify ) ) - -4.2. Attribute Types used in the pwdPolicy ObjectClass - - Following are the attribute types used by the pwdPolicy object - class. - -4.2.1. pwdAttribute - - This holds the name of the attribute to which the password policy is - applied. For example, the password policy may be applied to the - userPassword attribute. - - ( 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.1 - NAME 'pwdAttribute' - EQUALITY objectIdentifierMatch - SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.38 ) - -4.2.2. pwdMinAge - - This attribute holds the number of seconds that must elapse between - modifications to the password. If this attribute is not present, 0 - seconds is assumed. - - ( 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.2 - NAME 'pwdMinAge' - EQUALITY integerMatch - SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.27 - SINGLE-VALUE ) - -4.2.3. pwdMaxAge - - This attribute holds the number of seconds after which a modified - password will expire. - - If this attribute is not present, or if the value is 0 the password - does not expire. If not 0, the value must be greater than or equal - to the value of the pwdMinAge. - - -Behera, et. al. Expires August 15, 2004 Page 7 +Internet-Draft Password Policy for LDAP Directories October 2004 + + + Password policy administrators may deploy a password policy that + causes passwords to expire after a given amount of time - thus + forcing users to change their passwords periodically. + + As a side effect, there needs to be a way in which users are made + aware of this need to change their password before actually being + locked out of their accounts. One or both of the following methods + handle this: + + o A warning may be returned to the user sometime before his password + is due to expire. If the user fails to heed this warning before + the expiration time, his account will be locked. + o The user may bind to the directory a preset number of times after + her password has expired. If she fails to change her password + during one of her 'grace' authentications, her account will be + locked. + +4.2.2 Password History + + When the Password Expiration policy is used, an additional mechanism + may be employed to prevent users from simply re-using a previous + password (as this would effectively circumvent the expiration + policy). + + In order to do this; a history of used passwords is kept. The + password policy administrator sets the number of passwords to be + stored at any given time. Passwords are stored in this history + whenever the password is changed. Users aren't allowed to specify + any passwords that are in the history list while changing passwords. + +4.2.3 Password Minimum Age + + Users may circumvent the Password History mechanism by quickly + performing a series of password changes. If they change their + password enough times, their 'favorite' password will be pushed out + of the history list. + + This process may be made less attractive to users by employing a + minimum age for passwords. If users are forced to wait 24 hours + between password changes, they may be less likely to cycle through a + history of 10 passwords. + +4.2.4 Password Quality and Minimum length + + In order to prevent users from creating or updating passwords that + are easy to guess, a password quality policy may be employed. This + policy consists of two general mechanisms - ensuring that passwords + conform to a defined quality criterion and ensuring that they are of + + + +Sermersheim & Poitou Expires April 24, 2005 [Page 8] -INTERNET DRAFT LDAP Password Policy 15 February 2004 - - - - ( 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.3 - NAME 'pwdMaxAge' - EQUALITY integerMatch - SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.27 - SINGLE-VALUE ) - -4.2.4. pwdInHistory - - This attribute specifies the maximum number of used passwords stored - in the pwdHistory attribute. - - If this attribute is not present, or if the value is 0, used - passwords are not stored in the pwdHistory attribute and thus may be - reused. - - ( 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.4 - NAME 'pwdInHistory' - EQUALITY integerMatch - SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.27 - SINGLE-VALUE ) - -4.2.5. pwdCheckQuality - - This attribute indicates how the password quality will be verified - while being modified or added. If this attribute is not present, or - if the value is '0', quality checking will not be enforced. A value - of '1' indicates that the server will check the quality, and if the - server is unable to check it (due to a hashed password or other - reasons) it will be accepted. A value of '2' indicates that the - server will check the quality, and if the server is unable to verify - it, it will return an error refusing the password. - - ( 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.5 - NAME 'pwdCheckQuality' - EQUALITY integerMatch - SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.27 - SINGLE-VALUE ) - -4.2.6. pwdMinLength - - When quality checking is enabled, this attribute holds the minimum - number of characters that must be used in a password. If this - attribute is not present, no minimum password length will be - enforced. If the server is unable to check the length (due to a - hashed password or otherwise), the server will, depending on the - value of the pwdCheckQuality attribute, either accept the password - without checking it ('0' or '1') or refuse it ('2'). - - - -Behera, et. al. Expires August 15, 2004 Page 8 +Internet-Draft Password Policy for LDAP Directories October 2004 + + + a minimum length. + + Forcing a password to comply with the quality policy may imply a + variety of things including: + + o Disallowing trivial or well-known words make up the password. + o Forcing a certain number of digits be used. + o Disallowing anagrams of the user's name. + + The implementation of this policy meets with the following problems: + + o If the password to be added or updated is encrypted by the client + before being sent, the server has no way of enforcing this policy. + Therefore, the onus of enforcing this policy falls upon client + implementations. + o There are no specific definitions of what 'quality checking' + means. This can lead to unexpected behavior in a heterogeneous + environment. + +4.2.5 User Defined Passwords + + In some cases, it is desirable to disallow users from adding and + updating their own passwords. This policy makes this functionality + possible. + + This implies that certain other policy, such as password expiration + is not enforced. + +4.2.6 Password Change after Reset + + This policy forces the user to update her password after it has been + set for the first time, or has been reset by a password + administrator. + + This is needed in scenarios where a password administrator has set or + reset the password to a well-known value. + +4.2.7 Safe Modification + + As directories become more commonly used, it will not be unusual for + clients to connect to a directory and leave the connection open for + an extended period. This opens up the possibility for an intruder to + make modifications to a user's password while that user's computer is + connected but unattended. + + This policy forces the user to prove his identity by specifying the + old password during a password modify operation. + + + + +Sermersheim & Poitou Expires April 24, 2005 [Page 9] -INTERNET DRAFT LDAP Password Policy 15 February 2004 - - - ( 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.6 - NAME 'pwdMinLength' - EQUALITY integerMatch - SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.27 - SINGLE-VALUE ) - -4.2.7. pwdExpireWarning - - This attribute specifies the maximum number of seconds before a - password is due to expire that expiration warning messages will be - returned to an authenticating user. If this attribute is not - present, or if the value is 0 no warnings will be sent. If not 0, - the value must be smaller than the value of the pwdMaxAge attribute. - - ( 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.7 - NAME 'pwdExpireWarning' - EQUALITY integerMatch - SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.27 - SINGLE-VALUE ) - -4.2.8. pwdGraceLoginLimit - - This attribute specifies the number of times an expired password can - be used to authenticate. If this attribute is not present or if the - value is 0, authentication will fail. - - ( 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.8 - NAME 'pwdGraceLoginLimit' - EQUALITY integerMatch - SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.27 - SINGLE-VALUE ) - -4.2.9. pwdLockout - - This attribute indicates, when its value is "TRUE", that the - password may not be used to authenticate after a specified number of - consecutive failed bind attempts. The maximum number of consecutive - failed bind attempts is specified in pwdMaxFailure. - - If this attribute is not present, or if the value is "FALSE", the - password may be used to authenticate when the number of failed bind - attempts has been reached. - - ( 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.9 - NAME 'pwdLockout' - EQUALITY booleanMatch - SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.7 - SINGLE-VALUE ) - - - -Behera, et. al. Expires August 15, 2004 Page 9 +Internet-Draft Password Policy for LDAP Directories October 2004 + + + {TODO: This allows a dictionary attack unless we specify that this is + also subject to intruder detection} + +4.3 Restriction of the Password Policy + + The password policy defined in this document can apply to any + attribute containing a password. Password policy state information + is held in the user's entry, and applies to a password attribute, not + a particular password attribute value. Thus the server SHOULD + enforce that the password attribute subject to password policy, + contains one and only one password value. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Sermersheim & Poitou Expires April 24, 2005 [Page 10] -INTERNET DRAFT LDAP Password Policy 15 February 2004 - - -4.2.10. pwdLockoutDuration - - This attribute holds the number of seconds that the password cannot - be used to authenticate due to too many failed bind attempts. If - this attribute is not present, or if the value is 0 the password - cannot be used to authenticate until reset by an administrator. - - ( 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.10 - NAME 'pwdLockoutDuration' - EQUALITY integerMatch - SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.27 - SINGLE-VALUE ) - -4.2.11. pwdMaxFailure - - This attribute specifies the number of consecutive failed bind - attempts after which the password may not be used to authenticate. - If this attribute is not present, or if the value is 0, this policy - is not checked, and the value of pwdLockout will be ignored. - - ( 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.11 - NAME 'pwdMaxFailure' - EQUALITY integerMatch - SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.27 - SINGLE-VALUE ) - -4.2.12. pwdFailureCountInterval - - This attribute holds the number of seconds after which the password - failures are purged from the failure counter, even though no - successful authentication occurred. - - If this attribute is not present, or if its value is 0, the failure - counter is only reset by a successful authentication. - - ( 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.12 - NAME 'pwdFailureCountInterval' - EQUALITY integerMatch - SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.27 - SINGLE-VALUE ) - -4.2.13. pwdMustChange - - This attribute specifies with a value of "TRUE" that users must - change their passwords when they first bind to the directory after a - password is set or reset by the administrator. If this attribute is - not present, or if the value is "FALSE", users are not required to - change their password upon binding after the administrator sets or - resets the password. - - -Behera, et. al. Expires August 15, 2004 Page 10 +Internet-Draft Password Policy for LDAP Directories October 2004 + + +5. Schema used for Password Policy + + The schema elements defined here fall into two general categories. A + password policy object class is defined which contains a set of + administrative password policy attributes, and a set of operational + attributes are defined that hold general password policy state + information for each user. + +5.1 The pwdPolicy Object Class + + This object class contains the attributes defining a password policy + in effect for a set of users. Section 10 describes the + administration of this object, and the relationship between it and + particular objects. + + ( 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.2.1 + NAME 'pwdPolicy' + SUP top + AUXILIARY + MUST ( pwdAttribute ) + MAY ( pwdMinAge $ pwdMaxAge $ pwdInHistory $ pwdCheckQuality $ + pwdMinLength $ pwdExpireWarning $ pwdGraceAuthNLimit $ pwdLockout + $ pwdLockoutDuration $ pwdMaxFailure $ pwdFailureCountInterval $ + pwdMustChange $ pwdAllowUserChange $ pwdSafeModify ) ) + +5.2 Attribute Types used in the pwdPolicy ObjectClass + + Following are the attribute types used by the pwdPolicy object class. + +5.2.1 pwdAttribute + + This holds the name of the attribute to which the password policy is + applied. For example, the password policy may be applied to the + userPassword attribute. + + ( 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.1 + NAME 'pwdAttribute' + EQUALITY objectIdentifierMatch + SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.38 ) + +5.2.2 pwdMinAge + + This attribute holds the number of seconds that must elapse between + modifications to the password. If this attribute is not present, 0 + seconds is assumed. + + ( 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.2 + + + + +Sermersheim & Poitou Expires April 24, 2005 [Page 11] -INTERNET DRAFT LDAP Password Policy 15 February 2004 - - - - ( 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.13 - NAME 'pwdMustChange' - EQUALITY booleanMatch - SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.7 - SINGLE-VALUE ) - -4.2.14. pwdAllowUserChange - - This attribute indicates whether users can change their own - passwords, although the change operation is still subject to access - control. If this attribute is not present, a value of "TRUE" is - assumed. - - ( 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.14 - NAME 'pwdAllowUserChange' - EQUALITY booleanMatch - SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.7 - SINGLE-VALUE ) - -4.2.15. pwdSafeModify - - This attribute specifies whether or not the existing password must - be sent when changing a password. If this attribute is not present, - a "FALSE" value is assumed. - - ( 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.15 - NAME 'pwdSafeModify' - EQUALITY booleanMatch - SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.7 - SINGLE-VALUE ) - -4.3. Attribute Types for Password Policy State Information - - Password policy state information must be maintained for each user. - The information is located in each user entry as a set of - operational attributes. These operational attributes are: - pwdChangedTime, pwdAccountLockedTime, pwdExpirationWarned, - pwdFailureTime, pwdHistory, pwdGraceUseTime, pwdReset, - pwdPolicySubEntry. - -4.3.1. Password Policy State Attribute Option - - Since the password policy could apply to several attributes used to - store passwords, each of the above operational attributes must have - an option to specify which pwdAttribute is applies to. - The password policy option is defined as the following: - pwd- - - - -Behera, et. al. Expires August 15, 2004 Page 11 +Internet-Draft Password Policy for LDAP Directories October 2004 + + + NAME 'pwdMinAge' + EQUALITY integerMatch + SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.27 + SINGLE-VALUE ) + +5.2.3 pwdMaxAge + + This attribute holds the number of seconds after which a modified + password will expire. + + If this attribute is not present, or if the value is 0 the password + does not expire. If not 0, the value must be greater than or equal + to the value of the pwdMinAge. + + ( 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.3 + NAME 'pwdMaxAge' + EQUALITY integerMatch + SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.27 + SINGLE-VALUE ) + +5.2.4 pwdInHistory + + This attribute specifies the maximum number of used passwords stored + in the pwdHistory attribute. + + If this attribute is not present, or if the value is 0, used + passwords are not stored in the pwdHistory attribute and thus may be + reused. + + ( 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.4 + NAME 'pwdInHistory' + EQUALITY integerMatch + SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.27 + SINGLE-VALUE ) + +5.2.5 pwdCheckQuality + + {TODO: Consider changing the syntax to OID. Each OID will list a + quality rule (like min len, # of special characters, etc). These + rules can be specified outsid ethis document.} + + {TODO: Note that even though this is meant to be a check that happens + during password modification, it may also be allowed to happen during + authN. This is useful for situations where the password is encrypted + when modified, but decrypted when used to authN.} + + This attribute indicates how the password quality will be verified + while being modified or added. If this attribute is not present, or + + + +Sermersheim & Poitou Expires April 24, 2005 [Page 12] -INTERNET DRAFT LDAP Password Policy 15 February 2004 - - - where passwordAttribute a string following the OID syntax - (1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.38). The attribute type descriptor - (short name) MUST be used. - - For example, if the pwdPolicy object has for pwdAttribute - "userPassword" then the pwdChangedTime operational attribute, in a - user entry, will be: - pwdChangedTime;pwd-userPassword: 20000103121520Z - - This attribute option follows sub-typing semantics. If a client - requests a password policy state attribute to be returned in a - search operation, and does not specify an option, all subtypes of - that policy state attribute are returned. - - -4.3.2. pwdChangedTime - - This attribute specifies the last time the entry's password was - changed. This is used by the password expiration policy. If this - attribute does not exist, the password will never expire. - - ( 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.16 - NAME 'pwdChangedTime' - DESC 'The time the password was last changed' - SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.24 - EQUALITY generalizedTimeMatch - ORDERING generalizedTimeOrderingMatch - SINGLE-VALUE - USAGE directoryOperation) - -4.3.3. pwdAccountLockedTime - - This attribute holds the time that the user's account was locked. A - locked account means that the password may no longer be used to - authenticate. A 0 value means that the account has been locked - permanently, and that only an administrator can unlock the account. - - ( 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.17 - NAME 'pwdAccountLockedTime' - DESC 'The time an user account was locked' - SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.24 - EQUALITY generalizedTimeMatch - ORDERING generalizedTimeOrderingMatch - SINGLE-VALUE - USAGE directoryOperation) - -4.3.4. pwdExpirationWarned - - - - -Behera, et. al. Expires August 15, 2004 Page 12 +Internet-Draft Password Policy for LDAP Directories October 2004 + + + if the value is '0', quality checking will not be enforced. A value + of '1' indicates that the server will check the quality, and if the + server is unable to check it (due to a hashed password or other + reasons) it will be accepted. A value of '2' indicates that the + server will check the quality, and if the server is unable to verify + it, it will return an error refusing the password. + + ( 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.5 + NAME 'pwdCheckQuality' + EQUALITY integerMatch + SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.27 + SINGLE-VALUE ) + +5.2.6 pwdMinLength + + When quality checking is enabled, this attribute holds the minimum + number of characters that must be used in a password. If this + attribute is not present, no minimum password length will be + enforced. If the server is unable to check the length (due to a + hashed password or otherwise), the server will, depending on the + value of the pwdCheckQuality attribute, either accept the password + without checking it ('0' or '1') or refuse it ('2'). + + ( 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.6 + NAME 'pwdMinLength' + EQUALITY integerMatch + SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.27 + SINGLE-VALUE ) + +5.2.7 pwdExpireWarning + + This attribute specifies the maximum number of seconds before a + password is due to expire that expiration warning messages will be + returned to an authenticating user. + + If this attribute is not present, or if the value is 0 no warnings + will be returned. If not 0, the value must be smaller than the value + of the pwdMaxAge attribute. + + ( 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.7 + NAME 'pwdExpireWarning' + EQUALITY integerMatch + SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.27 + SINGLE-VALUE ) + +5.2.8 pwdGraceAuthNLimit + + This attribute specifies the number of times an expired password can + + + +Sermersheim & Poitou Expires April 24, 2005 [Page 13] -INTERNET DRAFT LDAP Password Policy 15 February 2004 - - - This attribute contains the time when the password expiration - warning was first sent to the client. The password will expire in - the pwdExpireWarning time. - - ( 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.18 - NAME 'pwdExpirationWarned' - DESC 'The time the user was first warned about the coming - expiration of the password' - SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.24 - EQUALITY generalizedTimeMatch - ORDERING generalizedTimeOrderingMatch - SINGLE-VALUE - USAGE directoryOperation ) - -4.3.5. pwdFailureTime - - This attribute holds the timestamps of the consecutive - authentication failures. - - ( 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.19 - NAME 'pwdFailureTime' - DESC 'The timestamps of the last consecutive authentication - failures' - SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.24 - EQUALITY generalizedTimeMatch - ORDERING generalizedTimeOrderingMatch - USAGE directoryOperation ) - - -4.3.6. pwdHistory - - This attribute holds a history of previously used passwords. - - Values of this attribute are transmitted in string format as given - by the following ABNF: - - pwdHistory = time "#" syntaxOID "#" length "#" data - - time = - - syntaxOID = numericoid ; the string representation of the - ; dotted-decimal OID that defines the - ; syntax used to store the password. - ; numericoid is described in 4.1 of - ; [RFC2252]. - - length = numericstring ; the number of octets in data. - ; numericstring is described in 4.1 of - - -Behera, et. al. Expires August 15, 2004 Page 13 +Internet-Draft Password Policy for LDAP Directories October 2004 + + + be used to authenticate. If this attribute is not present or if the + value is 0, authentication will fail. + + ( 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.8 + NAME 'pwdGraceAuthNLimit' + EQUALITY integerMatch + SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.27 + SINGLE-VALUE ) + +5.2.9 pwdLockout + + This attribute indicates, when its value is "TRUE", that the password + may not be used to authenticate after a specified number of + consecutive failed bind attempts. The maximum number of consecutive + failed bind attempts is specified in pwdMaxFailure. + + If this attribute is not present, or if the value is "FALSE", the + password may be used to authenticate when the number of failed bind + attempts has been reached. + + ( 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.9 + NAME 'pwdLockout' + EQUALITY booleanMatch + SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.7 + SINGLE-VALUE ) + +5.2.10 pwdLockoutDuration + + This attribute holds the number of seconds that the password cannot + be used to authenticate due to too many failed bind attempts. If + this attribute is not present, or if the value is 0 the password + cannot be used to authenticate until reset by a password + administrator. + + ( 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.10 + NAME 'pwdLockoutDuration' + EQUALITY integerMatch + SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.27 + SINGLE-VALUE ) + +5.2.11 pwdMaxFailure + + This attribute specifies the number of consecutive failed bind + attempts after which the password may not be used to authenticate. + If this attribute is not present, or if the value is 0, this policy + is not checked, and the value of pwdLockout will be ignored. + + + + + +Sermersheim & Poitou Expires April 24, 2005 [Page 14] -INTERNET DRAFT LDAP Password Policy 15 February 2004 - - - ; [RFC2252]. - - data = . - - This format allows the server to store, and transmit a history of - passwords that have been used. In order for equality matching to - function properly, the time field needs to adhere to a consistent - format. For this purpose, the time field MUST be in GMT format. - - ( 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.20 - NAME 'pwdHistory' - DESC 'The history of user s passwords' - SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.40 - EQUALITY octetStringMatch - USAGE directoryOperation) - -4.3.7. pwdGraceUseTime - - This attribute holds the timestamps of grace login once a password - has expired. - - ( 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.21 - NAME 'pwdGraceUseTime' - DESC 'The timestamps of the grace login once the password has - expired' - SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.24 - EQUALITY generalizedTimeMatch - - USAGE directoryOperation) - -4.3.8. pwdReset - - This attribute holds a flag to indicate (when TRUE) that the - password has been reset and therefore must be changed by the user on - first authentication. - - ( 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.22 - NAME 'pwdReset' - DESC 'The indication that the password has been reset' - EQUALITY booleanMatch - SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.7 - SINGLE-VALUE - USAGE directoryOperation) - -4.3.9. pwdPolicySubentry - - This attribute points to the pwdPolicy subentry in effect for this - object. - - -Behera, et. al. Expires August 15, 2004 Page 14 +Internet-Draft Password Policy for LDAP Directories October 2004 + + + ( 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.11 + NAME 'pwdMaxFailure' + EQUALITY integerMatch + SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.27 + SINGLE-VALUE ) + +5.2.12 pwdFailureCountInterval + + This attribute holds the number of seconds after which the password + failures are purged from the failure counter, even though no + successful authentication occurred. + + If this attribute is not present, or if its value is 0, the failure + counter is only reset by a successful authentication. + + ( 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.12 + NAME 'pwdFailureCountInterval' + EQUALITY integerMatch + SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.27 + SINGLE-VALUE ) + +5.2.13 pwdMustChange + + This attribute specifies with a value of "TRUE" that users must + change their passwords when they first bind to the directory after a + password is set or reset by a password administrator. If this + attribute is not present, or if the value is "FALSE", users are not + required to change their password upon binding after the password + administrator sets or resets the password. This attribute is not set + due to any actions specified by this document, it is typically set by + a password administrator after resetting a user's password. + + ( 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.13 + NAME 'pwdMustChange' + EQUALITY booleanMatch + SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.7 + SINGLE-VALUE ) + +5.2.14 pwdAllowUserChange + + This attribute indicates whether users can change their own + passwords, although the change operation is still subject to access + control. If this attribute is not present, a value of "TRUE" is + assumed. This attribute is intended to be used in the absense of an + access control mechanism. + + ( 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.14 + + + + +Sermersheim & Poitou Expires April 24, 2005 [Page 15] -INTERNET DRAFT LDAP Password Policy 15 February 2004 - - - - ( 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.23 - NAME 'pwdPolicySubentry' - DESC 'The pwdPolicy subentry in effect for this object' - EQUALITY distinguishedNameMatch - SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.12 - SINGLE-VALUE - USAGE directoryOperation) - -5. Controls used for Password Policy - - This section details the controls used while enforcing password - policy. A request control is defined that is sent by a client with a - request operation in order to elicit a response control. The - response control contains various warnings and errors associated - with password policy. - -5.1. Request Control - - This control MAY be sent with any LDAP request message in order to - convey to the server that this client is aware of, and can process - the response control described in this document. When a server - receives this control, it will return the response control when - appropriate and with the proper data. - - The controlType is 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.5.1 and the criticality - MUST be FALSE. There is no controlValue. - - passwordPolicyRequest - - controlType: 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.5.1 - criticality: FALSE - controlValue: None - -5.2. Response Control - - If the client has sent a passwordPolicyRequest control, the server - sends this control with the following operation responses: - bindResponse, modifyResponse, addResponse, compareResponse and - possibly extendedResponse, to inform of various conditions, and MAY - be sent with other operations (in the case of the changeAfterReset - error). - - passwordPolicyResponse - - controlType: 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.5.1 - criticality: FALSE - controlValue: an OCTET STRING, whose value is the BER encoding of the - following type: - - -Behera, et. al. Expires August 15, 2004 Page 15 +Internet-Draft Password Policy for LDAP Directories October 2004 + + + NAME 'pwdAllowUserChange' + EQUALITY booleanMatch + SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.7 + SINGLE-VALUE ) + +5.2.15 pwdSafeModify + + This attribute specifies whether or not the existing password must be + sent along with the new password when being changed. If this + attribute is not present, a "FALSE" value is assumed. + + ( 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.15 + NAME 'pwdSafeModify' + EQUALITY booleanMatch + SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.7 + SINGLE-VALUE ) + +5.3 Attribute Types for Password Policy State Information + + Password policy state information must be maintained for each user. + The information is located in each user entry as a set of operational + attributes. These operational attributes are: pwdChangedTime, + pwdAccountLockedTime, pwdFailureTime, pwdHistory, pwdGraceUseTime, + pwdReset, pwdPolicySubEntry. + +5.3.1 Password Policy State Attribute Option + + Since the password policy could apply to several attributes used to + store passwords, each of the above operational attributes must have + an option to specify which pwdAttribute it applies to. The password + policy option is defined as the following: + + pwd- + + where passwordAttribute a string following the OID syntax + (1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.38). The attribute type descriptor + (short name) MUST be used. + + For example, if the pwdPolicy object has for pwdAttribute + "userPassword" then the pwdChangedTime operational attribute, in a + user entry, will be: + + pwdChangedTime;pwd-userPassword: 20000103121520Z + + This attribute option follows sub-typing semantics. If a client + requests a password policy state attribute to be returned in a search + operation, and does not specify an option, all subtypes of that + policy state attribute are returned. + + + +Sermersheim & Poitou Expires April 24, 2005 [Page 16] -INTERNET DRAFT LDAP Password Policy 15 February 2004 - - - - PasswordPolicyResponseValue ::= SEQUENCE { - warning [0] CHOICE { - timeBeforeExpiration [0] INTEGER (0 .. maxInt), - graceLoginsRemaining [1] INTEGER (0 .. maxInt) } OPTIONAL - error [1] ENUMERATED { - passwordExpired (0), - accountLocked (1), - changeAfterReset (2), - passwordModNotAllowed (3), - mustSupplyOldPassword (4), - insufficientPasswordQuality (5), - passwordTooShort (6), - passwordTooYoung (7), - passwordInHistory (8) } OPTIONAL } - - The timeBeforeExpiration warning specifies the number of seconds - before a password will expire. The graceLoginsRemaining warning - specifies the remaining number of times a user will be allowed to - authenticate with an expired password. The passwordExpired error - signifies that the password has expired and must be reset. The - changeAfterReset error signifies that the password must be changed - before the user will be allowed to perform any operation other than - bind and modify. The passwordModNotAllowed error is set when a user - is restricted from changing her password. The - insufficientPasswordQuality error is set when a password doesn't - pass quality checking. The passwordTooYoung error is set if the age - of the password to be modified is not yet old enough. - - Typically, only either a warning or an error will be encoded though - there may be exceptions. For example, if the user is required to - change a password after the administrator set it, and the password - will expire in a short amount of time, the control may include the - timeBeforeExpiration warning and the changeAfterReset error. - - -6. Server Implementation by LDAP operation - - The following sections contain detailed instructions that refer to - attributes of the pwdPolicy object class. When doing so, the - attribute of the pwdPolicy object that governs the entry being - discussed is implied. - - The server SHOULD enforce that the password attribute subject to a - password policy as defined in this document, contains one and only - one password value. - - The scenarios in the following operations assume that the client has - attached a passwordPolicyRequest control to the request message of - - -Behera, et. al. Expires August 15, 2004 Page 16 +Internet-Draft Password Policy for LDAP Directories October 2004 + + +5.3.2 pwdChangedTime + + This attribute specifies the last time the entry's password was + changed. This is used by the password expiration policy. If this + attribute does not exist, the password will never expire. + + ( 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.16 + NAME 'pwdChangedTime' + DESC 'The time the password was last changed' + EQUALITY generalizedTimeMatch + ORDERING generalizedTimeOrderingMatch + SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.24 + SINGLE-VALUE + USAGE directoryOperation ) + +5.3.3 pwdAccountLockedTime + + This attribute holds the time that the user's account was locked. A + locked account means that the password may no longer be used to + authenticate. A 000001010000Z value means that the account has been + locked permanently, and that only a password administrator can unlock + the account. + + ( 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.17 + NAME 'pwdAccountLockedTime' + DESC 'The time an user account was locked' + EQUALITY generalizedTimeMatch + ORDERING generalizedTimeOrderingMatch + SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.24 + SINGLE-VALUE + USAGE directoryOperation ) + +5.3.4 pwdFailureTime + + This attribute holds the timestamps of the consecutive authentication + failures. + + ( 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.19 + NAME 'pwdFailureTime' + DESC 'The timestamps of the last consecutive authentication + failures' + EQUALITY generalizedTimeMatch + ORDERING generalizedTimeOrderingMatch + SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.24 + USAGE directoryOperation ) + + + + + + +Sermersheim & Poitou Expires April 24, 2005 [Page 17] -INTERNET DRAFT LDAP Password Policy 15 February 2004 - - - the operation. In the event that the passwordPolicyRequest control - was not sent, no passwordPolicyRequest control is returned. All - other instructions remain the same. - - -6.1. Bind Operation - - When processing a bind request, the server MUST perform the - following steps: - - 1. Check for a locked account: - - If the value of the pwdAccountLockedTime attribute is 0, or if - the current time is less than the value of the - pwdAccountLockedTime attribute added to the value of the - pwdLockoutDuration, the account is locked. - - If the account is locked, the server MUST send a bindResponse to - the client with the resultCode: unwillingToPerform (53), and MUST - include the passwordPolicyResponse in the controls field of the - bindResponse message with the error: accountLocked (1). - - If the account is not locked, the server MUST proceed with the - bind operation. - - 2. Check the result of the bind operation: - - If the bind operation succeeds with authentication, the server - MUST do the following: - - A. Delete the pwdFailureTime attribute. - - B. Check whether the password must be changed now. - - If the pwdMustChange attribute is set to TRUE, and if the - pwdReset attribute is set to TRUE, the password must be - changed now. - - If the password must be changed now, the server MUST send a - bindResponse to the client with the resultCode: success (0), - and MUST include the passwordPolicyResponse in the controls - field of the bindResponse message with the warning: - changeAfterReset specified. - The server MUST then disallow all operations issued by this - user except modify password, bind, unbind, abandon and - StartTLS extended operation. - - If the password does not need to be changed now, the operation - proceeds. - - -Behera, et. al. Expires August 15, 2004 Page 17 +Internet-Draft Password Policy for LDAP Directories October 2004 + + +5.3.5 pwdHistory + + This attribute holds a history of previously used passwords. Values + of this attribute are transmitted in string format as given by the + following ABNF: + + pwdHistory = time "#" syntaxOID "#" length "#" data + + time = + + syntaxOID = numericoid ; the string representation of the + ; dotted-decimal OID that defines the + ; syntax used to store the password. + ; numericoid is described in 4.1 + ; of [RFC2252]. + + length = numericstring ; the number of octets in data. + ; numericstring is described in 4.1 + ; of [RFC2252]. + + data = . + + This format allows the server to store, and transmit a history of + passwords that have been used. In order for equality matching to + function properly, the time field needs to adhere to a consistent + format. For this purpose, the time field MUST be in GMT format. + + ( 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.20 + NAME 'pwdHistory' + DESC 'The history of user s passwords' + EQUALITY octetStringMatch + SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.40 + USAGE directoryOperation ) + +5.3.6 pwdGraceUseTime + + This attribute holds the timestamps of grace authentications after a + password has expired. + + ( 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.21 + NAME 'pwdGraceUseTime' + DESC 'The timestamps of the grace authentication after the + password has expired' + EQUALITY generalizedTimeMatch + SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.24 + + + + +Sermersheim & Poitou Expires April 24, 2005 [Page 18] -INTERNET DRAFT LDAP Password Policy 15 February 2004 - - - - C. Check for password expiration - - The password has expired when either of the following - conditions is met: - - - If the value of the pwdExpireWarning attribute is 0, the - server subtracts the current time from the time stored in - pwdChangedTime to arrive at the password's age. If the age - is greater than the value in the pwdMaxAge attribute, the - password has expired. - - - If the value of the pwdExpireWarning attribute is non- - zero, and the pwdExpirationWarned attribute is present and - has a time value, the server subtracts the current time - from the time stored in the pwdExpirationWarned to arrive - at the first warning age. If the age is greater than the - value in the pwdExpireWarning attribute, the password has - expired. - - If the password has expired, the server MUST check for - remaining grace logins. - - If the pwdGraceUseTime attribute is present, the server - MUST count the number of values in that attribute and - subtract it from the pwdGraceLoginLimit. A positive result - specifies the number of remaining grace logins. - - If there are remaining grace logins, the server MUST add a - new value with the current time in pwdGraceUseTime. Then - it MUST send a bindResponse with the resultCode: success - (0), and MUST include the passwordPolicyResponse in the - controls field of the bindResponse message with the - warning: graceLoginsRemaining choice set to the number of - grace logins left. - - If there are no remaining grace logins, the server MUST - send a bindResponse with the resultCode: - invalidCredentials (49), and MUST include the - passwordPolicyResponse in the controls field of the - bindResponse message with the error: passwordExpired (0) - set. - - If the password has not expired, execution continues. - - D. Calculates whether the time before expiration warning should - be sent. - - - - -Behera, et. al. Expires August 15, 2004 Page 18 +Internet-Draft Password Policy for LDAP Directories October 2004 + + + USAGE directoryOperation ) + +5.3.7 pwdReset + + This attribute holds a flag to indicate (when TRUE) that the password + has been updated by the password administrator and must be changed by + the user on first authentication. + + ( 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.22 + NAME 'pwdReset' + DESC 'The indication that the password has been reset' + EQUALITY booleanMatch + SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.7 + SINGLE-VALUE + USAGE directoryOperation ) + +5.3.8 pwdPolicySubentry + + This attribute points to the pwdPolicy subentry in effect for this + object. + + ( 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.1.23 + NAME 'pwdPolicySubentry' + DESC 'The pwdPolicy subentry in effect for this object' + EQUALITY distinguishedNameMatch + SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.12 + SINGLE-VALUE + USAGE directoryOperation ) + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Sermersheim & Poitou Expires April 24, 2005 [Page 19] -INTERNET DRAFT LDAP Password Policy 15 February 2004 - - - If the pwdExpireWarning attribute is present and contains a - value, the server MUST perform the following steps. - - If the pwdExpirationWarned attribute is present and has a - time value, the warning time is the value of the - pwdExpirationWarned attribute plus the value of the - pwdExpireWarning attribute minus the current time. - - If the pwdExpirationWarned attribute is not present, the - server MUST subtract the current time from the time stored - in pwdChangedTime to arrive at the password's age. If the - age is greater than the value of the pwdMaxAge attribute - minus the value of the pwdExpireWarning attribute, the - server MUST set the current time as the value of the - pwdExpirationWarned attribute, and the warning time is the - value of pwdMaxAge minus the password's age. - - If the warning time is a positive number, the server MUST - send a bindResponse with the resultCode: success (0), and - MUST include the passwordPolicyResponse in the controls - field of the bindResponse message with the warning: - timeBeforeExiration set to the value as described above. - - If the warning time is zero, or wasn't calculated, the - server MUST send a bindResponse with the resultCode: - success (0), and MUST include the passwordPolicyResponse - with nothing in the SEQUENCE. - - If the pwdExpireWarning attribute is not present, the server - MUST send a bindResponse with the resultCode: success (0), - and MUST include the passwordPolicyResponse with nothing in - the SEQUENCE. - - If the bind operation fails authentication due to invalid - credentials, the server MUST do the following: - - A. Add the current time as a value of the pwdFailureTime - attribute. - - B. If the pwdLockout attribute is TRUE, the server MUST also do - the following: - - Count the number of values in the pwdFailureTime attribute - that are younger than pwdFailureCountInterval. - - If the number of these failures is greater or equal to the - pwdMaxFailure attribute, the server MUST lock the account - by setting the value of the pwdAccountLockedTime attribute - to the current time. After locking the account, the server - - -Behera, et. al. Expires August 15, 2004 Page 19 +Internet-Draft Password Policy for LDAP Directories October 2004 + + +6. Controls used for Password Policy + + This section details the controls used while enforcing password + policy. A request control is defined that is sent by a client with a + request operation in order to elicit a response control. The + response control contains various warnings and errors associated with + password policy. + +6.1 Request Control + + This control MAY be sent with any LDAP request message in order to + convey to the server that this client is aware of, and can process + the response control described in this document. When a server + receives this control, it will return the response control when + appropriate and with the proper data. + + The controlType is 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.5.1 and the criticality may + be TRUE or FALSE. There is no controlValue. + +6.2 Response Control + + If the client has sent a passwordPolicyRequest control, the server + (when solicited by the inclusion of the request control) sends this + control with the following operation responses: bindResponse, + modifyResponse, addResponse, compareResponse and possibly + extendedResponse, to inform of various conditions, and MAY be sent + with other operations (in the case of the changeAfterReset error). + The controlType is 1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.5.1 and the controlValue is + the BER encoding of the following type: + + PasswordPolicyResponseValue ::= SEQUENCE { + warning [0] CHOICE { + timeBeforeExpiration [0] INTEGER (0 .. maxInt), + graceAuthNsRemaining [1] INTEGER (0 .. maxInt) } OPTIONAL, + error [1] ENUMERATED { + passwordExpired (0), + accountLocked (1), + changeAfterReset (2), + passwordModNotAllowed (3), + mustSupplyOldPassword (4), + insufficientPasswordQuality (5), + passwordTooShort (6), + passwordTooYoung (7), + passwordInHistory (8) } OPTIONAL } + + The timeBeforeExpiration warning specifies the number of seconds + before a password will expire. The graceAuthNsRemaining warning + specifies the remaining number of times a user will be allowed to + + + +Sermersheim & Poitou Expires April 24, 2005 [Page 20] -INTERNET DRAFT LDAP Password Policy 15 February 2004 - - - MUST send a bindResponse to the client with the - resultCode: unwillingToPerform (53), and MUST include the - passwordPolicyResponse in the controls field of the - bindResponse message with the error: accountLocked (1). - - If the number of failures is less than the pwdMaxFailure - attribute, operation proceeds. - - C. Failure times that are old by more than - pwdFailureCountInterval are purged from the pwdFailureTime - attribute. - - - -6.2. Modify Password Operation - - Because the password is stored in an attribute, the modify operation - may be used to create or update a password. But some alternate - mechanisms have been defined or may be defined, such as the LDAP - Password Modify Extended Operation [RFC-3062]. - - - - - While processing a password modification, the server MUST perform - the following steps: - - 1. Check the pwdSafeModify attribute. If set to TRUE, the server - MUST ensure that the modify password operation included the - user's existing password. When the LDAP modify operation is used - to modify a password, this is done by specifying both a delete - action and an add or replace action, where the delete action is - first, and specifies the existing password, and the add or - replace action specifies the new password. Other password modify - operations SHOULD employ a similar mechanism. Otherwise this - policy will fail. - - If the existing password is not specified, the server MUST NOT - process the operation and MUST send the appropriate response - message to the client with the resultCode: unwillingToPerform - (53), and MUST include the passwordPolicyResponse in the controls - field of the response message with the error: - mustSupplyOldPassword (4). - - - 2. Check the value of the pwdMustChange attribute. If TRUE, the - server MUST check the pwdReset attribute in the user's entry, to - see if a directory administrator has reset the password. If so, - it MUST ensure that the modify password operation contains no - - -Behera, et. al. Expires August 15, 2004 Page 20 +Internet-Draft Password Policy for LDAP Directories October 2004 + + + authenticate with an expired password. The passwordExpired error + signifies that the password has expired and must be reset. The + changeAfterReset error signifies that the password must be changed + before the user will be allowed to perform any operation other than + bind and modify. The passwordModNotAllowed error is set when a user + is restricted from changing her password. The + insufficientPasswordQuality error is set when a password doesn't pass + quality checking. The passwordTooYoung error is set if the age of + the password to be modified is not yet old enough. + + Typically, only either a warning or an error will be encoded though + there may be exceptions. For example, if the user is required to + change a password after the password administrator set it, and the + password will expire in a short amount of time, the control may + include the timeBeforeExpiration warning and the changeAfterReset + error. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Sermersheim & Poitou Expires April 24, 2005 [Page 21] -INTERNET DRAFT LDAP Password Policy 15 February 2004 - - - modifications other than the modification of the password - attribute. If other modifications exist, the server MUST send a - response message to the client with the resultCode: - unwillingToPerform (53), and MUST include the - passwordPolicyResponse in the controls field of the response - message with the error: changeAfterReset (2). - - 3. Check to see whether the bound identity has sufficient rights to - modify the password. If the bound identity is a user changing its - own password, this MAY be done by checking the pwdAllowUserChange - attribute or using an access control mechanism. The determination - of this is implementation specific. If the user is not allowed to - change her password, the server MUST send a response message to - the client with the resultCode: unwillingToPerform (53), and MUST - include the passwordPolicyResponse in the controls field of the - response message with the error: passwordModNotAllowed (3). - - 4. Check the value of the pwdMinAge attribute. If it is set to a - non-zero value, the server MUST subtract the current time from - the value of the pwdChangedTime attribute to arrive at the - password's age. If the password's age is less than the value of - the pwdMinAge attribute, the password is too young to modify. In - this case, the server MUST send a response message to the client - with the resultCode: constraintViolation (19), and MUST include - the passwordPolicyResponse in the controls field of the response - message with the error: passwordTooYoung (7). - - 5. Check the value of the pwdCheckQuality attribute. - - If the value is non-zero, The server: - - A. MUST ensure that the password meets the quality criteria - enforced by the server. This enforcement is implementation - specific. - - If the server is unable to check the quality (due to a hashed - password or otherwise), the value of pwdCheckQuality is - evaluated. If the value is 1, operation MUST continue. If the - value is 2, the server MUST send a response message to the - client with the resultCode: constraintViolation (19), and MUST - include the passwordPolicyResponse in the controls field of - the response message with the error: - insufficientPasswordQuality (5). - - If the server is able to check the password quality, and the - check fails, the server MUST send a response message to the - client with the resultCode: constraintViolation (19), and MUST - include the passwordPolicyResponse in the controls field of - - - -Behera, et. al. Expires August 15, 2004 Page 21 +Internet-Draft Password Policy for LDAP Directories October 2004 + + +7. Policy Decision Points + + Following are a number of procedures used to make policy decisions. + These procedures are typically performed by the server while + processing an operation. + + The following sections contain detailed instructions that refer to + attributes of the pwdPolicy object class. When doing so, the + attribute of the pwdPolicy object that governs the entry being + discussed is implied. + +7.1 Locked Account Check + + A status of true is returned to indicate that the account is locked + if any of these conditions are met: + + o The value of the pwdAccountLockedTime attribute is 000001010000Z. + o The current time is less than the value of the + pwdAccountLockedTime attribute added to the value of the + pwdLockoutDuration. + + Otherwise a status of false is returned. + +7.2 Password Must be Changed Now Check + + A status of true is returned to indicate that the account is locked + if all of these conditions are met: + + The pwdMustChange attribute is set to TRUE. + The pwdReset attribute is set to TRUE. + + Otherwise a status of false is returned. + +7.3 Password Expiration Check + + A status of true is returned indicating that the password has expired + if the value of the pwdExpireWarning attribute is 0, and the current + time minus the value of pwdChangedTime is greater than the value of + the pwdMaxAge. + + Otherwise, a status of false is returned. + +7.4 Remaining Grace AuthN Check + + If the pwdGraceUseTime attribute is present, the number of values in + that attribute subtracted from the value of pwdGraceAuthNLimit is + returned. Otherwise zero is returned. A positive result specifies + the number of remaining grace authentications. + + + +Sermersheim & Poitou Expires April 24, 2005 [Page 22] -INTERNET DRAFT LDAP Password Policy 15 February 2004 - - - the response message with the error: - insufficientPasswordQuality (5). - - B. MUST check the value of the pwdMinLength attribute. If the - value is non-zero, it MUST ensure that the new password is of - at least the minimum length. - - If the server is unable to check the length (due to a hashed - password or otherwise), the value of pwdCheckQuality is - evaluated. If the value is 1, operation MUST continue. If the - value is 2, the server MUST send a response message to the - client with the resultCode: constraintViolation (19), and MUST - include the passwordPolicyResponse in the controls field of - the response message with the error: passwordTooShort (6). - - If the server is able to check the password length, and the - check fails, the server MUST send a response message to the - client with the resultCode: constraintViolation (19), and MUST - include the passwordPolicyResponse in the controls field of - the response message with the error: passwordTooShort (6). - - 6. Check the value of the pwdInHistory attribute. If the value is - non-zero, the server MUST check whether this password exists in - the entry's pwdHistory attribute or in the current password - attribute. If the password does exist in the pwdHistory attribute - or in the current password attribute, the server MUST send a - response message to the client with the resultCode: - constraintViolation (19), and MUST include the - passwordPolicyResponse in the controls field of the response - message with the error: passwordInHistory (8). - - If the steps have completed without causing an error condition, the - server MUST follow the following steps in order to update the - necessary password policy state attributes: - - 7. Check the value of the pwdMaxAge attribute. If the value is non- - zero, or if the value of the pwdMinAge attribute is non-zero, the - server MUST update the pwdChangedTime attribute on the entry to - the current time. - - 8. If the value of the pwdInHistory attribute is non-zero, the - server MUST add the previous password to the pwdHistory - attribute. If the number of attributes held in the pwdHistory - attribute exceeds the value of pwdInHistory, the server MUST - remove the oldest excess passwords. - - 9. Remove the pwdFailureTime, pwdReset, pwdGraceUseTime and - pwdExpirationWarned attributes from the user's entry if they - - - -Behera, et. al. Expires August 15, 2004 Page 22 +Internet-Draft Password Policy for LDAP Directories October 2004 + + +7.5 Time Before Expiration Check + + If the pwdExpireWarning attribute is not present a zero status is + returned. Otherwise the following steps are followed: + + Subtract the time stored in pwdChangedTime from the current time to + arrive at the password's age. If the password's age is greater than + than the value of the pwdMaxAge attribute, a zero status is returned. + Subtract the value of the pwdExpireWarning attribute from the value + of the pwdMaxAge attribute to arrive at the warning age. If the + password's age is equal to or greater than the warning age, the value + of pwdMaxAge minus the password's age is returned. + +7.6 Intruder Detection Check + + A status of true indicating that an intruder has been detected is + returned if the following conditions are met: + + The pwdLockout attribute is TRUE. + The number of values in the pwdFailureTime attribute that are + younger than pwdFailureCountInterval is greater or equal to the + pwdMaxFailure attribute. + + Otherwise a status of false is returned. + + While performing this check, values of pwdFailureTime that are old by + more than pwdFailureCountInterval are purged and not counted. + +7.7 Password Too Young Check + + A status of true indicating that not enough time has passed since the + password was last updated is returned if: + + The value of pwdMinAge is non-zero and pwdChangedTime is present. + The value of pwdMinAge is greater than the current time minus the + value of pwdChangedTime. + + Otherwise a false status is returned. + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Sermersheim & Poitou Expires April 24, 2005 [Page 23] -INTERNET DRAFT LDAP Password Policy 15 February 2004 - - - exist. - - The server MUST then apply the modify password operation. - -6.3. Add Operation - - The password MAY be set during an Add operation. If it is, the - server MUST perform the following steps while processing the add - operation. Note that these are essentially duplicates of steps 3, 5 - and 7 from Section 6.2 with the exception that pwdAllowUserChange is - not checked. - - 1. Check to see whether the bound identity has sufficient rights to - modify the password. This MAY be done by the use of an access - control mechanism. If the user is not allowed to add this - password, the server MUST send an addResponse to the client with - the resultCode: unwillingToPerform (53), and MUST include the - passwordPolicyResponse in the controls field of the addResponse - message with the error: passwordModNotAllowed (3). - - 2. Check the value of the pwdCheckQuality attribute. - - If the value is non-zero, The server: - - A. MUST ensure that the password meets the quality criteria - enforced by the server. This enforcement is implementation - specific. - - If the server is unable to check the quality (due to a hashed - password or otherwise), the value of pwdCheckQuality MUST be - evaluated. If the value is 1, operation MUST continue. If the - value is 2, the server MUST send an addResponse to the client - with the resultCode: constraintViolation (19), and MUST - include the passwordPolicyResponse in the controls field of - the addResponse message with the error: - insufficientPasswordQuality (5). - - If the server is able to check the password quality, and the - check fails, the server MUST send an addResponse to the client - with the resultCode: constraintViolation (19), and MUST - include the passwordPolicyResponse in the controls field of - the addResponse message with the error: - insufficientPasswordQuality (5). - - B. MUST check the value of the pwdMinLength attribute. If the - value is non-zero, it MUST ensure that the new password is of - at least the minimum length. - - - - -Behera, et. al. Expires August 15, 2004 Page 23 +Internet-Draft Password Policy for LDAP Directories October 2004 + + +8. Server Policy Enforcement Points + + The server SHOULD enforce that the password attribute subject to a + password policy as defined in this document, contains one and only + one password value. + + The scenarios in the following operations assume that the client has + attached a passwordPolicyRequest control to the request message of + the operation. In the event that the passwordPolicyRequest control + was not sent, no passwordPolicyResponse control is returned. All + other instructions remain the same. + + For successfuly completed operations, unless otherwise stated, no + passwordPolicyResponse control is returned. + +8.1 Password-based Authentication + + This section contains the policy enforcement rules and policy data + updates used while validating a password. Operations that validate + passwords include, but are not limited to, the Bind operation where + the simple choice specifies a password, and the compare operation + where the attribute being compared holds a password. + +8.1.1 Fail if the account is locked + + If the account is locked as specified in Section 7.1, the server + fails the operation with an appropriate resultCode (i.e. + invalidCredentials (49) in the case of a bind operation, compareFalse + (5) in the case of a compare operation, etc.). The server MAY set + the error: accountLocked (1) in the passwordPolicyResponse in the + controls field of the message. + +8.1.2 AuthN Passed Procedures + + If the authentication process indicates that the password validated, + these procedures are followed in order: + +8.1.2.1 Policy state updates + + Delete the pwdFailureTime and pwdAccountLockedTime attributes. + +8.1.2.2 Password must be changed now + + If the decision in Section 7.2 returns true, the server sends to the + client a response with an appropriate successful resultCode (i.e. + success (0), compareTrue (6), etc.), and includes the + passwordPolicyResponse in the controls field of the bindResponse + message with the warning: changeAfterReset specified. + + + +Sermersheim & Poitou Expires April 24, 2005 [Page 24] -INTERNET DRAFT LDAP Password Policy 15 February 2004 - - - If the server is unable to check the length (due to a hashed - password or otherwise), the value of pwdCheckQuality MUST be - evaluated. If the value is 1, operation MUST continue. If the - value is 2, the server MUST send an addResponse to the client - with the resultCode: constraintViolation (19), and MUST - include the passwordPolicyResponse in the controls field of - the addResponse message with the error: passwordTooShort (6). - - If the server is able to check the password length, and the - check fails, the server MUST send an addResponse to the client - with the resultCode: constraintViolation (19), and MUST - include the passwordPolicyResponse in the controls field of - the addResponse message with the error: passwordTooShort (6). - - If the steps above have completed without causing an error - condition, the server MUST follow the steps below in order to update - the necessary password policy state attributes. - - 3. Check the value of the pwdMaxAge attribute. If the value is non- - zero, or if the value of the pwdMinAge attribute is non-zero, the - server MUST update the pwdChangedTime attribute on the entry to - the current time. - -6.4. Compare Operation - - The compare operation MAY be used to compare a password. This might - be performed when a client wishes to verify that user's supplied - password is correct. An example of this is an LDAP HTTP - authentication redirector. It may be desirable to use this rather - than performing a bind operation in order to reduce possible - overhead involved in performing a bind. Access Controls SHOULD be - used to restrict this comparison from being made. - - If a server supports this behavior, it MUST comply with the - following. Otherwise the password policy described in this document - may be circumvented. - - While comparing password attributes, the server MUST perform the - following steps: - - 1. Check for a locked account: - - If the value of the pwdAccountLockedTime attribute is 0, or if - the current time is less than the value of the - pwdAccountLockedTime attribute added to the value of the - pwdLockoutDuration, the account is locked. - - If the account is locked, the server MUST send a compareResponse - to the client with the resultCode: compareFalse (5), and MUST - - -Behera, et. al. Expires August 15, 2004 Page 24 +Internet-Draft Password Policy for LDAP Directories October 2004 + + + For bind, the server MUST then disallow all operations issued by this + user except modify password, bind, unbind, abandon and StartTLS + extended operation. + +8.1.2.3 Expired password + + If the password has expired as per Section 7.3, the server either + returns a success or failure based on the state of grace + authentications. + +8.1.2.3.1 Remaining Grace Authentications + + If there are remaining grace authentications as per Section 7.4, the + server adds a new value with the current time in pwdGraceUseTime. + Then it sends to the client a response with an appropriate successful + resultCode (i.e. success (0), compareTrue (6), etc.), and includes + the passwordPolicyResponse in the controls field of the response + message with the warning: graceAuthNsRemaining choice set to the + number of grace authentications left. + + Implementor's note: The system time of the host machine may be more + granular than is needed to ensure unique values of this attribute. + It is recommended that a mechanism is used to ensure unique + generalized time values. The fractional seconds field may be used + for this purpose. + +8.1.2.3.2 No Remaining Grace Authentications + + If there are no remaining grace authentications, the server fails the + operation with an appropriate resultCode (invalidCredentials (49), + compareFalse (5), etc.), and includes the passwordPolicyResponse in + the controls field of the bindResponse message with the error: + passwordExpired (0) set. + +8.1.2.4 Expiration Warning + + If the result of Section 7.5 is a positive number, the server sends + to the client a response with an appropriate successful resultCode + (i.e. success (0), compareTrue (6), etc.), and includes the + passwordPolicyResponse in the controls field of the bindResponse + message with the warning: timeBeforeExiration set to the value as + described above. Otherwise, the server sends a successful response, + and omits the passwordPolicyResponse. + +8.1.2.5 AuthN Failed Procedures + + If the authentication process indicates that the password failed + validation due to invalid credentials, these procedures are followed: + + + +Sermersheim & Poitou Expires April 24, 2005 [Page 25] -INTERNET DRAFT LDAP Password Policy 15 February 2004 - - - include the passwordPolicyResponse in the controls field of the - compareResponse message with the error: accountLocked (1). - - If the account is not locked, the server MUST proceed with the - compare operation. - - 2. If Access Controls permit, the server MUST proceed with compare - operation and MUST check the result. - - If the result of the compare operation is true, the server MUST - do the following: - - A. Delete the pwdFailureTime attribute. - - B. Check for password expiration - - The password has expired when either of the following - conditions is met: - - - If the value of the pwdExpireWarning attribute is 0, the - server MUST subtract the current time from the time stored - in pwdChangedTime to arrive at the password's age. If the - age is greater than the value in the pwdMaxAge attribute, - the password has expired. - - - If the value of the pwdExpireWarning attribute is non- - zero, and the pwdExpirationWarned attribute is present and - has a time value, the server MUST subtract the current - time from the time stored in the pwdExpirationWarned to - arrive at the first warning age. If the age is greater - than the value in the pwdExpireWarning attribute, the - password has expired. - - If the password has expired, the server MUST check for - remaining grace logins. - - If the pwdGraceUseTime attribute is present, the server - MUST count the number of values in that attribute and MUST - subtract it from the pwdGraceLoginLimit. A positive result - specifies the number of remaining grace logins. - - If there are remaining grace logins, the server MUST add a - new value with the current time in pwdGraceUseTime. Then - it MUST send a compareResponse with the resultCode: - compareTrue (6), and MUST include the - passwordPolicyResponse in the controls field of the - compareResponse message with the warning: - graceLoginsRemaining choice set to the number of grace - logins left. - - -Behera, et. al. Expires August 15, 2004 Page 25 +Internet-Draft Password Policy for LDAP Directories October 2004 + + +8.1.2.5.1 Policy state update + + Add the current time as a value of the pwdFailureTime attribute. + + Implementor's note: The system time of the host machine may be more + granular than is needed to ensure unique values of this attribute. + It is recommended that a mechanism is used to ensure unique + generalized time values. The fractional seconds field may be used + for this purpose. + +8.1.2.5.2 Lock on intruder detection + + If the check in Section 7.6 returns a true state, the server locks + the account by setting the value of the pwdAccountLockedTime + attribute to the current time. After locking the account, the server + fails the operation with an appropriate resultCode + (invalidCredentials (49), compareFalse (5), etc.), and includes the + passwordPolicyResponse in the controls field of the message with the + error: accountLocked (1). + +8.2 Password Update Operations + + Because the password is stored in an attribute, various operations + (like add and modify) may be used to create or update a password. + But some alternate mechanisms have been defined or may be defined, + such as the LDAP Password Modify Extended Operation [RFC3062]. + + While processing a password update, the server performs the following + steps: + +8.2.1 Safe Modification + + If pwdSafeModify is set to TRUE and if there is an existing password + value, the server ensures that the password update operation includes + the user's existing password. + + When the LDAP modify operation is used to modify a password, this is + done by specifying both a delete action and an add or replace action, + where the delete action is first, and specifies the existing + password, and the add or replace action specifies the new password. + Other password update operations SHOULD employ a similar mechanism. + Otherwise this policy will fail. + + If the existing password is not specified, the server does not + process the operation and sends the appropriate response message to + the client with the resultCode: insufficientAccessRights (50), and + includes the passwordPolicyResponse in the controls field of the + response message with the error: mustSupplyOldPassword (4). + + + +Sermersheim & Poitou Expires April 24, 2005 [Page 26] -INTERNET DRAFT LDAP Password Policy 15 February 2004 - - - - If there are no remaining grace logins, the server MUST - send a compareResponse with the resultCode: compareFalse - (5), and MUST include the passwordPolicyResponse in the - controls field of the compareResponse message with the - error: passwordExpired (0) set. - - If the password has not expired, execution MUST continue. - - C. Calculate whether the time before expiration warning should be - sent. - - If the pwdExpireWarning attribute is present and contains a - value, the server MUST perform the following steps. - - If the pwdExpirationWarned attribute is present and has a - time value, the warning time is the value of the - pwdExpirationWarned attribute plus the value of the - pwdExpireWarning attribute minus the current time. - - If the pwdExpirationWarned attribute is not present, the - server MUST subtract the current time from the time stored - in pwdChangedTime to arrive at the password's age. If the - age is greater than the value of the pwdMaxAge attribute - minus the value of the pwdExpireWarning attribute, the - server MUST set the current time as the value of the - pwdExpirationWarned attribute, and the warning time is the - value of pwdMaxAge minus the password's age. - - If the warning time is a positive number, the server MUST - send a compareResponse with the resultCode: compareTrue - (6), and MUST include the passwordPolicyResponse in the - controls field of the compareResponse message with the - warning: timeBeforeExiration set to the value as described - above. - - If the warning time is zero, or wasn't calculated, the - server MUST send a compareResponse with the resultCode: - compareTrue (6), and MUST include the - passwordPolicyResponse with nothing in the SEQUENCE. - - If the pwdExpireWarning attribute is not present, the server - MUST send a compareResponse with the resultCode: compareTrue - (6), and MUST include the passwordPolicyResponse with nothing - in the SEQUENCE. - - If the result of the compare operation is false, the server MUST - do the following: - - - -Behera, et. al. Expires August 15, 2004 Page 26 +Internet-Draft Password Policy for LDAP Directories October 2004 + + +8.2.2 Change After Reset + + If the decision in Section 7.2 returns true, the server ensures that + the password update operation contains no modifications other than + the modification of the password attribute. If other modifications + exist, the server sends a response message to the client with the + resultCode: insufficientAccessRights (50), and includes the + passwordPolicyResponse in the controls field of the response message + with the error: changeAfterReset (2). + +8.2.3 Rights Check + + Check to see whether the bound identity has sufficient rights to + update the password. If the bound identity is a user changing its + own password, this MAY be done by checking the pwdAllowUserChange + attribute or using an access control mechanism. The determination of + this is implementation specific. If the user is not allowed to + update her password, the server sends a response message to the + client with the resultCode: insufficientAccessRights (50), and + includes the passwordPolicyResponse in the controls field of the + response message with the error: passwordModNotAllowed (3). + +8.2.4 Too Early to Update + + If the check in Section 7.7 results in a true status The server sends + a response message to the client with the resultCode: + constraintViolation (19), and includes the passwordPolicyResponse in + the controls field of the response message with the error: + passwordTooYoung (7). + +8.2.5 Password Quality + + Check the value of the pwdCheckQuality attribute. If the value is + non-zero, the server: + + o Ensure that the password meets the quality criteria enforced by + the server. This enforcement is implementation specific. + If the server is unable to check the quality (due to a hashed + password or otherwise), the value of pwdCheckQuality is evaluated. + If the value is 1, operation continues. If the value is 2, the + server sends a response message to the client with the resultCode: + constraintViolation (19), and includes the passwordPolicyResponse + in the controls field of the response message with the error: + insufficientPasswordQuality (5). + If the server is able to check the password quality, and the check + fails, the server sends a response message to the client with the + resultCode: constraintViolation (19), and includes the + passwordPolicyResponse in the controls field of the response + + + +Sermersheim & Poitou Expires April 24, 2005 [Page 27] -INTERNET DRAFT LDAP Password Policy 15 February 2004 - - - A. Add the current time as a value of the pwdFailureTime - attribute. - - B. If the pwdLockout attribute is TRUE, the server MUST do - the following: - - Count the number of values in the pwdFailureTime - attribute that are younger than - pwdFailureCountInterval. - - If the number of these failures is greater or equal to - the pwdMaxFailure attribute, the server MUST lock the - account by setting the value of the - pwdAccountLockedTime attribute to the current time. - After locking the account, the server MUST send a - compareResponse to the client with the resultCode: - compareFalse (5), and MUST include the - passwordPolicyResponse in the controls field of the - compareResponse message with the error: accountLocked - (1). - - If the number of failures is less than the - pwdMaxFailure attribute, operation MUST proceed. - - If the pwdLockout attribute is FALSE, operation MUST - continue. - - C. Failure times that are old by more than - pwdFailureCountInterval, MUST be purged from the - pwdFailureTime attribute. - - D. If no errors were returned, the server MUST send a - compareResponse with the resultCode: compareTrue (6), and - MUST include the passwordPolicyResponse with nothing in - the SEQUENCE. - -7. Client Implementation by LDAP operation - - These sections illustrate possible scenarios for each LDAP operation - and define the types of responses that identify those scenarios. - - The scenarios in the following operations assume that the client - attached a passwordPolicyRequest control to the request message of - the operation, and thus MAY receive a passwordPolicyResponse control - in the response message. In the event that the passwordPolicyRequest - control was not sent, no passwordPolicyRequest control is returned. - All other instructions remain the same. - -7.1. Bind Operation - - -Behera, et. al. Expires August 15, 2004 Page 27 +Internet-Draft Password Policy for LDAP Directories October 2004 + + + message with the error: insufficientPasswordQuality (5). + o checks the value of the pwdMinLength attribute. If the value is + non-zero, it ensures that the new password is of at least the + minimum length. + If the server is unable to check the length (due to a hashed + password or otherwise), the value of pwdCheckQuality is evaluated. + If the value is 1, operation continues. If the value is 2, the + server sends a response message to the client with the resultCode: + constraintViolation (19), and includes the passwordPolicyResponse + in the controls field of the response message with the error: + passwordTooShort (6). + If the server is able to check the password length, and the check + fails, the server sends a response message to the client with the + resultCode: constraintViolation (19), and includes the + passwordPolicyResponse in the controls field of the response + message with the error: passwordTooShort (6). + +8.2.6 Invalid Reuse + + If pwdInHistory is present and its value is non-zero, the server + checks whether this password exists in the entry's pwdHistory + attribute or in the current password attribute. If the password does + exist in the pwdHistory attribute or in the current password + attribute, the server sends a response message to the client with the + resultCode: constraintViolation (19), and includes the + passwordPolicyResponse in the controls field of the response message + with the error: passwordInHistory (8). + +8.2.7 Policy State Updates + + If the steps have completed without causing an error condition, the + server performs the following steps in order to update the necessary + password policy state attributes: + + If the value of either pwdMaxAge or pwdMinAge is non-zero, the server + updates the pwdChangedTime attribute on the entry to the current + time. + + If the value of pwdInHistory is non-zero, the server adds the + previous password (if one existed) to the pwdHistory attribute. If + the number of attributes held in the pwdHistory attribute exceeds the + value of pwdInHistory, the server removes the oldest excess + passwords. + + If the value the pwdMustChange is TRUE and the modification is + performed by a password administrator, then the pwdReset attribute is + set to TRUE. Otherwise, the pwdReset is removed from the user's + entry if it exists. + + + +Sermersheim & Poitou Expires April 24, 2005 [Page 28] -INTERNET DRAFT LDAP Password Policy 15 February 2004 - - - - For every bind response received, the client MUST check the - resultCode of the bindResponse and MUST check for a - passwordPolicyResponse to determine if any of the following - conditions are true and MAY prompt the user accordingly. - - 1. The password failure limit has been reached and the account is - locked. The user needs to retry later or contact the directory - administrator to reset the password. - - resultCode: unwillingToPerform (53) - passwordPolicyResponse: error: accountLocked (1) - - 2. The user is binding for the first time after the directory - administrator set the password. In this scenario, the client - SHOULD prompt the user to change his password immediately. - - resultCode: success (0) - passwordPolicyResponse: error: changeAfterReset (2) - - 3. The password has expired but there are remaining grace logins. - The user needs to change it. - - resultCode: success (0) - passwordPolicyResponse: warning: graceLoginsRemaining - - 4. The password has expired and there are no more grace logins. The - user MUST contact the directory administrator in order to have - its password reset. - - resultCode: invalidCredentials (49) - passwordPolicyResponse: error: passwordExpired (0) - - 5. The user's password will expire in n number of seconds. - - resultCode: success (0) - passwordPolicyResponse: warning: timeBeforeExpiration - -7.2. Modify Operations - -7.2.1. Modify Request - - If the application or client encrypts the password prior to sending - it in a password modification operation (whether done through - modifyRequest or another password modification mechanism), it SHOULD - check the values of the pwdMinLength, and pwdCheckQuality attributes - and SHOULD enforce these policies. - -7.2.2. Modify Response - - -Behera, et. al. Expires August 15, 2004 Page 28 +Internet-Draft Password Policy for LDAP Directories October 2004 + + + The pwdFailureTime, pwdGraceUseTime and pwdExpirationWarned + attributes is removed from the user's entry if they exist. + +8.3 Other Operations + + For operations other than bind, password update, unbind, abandon or + StartTLS, if the decision in Section 7.2 returns true, the server + sends a response message to the client with the resultCode: + insufficientAccessRights (50), and includes the + passwordPolicyResponse in the controls field of the response message + with the error: changeAfterReset (2). + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Sermersheim & Poitou Expires April 24, 2005 [Page 29] -INTERNET DRAFT LDAP Password Policy 15 February 2004 - - - - If the modifyRequest operation was used to change the password, or - if another mechanism is used --such as an extendedRequest-- the - modifyResponse or other appropriate response MAY contain information - pertinent to password policy. The client MUST check the resultCode - of the response and MUST check for a passwordPolicyResponse to - determine if any of the following conditions are true and optionally - notify the user of the condition. - - 1. The user attempted to change her password without specifying the - old password but the password policy requires this. - - resultCode: unwillingToPerform (53) - passwordPolicyResponse: error: mustSupplyOldPassword (4) - - 2. The user MUST change her password before submitting any other - LDAP requests. - - resultCode: unwillingToPerform (53) - passwordPolicyResponse: error: changeAfterReset (2) - - 3. The user doesn't have sufficient rights to change his password. - - resultCode: unwillingToPerform (53) - passwordPolicyResponse: error: passwordModNotAllowed (3) - - 4. It is too soon after the last password modification to change the - password. - - resultCode: constraintViolation (19) - passwordPolicyResponse: error: passwordTooYoung (7) - - 5. The password failed quality checking. - - resultCode: constraintViolation (19) - passwordPolicyResponse: error: - insufficientPasswordQuality (5) - - 6. The length of the password is too short. - - resultCode: constraintViolation (19) - passwordPolicyResponse: error: passwordTooShort (6) - - 7. The password has already been used; the user MUST choose a - different one. - - resultCode: constraintViolation (19) - passwordPolicyResponse: error: passwordInHistory (8) - - - -Behera, et. al. Expires August 15, 2004 Page 29 +Internet-Draft Password Policy for LDAP Directories October 2004 + + +9. Client Policy Enforcement Points + + These sections illustrate possible scenarios for each LDAP operation + and define the types of responses that identify those scenarios. + + The scenarios in the following operations assume that the client + attached a passwordPolicyRequest control to the request message of + the operation, and thus may receive a passwordPolicyResponse control + in the response message. In the event that the passwordPolicyRequest + control was not sent, no passwordPolicyResponse control is returned. + All other instructions remain the same. + +9.1 Bind Operation + + For every bind response received, the client checks the resultCode of + the bindResponse and checks for a passwordPolicyResponse control to + determine if any of the following conditions are true and MAY prompt + the user accordingly. + + o bindResponse.resultCode = insufficientAccessRights (50), + passwordPolicyResponse.error = accountLocked (1): The password + failure limit has been reached and the account is locked. The + user needs to retry later or contact the password administrator to + reset the password. + o bindResponse.resultCode = success (0), + passwordPolicyResponse.error = changeAfterReset (2): The user is + binding for the first time after the password administrator set + the password. In this scenario, the client SHOULD prompt the user + to change his password immediately. + o bindResponse.resultCode = success (0), + passwordPolicyResponse.warning = graceAuthNsRemaining: The + password has expired but there are remaining grace + authentications. The user needs to change it. + o bindResponse.resultCode = invalidCredentials (49), + passwordPolicyResponse.error = passwordExpired (0): The password + has expired and there are no more grace authentications. The user + contacts the password administrator in order to have its password + reset. + o bindResponse.resultCode = success (0), + passwordPolicyResponse.warning = timeBeforeExpiration: The user's + password will expire in n number of seconds. + +9.2 Modify Operations + +9.2.1 Modify Request + + If the application or client encrypts the password prior to sending + it in a password modification operation (whether done through + + + +Sermersheim & Poitou Expires April 24, 2005 [Page 30] -INTERNET DRAFT LDAP Password Policy 15 February 2004 - - - -7.3. Add Operation - - If a password is specified in an addRequest, the client MUST check - the resultCode of the addResponse and MUST check for a - passwordPolicyResponse to determine if any of the following - conditions are true and may prompt the user accordingly. - - 1. The user doesn't have sufficient rights to add this password. - - resultCode: unwillingToPerform (53) - passwordPolicyResponse: error: passwordModNotAllowed (3) - - 2. The password failed quality checking. - - resultCode: constraintViolation (19) - passwordPolicyResponse: error: - insufficientPasswordQuality (5) - - 3. The length of the password is too short. - - resultCode: constraintViolation (19) - passwordPolicyResponse: error: passwordTooShort (6) - - -7.4. Compare Operation - - When a compare operation is used to compare a password, the client - MUST check the resultCode of the compareResponse and MUST check for - a passwordPolicyResponse to determine if any of the following - conditions are true and MAY prompt the user accordingly. These - conditions assume that the result of the comparison was true. - - 1. The password failure limit has been reached and the account is - locked. The user needs to retry later or contact the directory - administrator to reset the password. - - resultCode: compareFalse (5) - passwordPolicyResponse: error: accountLocked (1) - - 2. The password has expired but there are remaining grace logins. - The user needs to change it. - - resultCode: compareTrue (6) - passwordPolicyResponse: warning: graceLoginsRemaining - - 3. The password has expired and there are no more grace logins. The - user MUST contact the directory administrator to reset the - password. - - -Behera, et. al. Expires August 15, 2004 Page 30 +Internet-Draft Password Policy for LDAP Directories October 2004 + + + modifyRequest or another password modification mechanism), it SHOULD + check the values of the pwdMinLength, and pwdCheckQuality attributes + and SHOULD enforce these policies. + +9.2.2 Modify Response + + If the modifyRequest operation was used to change the password, or if + another mechanism is used --such as an extendedRequest-- the + modifyResponse or other appropriate response MAY contain information + pertinent to password policy. The client checks the resultCode of + the response and checks for a passwordPolicyResponse control to + determine if any of the following conditions are true and optionally + notify the user of the condition. + + o .resultCode = insufficientAccessRights (50), + passwordPolicyResponse.error = mustSupplyOldPassword (4): The user + attempted to change her password without specifying the old + password but the password policy requires this. + o .resultCode = insufficientAccessRights (50), + passwordPolicyResponse.error = changeAfterReset (2): The user must + change her password before submitting any other LDAP requests. + o .resultCode = insufficientAccessRights (50), + passwordPolicyResponse.error = passwordModNotAllowed (3): The user + doesn't have sufficient rights to change his password. + o .resultCode = constraintViolation (19), + passwordPolicyResponse.error = passwordTooYoung (7): It is too + soon after the last password modification to change the password. + o .resultCode = constraintViolation (19), + passwordPolicyResponse.error = insufficientPasswordQuality (5): + The password failed quality checking. + o .resultCode = constraintViolation (19), + passwordPolicyResponse.error = passwordTooShort (6): The length of + the password is too short. + o .resultCode = constraintViolation (19), + passwordPolicyResponse.error = passwordInHistory (8): The password + has already been used; the user must choose a different one. + +9.3 Add Operation + + If a password is specified in an addRequest, the client checks the + resultCode of the addResponse and checks for a passwordPolicyResponse + control to determine if any of the following conditions are true and + may prompt the user accordingly. + + o addResponse.resultCode = insufficientAccessRights (50), + passwordPolicyResponse.error = passwordModNotAllowed (3): The user + doesn't have sufficient rights to add this password. + + + + +Sermersheim & Poitou Expires April 24, 2005 [Page 31] -INTERNET DRAFT LDAP Password Policy 15 February 2004 - - - - resultCode: compareFalse (5) - passwordPolicyResponse: error: passwordExpired (0) - - 4. The user's password will expire in n number of seconds. - - resultCode: compareTrue (6) - passwordPolicyResponse: warning: timeBeforeExpiration - - -7.5. Other Operations - - For operations other than bind, unbind, abandon, search or StartTLS, - the client MUST check the following result code and control to - determine if the user needs to change the password immediately. - - 1. The user needs to change password. The user SHOULD be prompted to - change the password immediately. - - resultCode: unwillingToPerform (53) - passwordPolicyResponse: error: changeAfterReset (2) - -8. Administration of a Password Policy - - - A password policy MUST be defined for a particular subtree of the - DIT by adding to an LDAP subentry whose immediate superior is the - root of the subtree, the pwdPolicy auxiliary object class. - The scope of the password policy is defined by the - SubtreeSpecification attribute of the LDAP subentry as specified in - RFC 3672 [RFC-3672]. - - It is possible to define password policies for different password - attributes within the same pwdPolicy entry, by specifying multiple - values of the pwdAttribute. But password policies could also be in - separate sub entries as long as they are contained under the same - LDAP subentry. - - Modifying the password policy MUST not result in any change in - users' entries to which the policy applies. - - It SHOULD be possible to overwrite the password policy for one user - by defining a new policy in a subentry of the user entry. - - Each object that is controlled by password policy SHALL advertise - the subentry that is being used to control its policy in its - pwdPolicySubentry attribute. Clients wishing to examine or manage - password policy for an object, MUST interrogate the - - - -Behera, et. al. Expires August 15, 2004 Page 31 +Internet-Draft Password Policy for LDAP Directories October 2004 + + + o addResponse.resultCode = constraintViolation (19), + passwordPolicyResponse.error = insufficientPasswordQuality (5): + The password failed quality checking. + o addResponse.resultCode = constraintViolation (19), + passwordPolicyResponse.error = passwordTooShort (6): The length of + the password is too short. + +9.4 Compare Operation + + When a compare operation is used to compare a password, the client + checks the resultCode of the compareResponse and checks for a + passwordPolicyResponse to determine if any of the following + conditions are true and MAY prompt the user accordingly. These + conditions assume that the result of the comparison was true. + + o compareResponse.resultCode = compareFalse (5), + passwordPolicyResponse.error = accountLocked (1): The password + failure limit has been reached and the account is locked. The + user needs to retry later or contact the password administrator to + reset the password. + o compareResponse.resultCode = compareTrue (6), + passwordPolicyResponse.warning = graceAuthNsRemaining: The + password has expired but there are remaining grace + authentications. The user needs to change it. + o compareResponse.resultCode = compareFalse (5), + passwordPolicyResponse.error = passwordExpired (0): The password + has expired and there are no more grace authentications. The user + must contact the password administrator to reset the password. + o compareResponse.resultCode = compareTrue (6), + passwordPolicyResponse.warning = timeBeforeExpiration: The user's + password will expire in n number of seconds. + +9.5 Other Operations + + For operations other than bind, unbind, abandon or StartTLS, the + client checks the following result code and control to determine if + the user needs to change the password immediately. + + o .resultCode = insufficientAccessRights (50), + passwordPolicyResponse.error = : changeAfterReset (2) + + + + + + + + + + + +Sermersheim & Poitou Expires April 24, 2005 [Page 32] -INTERNET DRAFT LDAP Password Policy 15 February 2004 - - - pwdPolicySubentry for that object in order to arrive at the proper - pwdPolicy subentry. - -9. Password Policy and Replication - - The pwdPolicy object defines the password policy for a portion of - the DIT and MUST be replicated on all the replicas of this subtree, - as any subentry would be, in order to have a consistent policy among - all replicated servers. - - The elements of the password policy that are related to the users - are stored in the entry themselves as operational attributes. - As these attributes are subject to modifications even on a read-only - replica, replicating them must be carefully considered. - - The pwdChangedTime attribute MUST be replicated on all replicas, to - allow expiration of the password. - - The pwdReset attribute MUST be replicated on all replicas, to deny - access to operations other than bind and modify password. - - The pwdHistory attribute MUST be replicated to writable replicas. It - doesn't have to be replicated to a read-only replica, since the - password will never be directly modified on this server. - - The pwdAccountLockedTime, pwdExpirationWarned, pwdFailureTime and - pwdGraceUseTime attributes MUST be replicated to writable replicas, - making the password policy global for all servers. - When the user entry is replicated to a read-only replica, these - attributes SHOULD NOT be replicated. This means that the number of - failures, of grace logins and the locking will take place on each - replicated server. For example, the effective number of failed - attempts on a user password will be N x M (where N is the number of - servers and M the value of pwdMaxFailure attribute). - Replicating these attributes to a read-only replica MAY reduce the - number of tries globally but MAY also introduce some inconstancies - in the way the password policy is applied. - - -10. Security Considerations - - This document defines a set of rules to implement in an LDAP server, - in order to mitigate some of the security risks associated with the - use of passwords and to make it difficult for password cracking - programs to break into directories. - - Authentication with a password MUST follow the recommendations made - in RFC 2829 [RFC-2829]. - - - -Behera, et. al. Expires August 15, 2004 Page 32 +Internet-Draft Password Policy for LDAP Directories October 2004 + + +10. Administration of the Password Policy + + {TODO: Need to define an administrativeRole (need OID). Need to + describe whether pwdPolicy admin areas can overlap} + + A password policy is defined for a particular subtree of the DIT by + adding to an LDAP subentry whose immediate superior is the root of + the subtree, the pwdPolicy auxiliary object class. The scope of the + password policy is defined by the SubtreeSpecification attribute of + the LDAP subentry as specified in [RFC3672]. + + It is possible to define password policies for different password + attributes within the same pwdPolicy entry, by specifying multiple + values of the pwdAttribute. But password policies could also be in + separate sub entries as long as they are contained under the same + LDAP subentry. + + Modifying the password policy MUST NOT result in any change in users' + entries to which the policy applies. + + It SHOULD be possible to overwrite the password policy for one user + by defining a new policy in a subentry of the user entry. + + Each object that is controlled by password policy advertises the + subentry that is being used to control its policy in its + pwdPolicySubentry attribute. Clients wishing to examine or manage + password policy for an object may interrogate the pwdPolicySubentry + for that object in order to arrive at the proper pwdPolicy subentry. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Sermersheim & Poitou Expires April 24, 2005 [Page 33] -INTERNET DRAFT LDAP Password Policy 15 February 2004 - - - Modifications of passwords SHOULD only occur when the connection is - protected with confidentiality and secure authentication. - - Access controls SHOULD be used to restrict access to the password - policy attributes. Especially all the attributes defined to maintain - the Password Policy state information SHOULD not be modifiable by - anyone but the Administrator of the directory server. - - As it is possible to define a password policy for one specific user - by adding a subentry immediately under the user's entry, Access - Controls SHOULD be used to restrict the use of the pwdPolicy object - class or the LDAP subentry object class. - - When a password policy is put in place, the LDAP directory is - subject to a denial of service attack. A malicious user could - deliberately lock out one specific user's account (or all of them) - by sending bind requests with wrong passwords. There is no way to - protect against this kind of attack. The LDAP directory server - SHOULD log as much information as it can (such as client IP address) - whenever an account is locked, in order to be able to identify the - origin of the attack. Denying anonymous access to the LDAP directory - is also a way to restrict this kind of attacks. - - -11. Acknowledgement - - This document is based in part on prior work done by Valerie Chu - from Netscape Communications Corp, published as draft-vchu-ldap-pwd- - policy-00.txt (December 1998). - - -12. Normative References - - [RFC-2119] S. Bradner, "Key Words for use in RFCs to Indicate - Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, March 1997. - - [RFC-2195] J. Klensin, R. Catoe, P. Krumviede, "IMAP/POP AUTHorize - Extension for Simple Challenge/Response", RFC 2195, September 1997. - - [RFC-2222] J. Myers, "Simple Authentication and Security Layer - (SASL)", RFC 2222, October 1997. - - [RFC-2251] Wahl, M., Howes, T., Kille, S., "Lightweight Directory - Access Protocol (v3)", RFC 2251, August 1997. - - [RFC-2252] Wahl, M., Coulbeck, A., Howes, T., Kille, S., - "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (v3): Attribute Syntax - Definitions", RFC 2252, December 1997. - - - -Behera, et. al. Expires August 15, 2004 Page 33 +Internet-Draft Password Policy for LDAP Directories October 2004 + + +11. Password Policy and Replication + + The pwdPolicy object defines the password policy for a portion of the + DIT and MUST be replicated on all the replicas of this subtree, as + any subentry would be, in order to have a consistent policy among all + replicated servers. + + The elements of the password policy that are related to the users are + stored in the entry themselves as operational attributes. As these + attributes are subject to modifications even on a read-only replica, + replicating them must be carefully considered. + + The pwdChangedTime attribute MUST be replicated on all replicas, to + allow expiration of the password. + + The pwdReset attribute MUST be replicated on all replicas, to deny + access to operations other than bind and modify password. + + The pwdHistory attribute MUST be replicated to writable replicas. It + doesn't have to be replicated to a read-only replica, since the + password will never be directly modified on this server. + + The pwdAccountLockedTime, pwdExpirationWarned, pwdFailureTime and + pwdGraceUseTime attributes MUST be replicated to writable replicas, + making the password policy global for all servers. When the user + entry is replicated to a read-only replica, these attributes SHOULD + NOT be replicated. This means that the number of failures, of grace + authentications and the locking will take place on each replicated + server. For example, the effective number of failed attempts on a + user password will be N x M (where N is the number of servers and M + the value of pwdMaxFailure attribute). Replicating these attributes + to a read-only replica MAY reduce the number of tries globally but + MAY also introduce some inconstancies in the way the password policy + is applied. + + Servers participating in a loosely consistent multi-master + replication agreement SHOULD employ a mechanism which ensures + uniqueness of values when populating the attributes pwdFailureTime + and pwdGraceUseTime. The method of achieving this is a local matter + and may consist of using a single authoritative source for the + generation of unique time values, or may consist of the use of the + fractional seconds part to hold a replica identifier. + + + + + + + + + +Sermersheim & Poitou Expires April 24, 2005 [Page 34] -INTERNET DRAFT LDAP Password Policy 15 February 2004 - - - [RFC-Digest] Paul J. Leach, Chris Newman, "Using Digest - Authentication as a SASL Mechanism", RFC 2831, May 2000. - - [RFC-3062] K. Zeilenga, "LDAP Password Modify Extended Operation", - RFC 3062, February 2001. - - [RFC-3672] K. Zeilenga, S. Legg, "Subentries in the Lightweight - Directory Access Protocol (LDAP)", RFC 3672, December. - - -13. Authors' Addresses - - Prasanta Behera - 18366 Chelmsford Dr. - Cupertino, CA 95014 - USA - prasantabehera@yahoo.com - - Ludovic Poitou - Sun Microsystems Inc. - 180, Avenue de l'Europe - Zirst de Montbonnot - 38334 Saint Ismier cedex - France - +33 476 188 212 - ludovic.poitou@sun.com - - Jim Sermersheim - Novell, Inc. - 1800 South Novell Place - Provo, Utah 84606, USA - +1 801 861-3088 - jimse@novell.com - -14. Copyright Notice - - Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). All Rights - Reserved. - - This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to - others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it - or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published - and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any - kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph - are included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this - document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing - the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other - Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of - developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for - - -Behera, et. al. Expires August 15, 2004 Page 34 +Internet-Draft Password Policy for LDAP Directories October 2004 + + +12. Security Considerations + + This document defines a set of rules to implement in an LDAP server, + in order to mitigate some of the security risks associated with the + use of passwords and to make it difficult for password cracking + programs to break into directories. + + Authentication with a password MUST follow the recommendations made + in [RFC2829]. + + Modifications of passwords SHOULD only occur when the connection is + protected with confidentiality and secure authentication. + + Access controls SHOULD be used to restrict access to the password + policy attributes. The attributes defined to maintain the password + policy state information SHOULD only be modifiable by the password + administrator or higher authority. The pwdHistory attribute MUST be + subject to the same level of access control as the attrbute holding + the password. + + As it is possible to define a password policy for one specific user + by adding a subentry immediately under the user's entry, Access + Controls SHOULD be used to restrict the use of the pwdPolicy object + class or the LDAP subentry object class. + + When the intruder detection password policy is enforced, the LDAP + directory is subject to a denial of service attack. A malicious user + could deliberately lock out one specific user's account (or all of + them) by sending bind requests with wrong passwords. There is no way + to protect against this kind of attack. The LDAP directory server + SHOULD log as much information as it can (such as client IP address) + whenever an account is locked, in order to be able to identify the + origin of the attack. Denying anonymous access to the LDAP directory + is also a way to restrict this kind of attack. + + Returning certain status codes (such as passwordPolicyResponse.error + = accountLocked) allows a denial of service attacker to know that it + has successfully denied service to an account. Servers SHOULD + implement additional checks which return the same status when it is + sensed that some number of failed authentication requests has occured + on a single connection, or from a client address. Server + implementors are encouraged to invent other checks similar to this in + order to thwart this type of DoS attack. + + + + + + + + +Sermersheim & Poitou Expires April 24, 2005 [Page 35] -INTERNET DRAFT LDAP Password Policy 15 February 2004 - - - copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be - followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than - English. - - The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be - revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns. - - This document and the information contained herein is provided on an - "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING - TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING - BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION - HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF - MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE." - +Internet-Draft Password Policy for LDAP Directories October 2004 + + +13. Acknowledgement + + This document is based in part on prior work done by Valerie Chu from + Netscape Communications Corp, published as + draft-vchu-ldap-pwd-policy-00.txt (December 1998). Prasanta Behera + participated in early revisions of this document. + +14 Normative References + + [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate + Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. + [RFC2195] Klensin, J., Catoe, R. and P. Krumviede, "IMAP/POP + AUTHorize Extension for Simple Challenge/Response", RFC + 2195, September 1997. + [RFC2222] Myers, J., "Simple Authentication and Security Layer + (SASL)", RFC 2222, October 1997. + [RFC2251] Wahl, M., Howes, T. and S. Kille, "Lightweight Directory + Access Protocol (v3)", RFC 2251, December 1997. + [RFC2252] Wahl, M., Coulbeck, A., Howes, T. and S. Kille, + "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (v3): Attribute + Syntax Definitions", RFC 2252, December 1997. + [RFC2829] Wahl, M., Alvestrand, H., Hodges, J. and R. Morgan, + "Authentication Methods for LDAP", RFC 2829, May 2000. + [RFC2831] Leach, P. and C. Newman, "Using Digest Authentication as a + SASL Mechanism", RFC 2831, May 2000. + [RFC3062] Zeilenga, K., "LDAP Password Modify Extended Operation", + RFC 3062, February 2001. + [RFC3383] Zeilenga, K., "Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) + Considerations for the Lightweight Directory Access + Protocol (LDAP)", BCP 64, RFC 3383, September 2002. + [RFC3672] Zeilenga, K., "Subentries in the Lightweight Directory + Access Protocol (LDAP)", RFC 3672, December 2003. + [X680] International Telecommunications Union, "Abstract Syntax + Notation One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation", + ITU-T Recommendation X.680, July 2002. + [X690] International Telecommunications Union, "Information + Technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic +Sermersheim & Poitou Expires April 24, 2005 [Page 36] + +Internet-Draft Password Policy for LDAP Directories October 2004 + + + Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and + Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)", ITU-T Recommendation + X.690, July 2002. + + +Authors' Addresses + + Jim Sermersheim + Novell, Inc + 1800 South Novell Place + Provo, Utah 84606 + USA + + Phone: +1 801 861-3088 + EMail: jimse@novell.com + + Ludovic Poitou + Sun Microsystems + 180, Avenue de l'Europe + Zirst de Montbonnot, 38334 Saint Ismier cedex + France + Phone: +33 476 188 212 + EMail: ludovic.poitou@sun.com @@ -1955,7 +2061,67 @@ INTERNET DRAFT LDAP Password Policy 15 February 2004 - -Behera, et. al. Expires August 15, 2004 Page 35 + + + + + + +Sermersheim & Poitou Expires April 24, 2005 [Page 37] +Internet-Draft Password Policy for LDAP Directories October 2004 + + +Intellectual Property Statement + The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any + Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to + pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in + this document or the extent to which any license under such rights + might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has + made any independent effort to identify any such rights. Information + on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be + found in BCP 78 and BCP 79. + + Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any + assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an + attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of + such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this + specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at + http://www.ietf.org/ipr. + + The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any + copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary + rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement + this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at + ietf-ipr@ietf.org. + + +Disclaimer of Validity + + This document and the information contained herein are provided on an + "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS + OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET + ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, + INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE + INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED + WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + + +Copyright Statement + + Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). This document is subject + to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and + except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights. + + +Acknowledgment + + Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the + Internet Society. + + + + +Sermersheim & Poitou Expires April 24, 2005 [Page 38] + diff --git a/doc/drafts/draft-ietf-ldapbis-authmeth-xx.txt b/doc/drafts/draft-ietf-ldapbis-authmeth-xx.txt index 859fd449d3..958e5c6a57 100644 --- a/doc/drafts/draft-ietf-ldapbis-authmeth-xx.txt +++ b/doc/drafts/draft-ietf-ldapbis-authmeth-xx.txt @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT Editor: R. Harrison -draft-ietf-ldapbis-authmeth-13.txt Novell, Inc. -Obsoletes: 2829, 2830 October, 2004 +draft-ietf-ldapbis-authmeth-14.txt Novell, Inc. +Obsoletes: 2829, 2830 February, 2005 Intended Category: Draft Standard @@ -9,22 +9,18 @@ Intended Category: Draft Standard - LDAP: Authentication Methods and Connection Level Security Mechanisms - Status of this Memo - By submitting this Internet-Draft, I accept the provisions of Section 4 of RFC 3667. By submitting this Internet-Draft, I certify that any applicable patent or other IPR claims of which I am aware have been disclosed, and any of which I become aware will be disclosed, in accordance with RFC 3668. - This document is intended to be, after appropriate review and revision, submitted to the RFC Editor as a Standard Track document. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. Technical discussion of @@ -33,71 +29,55 @@ Status of this Memo editorial comments directly to the author . - Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- Drafts. - Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." - The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt - The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. - Copyright Notice - Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). All Rights Reserved. - Abstract - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 1] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 1] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 This document describes authentication methods and connection level security mechanisms of the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP). - This document details establishment of TLS (Transport Layer Security) using the StartTLS operation. - This document details the simple Bind authentication method including anonymous, unauthenticated, and plain-text password mechanisms and the SASL (Simple Authentication and Security Layer) Bind authentication method including DIGEST-MD5 and EXTERNAL mechanisms. - This document discusses various authentication and authorization states through which a connection to an LDAP server may pass and the actions that trigger these state changes. - Table of Contents - 1. Introduction.....................................................3 1.1. Relationship to Other Documents................................5 - 1.2. Conventions Used in this Document..............................6 - 1.2.1. Glossary of Terms............................................6 - 1.2.2. Security Terms and Concepts..................................6 - 1.2.3. Keywords.....................................................6 + 1.2. Conventions....................................................5 2. Implementation Requirements......................................6 3. StartTLS Operation...............................................7 3.1. Sequencing of the StartTLS Operation...........................7 @@ -105,124 +85,105 @@ Table of Contents 3.1.2. StartTLS Response............................................8 3.1.3. TLS Version Negotiation......................................8 3.1.4. Client Certificate...........................................8 - 3.1.5. Discovery of Resultant Security Level........................9 + 3.1.5. Discovery of Resultant Security Level........................8 3.1.6. Server Identity Check........................................9 - 3.1.7. Refresh of Server Capabilities Information..................10 + 3.1.7. Refresh of Server Capabilities Information...................9 3.2. Effects of TLS on a Client's Authorization Identity...........10 - 3.2.1. TLS Connection Establishment Effects........................10 - 3.2.2. Client Assertion of Authorization Identity..................10 - 3.2.3. TLS Connection Closure Effects..............................10 - 3.3. TLS Ciphersuites..............................................11 - 3.3.1. TLS Ciphersuites Recommendations............................11 - 4. Associations....................................................12 - 4.1. Anonymous Association on Unbound Connections..................12 + 3.3. TLS Ciphersuites..............................................10 + 3.3.1. TLS Ciphersuites Recommendations............................10 + 4. Associations....................................................11 + 4.1. Anonymous Association on Unbound Connections..................11 4.2. Anonymous Association After Failed Bind.......................12 4.3. Invalidated Associations......................................12 - 5. Bind Operation..................................................13 - 5.1. Simple Authentication Choice..................................13 - 5.2. SASL Authentication Choice....................................13 + 5. Bind Operation..................................................12 + 5.1. Simple Authentication Choice..................................12 + 5.2. SASL Authentication Choice....................................12 6. Anonymous Authentication Mechanism of Simple Bind...............13 7. Unauthenticated Authentication Mechanism of Simple Bind.........13 - - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 2] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - - 8. Simple Authentication Mechanism of Simple Bind .................14 - 9. SASL Protocol Profile...........................................15 - 9.1. SASL Service Name for LDAP....................................15 - 9.2. SASL Authentication Initiation and Protocol Exchange..........15 - 9.3. Octet Where Negotiated Security Mechanisms Take Effect........16 - 9.4. Determination of Supported SASL Mechanisms....................16 - 9.5. Rules for Using SASL Security Layers..........................17 - 9.6 Support for Multiple Authentications...........................17 - 10. SASL EXTERNAL Authentication Mechanism.........................17 - 10.1. Implicit Assertion...........................................17 - 10.2. Explicit Assertion...........................................18 - 10.3. SASL Authorization Identity..................................18 - 10.4. SASL Authorization Identity Syntax...........................18 - 11. SASL DIGEST-MD5 Authentication Mechanism.......................19 - 12. Security Considerations........................................19 - 12.1. General LDAP Security Considerations.........................19 - 12.1.1. Password-related Security Considerations...................20 + 8. Simple Authentication Mechanism of Simple Bind .................13 + 9. SASL Protocol Profile...........................................14 + 9.1. SASL Service Name for LDAP....................................14 + 9.2. SASL Authentication Initiation and Protocol Exchange..........14 + 9.3. Octet Where Negotiated Security Mechanisms Take Effect........15 + 9.4. Determination of Supported SASL Mechanisms....................15 + + +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 2] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 + + 9.5. Rules for Using SASL Layers...................................16 + 9.6 Support for Multiple Authentications...........................16 + 9.7. SASL Authorization Identities.................................16 + 10. SASL DIGEST-MD5 Authentication Mechanism.......................17 + 11. SASL EXTERNAL Authentication Mechanism.........................17 + 11.1. Implicit Assertion...........................................18 + 11.2. Explicit Assertion...........................................18 + 12. Security Considerations........................................18 + 12.1. General LDAP Security Considerations.........................18 + 12.1.1. Password-related Security Considerations...................19 12.2. StartTLS Security Considerations.............................20 - 12.3. Unauthenticated Mechanism Security Considerations............21 + 12.3. Unauthenticated Mechanism Security Considerations............20 12.4. Simple Mechanism Security Considerations.....................21 12.5. SASL DIGEST-MD5 Mechanism Security Considerations............21 - 12.6. Related Security Considerations..............................22 - 13. IANA Considerations............................................22 - Acknowledgments....................................................22 - Normative References...............................................22 + 12.6. Related Security Considerations..............................21 + 13. IANA Considerations............................................21 + Acknowledgments....................................................21 + Normative References...............................................21 Informative References.............................................23 - Author's Address...................................................24 - Appendix A. Association State Transition Tables....................24 - A.1. Association States............................................24 - A.2. Actions that Affect Association State.........................25 - A.3. Decisions Used in Making Association State Changes............25 - A.4. Association State Transition Table............................25 - Appendix B. Authentication and Authorization Concepts..............26 - B.1. Access Control Policy.........................................26 - B.2. Access Control Factors........................................26 - B.3. Authentication, Credentials, Identity.........................27 - B.4. Authorization Identity........................................27 - Appendix C. RFC 2829 Change History................................27 - Appendix D. RFC 2830 Change History................................31 - Appendix E. RFC 2251 Change History................................32 - Appendix F. Change History to Combined Document....................32 - Added implementation requirement that server implementations ......45 + Author's Address...................................................23 + Appendix A. Association State Transition Tables....................23 + A.1. Association States............................................23 + A.2. Actions that Affect Association State.........................24 + A.3. Association State Transition Table............................24 + Appendix B. Authentication and Authorization Concepts..............25 + B.1. Access Control Policy.........................................25 + B.2. Access Control Factors........................................25 + B.3. Authentication, Credentials, Identity.........................25 + B.4. Authorization Identity........................................25 + Appendix C. RFC 2829 Change History................................26 + Appendix D. RFC 2830 Change History................................30 + Appendix E. RFC 2251 Change History................................30 + Appendix F. Change History to Combined Document....................31 Intellectual Property Rights.......................................45 - 1. Introduction - The Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) [Roadmap] is a powerful protocol for accessing directories. It offers means of - - - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 3] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - searching, retrieving and manipulating directory content, and ways to access a rich set of security functions. - It is vital that these security functions be interoperable among all LDAP clients and servers on the Internet; therefore there has to be a minimum subset of security functions that is common to all implementations that claim LDAP conformance. - Basic threats to an LDAP directory service include: - (1) Unauthorized access to directory data via data-retrieval - operations, - - (2) Unauthorized access to directory data by monitoring others' - access, +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 3] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 - (3) Unauthorized access to reusable client authentication - information by monitoring others' access, + (1) Unauthorized access to directory data via data-retrieval + operations. + (2) Unauthorized access to directory data by monitoring others' + access. - (4) Unauthorized modification of directory data, + (3) Unauthorized access to reusable client authentication + information by monitoring others' access. + (4) Unauthorized modification of directory data. (5) Unauthorized modification of configuration information, - (6) Denial of Service: Use of resources (commonly in excess) in a - manner intended to deny service to others, - + manner intended to deny service to others. (7) Spoofing: Tricking a user or client into believing that information came from the directory when in fact it did not, @@ -231,67 +192,54 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 information to a hostile entity that appears to be the directory server but is not. Tricking a directory server into believing that information came from a particular client when in fact it - came from a hostile entity, and - + came from a hostile entity. (8) Hijacking: An attacker seizes control of an established protocol session. - Threats (1), (4), (5), (6), (7) are (8) are active attacks. Threats (2) and (3) are passive attacks. - Threats (1), (4), (5) and (6) are due to hostile clients. Threats (2), (3), (7) and (8) are due to hostile agents on the path between client and server or hostile agents posing as a server, e.g. IP spoofing. - - LDAP offers the following security mechanisms: - (1) Authentication by means of the Bind operation. The Bind operation provides a simple method which supports anonymous, - unauthenticated, and authenticated with password mechanisms, and + unauthenticated, and authenticated-with-password mechanisms, and the Secure Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) method which supports a wide variety of authentication mechanisms, - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 4] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - - (2) Mechanisms to support vendor-specific access control facilities (LDAP does not offer a standard access control facility) - (3) Data integrity protection by means of security layers in TLS or SASL mechanisms, - (4) Data confidentiality protection by means of security layers in TLS or SASL mechanisms, + +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 4] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 + (5) Server resource usage limitation by means of administrative limits configured on the server, and - (6) Server authentication by means of the TLS protocol or SASL - mechanism. - + mechanisms. LDAP may also be protected by means outside the LDAP protocol, e.g. with IP-level security [RFC2401]. - At the moment, imposition of access controls is done by means outside the scope of LDAP. - Considering the above requirements, experience has shown that simply allowing implementations to pick and choose among the possible alternatives is not a strategy that leads to interoperability. In @@ -300,7 +248,6 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 they will support only clear text passwords that provide inadequate security for most circumstances. - It is desirable to allow clients to authenticate using a variety of mechanisms including mechanisms where identities are represented as distinguished names [X.501] [Models] in string form [LDAPDN] or are @@ -311,7 +258,6 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 implement mechanism for establishing transport-layer security services. - The set of security mechanisms provided in LDAP and described in this document is intended to meet the security needs for a wide range of deployment scenarios and still provide a high degree of @@ -320,58 +266,53 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 mechanisms that might be used to achieve a reasonable level of security in various circumstances. - 1.1. Relationship to Other Documents - This document is an integral part of the LDAP Technical Specification [Roadmap]. - This document obsoletes RFC 2829. - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 5] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - - Sections 2 and 4 of RFC 2830 are obsoleted by [Protocol]. The remainder of RFC 2830 is obsoleted by this document. +1.2. Conventions -1.2. Conventions Used in this Document - - -1.2.1. Glossary of Terms - - - The following terms are used in this document. To aid the reader, - these terms are defined here. - - - - "user" represents any human or application entity which is - accessing the directory using a directory client. A directory - client (or client) is also known as a directory user agent (DUA). + The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", + "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this + document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. - - "connection" refers to the underlying transport protocol - connection used to carry the protocol exchange. +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 5] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 - - "TLS connection" refers to an LDAP connection with TLS - protection [TLS]. + The term "user" represents any human or application entity which is + accessing the directory using a directory client. A directory + client (or client) is also known as a directory user agent (DUA). + The term "transport connection" refers to the underlying transport + services used to carry the protocol exchange, as well as + associations established by these services. - - "association" refers to the association that exists between the - connection to its current authorization state. As a shorthand, - an association with an authorization state of can be - referred to as a " association", e.g. an association with - an anonymous authorization state is an anonymous association. + The term "TLS layer" refers to TLS services used in providing + security services, as well as associations established by these + services. + The term "SASL layer" refers to SASL services used in providing + security services, as well as associations established by these + services. -1.2.2. Security Terms and Concepts + The term "LDAP message layer" refers to the LDAP Message (PDU) + services used in providing directory services, as well as + associations established by these services. + The term "association" refers to the association that exists between + the transport connection and its current authorization state. As a + shorthand, an association with an authorization state of can + be referred to as a " association", e.g. an association with + an anonymous authorization state is an anonymous association. In general, security terms in this document are used consistently with the definitions provided in [RFC2828]. In addition, several @@ -383,109 +324,87 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 unfamiliar with security-related concepts are encouraged to review Appendix C before reading the remainder of this document. - -1.2.3. Keywords - - - The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", - "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this - document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. - - 2. Implementation Requirements - LDAP server implementations MUST support the anonymous - authentication mechanism of simple bind (as discussed in Section 6). - + authentication mechanism of simple bind (section 6). LDAP implementations that support any authentication mechanism other than the anonymous authentication mechanism of simple bind MUST - support the DIGEST-MD5 [DIGEST-MD5] mechanism of SASL bind (as - detailed in section 11). DIGEST-MD5 is a reasonably strong - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 6] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - + support the DIGEST-MD5 [DIGEST-MD5] mechanism of SASL bind (section + 10). DIGEST-MD5 is a reasonably strong authentication mechanism + that provides (mandatory-to-implement) data security (data integrity + and data confidentiality) services. - authentication mechanism that provides (mandatory-to-implement) data - security (data integrity and data confidentiality) services. + LDAP implementations SHOULD support the simple (DN and password) + authentication mechanism of simple bind (section 8). + Implementations that support this authentication mechanism MUST be + capable of protecting using TLS as established by the StartTLS + operation (section 3), SHOULD disallow the use of this +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 6] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 - LDAP impementations SHOULD support the simple (DN and password) - authentication mechanism of simple bind (as detailed in section 8). - Implementations that support this mechanism MUST be capable of - protecting it by establishment of TLS (as discussed in section 3) or - other suitable suitable data confidentiality and data integrity - protection (e.g. IPSec). - + authentication mechanism by default when suitable data security + services are not in place, and MAY provide other suitable data + security services for use with this authentication mechanism. Implementations MAY support additional authentication mechanisms. Some of these mechanisms are discussed below. - LDAP server implementations SHOULD support client assertion of authorization identity via the SASL EXTERNAL mechanism (sections 3.2.2 and 9). - - LDAP server implementations SHOULD support the StartTLS operation, - and server implementations that do support the StartTLS operation - MUST support the TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA ciphersuite. - + LDAP server implementations SHOULD support the StartTLS operation + (section 3), and server implementations that do support the StartTLS + operation MUST support the TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + ciphersuite. 3. StartTLS Operation - The Start Transport Layer Security (StartTLS) operation defined in section 4.14 of [Protocol] provides the ability to establish TLS [TLS] on an LDAP connection. - The goals of using the TLS [TLS] protocol with LDAP are to ensure data confidentiality and integrity, and to optionally provide for authentication. TLS expressly provides these capabilities, although the authentication services of TLS are available to LDAP only in combination with the SASL EXTERNAL authentication method (see - section 10), and then only if the SASL EXTERNAL implementation + section 11), and then only if the SASL EXTERNAL implementation chooses to make use of the TLS credentials. - 3.1. Sequencing of the StartTLS Operation - This section describes the overall procedures clients and servers must follow for TLS establishment. These procedures take into consideration various aspects of the association including discovery of resultant security level and assertion of the client's authorization identity. - 3.1.1. StartTLS Request - A client may send the StartTLS extended request at any time after establishing an LDAP connection, except: - - when TLS is currently established on the connection, - when a multi-stage SASL negotiation is in progress on the connection, or - when it has not yet received responses for all operation requests previously issued on the connection. - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 7] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - As described in [Protocol] Section 4.14.2.2, a (detected) violation of any of these requirements results in a return of the operationsError resultCode. + +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 7] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 + Client implementers should ensure that they strictly follow these operation sequencing requirements to prevent interoperability issues. Operational experience has shown that violating these @@ -494,216 +413,143 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 these requirements due to server hardware speed, network latencies, etc. - There is no general requirement that the client have or have not already performed a Bind operation (section 4) before sending a StartTLS operation request. - - If the client did not establish a TLS connection before sending a - request and the server requires the client to establish a TLS - connection before performing that request, the server MUST reject - that request by sending a resultCode of confidentialityRequired. - - 3.1.2. StartTLS Response - The server will return an extended response with the resultCode of success if it is willing and able to negotiate TLS. - - It will return a resultCode other than success (documented in + It will return a resultCode other than success (as documented in [Protocol] section 4.13.2.2) if it is unwilling or unable to do so. The state of the association is unaffected if a non-success resultCode is returned. - In the successful case, the client (which has ceased to transfer LDAP requests on the connection) MUST either begin a TLS negotiation or close the connection. The client will send PDUs in the TLS Record Protocol directly over the underlying transport connection to the - server to initiate [TLS] negotiation. - + server during TLS negotiation. 3.1.3. TLS Version Negotiation - Negotiating the version of TLS to be used is a part of the TLS Handshake Protocol [TLS]. Please refer to that document for details. - 3.1.4. Client Certificate - If an LDAP server requests a client to provide its certificate during TLS negotiation and the client does not present a suitable certificate (e.g. one that can be validated), the server may use a local security policy to determine whether to successfully complete - TLS negotiation. - - - If the client provides a certificate that can be validated, - information in the certificate may be used by the server in - establishing the client's authorization identity by use of the SASL - EXTERNAL mechanism as discussed in Section 9. - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 8] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - + TLS negotiation. + If a client that has provided a suitable certificate subsequently + binds using the SASL EXTERNAL authentication mechanism (section 9), + information in the certificate may be used by the server to + establish the client's authorization identity. 3.1.5. Discovery of Resultant Security Level - - After a TLS connection is established on an LDAP connection, both + After a TLS layer is established on a transport connection, both parties are to individually decide whether or not to continue based on the security level achieved. The procedure for ascertaining the - TLS connection's security level is implementation dependent. + TLS layer's security level is implementation dependent. + + +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 8] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 If the client or server decides that the security level is not high - enough for it to continue, it SHOULD gracefully close the TLS + enough for it to continue, it SHOULD gracefully remove the TLS connection immediately after the TLS negotiation has completed (see [Protocol] section 4.13.3.1 and section 3.2.3 below). The client - may then close the connection, attempt to StartTLS again, send an - unbind request, or send any other LDAP request. - + may then close the transport connection, attempt to StartTLS again, + send an unbind request, or send any other LDAP request. 3.1.6. Server Identity Check - The client MUST check its understanding of the server's hostname against the server's identity as presented in the server's Certificate message in order to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks. - Matching is performed according to these rules: - - The client MUST use the server name provided by the user (or other trusted entity) as the value to compare against the server name as expressed in the server's certificate. A hostname derived from user input is to be considered provided by the user only if derived in a secure fashion (e.g., DNSSEC). - - If a subjectAltName extension of type dNSName is present in the certificate, it SHOULD be used as the source of the server's identity. - - The string values to be compared MUST be prepared according to the rules described in [Matching]. - - The "*" wildcard character is allowed. If present, it applies only to the left-most name component. - For example, *.bar.com would match a.bar.com and b.bar.com, but it would not match a.x.bar.com nor would it match bar.com. If more than one identity of a given type is present in the - certificate (e.g. more than one dNSName name), a match in any + certificate (e.g. more than one dNSName name), a match with any one of the set is considered acceptable. - If the hostname does not match the dNSName-based identity in the certificate per the above check, user-oriented clients SHOULD either notify the user (clients may give the user the opportunity to - continue with the connection in any case) or terminate the + continue with the LDAP session in this case) or close the transport connection and indicate that the server's identity is suspect. - Automated clients SHOULD close the connection, returning and/or - logging an error indicating that the server's identity is suspect. - - - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 9] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - + Automated clients SHOULD close the connection and then return + and/or log an error indicating that the server's identity is suspect. Beyond the server identity checks described in this section, clients SHOULD be prepared to do further checking to ensure that the server - is authorized to provide the service it is observed to provide. The + is authorized to provide the service it is requested to provide. The client may need to make use of local policy information in making this determination. - 3.1.7. Refresh of Server Capabilities Information - Upon TLS session establishment, the client SHOULD discard or refresh + +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 9] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 + + Upon installing a TLS layer, the client SHOULD discard or refresh all information about the server it obtained prior to the initiation of the TLS negotiation and not obtained through secure mechanisms. This protects against man-in-the-middle attacks that may have altered any server capabilities information retrieved prior to TLS - establishment. - + layer installation. - The server may advertise different capabilities after TLS - establishment. In particular, the value of supportedSASLMechanisms - may be different after TLS has been negotiated (specifically, the + The server may advertise different capabilities after installing a + TLS layer. In particular, the value of supportedSASLMechanisms may + be different after a TLS layer has been installed (specifically, the EXTERNAL and PLAIN [PLAIN] mechanisms are likely to be listed only - after a TLS negotiation has been performed). - + after a TLS layer has been installed). 3.2. Effects of TLS on a Client's Authorization Identity - - This section describes the effects on a client's authorization - identity brought about by establishing TLS on an LDAP connection. - The default effects are described first, and next the facilities for - client assertion of authorization identity are discussed including - error conditions. Finally, the effects of closing the TLS connection - are described. - - - Authorization identities and related concepts are described in - Appendix B. - - -3.2.1. TLS Connection Establishment Effects - - - The decision to keep or invalidate the established state of the - association (section 4.3) after TLS connection establishment is a - matter of local server policy. - - -3.2.2. Client Assertion of Authorization Identity - - - After successfully establishing a TLS session, a client may request - that its certificate exchanged during the TLS establishment be - utilized to determine the authorization identity of the association. - The client accomplishes this via an LDAP Bind request specifying a - SASL mechanism of EXTERNAL [SASL] (section 10). - - -3.2.3. TLS Connection Closure Effects - - The decision to keep or invalidate the established state of the - association after TLS closure is a matter of local server policy. - + association (section 4.3) after TLS layer installation or removal is + a matter of local server policy. 3.3. TLS Ciphersuites - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 10] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - Several issues should be considered when selecting TLS ciphersuites that are appropriate for use in a given circumstance. These issues include the following: - - The ciphersuite's ability to provide adequate confidentiality - protection for passwords and other data sent over the LDAP + protection for passwords and other data sent over the transport connection. Client and server implementers should recognize that some TLS ciphersuites provide no confidentiality protection while other ciphersuites that do provide confidentiality @@ -711,104 +557,91 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 methods, especially in light of ever-increasing CPU speeds that reduce the time needed to successfully mount such attacks. - - Client and server implementers should carefully consider the + - Client and server implementers should carefully consider the value of the password or data being protected versus the level of confidentially protection provided by the ciphersuite to ensure that the level of protection afforded by the ciphersuite is appropriate. - - The ciphersuite's vulnerability (or lack thereof) to man-in-the- middle attacks. Ciphersuites vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks SHOULD NOT be used to protect passwords or sensitive data, unless the network configuration is such that the danger of a man-in-the-middle attack is tolerable. - 3.3.1. TLS Ciphersuites Recommendations - [[TODO: Kurt will have someone from security to look at this and will propose how to handle discussion of specific TLS ciphersuites in this draft.]] - As of the writing of this document, the following recommendations regarding TLS ciphersuites are applicable. Because circumstances are + +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 10] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 + constantly changing, this list must not be considered exhaustive, but is hoped that it will serve as a useful starting point for implementers. - The following ciphersuites defined in [TLS] MUST NOT be used for confidentiality protection of passwords or data: - TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5 TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA - The following ciphersuites defined in [TLS] can be cracked easily (less than a day of CPU time on a standard CPU in 2000) and are NOT RECOMMENDED for use in confidentiality protection of passwords or data: - TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5 TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5 TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA TLS_DH_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA TLS_DH_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 11] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA TLS_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5 TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA - The following ciphersuites are vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks: - TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5 TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA - 4. Associations - Every LDAP connection has an associated authorization state referred to as the "association". The Bind operation defined in section 4.2 of [Protocol] and discussed further in section 5 below allows information to be exchanged between the client and server to change the authorization state of the association. - 4.1. Anonymous Association on Unbound Connections - Prior to the successful completion of a Bind operation and during any subsequent authentication exchange, the association has an anonymous authorization state. Among other things this implies that - the client need not send a Bind Request in the first PDU of the - connection. The client may send any operation request prior to + the client need not send a Bind Request in the first PDU of the LDAP + message layer. The client may send any operation request prior to binding, and the server MUST treat it as if it had been performed after an anonymous bind operation (section 6). This association state is sometimes referred to as an implied anonymous bind. -4.2. Anonymous Association After Failed Bind +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 11] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 +4.2. Anonymous Association After Failed Bind Upon receipt of a Bind request, the association is moved to an anonymous state and only upon successful completion of the @@ -816,196 +649,146 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 moved to an authenticated state. Thus, a failed Bind operation produces an anonymous association. - 4.3. Invalidated Associations - The server may move the association to an invalidated state at any time, e.g. if an established security layer between the client and - server has unexpectedly failed or been compromised. While the - connection has an invalid association, the server may reject any + server has unexpectedly failed or been compromised. While the LDAP + session has an invalidated association, the server may reject any operation request other than Bind, Unbind, and StartTLS by - responding with a resultCode of strongAuthRequired to indicate that - the server requires stronger authentication before it will attempt - to perform the requested operation. In practice, this means that the - client needs to bind to(re)establish a suitably strong authorization - - - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 12] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - - state on the association before the server will attempt to perform - the requested operation. - + responding with a resultCode of strongerAuthRequired to indicate + that the server requires stronger authentication before it will + attempt to perform the requested operation. In practice, this means + that the client needs to bind to(re)establish a suitably strong + authorization state on the association before the server will + attempt to perform the requested operation. 5. Bind Operation - The Bind operation ([Protocol] section 4.2) allows authentication information to be exchanged between the client and server to establish a new authorization state on the association. - The Bind request typically specifies the desired authentication identity. Some Bind mechanisms also allow the client to specify the authorization identity. If the authorization identity is not specified, the server derives it from the authentication identity in an implementation-specific manner. - If the authorization identity is specified the server MUST verify that the client's authentication identity is permitted to assume (e.g. proxy for) the asserted authorization identity. The server MUST reject the Bind operation with an invalidCredentials resultCode in the Bind response if the client is not so authorized. - 5.1. Simple Authentication Choice - The simple authentication choice of the Bind Operation provides three authentication mechanisms: + 1. An anonymous authentication mechanism (section 6), - 1. an anonymous authentication mechanism (section 6), - + 2. An unauthenticated authentication mechanism (section 7), and - 2. an unauthenticated authentication mechanism (section 7), and - - - 3. a simple authentication mechanism using credentials consisting + 3. A simple authentication mechanism using credentials consisting of a name (in the form of an LDAP distinguished name [LDAPDN]) and a password (section 8). - 5.2. SASL Authentication Choice +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 12] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 + The sasl authentication choice of the Bind Operation provides facilities for using any SASL mechanism (sections 9-11) including authentication mechanisms and other services (e.g. data security services). - 6. Anonymous Authentication Mechanism of Simple Bind - An LDAP client may use the anonymous authentication mechanism of the simple Bind choice to explicitly establish an anonymous association - by sending a Bind request with a name value of zero length and with - the simple authentication choice containing a password value of zero - length. - + by sending a Bind request with a name value of zero length and + specifying the simple authentication choice containing a password + value of zero length. 7. Unauthenticated Authentication Mechanism of Simple Bind - An LDAP client may use the unauthenticated authentication mechanism of the simple Bind choice to establish an anonymous association by sending a Bind request with a name value, a distinguished name in - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 13] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - - LDAP string form [LDAPDN], of non-zero length, and specifying the - the simple authentication choice containing a password value of zero + LDAP string form [LDAPDN] of non-zero length, and specifying the the + simple authentication choice containing a password value of zero length. - Unauthenticated binds can have significant security issues (see section 12.3). Servers SHOULD by default reject unauthenticated bind requests with a resultCode of invalidCredentials, and clients may need to actively detect situations where they would unintentionally make an unauthenticated bind request. - 8. Simple Authentication Mechanism of Simple Bind - An LDAP client may use the simple authentication mechanism of the simple Bind choice to establish an authenticated association by sending a Bind request with a name value, a distinguished name in - LDAP string form [LDAPDN], and specifying the simple authentication - choice containing an OCTET STRING password value of non-zero length. - + LDAP string form [LDAPDN] of non-zero length, and specifying the + simple authentication choice containing an OCTET STRING password + value of non-zero length. Servers that map the DN sent in the bind request to a directory entry with an associated set of one or more passwords used with this - mechanism, will compare the presented password to that set of + mechanism will compare the presented password to that set of passwords. The presented password is considered valid if it matches any member of this set. - - If the DN is syntactically invalid, the server returns the - invalidDNSyntax result code. If the DN is syntactically correct but - not valid for purposes of authentication, or the password is not + A resultCode of invalidDNSyntax indicates that the DN sent in the + name value is syntactically invalid. A resultCode of + invalidCredentials indicates that the DN is syntactically correct + but not valid for purposes of authentication, or the password is not valid for the DN, or the server otherwise considers the credentials - to be invalid, the server returns the invalidCredentials result - code. The server is only to return the success result code when the - credentials are valid and the server is willing to provide service - to the entity these credentials identify. + to be invalidA resultCode of success indicates that the credentials + are valid and the server is willing to provide service to the entity + these credentials identify. + + +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 13] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 Server behavior is undefined for bind requests specifying the simple authentication mechanism with a zero-length name value and a password value of non-zero length. - - The simple authentication mechanism of simple bind is not suitable for authentication in environments where there is no network or - transport layer confidentiality. LDAP implementations SHALL NOT - support this mechanism unless they are capable of protecting it by - establishment of TLS (as discussed in section 3) or other suitable - data confidentiality and data integrity protection(e.g. IPSec). LDAP - implementations SHOULD support authentication with the "simple" - authentication choice when the connection is protected against - eavesdropping using TLS, as defined in section 3. LDAP - implementations SHOULD NOT support authentication with the "simple" - authentication choice unless the data on the connection is protected - using TLS or other data confidentiality and data integrity - protection. - + transport layer confidentiality.x 9. SASL Protocol Profile - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 14] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - LDAP allows authentication via any SASL mechanism [SASL]. As LDAP includes native anonymous and simple (plain text) authentication methods, the ANONYMOUS [ANONYMOUS] and PLAIN [PLAIN] SASL mechanisms are typically not used with LDAP. - Each protocol that utilizes SASL services is required to supply certain information profiling the way they are exposed through the protocol ([SASL] section 5). This section explains how each of these profiling requirements are met by LDAP. - 9.1. SASL Service Name for LDAP - The SASL service name for LDAP is "ldap", which has been registered with the IANA as a SASL service name. - 9.2. SASL Authentication Initiation and Protocol Exchange - - SASL authentication is initiated via an LDAP bind request + SASL authentication is initiated via an LDAP Bind request ([Protocol] section 4.2) with the following parameters: - - The version is 3. - The AuthenticationChoice is sasl. - The mechanism element of the SaslCredentials sequence contains @@ -1015,55 +798,52 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 mechanisms that are defined to have the client send data first (see [SASL] sections 5 and 5.1). - In general, a SASL authentication protocol exchange consists of a series of server challenges and client responses, the contents of which are specific to and defined by the SASL mechanism. Thus for some SASL authentication mechanisms, it may be necessary for the client to respond to one or more server challenges by invoking the - BindRequest multiple times. A challenge is indicated by the server - sending a BindResponse with the resultCode set to + Bind operation multiple times. A challenge is indicated by the + server sending a BindResponse PDU with the resultCode set to saslBindInProgress. This indicates that the server requires the - client to send a new bind request with the same sasl mechanism to + client to send a new BindRequest PDU with the same sasl mechanism to continue the authentication process. - - To the LDAP protocol, these challenges and responses are opaque + To LDAP message layer, these challenges and responses are opaque binary tokens of arbitrary length. LDAP servers use the - serverSaslCreds field, an OCTET STRING, in a bind response message - to transmit each challenge. LDAP clients use the credentials field, - an OCTET STRING, in the SaslCredentials sequence of a bind request - message to transmit each response. Note that unlike some Internet - protocols where SASL is used, LDAP is not text-based, thus no Base64 - transformations are performed on these challenge and response values. + serverSaslCreds field, an OCTET STRING, in a BindResponse PDU + message to transmit each challenge. LDAP clients use the credentials + +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 14] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 + field, an OCTET STRING, in the SaslCredentials sequence of a + BindRequest PDU message to transmit each response. Note that unlike + some Internet protocols where SASL is used, LDAP is not text based, + thus no Base64 transformations are performed on these challenge and + response values. - Clients sending a bind request with the sasl choice selected SHOULD + Clients sending a BindRequest with the sasl choice selected SHOULD send an zero-length value in the name field. Servers receiving a bind request with the sasl choice selected SHALL ignore any value in the name field. - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 15] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - A client may abort a SASL bind negotiation by sending a BindRequest with a different value in the mechanism field of SaslCredentials, or an AuthenticationChoice other than sasl. If the client sends a BindRequest with the sasl mechanism field as - an empty string, the server MUST return a BindResponse with - authMethodNotSupported as the resultCode. This will allow clients to + an empty string, the server MUST return a BindResponse with a + resultCode of authMethodNotSupported. This will allow the client to abort a negotiation if it wishes to try again with the same SASL mechanism. The server indicates completion of the SASL challenge-response - exchange by responding with a bind response in which the resultCode - is either success, or an error indication. - + exchange by responding with a BindResponse in which the resultCode + is not saslBindInProgress (either success or another error + indication). The serverSaslCreds field in the BindResponse can be used to include an optional challenge with a success notification for mechanisms @@ -1073,218 +853,121 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 SHALL omit the serverSaslCreds field (rather than including the field with a zero-length value). - 9.3. Octet Where Negotiated Security Mechanisms Take Effect + SASL layers take effect following the transmission by the server and + reception by the client of the final successful BindResponse in the + exchange. - SASL security layers take effect following the transmission by the - server and reception by the client of the final successful - BindResponse in the exchange. - - - Once a SASL security layer providing data integrity or - confidentiality services takes effect, the layer remains in effect - until a new layer is installed (i.e. at the first octet following - the final BindResponse of the bind operation that caused the new - layer to take effect). Thus, an established SASL security layer is - not affected by a failed or non-SASL Bind. - + Once a SASL layer providing data integrity or confidentiality + services takes effect, the layer remains in effect until a new layer + is installed (i.e. at the first octet following the final + BindResponse of the bind operation that caused the new layer to take + effect). Thus, an established SASL layer is not affected by a + failed or non-SASL Bind. 9.4. Determination of Supported SASL Mechanisms - Clients may determine the SASL mechanisms a server supports by reading the supportedSASLMechanisms attribute from the root DSE (DSA-Specific Entry) ([Models] section 5.1). The values of this attribute, if any, list the mechanisms the server supports in the - current LDAP session state. LDAP servers SHOULD allow an - anonymously-bound client to retrieve the supportedSASLMechanisms - attribute of the root DSE. +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 15] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 - Because SASL mechanisms provide critical security functions, clients + current LDAP session state. LDAP servers SHOULD allow a client with + an anonymous association to retrieve the supportedSASLMechanisms + attribute of the root DSE. + + Because SASL mechanisms provide critical security functions, clients and servers should be configurable to specify what mechanisms are acceptable and allow only those mechanisms to be used. Both clients and servers must confirm that the negotiated security level meets their requirements before proceeding to use the connection. +9.5. Rules for Using SASL Layers -9.5. Rules for Using SASL Security Layers - - - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 16] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - - If a SASL security layer is negotiated, the client SHOULD discard - information about the server it obtained prior to the initiation of - the SASL negotiation and not obtained through secure mechanisms. - - - If a lower level security layer (such as TLS) is negotiated, any - SASL security services SHALL be layered on top of such security - layers regardless of the order of their negotiation. In all other - respects, SASL security services and other security layers act - independently, e.g. if both TLS and SASL security service are in - effect then removing the SASL security service does not affect the - continuing service of TLS and vice versa. + If a SASL layer is installed, the client SHOULD discard information + about the server it obtained prior to the initiation of the SASL + negotiation and not obtained through secure mechanisms. + If a lower level security layer (such as TLS) is installed, any SASL + layer SHALL be layered on top of such security layers regardless of + the order of their negotiation. In all other respects, the SASL + layer and other security layers act independently, e.g. if both a + TLS layer and a SASL layer are in effect then removing the SASL + layer does not affect the continuing service of the TLS layer and + vice versa. 9.6 Support for Multiple Authentications - LDAP supports multiple SASL authentications as defined in [SASL] section 6.3. +9.7. SASL Authorization Identities -10. SASL EXTERNAL Authentication Mechanism - - - A client can use the SASL EXTERNAL [SASL] mechanism to request the - LDAP server to authenticate and establish a resulting authorization - identity using security credentials exchanged by a lower security - layer (such as by TLS authentication or IP-level security - [RFC2401]). - - - The authorization identity used to determine the state of the - association is derived from the security credentials in an - implementation-specific manner. If the client's authentication - credentials have not been established at a lower security layer, the - SASL EXTERNAL bind MUST fail with a resultCode of - inappropriateAuthentication. Although this situation has the effect - of leaving the association in an anonymous state (section 5), the - state of any established security layer is unaffected. - - - A client may either implicitly request that its authorization - identity be derived from its authentication credentials exchanged at - a lower security layer or it may explicitly provide an authorization - identity and assert that it be used in combination with those - authentication credentials. The former is known as an implicit - assertion, and the latter as an explicit assertion. - - -10.1. Implicit Assertion - - - An implicit authorization identity assertion is performed by - invoking a Bind request of the SASL form using the EXTERNAL - mechanism name that does not include the optional credentials octet - string (found within the SaslCredentials sequence in the Bind - Request). The server will derive the client's authorization identity - from the authentication identity supplied by the security layer - (e.g., a public key certificate used during TLS establishment) - according to local policy. The underlying mechanics of how this is - accomplished are implementation specific. - - -10.2. Explicit Assertion - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 17] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - - - An explicit authorization identity assertion is performed by - invoking a Bind request of the SASL form using the EXTERNAL - mechanism name that includes the credentials octet string. This - string MUST be constructed as documented in section 10.4. - - -10.3. SASL Authorization Identity - - - When the EXTERNAL SASL mechanism is being negotiated, if the - SaslCredentials credentials field is present, it contains an - authorization identity. Other mechanisms define the location of the - authorization identity in the credentials field. In either case, the - authorization identity is represented in the authzId form described - below. - - -10.4. SASL Authorization Identity Syntax - - - The authorization identity is a string of UTF-8 [RFC3629] encoded - [Unicode] characters corresponding to the following ABNF [RFC2234] - grammar: - + Some SASL mechanisms allow clients to request a desired + authorization identity for the association. The decision to allow or + disallow the current authentication identity to have access to the + requested authorization identity is a matter of local policy ([SASL] + section 4.2). The authorization identity is a string of UTF-8 + [RFC3629] encoded [Unicode] characters corresponding to the + following ABNF [RFC2234] grammar: authzId ::= dnAuthzId / uAuthzId - DNCOLON ::= %x64 %x6e %x3a ; "dn:" UCOLON ::= %x75 %x3a ; "u:" - ; distinguished-name-based authz id. dnAuthzId ::= DNCOLON distinguishedName - ; unspecified authorization id, UTF-8 encoded. uAuthzId ::= UCOLON userid userid ::= *UTF8 ; syntax unspecified - where the production is defined in section 3 of - [LDAPDN] and production is defined in section 1.3 of [Models]. + [LDAPDN] and the production is defined in section 1.3 of + [Models]. + +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 16] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 In order to support additional specific authorization identity forms, future updates to this specification may add new choices supporting other forms of the authzId production. - The dnAuthzId choice is used to assert authorization identities in the form of a distinguished name to be matched in accordance with - the distinguishedNameMatch matching rule [Syntaxes]. The decision to - allow or disallow an authentication identity to have access to the - requested authorization identity is a matter of local policy ([SASL] - section 4.2). For this reason there is no requirement that the - asserted dn be that of an entry in the directory. - + the distinguishedNameMatch matching rule [Syntaxes]. There is no + requirement that the asserted distinguishedName value be that of an + entry in the directory. The uAuthzId choice allows clients to assert an authorization identity that is not in distinguished name form. The format of userid is defined as only a sequence of UTF-8 [RFC3629] encoded [Unicode] characters, and any further interpretation is a local - matter. To compare uAuthzID values, each uAuthzID value MUST be - - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 18] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - - prepared using [SASLPrep] and then the two values are compared - octet-wise. - - - For example, the userid could identify a user of a specific + matter. For example, the userid could identify a user of a specific directory service, be a login name, or be an email address. A - uAuthzId SHOULD NOT be assumed to be globally unique. - + uAuthzId SHOULD NOT be assumed to be globally unique. To compare + uAuthzID values, each uAuthzID value MUST be prepared using + [SASLPrep] and then the two values are compared octet-wise. -11. SASL DIGEST-MD5 Authentication Mechanism +10. SASL DIGEST-MD5 Authentication Mechanism - - LDAP servers that implement any authentication method or mechanism - other than simple anonymous bind MUST implement the SASL - DIGEST-MD5 mechanism [DIGEST-MD5]. This provides client + The SASL DIGEST-MD5 mechanism [DIGEST-MD5] provides client authentication with protection against passive eavesdropping attacks but does not provide protection against man-in-the-middle attacks. DIGEST-MD5 also provides data integrity and data confidentiality capabilities. - Support for subsequent authentication ([DIGEST-MD5] section 2.2) is OPTIONAL in clients and servers. - Implementers must take care to ensure that they maintain the semantics of the DIGEST-MD5 specification even when handling data that has different semantics in the LDAP protocol. @@ -1301,33 +984,78 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 being compared semantically as LDAP DNs because the cn attribute is defined to be case insensitive, however the two values are not equivalent if they represent username values in DIGEST-MD5 because - [SASLPrep] semantics are used by DIGEST-MD5. + [SASLPrep] semantics are used by DIGEST-MD5. +11. SASL EXTERNAL Authentication Mechanism -12. Security Considerations + A client can use the SASL EXTERNAL [SASL] mechanism to request the + LDAP server to authenticate and establish a resulting authorization +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 17] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 + + identity using security credentials exchanged by a lower security + layer (such as by TLS authentication or IP-level security + [RFC2401]). + + The authorization identity used to determine the resulting + association is derived from the security credentials in an + implementation-specific manner. If the client's authentication + credentials have not been established at a lower security layer, the + SASL EXTERNAL bind MUST fail with a resultCode of + inappropriateAuthentication. Although this situation has the effect + of leaving the association in an anonymous state (section 5), the + state of any installed security layer is unaffected. + + A client may either request that its authorization identity be + automatically derived from its authentication credentials exchanged + at a lower security layer or it may explicitly provide an + authorization identity desired for the association. The former is + known as an implicit assertion, and the latter as an explicit + assertion. + +11.1. Implicit Assertion + + An implicit authorization identity assertion is performed by + invoking a Bind request of the SASL form using the EXTERNAL + mechanism name that does not include the optional credentials field + (found within the SaslCredentials sequence in the BindRequest). The + server will derive the client's authorization identity from the + authentication identity supplied by a security layer (e.g., a public + key certificate used during TLS layer installation) according to + local policy. The underlying mechanics of how this is accomplished + are implementation specific. + +11.2. Explicit Assertion + + An explicit authorization identity assertion is performed by + invoking a Bind request of the SASL form using the EXTERNAL + mechanism name that includes the credentials field (found within the + SaslCredentials sequence in the BindRequest). The value of the + credentials field, an octet string, is the asserted authorization + identity and MUST be constructed as documented in section 9.7. + +12. Security Considerations Security issues are discussed throughout this document. The unsurprising conclusion is that security is an integral and necessary part of LDAP. This section discusses a number of LDAP- related security considerations. - 12.1. General LDAP Security Considerations - LDAP itself provides no security or protection from accessing or updating the directory by other means than through the LDAP protocol, e.g. from inspection by database administrators. Access - control SHOULD always be applied when reading sensitive information - or updating directory information. - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 19] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 18] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 + control SHOULD always be applied when reading sensitive information + or updating directory information. Servers can minimize denial of service attacks by providing the ability to configure and enforce administrative limits on @@ -1335,28 +1063,31 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 unwillingToPerform resultCode rather than performing computationally expensive operations requested by unauthorized clients. - A connection on which the client has not established connection integrity and privacy services (e.g via StartTLS, IPSec or a suitable SASL mechanism) is subject to man-in-the-middle attacks to view and modify information in transit. Client and server - implementors SHOULD take measures to protect confidential data from - these attacks by using data protection services as discussed in this - document. - + implementors SHOULD take measures to protect confidential data in + the LDAP session from these attacks by using data protection + services as discussed in this document. Clients and servers should + provide the ability to be configured to require these protections. + A resultCode of confidentialityRequired indicates that the server + requires establishment of (stronger) data confidentiality protection + in order to perform the requested operation. 12.1.1. Password-related Security Considerations - LDAP allows multi-valued password attributes. In systems where entries are expected to have one and only one password, administrative controls should be provided to enforce this behavior. - The use of clear text passwords and other unprotected authentication credentials is strongly discouraged over open networks when the - underlying transport service cannot guarantee confidentiality. - + underlying transport service cannot guarantee confidentiality. LDAP + implementations SHOULD NOT support authentication methods using + cleartext passwords and other unprotected authentication credentials + unless the data on the connection is protected using TLS or other + data confidentiality and data integrity protection. The transmission of passwords in the clear--typically for authentication or modification--poses a significant security risk. @@ -1365,26 +1096,25 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 negotiating transport or session layer data confidentiality services before transmitting password values. - To mitigate the security risks associated with the transfer of passwords, a server implementation that supports any password-based authentication mechanism that transmits passwords in the clear MUST support a policy mechanism that at the time of authentication or password modification, requires: - - A StartTLS encryption layer has been successfully negotiated. - + A TLS layer has been successfully installed. OR - Some other data confidentiality mechanism that protects the password value from snooping has been provided. +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 19] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 - OR + OR The server returns a resultCode of confidentialityRequired for the operation (i.e. simple bind with password value, SASL bind @@ -1392,22 +1122,12 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 including a userPassword value, etc.), even if the password value is correct. - 12.2. StartTLS Security Considerations - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 20] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - - - All security gained via use of the StartTLS operation is gained by the use of TLS itself. The StartTLS operation, on its own, does not provide any additional security. - The level of security provided though the use of TLS depends directly on both the quality of the TLS implementation used and the style of usage of that implementation. Additionally, a man-in-the- @@ -1415,29 +1135,24 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 supportedExtension attribute of the root DSE. Both parties SHOULD independently ascertain and consent to the security level achieved once TLS is established and before beginning use of the TLS - connection. For example, the security level of the TLS connection - might have been negotiated down to plaintext. - + connection. For example, the security level of the TLS layer might + have been negotiated down to plaintext. - Clients SHOULD by default either warn the user when the security + Clients SHOULD by default either warn the user when the security level achieved does not provide an acceptable level of data confidentiality and/or data integrity protection, or be configured to refuse to proceed without an acceptable level of security. - Server implementors SHOULD allow server administrators to elect whether and when data confidentiality and integrity are required, as well as elect whether authentication of the client during the TLS handshake is required. - Implementers should be aware of and understand TLS security considerations as discussed in the TLS specification [TLS]. - 12.3. Unauthenticated Mechanism Security Considerations - Operational experience shows that clients can (and frequently do) misuse the unauthenticated authentication mechanism of simple bind (see section 7). For example, a client program might make a @@ -1446,160 +1161,135 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 implementations may return a success response to an unauthenticated bind request thus leaving the client with the impression that the server has successfully authenticated the identity represented by - the user name, when in effect, an anonymous association has been + the user name when in reality, an anonymous association has been established. Clients that use the results from a simple bind operation to make authorization decisions should actively detect unauthenticated bind requests (by verifying that the supplied password is not empty) and react appropriately. -12.4. Simple Mechanism Security Considerations +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 20] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 +12.4. Simple Mechanism Security Considerations The simple authentication mechanism of simple bind discloses the password to the server, which is an inherent security risk. There are other mechanisms such as DIGEST-MD5 that do not disclose password to server. - 12.5. SASL DIGEST-MD5 Mechanism Security Considerations - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 21] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - The SASL DIGEST-MD5 mechanism is prone to the qop substitution attack, as discussed in 3.6 of [DIGEST-MD5]. The qop substitution attack can be mitigated (as discussed in 3.6 of [DIGEST-MD5]). - The SASL DIGEST-MD5 mechanism [DIGEST-MD5] provides client authentication with protection against passive eavesdropping attacks but does not provide protection against man-in-the-middle attacks. - Implementers should be aware of and understand DIGEST-MD5 security considerations as discussed in the DIGEST-MD5 specification [DIGEST- MD5]. - 12.6. Related Security Considerations - Additional security considerations relating to the various authentication methods and mechanisms discussed in this document - apply and can be found in [SASL], [SASLPrep], [StringPrep] and + apply and can be found in [SASL], [SASLPrep], [StringPrep] and [RFC3629]. - 13. IANA Considerations - The following IANA considerations apply to this document: - It is requested that the IANA update the LDAP Protocol Mechanism registry to indicate that this document and [Protocol] provide the definitive technical specification for the StartTLS (1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.20037) extended operation. - [[TODO: add any missing IANA Considerations.]] - Acknowledgments - This document combines information originally contained in RFC 2829 and RFC 2830. The editor acknowledges the work of Harald Tveit Alvestrand, Jeff Hodges, Tim Howes, Steve Kille, RL "Bob" Morgan , and Mark Wahl, each of whom authored one or more of these documents. - This document is based upon input of the IETF LDAP Revision working group. The contributions and suggestions made by its members in shaping the contents and technical accuracy of this document is greatly appreciated. - Normative References + +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 21] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 + [[Note to the RFC Editor: please replace the citation tags used in referencing Internet-Drafts with tags of the form RFCnnnn.]] - [RFC2234] Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax Specifications: ABNF", RFC 2234, November 1997. - [DIGEST-MD5] Leach, P. C. Newman, and A. Melnikov, "Using Digest Authentication as a SASL Mechanism", draft-ietf-sasl- rfc2831bis-xx.txt, a work in progress. - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 22] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key Words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. - [LDAPDN] Zeilenga, Kurt D. (editor), "LDAP: String Representation of Distinguished Names", draft-ietf- ldapbis-dn-xx.txt, a work in progress. - [Matching] Hoffman, Paul and Steve Hanna, "Matching Text Strings in PKIX Certificates", draft-hoffman-pkix-stringmatch- xx.txt, a work in progress. - [Models] Zeilenga, Kurt D. (editor), "LDAP: Directory Information Models", draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-xx.txt, a work in progress. - [Protocol] Sermersheim, J., "LDAP: The Protocol", draft-ietf- ldapbis-protocol-xx.txt, a work in progress. - [Roadmap] K. Zeilenga, "LDAP: Technical Specification Road Map", draft-ietf-ldapbis-roadmap-xx.txt, a work in progress. - [SASL] Melnikov, A. (editor), "Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL)", draft-ietf-sasl-rfc2222bis- xx.txt, a work in progress. - [SASLPrep] Zeilenga, K., "Stringprep profile for user names and passwords", draft-ietf-sasl-saslprep-xx.txt, (a work in progress). - [StringPrep] M. Blanchet, "Preparation of Internationalized Strings ('stringprep')", draft-hoffman-rfc3454bis-xx.txt, a work in progress. - [Syntaxes] Legg, S. (editor), "LDAP: Syntaxes and Matching Rules", draft-ietf-ldapbis-syntaxes-xx.txt, a work in progress. - [TLS] Dierks, T. and C. Allen. "The TLS Protocol Version 1.1", draft-ietf-tls-rfc2246-bis-xx.txt, a work in progress. - [RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646", RFC 3629, STD 63, November 2003. + +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 22] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 + [Unicode] The Unicode Consortium, "The Unicode Standard, Version 3.2.0" is defined by "The Unicode Standard, Version 3.0" (Reading, MA, Addison-Wesley, 2000. ISBN 0-201- @@ -1609,34 +1299,22 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 "Unicode Standard Annex #28: Unicode 3.2" (http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr28/). - Informative References - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 23] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - [ANONYMOUS] Zeilenga, K.,"Anonymous SASL Mechanism", draft- zeilenga-sasl-anon-xx.txt, a work in progress. - [RFC2828] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary", RFC 2828, May 2000. - [PLAIN] Zeilenga, K.,"Plain SASL Mechanism", draft-zeilenga- sasl-plain-xx.txt, a work in progress. - [RFC2401] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol", RFC 2401, November 1998. - Author's Address - Roger Harrison Novell, Inc. 1800 S. Novell Place @@ -1645,167 +1323,108 @@ Author's Address +1 801 861 2642 roger_harrison@novell.com - Appendix A. Association State Transition Tables - This section provides a state transition table to represent a state diagram for the various authentication states through which an association may pass during the course of its existence and the actions that cause these changes in state. - This section is based entirely on information found in this document and other documents that are part of the LDAP Technical Specification [Roadmap]. As such, it is strictly informational in nature. - A.1. Association States - The following table lists the valid association states and provides a description of each state. The ID for each state is used in the - state transition table in section A.4. - + state transition table in section A.3. - ID State Description + ID Association State Description -- -------------------------------------------------------------- + + +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 23] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 + S1 Anonymous no Authentication ID is associated with the LDAP connection no Authorization ID is in force S2 Authenticated Authentication ID = I Authorization ID = X - S3 Authenticated SASL EXTERNAL, implicit authorization ID - Authentication ID = J - Authorization ID = Y - - - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 24] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - - S4 Authenticated SASL EXTERNAL, explicit authorization ID Z - Authentication ID = J - Authorization ID = Z - S5 Invalidated - + S3 Invalidated A.2. Actions that Affect Association State - The following table lists the actions that can affect the authentication and authorization state of an association. The ID for - each action is used in the state transition table in section A.4. - + each action is used in the state transition table in section A.3. ID Action -- -------------------------------------------------------------- A1 Client bind request fails A2 Client successfully performs anonymous simple bind or unauthenticated simple bind - A3 Client successfully performs simple bind with name and password - OR SASL bind with any mechanism except EXTERNAL using an - authentication ID = I that maps to authorization ID X - A4 Client Binds SASL EXTERNAL with implicit assertion of - authorization ID (section 9.1). The current authentication ID - maps to authorization ID = Y. - A5 Client Binds SASL EXTERNAL with explicit assertion of - authorization ID = Z (section 9.2). - A6 Client StartTLS request fails - A7 Client StartTLS request succeeds - A8 Client or Server: graceful TLS removal - A9 Server decides to invalidate current association state - - -A.3. Decisions Used in Making Association State Changes - - - Certain changes in the authentication and authorization state of an - association are only allowed if the server can affirmatively answer - a question. These questions are applied as part of the criteria for - allowing or disallowing a state transition in the state transition - table in section A.4. - - - ID Decision Question - -- -------------------------------------------------------------- - D1 Are lower-layer credentials available? - D2 Can lower-layer credentials for Auth ID "K" be mapped to - asserted AuthZID "L"? - - -A.4. Association State Transition Table - + A3 Client successfully binds producing an authentication ID of I. + Authentication ID I maps to authorization ID X. Depending on + the bind mechanism and associated parameters authorization ID X + was either derived from authentication ID I or was explicitly + requested as part of the bind operation. + A4 Client StartTLS request fails + A5 Client StartTLS request succeeds + A6 Client or Server: graceful TLS layer removal + A7 Server decides to invalidate current association state + +A.3. Association State Transition Table The Association table below lists the the actions that could affect the authorization state of an association and the resulting state of an association after a given action occurs. - S1, the initial state for the state machine described in this table, is the association state when an LDAP connection is initially established. + Next State + Action Comment + ---------------- --------------- ------------------------------- + A1 S1 Section 4 + A2 S1 Sections 6 and 7 + A3 S2 + A4 no change [Protocol] section 4.14.2.2 + A5 no change or S3* [Protocol] section 4.14.2.1 + A6 no change or S3* [Protocol] section 4.14.3.1 + A7 S3 + * The server may invalidate the association after installing or + removing a TLS layer (section 3.2). -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 25] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - - Next State - Action Comment - ------------------ ----------- -------------------------------- - A1 S1 Section 4 - A2 S1 Sections 6 & 7 - A3 S2 Sections 8, 9 - A4, S1 Failed bind, section 10.1 - D1=no - A4, S3 - D1=yes - A5, S1 Failed bind, section 10.2 - D1=no - A5, S1 Failed bind, section 10.2 - D1=yes, - D2=no - A5, S4 - D1=yes, D2=yes - A6 no change* [Protocol] section 4.14.2.2 - A7 no change* [Protocol] section 4.14.2.1 - A8 S1 [Protocol] section 4.14.3.1 - A9 S5 - - - * The server may invalidate the association after TLS - establishment or closure (section 3.2). +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 24] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 Appendix B. Authentication and Authorization Concepts - This appendix defines basic terms, concepts, and interrelationships regarding authentication, authorization, credentials, and identity. These concepts are used in describing how various security approaches are utilized in client authentication and authorization. - B.1. Access Control Policy - An access control policy is a set of rules defining the protection of resources, generally in terms of the capabilities of persons or other entities accessing those resources. Security objects and mechanisms, such as those described here, enable the expression of access control policies and their enforcement. - B.2. Access Control Factors - A request, when it is being processed by a server, may be associated with a wide variety of security-related factors (section 4.2 of [Protocol]). The server uses these factors to determine whether and @@ -1816,22 +1435,13 @@ B.2. Access Control Factors associated with the connection via which the request is transmitted, others (e.g. time of day) may be "environmental". - Access control policies are expressed in terms of access control factors. E.g., a request having ACFs i,j,k can perform operation Y - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 26] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - on resource Z. The set of ACFs that a server makes available for such expressions is implementation-specific. - B.3. Authentication, Credentials, Identity - Authentication credentials are the evidence supplied by one party to another, asserting the identity of the supplying party (e.g. a user) who is attempting to establish a new association state with the @@ -1840,7 +1450,6 @@ B.3. Authentication, Credentials, Identity the identity they assert. An authentication identity is the name presented in a credential. - There are many forms of authentication credentials -- the form used depends upon the particular authentication mechanism negotiated by the parties. For example: X.509 certificates, Kerberos tickets, @@ -1848,17 +1457,20 @@ B.3. Authentication, Credentials, Identity mechanism may constrain the form of authentication identities used with it. - B.4. Authorization Identity - An authorization identity is one kind of access control factor. It is the name of the user or other entity that requests that operations be performed. Access control policies are often expressed + + +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 25] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 + in terms of authorization identities; e.g., entity X can perform operation Y on resource Z. - The authorization identity bound to an association is often exactly the same as the authentication identity presented by the client, but it may be different. SASL allows clients to specify an authorization @@ -1873,160 +1485,118 @@ B.4. Authorization Identity authorization identity from the authentication credentials supplied by a client is performed in an implementation-specific manner. - Appendix C. RFC 2829 Change History - This appendix lists the changes made to the text of RFC 2829 in preparing this document. - C.0. General Editorial Changes Version -00 - - Changed other instances of the term LDAP to LDAP where v3 of the protocol is implied. Also made all references to LDAP use the same wording. - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 27] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - - Miscellaneous grammatical changes to improve readability. - - Made capitalization in section headings consistent. - Version -01 - - Changed title to reflect inclusion of material from RFC 2830 and 2251. - C.1. Changes to Section 1 - Version -01 - - Moved conventions used in document to a separate section. - C.2. Changes to Section 2 - Version -01 - - Moved section to an appendix. - C.3. Changes to Section 3 - Version -01 - - Moved section to an appendix. +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 26] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 + - Moved section to an appendix. C.4 Changes to Section 4 - Version -00 - - Changed "Distinguished Name" to "LDAP distinguished name". - C.5. Changes to Section 5 - Version -00 - - Added the following sentence: "Servers SHOULD NOT allow clients with anonymous authentication to modify directory entries or access sensitive information in directory entries." - C.5.1. Changes to Section 5.1 - Version -00 - - Replaced the text describing the procedure for performing an anonymous bind (protocol) with a reference to section 4.2 of RFC 2251 (the protocol spec). - Version -01 - - Brought text describing procedure for performing an anonymous bind from section 4.2 of RFC 2251 bis. This text will be removed from the draft standard version of that document. - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 28] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - - C.6. Changes to Section 6. - Version -00 - Reorganized text in section 6.1 as follows: - 1. Added a new section (6.1) titled "Simple Authentication" and moved one of two introductory paragraphs for section 6 into section 6.1. Added sentences to the paragraph indicating: - a. simple authentication is not suitable for environments where confidentiality is not available. - b. LDAP implementations SHOULD NOT support simple authentication unless confidentiality and data integrity mechanisms are in force. - 2. Moved first paragraph of section 6 (beginning with "LDAP implementations MUST support authentication with a password...") to section on Digest Authentication (Now section 6.2). - C.6.1. Changes to Section 6.1. - Version -00 Renamed section to 6.2 +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 27] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 + - Added sentence from original section 6 indicating that the DIGEST-MD5 SASL mechanism is required for all conforming LDAP implementations - C.6.2. Changes to Section 6.2 - Version -00 - - Renamed section to 6.3 - - Reworded first paragraph to remove reference to user and the userPassword password attribute Made the first paragraph more general by simply saying that if a directory supports simple @@ -2034,422 +1604,311 @@ C.6.2. Changes to Section 6.2 following negotiation of a TLS ciphersuite that supports confidentiality. - - Replaced "the name of the user's entry" with "a DN" since not all bind operations are performed on behalf of a "user." - - Added Section 6.3.1 heading just prior to paragraph 5. - - Paragraph 5: replaced "The server" with "DSAs that map the DN sent in the bind request to a directory entry with a userPassword attribute." - C.6.3. Changes to section 6.3. - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 29] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - Version -00 - - Renamed to section 6.4. - C.7. Changes to section 7. - none - C.7.1. Changes to section 7.1. - Version -00 - - Clarified the entity issuing a certificate by moving the phrase "to have issued the certificate" immediately after "Certification Authority." - C.8. Changes to section 8. - Version -00 - - Removed the first paragraph because simple authentication is covered explicitly in section 6. - - Added section 8.1. heading just prior to second paragraph. - - Added section 8.2. heading just prior to third paragraph. +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 28] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 + - Added section 8.2. heading just prior to third paragraph. - Added section 8.3. heading just prior to fourth paragraph. - Version -01 - - Moved entire section 8 of RFC 2829 into section 3.4 (Using SASL for Other Security Services) to bring material on SASL mechanisms together into one location. - C.9. Changes to section 9. - Version -00 - - Paragraph 2: changed "EXTERNAL mechanism" to "EXTERNAL SASL mechanism." - - Added section 9.1. heading. - - Modified a comment in the ABNF from "unspecified userid" to "unspecified authz id". - - Deleted sentence, "A utf8string is defined to be the UTF-8 encoding of one or more ISO 10646 characters," because it is redundant. - - Added section 9.1.1. heading. - - Added section 9.1.2. heading. - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 30] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - - Version -01 - - Moved entire section 9 to become section 3.5 so that it would be with other SASL material. - C.10. Changes to Section 10. - Version -00 - - Updated reference to cracking from a week of CPU time in 1997 to be a day of CPU time in 2000. - - Added text: "These ciphersuites are NOT RECOMMENDED for use... and server implementers SHOULD" to sentence just prior the second list of ciphersuites. - - Added text: "and MAY support other ciphersuites offering equivalent or better protection," to the last paragraph of the section. - C.11. Changes to Section 11. - Version -01 - - Moved to section 3.6 to be with other SASL material. +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 29] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 + - Moved to section 3.6 to be with other SASL material. C.12. Changes to Section 12. - Version -00 - - Inserted new section 12 that specifies when SASL protections begin following SASL negotiation, etc. The original section 12 is renumbered to become section 13. - Version -01 - - Moved to section 3.7 to be with other SASL material. - C.13. Changes to Section 13 (original section 12). - None - Appendix D. RFC 2830 Change History - This appendix lists the changes made to the text of RFC 2830 in preparing this document. - D.0. General Editorial Changes - - Material showing the PDUs for the StartTLS response was broken out into a new section. - - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 31] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - - The wording of the definition of the StartTLS request and StartTLS response was changed to make them parallel. NO changes were made to the ASN.1 definition or the associated values of the parameters. - - A separate section heading for graceful TLS closure was added for parallelism with section on abrupt TLS closure. - Appendix E. RFC 2251 Change History - This appendix lists the changes made to the text of RFC 2251 in preparing this document. - E.0. General Editorial Changes - - All material from section 4.2 of RFC 2251 was moved into this document. - - A new section was created for the Bind Request - - Section 4.2.1 of RFC 2251 (Sequencing Bind Request) was moved after the section on the Bind Response for parallelism with the presentation of the StartTLS operations. The section was also subdivided to explicitly call out the various effects being described within it. + +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 30] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 + - All SASL profile information from RFC 2829 was brought within the discussion of the Bind operation (primarily sections 4.4 - 4.7). - Appendix F. Change History to Combined Document - F.1. Changes for draft-ldap-bis-authmeth-02 - General - - Added references to other LDAP standard documents, to sections within the document, and fixed broken references. - - General editorial changes--punctuation, spelling, formatting, etc. - Section 1. - - Added glossary of terms and added sub-section headings - Section 2. - - Clarified security mechanisms 3, 4, & 5 and brought language in line with IETF security glossary. - Section 3. - - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 32] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - - Brought language in requirement (3) in line with security glossary. - - Clarified that information fetched prior to initiation of TLS negotiation must be discarded - -Clarified that information fetched prior to initiation of SASL negotiation must be discarded - - Rewrote paragraph on SASL negotiation requirements to clarify intent - Section 4.4. - - Added stipulation that sasl choice allows for any SASL mechanism not prohibited by this document. (Resolved conflict between this statement and one that prohibited use of ANONYMOUS and PLAIN SASL mechanisms.) - Section 5.3.6 - - Added a.x.bar.com to wildcard matching example on hostname check. - Section 6 + + +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 31] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 + - Added Association State Transition Tables to show the various states through which an association may pass along with the actions and decisions required to traverse from state to state. - Appendix A - - Brought security terminology in line with IETF security glossary throughout the appendix. - F.2. Changes for draft-ldapbis-authmeth-03 - General - - Added introductory notes and changed title of document and references to conform to WG chair suggestions for the overall technical specification. - - Several issues--H.13, H.14, H.16, H.17--were resolved without requiring changes to the document. - Section 3 - - Removed reference to /etc/passwd file and associated text. - Section 4 - - Removed sections 4.1, 4.2 and parts of section 4.3. This information was being duplicated in the protocol specification and will now reside there permanently. - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 33] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - Section 4.2 - - changed words, "not recommended" to "strongly discouraged" - Section 4.3 - - Based on ldapbis WG discussion at IETF52 two sentences were added indicating that clients SHOULD NOT send a DN value when binding with the sasl choice and servers SHALL ignore any value received in this circumstance. - - Section 8.3.1 - - Generalized the language of this section to not refer to any specific password attribute or to refer to the directory entry as a "user" entry. - Section 11 - - Added security consideration regarding misuse of unauthenticated access. - - Added security consideration requiring access control to be applied only to authenticated users and recommending it be + +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 32] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 + applied when reading sensitive information or updating directory information. - F.3. Changes for draft-ldapbis-authmeth-04 - General - - Changed references to use [RFCnnnn] format wherever possible. (References to works in progress still use [name] format.) - Various edits to correct typos and bring field names, etc. in line with specification in [Protocol] draft. - - Several issues--H.13, H.14, H.16, H.17--were resolved without requiring changes to the document. - Section 4.4.1. - - Changed ABNF grammar to use productions that are like those in the model draft. - Section 5 - - Removed sections 5.1, 5.2, and 5.4 that will be added to [Protocol]. Renumbered sections to accommodate this change. - - Section 6 - - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 34] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - - Reviewed Association State table for completeness and accuracy. Renumbered actions A3, , and A5 to be A5, A3, and A4 respectively. Re-ordered several lines in the table to ensure @@ -2458,10 +1917,8 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 was missing and valid. Added actions A7 and A8 placeholders to states S1, S2, S4 and S5 pending resolution of issue H.28. - Section 11 - - Modified security consideration (originally added in -03) requiring access control to be applied only to authenticated users. This seems nonsensical because anonymous users may have @@ -2469,34 +1926,32 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - Section 13 - - Verified all normative references and moved informative references to a new section 14. - F.4. Changes for draft-ldapbis-authmeth-05 - General - - General editory changes to fix punctuation, spelling, line length issues, etc. + +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 33] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 + - Verified and updated intra- and inter-document references throughout. - Document-wide review for proper usage of RFC 2119 keywords with several changes to correct improper usage. - Abstract - Updated to match current contents of documents. This was needed due to movement of material on Bind and StartTLS operations to [Protocol] in this revision. - Section 3. - - Renamed section to "Rationale for LDAP Security Mechanisms" and removed text that did not support this theme. Part of the motivation for this change was to remove the implication of the @@ -2504,351 +1959,259 @@ F.4. Changes for draft-ldapbis-authmeth-05 other text found in the section that everything in the section was a requirement - - Information from several removed paragraphs that describe deployment scenarios will be added Appendix A in the next revision of the draft. - - Paragraph beginning, " If TLS is negotiated, the client MUST discard all information..." was moved to section 5.1.7 and integrated with related material there. - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 35] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - - Paragraph beginning, "If a SASL security layer is negotiated..." was moved to section 4.2 - Section 4.l. - - Changed wording of first paragraph to clarify meaning. - Section 4.2. - Added paragraph from section 3 of -04 beginning, "If a SASL security layer is negotiated..." - Section 4.3.3. - Renamed to "Other SASL Mechanisms" and completely rewrote the section (one sentence) to generalize the treatment of SASL mechanisms not explicitly mentioned in this document. - Section 4.4.1. - - Added paragraph beginning, "The dnAuthzID choice allows client applications..." to clarify whether DN form authorization identities have to also have a corresponding directory entry. This change was based on editor's perception of WG consensus. - - Made minor clarifying edits in the paragraph beginning, "The uAuthzID choice allows for compatibility..." - Section 5.1.1. +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 34] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 + Section 5.1.1. - Made minor clarifying edits in the last paragraph of the section. - Section 5.1.7. - - Wording from section 3 paragraph beginning " If TLS is negotiated, the client MUST discard all information..." was moved to this section and integrated with existing text. - Section 5.2. - - Changed usage of "TLS connection" to "TLS session" throughout. - - Removed empty section 5.2.1 and renumbered sections it had previously contained. - Section 8. - - Added introductory paragraph at beginning of section. + Section 8.1. - Section 8.1. - - - - Changed term "data privacy" to "data confidentiality" to be - consistent with usage in rest of document. - - - Section 8.2. - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 36] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - + - Changed term "data privacy" to "data confidentiality" to be + consistent with usage in rest of document. + Section 8.2. - Changed first paragraph to require implementations that implement *password-based* authentication to implement and support DIGEST-MD5 SASL authentication. - Section 11. - - First paragraph: changed "session encryption" to "session confidentiality protection" to be consistent with usage in rest of document. - Appendix B. - - Began changes to incorporate information on deployment scenarios removed from section 3. - F.5. Changes for draft-ldapbis-authmeth-06 - General - - Combined Section 2 (Introduction) and Section 3 (Motivation) and moved Introduction to section 1. All following sections numbers were decremented by one as result. - - Edits to fix typos, I-D nits, etc. +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 35] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 + - Opened several new issues in Appendix G based on feedback from WG. Some of these have been resolved. Others require further discussion. - Section 1 - - Added additional example of spoofing under threat (7). - Section 2.1 - - Changed definition of "association" and added terms, "connection" and "TLS connection" to bring usage in line with [Protocol]. - Section 4.1.6 - - Clarified sentence stating that the client MUST NOT use derived forms of DNS names. - Section 5.1 - - Began edits to association state table to clarify meaning of various states and actions. - - Added action A9 to cover abandoned bind operation and added appropriate transitions to the state transition table to accommodate it. - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 37] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - Section 7.2 - - Replaced first paragraph to clarify that the "DIGEST-MD5" SASL mechanism is required to implement. - Section 9 - - Rewrote the section to make the advice more applicable over the long term, i.e. more "timeless." The intent of content in the original section was preserved. - Section 10 - - Added a clarifying example to the consideration regarding misuse of unauthenticated access. - F.6. Changes for draft-ldapbis-authmeth-07 - General - - Updated external and internal references to accommodate changes in recent drafts. - - Opened several new issues in Appendix G based on feedback from WG. Some of these have been resolved. Others require further discussion. +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 36] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 - Section 3 + Section 3 - Rewrote much of section 3.3 to meet the SASL profile requirements of draft-ietf-sasl-rfc2222bis-xx.txt section 5. - - Changed treatement of SASL ANONYMOUS and PLAIN mechanisms to bring in line with WG consensus. - Section 4 - - Note to implementers in section 4.1.1 based on operational experience. - - Clarification on client continuing by performing a StartTLS with TLS already established in section 4.1.4. - - Moved verification of mapping of client's authentication ID to asserted authorization ID to apply only to explicit assertion. The local policy in place for implicit assertion is adequate. - Section 7 - - Removed most of section 7.2 as the information is now covered adequately via the new SASL profile in section 3.3. Added note to implementors regarding the treatment of username and realm values in DIGEST-MD5. - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 38] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - - Section 7.3. Minor clarifications in wording. - - Section 7.3.1. Clarification that a match of the presented value to any member of the set of stored passwords constitutes a successful authentication. - F.7. Changes for draft-ldapbis-authmeth-08 - General - - Changed usage from LDAPv3 to LDAP for usage consistency across LDAP technical specification. - - Fixed a number of usage nits for consistency and to bring doc in conformance with publication guidelines. - Abstract - - Significant cleanup and rewording of abstract based on WG feedback. - Section 2.1 - - New definition of user. - Section 3 +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 37] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 + - Added 1.5 sentences at end of introductory paragraph indicating the effect of the Bind op on the association. - Section 3.1 - - Retitled section and clarified wording - Section 3.2 - - Clarified that simple authentication choice provides three types of authentication: anonymous, unauthenticated, and simple password. - Section 3.3.3 - - New wording clarifying when negotiated security mechanisms take effect. - Section 3.3.5 - - Changed requirement to discard information about server fetched prior to SASL negotiation from MUST to SHOULD to allow for information obtained through secure mechanisms. - Section 3.3.6 - - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 39] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - - Simplified wording of first paragraph based on suggestion from WG. - Section 3.4 - - Minor clarifications in wording. - Section 3.4.1 - - Minor clarifications in wording in first sentence. - Explicitly called out that the DN value in the dnAuthzID form is to be matched using DN matching rules. @@ -2857,104 +2220,85 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - Clarified requirement on assuming global uniqueness by changing a "generally... MUST" wording to "SHOULD". - Section 4.1.1 - - Simplified wording describing conditions when StartTLS cannot be sent. - Simplified wording in note to implementers regarding race condition with outstanding LDAP operations on connection. - Section 4.1.5 - - Removed section and moved relevant text to section 4.2.2. +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 38] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 - Section 4.1.6 + Section 4.1.6 - Renumbered to 4.1.5. - Updated server identity check rules for server's name based on WG list discussion. - Section 4.1.7 - - Renumbered to 4.1.6 - Changed requirement to discard information about server fetched prior to TLS negotion from MUST to SHOULD to allow for information obtained through secure mechanisms. - Section 6.1 - - Clarified wording. - Added definition of anonymous and unauthenticated binds. - Section 10 - - Added security consideration (moved from elsewhere) discouraging use of cleartext passwords on unprotected communication channels. - Section 11 - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 40] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - - Added an IANA consideration to update GSSAPI service name registry to point to [Roadmap] and [Authmeth] - F.8. Changes for draft-ldapbis-authmeth-09 - General - - Updated section references within document - Changed reference tags to match other docs in LDAP TS - Used non-quoted names for all SASL mechanisms - Abstract - - Inspected keyword usage and removed several improper usages. - - Removed sentence saying DIGEST-MD5 is LDAP's mandatory-to- implement mechanism. This is covered elsewhere in document. - - Moved section 5, authentication state table, of -08 draft to section 8 of -09 and completely rewrote it. - Section 1 - - Reworded sentence beginning, "It is also desirable to allow authentication methods to carry identities based on existing, non-LDAP DN-forms..." + + +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 39] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 + - Clarified relationship of this document to other documents in the LDAP TS. - Section 3.3.5 - - Removed paragraph beginning,"If the client is configured to support multiple SASL mechanisms..." because the actions specified in the paragraph do not provide the protections @@ -2962,91 +2306,67 @@ F.8. Changes for draft-ldapbis-authmeth-09 server should allow specification of acceptable mechanisms and only allow those mechanisms to be used. - - Clarified independent behavior when TLS and SASL security layers are both in force (e.g. one being removed doesn't affect the other). - Section 3.3.6 - - Moved most of section 4.2.2, Client Assertion of Authorization Identity, to sections 3.3.6, 3.3.6.1, and 3.3.6.2. - Section 3.3.6.4 - - Moved some normative comments into text body. - Section 4.1.2 - - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 41] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - - Non success resultCode values are valid if server is *unwilling* or unable to negotiate TLS. - Section 4.2.1 - - Rewrote entire section based on WG feedback. - Section 4.2.2 - - Moved most of this section to 3.3.6 for better document flow. - Section 4.2.3 - - Rewrote entire section based on WG feedback. - Section 5.1 - - Moved imperative language regarding unauthenticated access from security considerations to here. - Section 6 - - Added several paragraphs regarding the risks of transmitting passwords in the clear and requiring server implementations to provide a specific configuration that reduces these risks. - Section 6.2 +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 40] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 + - Added sentence describing protections provided by DIGEST-MD5 method. - Changed DNs in exmple to be dc=example,dc=com. - Section 10 - - Updated consideration on use of cleartext passwords to include other unprotected authentication credentials - Substantial rework of consideration on misuse of unauthenticated bind. - F.9. Changes for draft-ldapbis-authmeth-10 - - Reorganized content of sections 3-9 to improve document flow and reduce redundancy. - Resolved issue of effect of Start TLS and TLS closure on @@ -3058,18 +2378,10 @@ F.9. Changes for draft-ldapbis-authmeth-10 - Moved authentication state table to appendix and relettered appendices. - F.10. Changes for draft-ldapbis-authmeth-11 - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 42] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - General - - Many editorial changes throughout to clarify wording and better express intent, primarily based on suggestions from WG mail list. @@ -3077,204 +2389,219 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 document, e.g. "Anonymous Authentication Mechanism of the Simple Bind Choice". - Section 1 - - Editorial changes to add clarity. - Moved section 2 of authmeth -09 into section 1 - Section 2 - - New section outlining implementation requirements. - Section 3.1.1 - - Editorial clarification on need for following operation sequencing requirements. - Section 3.1.4 + + +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 41] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 + - New section added to describe use of client certificates with StartTLS. Incorporates material moved from other sections of authmeth -09. - Section 4 - New section added to discuss associations. Related material was moved from various other sections of authmeth -09 and incorporated into this new section. - Section 5 - - Added several paragraphs regarding transmission and derivation of authentication and authorization identities using the Bind operation. - Section 8 - - Clarified rules for determining valid credentials and situations where invalidCredentials result is to be returned. - Section 14 - - Added three security considerations based on WG feedback. - Appendix A - - Simplfied state tables by removing two unnecessary actions from the actions table, and removing the current state column of the - - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 43] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - state transition table. Updated references to authmeth and [Protocol]. - F.11. Changes for draft-ldapbis-authmeth-12 - General - - Changed refererences from Start TLS to StartTLS. - Removed Appendix B: Example Deployment Scenarios - Removed Appendix H as all issues listed in the appendix are now resolved. - Section 2 - - Added implementation requirement that server implementations that SUPPORT StartTLS MUST support the TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA ciphersuite. - Section 3.1.2 - - Added wording clarifying that a client's association is unaffected if a non-success resultCode is returned in the StartTLS response. - Section 9.2 +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 42] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 + - Final paragraph of this section details requirements for serverSaslCreds field when no challenge value is sent. - Section 10 - - Clarified language on uAuthzID usage. - Section 12 - - Moved entire section into security considerations. New section number is 12.1.1. - Reorganized security considerations by topic. - Added several security considerations based on WG feedback. - Section 13 - - Moved section to become section 3.3. - F.12. Changes for draft-ldapbis-authmeth-13 - General - - General edits for clarity and to remove errors. - Reworded definition of association (section 1.2) and reworked usage of association throughout document. Current semantics: every connection has an association with the same lifetime as the connection, and that association passes through various authorization states. - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 44] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - - Made usage of data confidentiality consistent throughout document. - Section 1 - Reworded mechanisms 3 and 4 for more parallelism. - - Changed language on rationale for required mechansisms from + - Changed language on rationale for required mechanisms from future to past tense. - Section 2 - Clarified that implementations may support any additional authentication mechanism, not just mechanisms associated with simple and SASL bind choices. - Section 3 - Moved paragraph explaining goals for using TLS with LDAP from security considerations to here. - Section 4.3 - Reworked text to better explain meaning of strongAuthRequired - result code when for invalidated associations. - + resultCode when for invalidated associations. Section 8 - Clarified action when simple bind request has a DN with invalid syntax. - Section 12.1 + +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 43] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 + - Added ability to configure and enforce administrative service limits as a way to protect against denial of service attacks. - Section 12.2 - Clarified that this security consideration relates to performing client authentication during the TLS handshake and not to subsequent SASL EXTERNAL authentication. - Appendix A - Updated tables by collapsing identical states and actions. Also added an invalidated association state and accompanying actions. -Added implementation requirement that server implementations +F.13. Changes for draft-ldapbis-authmeth-14 -Intellectual Property Rights + General + + - Moved to standardized LDAP TS terms: transport connection, TLS + layer, SASL layer, and LDAP message layer. Reworked usage of + terminology throughout document to conform to latest usage. + - Changed language on resultCode values to be less prescriptive + and more descriptive. + + Section 1 + - Changed format and definitions of terms to parallel latest + revision of [Protocol]. + + Section 2 + - Updated implementation requirements for protecting LDAP simple + bind mechanism to conform to WG consensus. + + Section 3.1.1 + - Moved last paragraph to security considerations and made + generalized discussion of use of confidentialityRequired + resultCode general for all data confidentiality services not + just TLS. + + Section 3.1.4 + ûRewrote last paragraph to clarify that SASL EXTERNAL is a + client action when server uses certificate information to + derive authorization ID. + Section 3.2 + ûCollapsed three subsections into a single subsection. Removed + text that implied that the TLS credentials were the only lower + layer credentials that are used by SASL EXTERNAL in determining + authentication ID and authorization ID. + + Section 8 + - Removed most of last paragraph that was redundant with + implementation requirements in section 2. + + Section 10 + +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 44] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 + + - Changed to SASL DIGEST-MD5 (was section 11 in -13 revision) + + Section 11 + - Changed to SASL EXTERNAL (was section 10 in -13 revision). Moved + discussion of SASL authorization identities to Section 9.7. + Clarified language around implicit and explicit assertion of + authroization identities. + + Appendix A + - Further collapsed identical states and actions continuing work + in previous revisions. + +Intellectual Property Rights The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed @@ -3285,36 +2612,25 @@ Intellectual Property Rights Information on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be found in BCP 78 and BCP 79. - Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 45] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - of such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at http://www.ietf.org/ipr. - The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at ietf- ipr@ietf.org. - Full Copyright Statement - Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights. - This document and the information contained herein are provided on an "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE @@ -3328,30 +2644,5 @@ Full Copyright Statement - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 46] \ No newline at end of file +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 45] + diff --git a/doc/drafts/draft-ietf-ldapbis-bcp64-xx.txt b/doc/drafts/draft-ietf-ldapbis-bcp64-xx.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a2465e3a99 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/drafts/draft-ietf-ldapbis-bcp64-xx.txt @@ -0,0 +1,1177 @@ + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT Kurt D. Zeilenga +Intended Category: BCP OpenLDAP Foundation +Expires in six months 21 February 2005 +Obsoletes: RFC 3383 + + + IANA Considerations for LDAP + + + + +Status of Memo + + This document is intended to be, after appropriate review and + revision, submitted to the RFC Editor as a Best Current Practice + document. This document is intended to replace RFC 3383. + Distribution of this memo is unlimited. Technical discussion of this + document will take place on the IETF LDAP Revision Working Group + (LDAPBIS) mailing list . Please send + editorial comments directly to the document editor + . + + By submitting this Internet-Draft, I accept the provisions of Section + 4 of RFC 3667. By submitting this Internet-Draft, I certify that any + applicable patent or other IPR claims of which I am aware have been + disclosed, or will be disclosed, and any of which I become aware will + be disclosed, in accordance with RFC 3668. + + Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering + Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other + groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. + + Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months + and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any + time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference + material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." + + The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at + http://www.ietf.org/1id-abstracts.html + + The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at + http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html + + + Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005). All Rights Reserved. + + Please see the Full Copyright section near the end of this document + for more information. + + + +Zeilenga IANA Considerations for LDAP [Page 1] + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-bcp64-05.txt 21 February 2005 + + +Abstract + + This document provides procedures for registering extensible elements + of Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP). The document also + provides guidelines to Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) + describing conditions under which new values can be assigned. + + +1. Introduction + + The Lightweight Directory Access Protocol [Roadmap] (LDAP) is an + extensible protocol. LDAP supports: + + - addition of new operations, + - extension of existing operations, and + - extensible schema. + + This document details procedures for registering values of used to + unambiguously identify extensible elements of the protocol including: + + - LDAP message types; + - LDAP extended operations and controls; + - LDAP result codes; + - LDAP authentication methods; + - LDAP attribute description options; and + - Object Identifier descriptors. + + These registries are maintained by the Internet Assigned Numbers + Authority (IANA). + + In addition, this document provides guidelines to IANA describing the + conditions under which new values can be assigned. + + This document replaces RFC 3383. + + +2. Terminology and Conventions + + This section details terms and conventions used in this document. + + +2.1. Policy Terminology + + The terms "IESG Approval", "Standards Action", "IETF Consensus", + "Specification Required", "First Come First Served", "Expert Review", + and "Private Use" are used as defined in BCP 26 [RFC2434]. + + + + + +Zeilenga IANA Considerations for LDAP [Page 2] + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-bcp64-05.txt 21 February 2005 + + +2.2. Requirement Terminology + + The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", + "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this + document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119]. In + this case, "the specification" as used by BCP 14 refers to the + processing of protocols being submitted to the IETF standards + process. + + +2.3. Common ABNF Productions + + A number of syntaxes in this document are described using ABNF + [RFC2234]. These syntaxes rely on the following common productions: + + ALPHA = %x41-5A / %x61-7A ; "A"-"Z" / "a"-"z" + LDIGIT = %x31-39 ; "1"-"9" + DIGIT = %x30 / LDIGIT ; "0"-"9" + HYPHEN = %x2D ; "-" + DOT = %x2E ; "." + number = DIGIT / ( LDIGIT 1*DIGIT ) + keychar = ALPHA / DIGIT / HYPHEN + leadkeychar = ALPHA + keystring = leadkeychar *keychar + + A keyword is a case-insensitive string of UTF-8 [RFC3629] encoded + Unicode [Unicode] restricted to the production. + + +3. IANA Considerations for LDAP + + This section details each kind of protocol value which can be + registered and provides IANA guidelines on how to assign new values. + + IANA may reject obviously bogus registrations described. + + LDAP values specified in RFCs MUST be registered. Other LDAP values, + expecting those in private-use name spaces, SHOULD be registered. + RFCs SHOULD NOT reference, use, or otherwise recongize unregistered + LDAP values. + + +3.1. Object Identifiers + + Numerous LDAP schema and protocol elements are identified by Object + Identifiers (OIDs) [X.680]. Specifications which assign OIDs to + elements SHOULD state who delegated the OIDs for its use. + + + + +Zeilenga IANA Considerations for LDAP [Page 3] + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-bcp64-05.txt 21 February 2005 + + + For IETF developed elements, specifications SHOULD use OIDs under + "Internet Directory Numbers" (1.3.6.1.1.x). For elements developed + by others, any properly delegated OID can be used, including those + under "Internet Directory Numbers" (1.3.6.1.1.x) or "Internet Private + Enterprise Numbers" (1.3.6.1.4.1.x). + + Internet Directory Numbers (1.3.6.1.1.x) will be assigned upon Expert + Review with Specification Required. Only one OID per specification + will be assigned. The specification MAY then assign any number of + OIDs within this arc without further coordination with IANA. + + Internet Private Enterprise Numbers (1.3.6.1.4.1.x) are assigned by + IANA . Practices for IANA + assignment of Internet Private Enterprise Numbers is detailed in STD + 16 [RFC1155]. + + To avoid interoperability problems between early implementations of a + "work in progress" and implementations of the published specification + (e.g., the RFC), experimental OIDs SHOULD be used in "works in + progress" and early implementations. OIDs under the Internet + Experimental OID arc (1.3.6.1.3.x) may be used for this purpose. + Practices for IANA assignment of these Internet Experimental numbers + is detailed in STD 16 [RFC1155]. + + +3.2 Protocol Mechanisms + + LDAP provides a number of Root DSE attributes for discovery of + protocol mechanisms identified by OIDs, including the + supportedControl, supportedExtension, and supportedFeatures + attributes [Models], + + A registry of OIDs used for discover of protocol mechanisms is + provided to allow implementors and others to locate the technical + specification for these protocol mechanisms. Future specifications + of additional Root DSE attributes holding values identifying protocol + mechanisms MAY extend this registry for their values. + + Protocol Mechanisms are registered on a First Come First Served + basis. + + +3.3 LDAP Syntaxes + + This registry provides a listing of LDAP syntaxes [Models]. Each + LDAP syntax is identified by an object identifier (OID). This + registry is provided to allow implementors and others to locate the + technical specification describing a particular LDAP Syntax. + + + +Zeilenga IANA Considerations for LDAP [Page 4] + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-bcp64-05.txt 21 February 2005 + + + LDAP Syntaxes are registered on a First Come First Served with + Specification Required basis. + + Note: unlike object classes, attribute types and various other kinds + of schema elements, descriptors are not used in LDAP to identify LDAP + Syntaxes. + + +3.4. Object Identifier Descriptors + + LDAP allows short descriptive names (or descriptors) to be used + instead of a numeric Object Identifier to identify select protocol + extensions [Protocol], schema elements [Models], LDAP URL [LDAPURL] + extensions, and other objects. + + While the protocol allows the same descriptor to refer to different + object identifiers in certain cases and the registry supports + multiple registrations of the same descriptor (each indicating a + different kind of schema element and different object identifier), + multiple registrations of the same descriptor are to be avoided. All + such registration requests require Expert Review. + + Descriptors are restricted to strings of UTF-8 encoded Unicode + characters restricted by the following ABNF: + + name = keystring + + Descriptors are case-insensitive. + + Multiple names may be assigned to a given OID. For purposes of + registration, an OID is to be represented in numeric OID form (e.g., + 1.1.0.23.40) conforming to the ABNF: + + numericoid = number 1*( DOT number ) + + While the protocol places no maximum length restriction upon + descriptors, they should be short. Descriptors longer than 48 + characters may be viewed as too long to register. + + A value ending with a hyphen ("-") reserves all descriptors which + start with that value. For example, the registration of the option + "descrFamily-" reserves all options which start with "descrFamily-" + for some related purpose. + + Descriptors beginning with "x-" are for Private Use and cannot be + registered. + + Descriptors beginning with "e-" are reserved for experiments and will + + + +Zeilenga IANA Considerations for LDAP [Page 5] + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-bcp64-05.txt 21 February 2005 + + + be registered on a First Come First Served basis. + + All other descriptors require Expert Review to be registered. + + The registrant need not "own" the OID being named. + + The OID name space is managed by The ISO/IEC Joint Technical + Committee 1 - Subcommittee 6. + + +3.5. AttributeDescription Options + + An AttributeDescription [Models] can contain zero or more options + specifying additional semantics. An option SHALL be restricted to a + string UTF-8 encoded Unicode characters limited by the following + ABNF: + + option = keystring + + Options are case-insensitive. + + While the protocol places no maximum length restriction upon option + strings, they should be short. Options longer than 24 characters may + be viewed as too long to register. + + Values ending with a hyphen ("-") reserve all option names which + start with the name. For example, the registration of the option + "optionFamily-" reserves all options which start with "optionFamily-" + for some related purpose. + + Options beginning with "x-" are for Private Use and cannot be + registered. + + Options beginning with "e-" are reserved for experiments and will be + registered on a First Come First Served basis. + + All other options require Standards Action or Expert Review with + Specification Required to be registered. + + +3.6. LDAP Message Types + + Each protocol message is encapsulated in an LDAPMessage envelope + [Protocol]. The protocolOp CHOICE indicates the type of message + encapsulated. Each message type consists of an ASN.1 identifier in + the form of a keyword and a non-negative choice number. The choice + number is combined with the class (APPLICATION) and data type + (CONSTRUCTED or PRIMITIVE) to construct the BER tag in the message's + + + +Zeilenga IANA Considerations for LDAP [Page 6] + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-bcp64-05.txt 21 February 2005 + + + encoding. The choice numbers for existing protocol messages are + implicit in the protocol's ASN.1 defined in [Protocol]. + + New values will be registered upon Standards Action. + + Note: LDAP provides extensible messages which reduces, but does not + eliminate, the need to add new message types. + + +3.7. LDAP Authentication Method + + The LDAP Bind operation supports multiple authentication methods + [Protocol]. Each authentication choice consists of an ASN.1 + identifier in the form of a keyword and a non-negative integer. + + The registrant SHALL classify the authentication method usage using + one of the following terms: + + COMMON - method is appropriate for common use on the + Internet, + LIMITED USE - method is appropriate for limited use, + OBSOLETE - method has been deprecated or otherwise found to + be inappropriate for any use. + + Methods without publicly available specifications SHALL NOT be + classified as COMMON. New registrations of class OBSOLETE cannot be + registered. + + New authentication method integers in the range 0-1023 require + Standards Action to be registered. New authentication method + integers in the range 1024-4095 require Expert Review with + Specification Required. New authentication method integers in the + range 4096-16383 will be registered on a First Come First Served + basis. Keywords associated with integers in the range 0-4095 SHALL + NOT start with "e-" or "x-". Keywords associated with integers in + the range 4096-16383 SHALL start with "e-". Values greater than or + equal to 16384 and keywords starting with "x-" are for Private Use + and cannot be registered. + + Note: LDAP supports Simple Authentication and Security Layers [SASL] + as an authentication choice. SASL is an extensible + authentication framework. + + +3.8. LDAP Result Codes + + LDAP result messages carry an resultCode enumerated value to indicate + the outcome of the operation [Protocol]. Each result code consists + + + +Zeilenga IANA Considerations for LDAP [Page 7] + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-bcp64-05.txt 21 February 2005 + + + of a ASN.1 identifier in the form of a keyword and a non-negative + integer. + + New resultCodes integers in the range 0-1023 require Standards Action + to be registered. New resultCode integers in the range 1024-4095 + require Expert Review with Specification Required. New resultCode + integers in the range 4096-16383 will be registered on a First Come + First Served basis. Keywords associated with integers in the range + 0-4095 SHALL NOT start with "e-" or "x-". Keywords associated with + integers in the range 4096-16383 SHALL start with "e-". Values + greater than or equal to 16384 and keywords starting with "x-" are + for Private Use and cannot be registered. + + +3.9. LDAP Search Scope + + LDAP SearchRequest messages carry a scope enumerated value to + indicate the extend of search within the DIT [Protocol] Each search + value consists of a ASN.1 identifier in the form of a keyword and a + non-negative integer. + + New scope integers in the range 0-1023 require Standards Action to be + registered. New scope integers in the range 1024-4095 require Expert + Review with Specification Required. New scope integers in the range + 4096-16383 will be registered on a First Come First Served basis. + Keywords associated with integers in the range 0-4095 SHALL NOT start + with "e-" or "x-". Keywords associated with integers in the range + 4096-16383 SHALL start with "e-". Values greater than or equal to + 16384 and keywords starting with "x-" are for Private Use and cannot + be registered. + + +3.10. LDAP Filter Choice + + LDAP filters are used in making assertions against an object + represented in the directory [Protocol]. The Filter CHOICE indicates + a type of assertion. Each Filter CHOICE consists of an ASN.1 + identifier in the form of a keyword and a non-negative choice number. + The choice number is combined with the class (APPLICATION) and data + type (CONSTRUCTED or PRIMITIVE) to construct the BER tag in the + message's encoding. + + Note: LDAP provides the extensibleMatching choice which reduces, but + does not eliminate, the need to add new filter choices. + + +3.11. LDAP ModifyRequest Operation Type + + + + +Zeilenga IANA Considerations for LDAP [Page 8] + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-bcp64-05.txt 21 February 2005 + + + The LDAP ModifyRequest carries a sequence of modification operations + [Protocol]. Each kind (e.g., add, delete, replace) of operation is + consists of a ASN.1 identifier in the form of a keyword and a + non-negative integer. + + New operation type integers in the range 0-1023 require Standards + Action to be registered. New operation type integers in the range + 1024-4095 require Expert Review with Specification Required. New + operation type integers in the range 4096-16383 will be registered on + a First Come First Served basis. Keywords associated with integers + in the range 0-4095 SHALL NOT start with "e-" or "x-". Keywords + associated with integers in the range 4096-16383 SHALL start with + "e-". Values greater than or equal to 16384 and keywords starting + with "x-" are for Private Use and cannot be registered. + + +3.12. LDAP authzId Prefixes + + Authorization Identities in LDAP are strings conforming to the + production [AuthMeth]. This production is extensible. + Each new specific authorization form is identified by a prefix string + conforming to the following ABNF: + + prefix = keystring COLON + COLON = %x3A ; COLON (":" U+003A) + + Prefixes are case-insensitive. + + While the protocol places no maximum length restriction upon prefix + strings, they should be short. Prefixes longer than 12 characters + may be viewed as too long to register. + + Prefixes beginning with "x-" are for Private Use and cannot be + registered. + + Prefixes beginning with "e-" are reserved for experiments and will be + registered on a First Come First Served basis. + + All other prefixes require Standards Action or Expert Review with + Specification Required to be registered. + + +3.13. Directory Systems Names + + The IANA-maintained "Directory Systems Names" registry [IANADSN] of + valid keywords for well known attributes was used in the LDAPv2 + string representation of a distinguished name [RFC1779]. LDAPv2 is + now Historic [RFC3494]. + + + +Zeilenga IANA Considerations for LDAP [Page 9] + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-bcp64-05.txt 21 February 2005 + + + Directory systems names are not known to be used in any other + context. LDAPv3 [LDAPDN] uses Object Identifier Descriptors [Section + 3.2] (which have a different syntax than directory system names). + + New Directory System Names will no longer be accepted. For + historical purposes, the current list of registered names should + remain publicly available. + + +4. Registration Procedure + + The procedure given here MUST be used by anyone who wishes to use a + new value of a type described in Section 3 of this document. + + The first step is for the requester to fill out the appropriate form. + Templates are provided in Appendix A. + + If the policy is Standards Action, the completed form SHOULD be + provided to the IESG with the request for Standards Action. Upon + approval of the Standards Action, the IESG SHALL forward the request + (possibly revised) to IANA. The IESG SHALL be viewed as the owner of + all values requiring Standards Action. + + If the policy is Expert Review, the requester SHALL post the + completed form to the mailing list for + public review. The review period is two (2) weeks. If a revised + form is later submitted, the review period is restarted. Anyone may + subscribe to this list by sending a request to + . During the review, objections may + be raised by anyone (including the Expert) on the list. After + completion of the review, the Expert, based upon public comments, + SHALL either approve the request and forward it to the IESG OR deny + the request. In either case, the Expert SHALL promptly notify the + requester of the action. Actions of the Expert may be appealed + [RFC2026]. The Expert is appointed by Applications Area Director(s). + The requester is viewed as the owner of values registered under + Expert Review. + + If the policy is First Come First Served, the requester SHALL submit + the completed form directly to the IANA: . The + requester is viewed as the owner of values registered under First + Come First Served. + + Neither the Expert nor IANA will take position on the claims of + copyright or trademarks issues regarding completed forms. + + Prior to submission of the Internet Draft (I-D) to the RFC Editor but + after IESG review and tentative approval, the document editor SHOULD + + + +Zeilenga IANA Considerations for LDAP [Page 10] + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-bcp64-05.txt 21 February 2005 + + + revise the I-D to use registered values. + + +5. Registration Maintenance + + This section discusses maintenance of registrations. + + +5.1. Lists of Registered Values + + IANA makes lists of registered values readily available to the + Internet community on their web site: . + + +5.2. Change Control + + The registration owner MAY update the registration subject to the + same constraints and review as with new registrations. In cases + where the owner is not unable or unwilling to make necessary updates, + the IESG MAY assume ownership in order to update the registration. + + +5.3. Comments + + For cases where others (anyone other than the owner) have significant + objections to the claims in a registration and the owner does not + agree to change the registration, comments MAY be attached to a + registration upon Expert Review. For registrations owned by the + IESG, the objections SHOULD be addressed by initiating a request for + Expert Review. + + The form to these requests is ad hoc, but MUST include the specific + objections to be reviewed and SHOULD contain (directly or by + reference) materials supporting the objections. + + +6. Security Considerations + + The security considerations detailed in BCP 26 [RFC2434] are + generally applicable to this document. Additional security + considerations specific to each name space are discussed in Section 3 + where appropriate. + + Security considerations for LDAP are discussed in documents + comprising the technical specification [Roadmap]. + + +7. Acknowledgment + + + +Zeilenga IANA Considerations for LDAP [Page 11] + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-bcp64-05.txt 21 February 2005 + + + This document is a product of the IETF LDAP Revision (LDAPBIS) + Working Group (WG). This document is a revision of RFC 3383, also a + product of the LDAPBIS WG. + + This document includes text borrowed from "Guidelines for Writing an + IANA Considerations Section in RFCs" [RFC2434] by Thomas Narten and + Harald Alvestrand. + + +8. Author's Address + + Kurt D. Zeilenga + OpenLDAP Foundation + + Email: Kurt@OpenLDAP.org + + +9. References + + [[Note to the RFC Editor: please replace the citation tags used in + referencing Internet-Drafts with tags of the form RFCnnnn where + possible.]] + + +9.1. Normative References + + [RFC1155] Rose, M. and K. McCloghrie, "Structure and + Identification of Management Information for TCP/IP- + based Internets", STD 16 (also RFC 1155), May 1990. + + [RFC2026] Bradner, S., "The Internet Standards Process -- Revision + 3", BCP 9 (also RFC 2026), October 1996. + + [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate + Requirement Levels", BCP 14 (also RFC 2119), March 1997. + + [RFC2234] Crocker, D. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax + Specifications: ABNF", RFC 2234, November 1997. + + [RFC2434] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an + IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26 (also RFC + 2434), October 1998. + + [RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO + 10646", RFC 3629 (also STD 63), November 2003. + + [Roadmap] Zeilenga, K. (editor), "LDAP: Technical Specification + Road Map", draft-ietf-ldapbis-roadmap-xx.txt, a work in + + + +Zeilenga IANA Considerations for LDAP [Page 12] + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-bcp64-05.txt 21 February 2005 + + + progress. + + [AuthMeth] Harrison, R. (editor), "LDAP: Authentication Methods and + Connection Level Security Mechanisms", + draft-ietf-ldapbis-authmeth-xx.txt, a work in progress. + + [Models] Zeilenga, K. (editor), "LDAP: Directory Information + Models", draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-xx.txt, a work in + progress. + + [Protocol] Sermersheim, J. (editor), "LDAP: The Protocol", + draft-ietf-ldapbis-protocol-xx.txt, a work in progress. + + [LDAPURL] Smith, M. (editor), "LDAP: Uniform Resource Locator", + draft-ietf-ldapbis-url-xx.txt, a work in progress. + + [Unicode] The Unicode Consortium, "The Unicode Standard, Version + 3.2.0" is defined by "The Unicode Standard, Version 3.0" + (Reading, MA, Addison-Wesley, 2000. ISBN 0-201-61633-5), + as amended by the "Unicode Standard Annex #27: Unicode + 3.1" (http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr27/) and by the + "Unicode Standard Annex #28: Unicode 3.2" + (http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr28/). + + [X.680] International Telecommunication Union - + Telecommunication Standardization Sector, "Abstract + Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) - Specification of Basic + Notation", X.680(2002) (also ISO/IEC 8824-1:2002). + + +9.2. Informative References + + [RFC1779] Kille, S., "A String Representation of Distinguished + Names", RFC 1779, March 1995. + + [RFC3494] Zeilenga, K., "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol + version 2 (LDAPv2) to Historic Status", RFC 3494, March + 2003. + + [Syntaxes] Legg, S. (editor), "LDAP: Syntaxes and Matching Rules", + draft-ietf-ldapbis-syntaxes-xx.txt, a work in progress. + + [LDAPDN] Zeilenga, K. (editor), "LDAP: String Representation of + Distinguished Names", draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-xx.txt, a + work in progress. + + [SASL] Melnikov, A. (Editor), "Simple Authentication and + Security Layer (SASL)", + + + +Zeilenga IANA Considerations for LDAP [Page 13] + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-bcp64-05.txt 21 February 2005 + + + draft-ietf-sasl-rfc2222bis-xx.txt, a work in progress. + + [IANADSN] IANA, "Directory Systems Names", + http://www.iana.org/assignments/directory-system-names. + + +Appendix A. Registration Templates + + This appendix provides registration templates for registering new + LDAP values. Note that more than one value may be requested by + extending the template by listing multiple values, or through use of + tables. + + +A.1. LDAP Object Identifier Registration Template + + Subject: Request for LDAP OID Registration + + Person & email address to contact for further information: + + Specification: (I-D) + + Author/Change Controller: + + Comments: + + (Any comments that the requester deems relevant to the request) + + +A.2. LDAP Protocol Mechanism Registration Template + + Subject: Request for LDAP Protocol Mechanism Registration + + Object Identifier: + + Description: + + Person & email address to contact for further information: + + Usage: (One of Control or Extension or Feature or other) + + Specification: (RFC, I-D, URI) + + Author/Change Controller: + + Comments: + + (Any comments that the requester deems relevant to the request) + + + +Zeilenga IANA Considerations for LDAP [Page 14] + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-bcp64-05.txt 21 February 2005 + + +A.3. LDAP Syntax Registration Template + + Subject: Request for LDAP Syntax Registration + + Object Identifier: + + Description: + + Person & email address to contact for further information: + + Specification: (RFC, I-D, URI) + + Author/Change Controller: + + Comments: + + (Any comments that the requester deems relevant to the request) + + +A.4. LDAP Descriptor Registration Template + + Subject: Request for LDAP Descriptor Registration + + Descriptor (short name): + + Object Identifier: + + Person & email address to contact for further information: + + Usage: (One of administrative role, attribute type, matching rule, + name form, object class, URL extension, or other) + + Specification: (RFC, I-D, URI) + + Author/Change Controller: + + Comments: + + (Any comments that the requester deems relevant to the request) + + +A.5. LDAP Attribute Description Option Registration Template + + Subject: Request for LDAP Attribute Description Option Registration + + Option Name: + + Family of Options: (YES or NO) + + + +Zeilenga IANA Considerations for LDAP [Page 15] + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-bcp64-05.txt 21 February 2005 + + + Person & email address to contact for further information: + + Specification: (RFC, I-D, URI) + + Author/Change Controller: + + Comments: + + (Any comments that the requester deems relevant to the request) + + +A.6. LDAP Message Type Registration Template + + Subject: Request for LDAP Message Type Registration + + LDAP Message Name: + + Person & email address to contact for further information: + + Specification: (Approved I-D) + + Comments: + + (Any comments that the requester deems relevant to the request) + + +A.7. LDAP Authentication Method Registration Template + + Subject: Request for LDAP Authentication Method Registration + + Authentication Method Name: + + Person & email address to contact for further information: + + Specification: (RFC, I-D, URI) + + Intended Usage: (One of COMMON, LIMITED-USE, OBSOLETE) + + Author/Change Controller: + + Comments: + + (Any comments that the requester deems relevant to the request) + + +A.8. LDAP Result Code Registration Template + + Subject: Request for LDAP Result Code Registration + + + +Zeilenga IANA Considerations for LDAP [Page 16] + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-bcp64-05.txt 21 February 2005 + + + Result Code Name: + + Person & email address to contact for further information: + + Specification: (RFC, I-D, URI) + + Author/Change Controller: + + Comments: + + (Any comments that the requester deems relevant to the request) + + +A.8. LDAP Search Scope Registration Template + + Subject: Request for LDAP Search Scope Registration + + Search Scope Name: + + Filter Scope String: + + Person & email address to contact for further information: + + Specification: (RFC, I-D, URI) + + Author/Change Controller: + + Comments: + + (Any comments that the requester deems relevant to the request) + + +A.9. LDAP Filter Choice Registration Template + + Subject: Request for LDAP Filter Choice Registration + + Filter Choice Name: + + Person & email address to contact for further information: + + Specification: (RFC, I-D, URI) + + Author/Change Controller: + + Comments: + + (Any comments that the requester deems relevant to the request) + + + + +Zeilenga IANA Considerations for LDAP [Page 17] + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-bcp64-05.txt 21 February 2005 + + +A.10. LDAP ModifyRequest Operation Registration Template + + Subject: Request for LDAP ModifyRequest Operation Registration + + ModifyRequest Operation Name: + + Person & email address to contact for further information: + + Specification: (RFC, I-D, URI) + + Author/Change Controller: + + Comments: + + (Any comments that the requester deems relevant to the request) + + +Appendix B. Changes since RFC 3383 + + This informative appendix provides a summary of changes made since RFC + 3383. + + - Object Identifier Descriptors practices were updated to require + all descriptors defined in RFCs to be registered and + recommending all other descriptors (excepting those in + private-use name space) be registered. Additionally, all + requests for multiple registrations of the same descriptor are + now subject to Expert Review. + + - Protocol Mechanisms practices were updated to include values of + the 'supportedFeatures' attribute type. + + - LDAP Syntax, Search Scope, Filter Choice, ModifyRequest + operation, and authzId prefixes registries were added. + [[Initial values provided in Appendix C. This Appendix is to be + removed by the RFC Editor before publication as an RFC.]] + + - References to RFCs comprising the LDAP technical specifications + have been updated to latest revisions. + + - References to ISO 10646 have been replaced with [Unicode]. + + - The "Assigned Values" appendix providing initial registry values + was removed. + + - Numerous editorial changes were made. + + + + + +Zeilenga IANA Considerations for LDAP [Page 18] + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-bcp64-05.txt 21 February 2005 + + +Appendix C. Initial Values for new registries + + This appendix provides initial values for new registries. + + +C.1. LDAP Syntaxes + + Object Identifier Syntax Owner Reference + ----------------------------- -------------------------- ----- --- + 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.3 Attribute Type Description IESG [Syntaxes] + 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.6 Bit String IESG [Syntaxes] + 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.7 Boolean IESG [Syntaxes] + 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.11 Country String IESG [Syntaxes] + 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.12 DN IESG [Syntaxes] + 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.14 Delivery Method IESG [Syntaxes] + 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.15 Directory String IESG [Syntaxes] + 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.16 DIT Content Rule Description IESG [Syntaxes] + 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.17 DIT Structure Rule Description IESG [Syntaxes] + 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.21 Enhanced Guide IESG [Syntaxes] + 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.22 Facsimile Telephone Number IESG [Syntaxes] + 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.23 Fax IESG [Syntaxes] + 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.24 Generalized Time IESG [Syntaxes] + 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.25 Guide IESG [Syntaxes] + 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.26 IA5 String IESG [Syntaxes] + 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.27 Integer IESG [Syntaxes] + 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.28 JPEG IESG [Syntaxes] + 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.30 Matching Rule Description IESG [Syntaxes] + 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.31 Matching Rule Use Description IESG [Syntaxes] + 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.34 Name And Optional UID IESG [Syntaxes] + 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.35 Name Form Description IESG [Syntaxes] + 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.36 Numeric String IESG [Syntaxes] + 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.37 Object Class Description IESG [Syntaxes] + 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.38 OID IESG [Syntaxes] + 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.39 Other Mailbox IESG [Syntaxes] + 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.40 Octet String IESG [Syntaxes] + 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.41 Postal Address IESG [Syntaxes] + 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.44 Printable String IESG [Syntaxes] + 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.50 Telephone Number IESG [Syntaxes] + 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.51 Teletex Terminal Identifier IESG [Syntaxes] + 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.52 Telex Number IESG [Syntaxes] + 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.53 UTC Time IESG [Syntaxes] + 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.54 LDAP Syntax Description IESG [Syntaxes] + 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.58 Substring Assertion IESG [Syntaxes] + + +C.2. LDAP Search Scopes + + Name URLString Value Owner Reference + + + +Zeilenga IANA Considerations for LDAP [Page 19] + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-bcp64-05.txt 21 February 2005 + + + ---------------- --------- ----- ----- ------------------- + baseObject base 0 IESG [Protocol][LDAPURL] + singleLevel one 1 IESG [Protocol][LDAPURL] + wholeSubtree sub 2 IESG [Protocol][LDAPURL] + + +C.3. LDAP Filter Choices + + Name Value Owner Reference + ---------------- ----- ----- --------- + and 0 IESG [Protocol] + or 1 IESG [Protocol] + not 2 IESG [Protocol] + equalityMatch 3 IESG [Protocol] + substrings 4 IESG [Protocol] + greaterOrEqual 5 IESG [Protocol] + lessOrEqual 6 IESG [Protocol] + present 7 IESG [Protocol] + approxMatch 8 IESG [Protocol] + extensibleMatch 9 IESG [Protocol] + + +C.4. LDAP ModifyRequest Operations + + Name Value Owner Reference + ---------------- ----- ----- --------- + add 0 IESG [Protocol] + delete 1 IESG [Protocol] + replace 2 IESG [Protocol] + + +C.5. LDAP authzId prefixes + + Name Prefix Owner Reference + ---------------- ------ ----- --------- + dnAuthzId dn: IESG [AuthMeth] + uAuthzId u: IESG [AuthMeth] + + +Full Copyright + + Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005). This document is subject + to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and + except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights. + + This document and the information contained herein are provided on an + "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS + OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET + + + +Zeilenga IANA Considerations for LDAP [Page 20] + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-bcp64-05.txt 21 February 2005 + + + ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, + INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE + INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED + WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + + + +Intellectual Property Rights + + The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any + Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to + pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in + this document or the extent to which any license under such rights + might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has + made any independent effort to identify any such rights. Information + on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be found + in BCP 78 and BCP 79. + + Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any + assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an + attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of + such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this specification + can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at + http://www.ietf.org/ipr. + + The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any + copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary + rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement + this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at + ietf-ipr@ietf.org. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Zeilenga IANA Considerations for LDAP [Page 21] + diff --git a/doc/drafts/draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-xx.txt b/doc/drafts/draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-xx.txt index eb38efdbec..458f65eea1 100644 --- a/doc/drafts/draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-xx.txt +++ b/doc/drafts/draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-xx.txt @@ -1,20 +1,22 @@ + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT Editor: Kurt D. Zeilenga Intended Category: Standard Track OpenLDAP Foundation -Expires in six months 24 October 2004 -Obsoletes: 2253 - +Expires in six months 10 February 2005 +Obsoletes: RFC 2253 LDAP: String Representation of Distinguished Names - - + Status of Memo - This document is intended to be, after appropriate review and revision, submitted to the RFC Editor as a Standard Track document replacing RFC 2253. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. @@ -23,50 +25,42 @@ Status of Memo . Please send editorial comments directly to the document editor . - By submitting this Internet-Draft, I accept the provisions of Section 4 of RFC 3667. By submitting this Internet-Draft, I certify that any applicable patent or other IPR claims of which I am aware have been disclosed, or will be disclosed, and any of which I become aware will be disclosed, in accordance with RFC 3668. - Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. - Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." - The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at - . The list of - Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at - . + http://www.ietf.org/1id-abstracts.html + The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at + http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html - Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). All Rights Reserved. + Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005). All Rights Reserved. Please see the Full Copyright section near the end of this document for more information. - - - Zeilenga LDAP: Distinguished Names [Page 1] -INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-15.txt 24 October 2004 - + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-16.txt 10 February 2005 Abstract - The X.500 Directory uses distinguished names (DNs) as primary keys to entries in the directory. This document defines the string representation used in the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol @@ -75,23 +69,19 @@ Abstract names, while being able to represent any distinguished name. - 1. Background and Intended Usage - In X.500-based directory systems [X.500], including those accessed using the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) [Roadmap], distinguished names (DNs) are used to unambiguously refer to directory entries [X.501][Models]. - The structure of a DN [X.501] is described in terms of ASN.1 [X.680]. In the X.500 Directory Access Protocol [X.511] (and other ITU-defined directory protocols), DNs are encoded using the Basic Encoding Rules (BER) [X.690]. In LDAP, DNs are represented in the string form described in this document. - It is important to have a common format to be able to unambiguously represent a distinguished name. The primary goal of this specification is ease of encoding and decoding. A secondary goal is @@ -101,84 +91,68 @@ Abstract translations (such as expressing attribute type names in the local national language). - This document defines the string representation of Distinguished Names used in LDAP [Protocol][Syntaxes]. Section 2 details the RECOMMENDED algorithm for converting a DN from its ASN.1 structured representation to a string. Section 3 details how to convert a DN from a string to a ASN.1 structured representation. - While other documents may define other algorithms for converting a DN from its ASN.1 structured representation to a string, all algorithms MUST produce strings which adhere to the requirements of Section 3. - This document does not define a canonical string representation for DNs. Comparison of DNs for equality is to be performed in accordance with the distinguishedNameMatch matching rule [Syntaxes]. - - This document is an integral part of the LDAP Technical Specification - [Roadmap]. This document obsoletes RFC 2253. Changes since RFC 2253 - + This document is a integral part of the LDAP technical specification + [Roadmap] which obsoletes the previously defined LDAP technical Zeilenga LDAP: Distinguished Names [Page 2] -INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-15.txt 24 October 2004 - - + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-16.txt 10 February 2005 - are summarized in Appendix B. + specification, RFC 3377, in its entirety. This document obsoletes RFC + 2253. Changes since RFC 2253 are summarized in Appendix B. This specification assumes familiarity with X.500 [X.500] and the concept of Distinguished Name [X.501][Models]. - 1.1. Conventions - The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119]. - Character names in this document use the notation for code points and names from the Unicode Standard [Unicode]. For example, the letter "a" may be represented as either or . - Note: a glossary of terms used in Unicode can be found in [Glossary]. Information on the Unicode character encoding model can be found in [CharModel]. - 2. Converting DistinguishedName from ASN.1 to a String - X.501 [X.501] defines the ASN.1 [X.680] structure of distinguished name. The following is a variant provided for discussion purposes. - DistinguishedName ::= RDNSequence - RDNSequence ::= SEQUENCE OF RelativeDistinguishedName - RelativeDistinguishedName ::= SET SIZE (1..MAX) OF AttributeTypeAndValue - AttributeTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE { type AttributeType, value AttributeValue } - This section defines the RECOMMENDED algorithm for converting a distinguished name from an ASN.1 structured representation to an UTF-8 [RFC3629] encoded Unicode [Unicode] character string representation. @@ -188,63 +162,51 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-15.txt 24 October 2004 implementations. - 2.1. Converting the RDNSequence - - Zeilenga LDAP: Distinguished Names [Page 3] -INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-15.txt 24 October 2004 - + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-16.txt 10 February 2005 If the RDNSequence is an empty sequence, the result is the empty or zero length string. - Otherwise, the output consists of the string encodings of each RelativeDistinguishedName in the RDNSequence (according to Section 2.2), starting with the last element of the sequence and moving backwards toward the first. - The encodings of adjoining RelativeDistinguishedNames are separated by a comma (',' U+002C) character. - 2.2. Converting RelativeDistinguishedName - When converting from an ASN.1 RelativeDistinguishedName to a string, the output consists of the string encodings of each AttributeTypeAndValue (according to Section 2.3), in any order. - Where there is a multi-valued RDN, the outputs from adjoining AttributeTypeAndValues are separated by a plus sign ('+' U+002B) character. - 2.3. Converting AttributeTypeAndValue - The AttributeTypeAndValue is encoded as the string representation of the AttributeType, followed by an equals sign ('=' U+003D) character, followed by the string representation of the AttributeValue. The encoding of the AttributeValue is given in Section 2.4. - - If the AttributeType is defined to have a short name and that short - name is known to be registered [REGISTRY][BCP64bis] as identifying the - AttributeType, that short name, a , is used. Otherwise the - AttributeType is encoded as the dotted-decimal encoding, a - , of its OBJECT IDENTIFIER. The and - is defined in [Models]. - + If the AttributeType is defined to have a short name (descriptor) + [Models] and that short name is known to be registered + [REGISTRY][BCP64bis] as identifying the AttributeType, that short + name, a , is used. Otherwise the AttributeType is encoded as + the dotted-decimal encoding, a , of its OBJECT IDENTIFIER. + The and is defined in [Models]. Implementations are not expected to dynamically update their knowledge of registered short names. However, implementations SHOULD provide a @@ -252,20 +214,17 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-15.txt 24 October 2004 updated. - 2.4. Converting an AttributeValue from ASN.1 to a String - If the AttributeType is of the dotted-decimal form, the AttributeValue is represented by an number sign ('#' U+0023) character followed by the hexadecimal encoding of each of the octets of the BER encoding of - Zeilenga LDAP: Distinguished Names [Page 4] -INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-15.txt 24 October 2004 - + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-16.txt 10 February 2005 the X.500 AttributeValue. This form is also used when the syntax of @@ -275,7 +234,6 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-15.txt 24 October 2004 form may also be used in other cases, such as when a reversible string representation is desired (see Section 5.2). - Otherwise, if the AttributeValue is of a syntax which has a LDAP-specific string encoding, the value is converted first to a UTF-8 encoded Unicode string according to its syntax specification (see @@ -284,62 +242,49 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-15.txt 24 October 2004 escaping, then that string can be used as the string representation of the value. - - a space (' ' U+0020) or number sign ('#' U+0023) occurring at the beginning of the string; - - a space (' ' U+0020) character occurring at the end of the string; - - one of the characters '"', '+', ',', ';', '<', '>', or '\' (U+0022, U+002B, U+002C, U+003B, U+003C, U+003E, or U+005C respectively); - - the null (U+0000) character. - Other characters may be escaped. - Each octet of the character to be escaped is replaced by a backslash and two hex digits, which form a single octet in the code of the character. Alternatively, if and only if the character to be escaped is one of - ' ', '"', '#', '+', ',', ';', '<', '=', '>', or '\' (U+0020, U+0022, U+0023, U+002B, U+002C, U+003B, U+003C, U+003D, U+003E, U+005C respectively) - - it can be prefixed by a backslash ('\' U+0005C). - + it can be prefixed by a backslash ('\' U+005C). Examples of the escaping mechanism are shown in Section 4. - 3. Parsing a String back to a Distinguished Name - The string representation of Distinguished Names is restricted to UTF-8 [RFC3629] encoded Unicode [Unicode] characters. The structure of this string representation is specified using the following - Zeilenga LDAP: Distinguished Names [Page 5] -INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-15.txt 24 October 2004 - + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-16.txt 10 February 2005 Augmented BNF [RFC2234] grammar: - distinguishedName = [ relativeDistinguishedName *( COMMA relativeDistinguishedName ) ] relativeDistinguishedName = attributeTypeAndValue @@ -348,47 +293,39 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-15.txt 24 October 2004 attributeType = descr / numericoid attributeValue = string / hexstring - ; The following characters are to be escaped when they appear ; in the value to be encoded: ESC, one of , leading ; SHARP or SPACE, trailing SPACE, and NULL. string = [ ( leadchar / pair ) [ *( stringchar / pair ) ( trailchar / pair ) ] ] - leadchar = LUTF1 / UTFMB LUTF1 = %x01-1F / %x21 / %x24-2A / %x2D-3A / %x3D / %x3F-5B / %x5D-7F - trailchar = TUTF1 / UTFMB TUTF1 = %x01-1F / %x21 / %x23-2A / %x2D-3A / %x3D / %x3F-5B / %x5D-7F - stringchar = SUTF1 / UTFMB SUTF1 = %x01-21 / %x23-2A / %x2D-3A / %x3D / %x3F-5B / %x5D-7F - pair = ESC ( ESC / special / hexpair ) special = escaped / SPACE / SHARP / EQUALS escaped = DQUOTE / PLUS / COMMA / SEMI / LANGLE / RANGLE hexstring = SHARP 1*hexpair hexpair = HEX HEX - where the productions , , , , , , , , , , , , , , are defined in [Models]. - Each , either a or a , refers to an attribute type of an attribute value assertion (AVA). The is followed by a and an . The is either in or form. - If in form, a LDAP string representation asserted value can be obtained by replacing (left-to-right, non-recursively) each appearing in the as follows: @@ -397,33 +334,27 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-15.txt 24 October 2004 - Zeilenga LDAP: Distinguished Names [Page 6] -INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-15.txt 24 October 2004 - + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-16.txt 10 February 2005 replace with the octet indicated by the . - If in form, a BER representation can be obtained from converting each of the to the octet indicated by the . - One or more attribute values assertions, separated by , for a relative distinguished name. - Zero or more relative distinguished names, separated by , for a distinguished name. - Implementations MUST recognize AttributeType name strings (descriptors) listed in the following table, but MAY recognize other name strings. - String X.500 AttributeType ------ -------------------------------------------- CN commonName (2.5.4.3) @@ -436,7 +367,6 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-15.txt 24 October 2004 DC domainComponent (0.9.2342.19200300.100.1.25) UID userId (0.9.2342.19200300.100.1.1) - Implementations MAY recognize other DN string representations (such as that described in RFC 1779). However, as there is no requirement that alternative DN string representations to be recognized (and, if so, @@ -444,59 +374,46 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-15.txt 24 October 2004 with Section 2 of this document. - 4. Examples - This notation is designed to be convenient for common forms of name. This section gives a few examples of distinguished names written using this notation. First is a name containing three relative distinguished names (RDNs): - UID=jsmith,DC=example,DC=net - Here is an example name containing three RDNs, in which the first RDN is multi-valued: - OU=Sales+CN=J. Smith,DC=example,DC=net - Zeilenga LDAP: Distinguished Names [Page 7] -INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-15.txt 24 October 2004 - + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-16.txt 10 February 2005 This example shows the method of escaping of a special characters appearing in a common name: - CN=James \"Jim\" Smith\, III,DC=example,DC=net - The following shows the method for encoding a value which contains a carriage return character: - CN=Before\0dAfter,DC=example,DC=net - In this RDN example, the type in the RDN is unrecognized, and the value is the BER encoding of an OCTET STRING containing two octets 0x48 and 0x69. - 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.0=#04024869 - Finally, this example shows an RDN whose commonName value consisting of 5 letters: - Unicode Character Code UTF-8 Escaped ------------------------------- ------ ------ -------- LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L U+004C 0x4C L @@ -505,28 +422,22 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-15.txt 24 October 2004 LATIN SMALL LETTER I U+0069 0x69 i LATIN SMALL LETTER C WITH ACUTE U+0107 0xC487 \C4\87 - could be encoded in printable ASCII (useful for debugging purposes) as: - CN=Lu\C4\8Di\C4\87 - 5. Security Considerations - The following security considerations are specific to the handling of distinguished names. LDAP security considerations are discussed in [Protocol] and other documents comprising the LDAP Technical Specification [Roadmap]. - 5.1. Disclosure - Distinguished Names typically consist of descriptive information about the entries they name, which can be people, organizations, devices or other real-world objects. This frequently includes some of the @@ -535,10 +446,9 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-15.txt 24 October 2004 - Zeilenga LDAP: Distinguished Names [Page 8] -INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-15.txt 24 October 2004 - + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-16.txt 10 February 2005 - the common name of the object (i.e. a person's full name) @@ -546,22 +456,27 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-15.txt 24 October 2004 - its physical location (country, locality, city, street address) - organizational attributes (such as department name or affiliation) - - Most countries have privacy laws regarding the publication of - information about people. - + In some cases, such information can be considered sensitive. In many + countries, privacy laws exist which prohibit disclosure of certain + kinds of descriptive information (e.g., email addresses). Hence, + servers implementors are encouraged to support DIT structural rules + and name forms [Models] as these provide a mechanism for + administrators to select appropriate naming attributes for entries. + Administrators are encouraged to use these mechanisms, access + controls, and other administrative controls which may be available to + restrict use of attributes containing sensitive information in naming + of entries. Additionally, use of authentication and data security + services in LDAP [AuthMeth][Protocol] should be considered. 5.2. Use of Distinguished Names in Security Applications - The transformations of an AttributeValue value from its X.501 form to an LDAP string representation are not always reversible back to the same BER (Basic Encoding Rules) or DER (Distinguished Encoding rules) form. An example of a situation which requires the DER form of a distinguished name is the verification of an X.509 certificate. - For example, a distinguished name consisting of one RDN with one AVA, in which the type is commonName and the value is of the TeletexString choice with the letters 'Sam' would be represented in LDAP as the @@ -569,7 +484,6 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-15.txt 24 October 2004 still 'Sam' but of the PrintableString choice would have the same representation . - Applications which require the reconstruction of the DER form of the value SHOULD NOT use the string representation of attribute syntaxes when converting a distinguished name to the LDAP format. Instead, @@ -577,69 +491,57 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-15.txt 24 October 2004 U+0023) as described in the first paragraph of Section 2.4. - 6. Acknowledgment - This document is an update to RFC 2253, by Mark Wahl, Tim Howes, and Steve Kille. RFC 2253 was a product of the IETF ASID Working Group. - This document is a product of the IETF LDAPBIS Working Group. -7. Document Editor's Address - - Kurt D. Zeilenga - OpenLDAP Foundation - - - - -8. References +Zeilenga LDAP: Distinguished Names [Page 9] + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-16.txt 10 February 2005 +7. Document Editor's Address + Kurt D. Zeilenga + OpenLDAP Foundation -Zeilenga LDAP: Distinguished Names [Page 9] -INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-15.txt 24 October 2004 + Email: Kurt@OpenLDAP.org +8. References [[Note to the RFC Editor: please replace the citation tags used in - referencing Internet-Drafts with tags of the form RFCnnnn.]] - + referencing Internet-Drafts with tags of the form RFCnnnn where + possible.]] 8.1. Normative References - [X.501] International Telecommunication Union - Telecommunication Standardization Sector, "The Directory -- Models," X.501(1993) (also ISO/IEC 9594-2:1994). - [X.680] International Telecommunication Union - Telecommunication Standardization Sector, "Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) - Specification of Basic Notation", X.680(1997) (also ISO/IEC 8824-1:1998). - [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14 (also RFC 2119), March 1997. - [RFC2234] Crocker, D. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax Specifications: ABNF", RFC 2234, November 1997. - [RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646", RFC 3629 (also STD 63), November 2003. - [Unicode] The Unicode Consortium, "The Unicode Standard, Version 3.2.0" is defined by "The Unicode Standard, Version 3.0" (Reading, MA, Addison-Wesley, 2000. ISBN 0-201-61633-5), @@ -648,56 +550,45 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-15.txt 24 October 2004 "Unicode Standard Annex #28: Unicode 3.2" (http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr28/). - [Models] Zeilenga, K. (editor), "LDAP: Directory Information Models", draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-xx.txt, a work in progress. - [Roadmap] Zeilenga, K. (editor), "LDAP: Technical Specification + + + +Zeilenga LDAP: Distinguished Names [Page 10] + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-16.txt 10 February 2005 + + Road Map", draft-ietf-ldapbis-roadmap-xx.txt, a work in progress. - [Protocol] Sermersheim, J. (editor), "LDAP: The Protocol", draft-ietf-ldapbis-protocol-xx.txt, a work in progress. - [Syntaxes] Legg, S. (editor), "LDAP: Syntaxes and Matching Rules", draft-ietf-ldapbis-syntaxes-xx.txt, a work in progress. - [Schema] Dally, K. (editor), "LDAP: User Schema", draft-ietf-ldapbis-user-schema-xx.txt, a work in - - - - -Zeilenga LDAP: Distinguished Names [Page 10] -INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-15.txt 24 October 2004 - - - progress. - [REGISTRY] IANA, Object Identifier Descriptors Registry, . - 8.2. Informative References - [ASCII] Coded Character Set--7-bit American Standard Code for Information Interchange, ANSI X3.4-1986. - [X.500] International Telecommunication Union - Telecommunication Standardization Sector, "The Directory -- Overview of concepts, models and services," X.500(1993) (also ISO/IEC 9594-1:1994). - [X.690] International Telecommunication Union - Telecommunication Standardization Sector, "Specification of ASN.1 encoding rules: Basic Encoding Rules (BER), @@ -705,61 +596,49 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-15.txt 24 October 2004 Encoding Rules (DER)", X.690(1997) (also ISO/IEC 8825-1:1998). - [RFC2849] Good, G., "The LDAP Data Interchange Format (LDIF) - Technical Specification", RFC 2849, June 2000. - [BCP64bis] Zeilenga, K., "IANA Considerations for LDAP", draft-ietf-ldapbis-bcp64-xx.txt, a work in progress. - [CharModel] Whistler, K. and M. Davis, "Unicode Technical Report #17, Character Encoding Model", UTR17, , August 2000. - [Glossary] The Unicode Consortium, "Unicode Glossary", . -Appendix A. Presentation Issues +Zeilenga LDAP: Distinguished Names [Page 11] + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-16.txt 10 February 2005 + + +Appendix A. Presentation Issues This appendix is provided for informational purposes only, it is not a normative part of this specification. - The string representation described in this document is not intended to be presented to humans without translation. However, at times it may be desirable to present non-translated DN strings to users. This section discusses presentation issues associated with non-translated DN strings. Presentation of translated DN strings issues are not - - - - -Zeilenga LDAP: Distinguished Names [Page 11] -INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-15.txt 24 October 2004 - - - discussed in this appendix. Transcoding issues are also not discussed in this appendix. - This appendix provides guidance for applications presenting DN strings to users. This section is not comprehensive, it does not discuss all presentation issues which implementors may face. - Not all user interfaces are capable of displaying the full set of Unicode characters. Some Unicode characters are not displayable. - It is recommended that human interfaces use the optional hex pair escaping mechanism (Section 2.3) to produce a string representation suitable for display to the user. For example, an application can @@ -767,7 +646,6 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-15.txt 24 October 2004 characters appearing in the AttributeValue's string representation (as demonstrated in the final example of Section 4). - When a DN string is displayed in free form text, it is often necessary to distinguish the DN string from surrounding text. While this is often done with white space (as demonstrated in Section 4), it is @@ -781,7 +659,6 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-15.txt 24 October 2004 be noted to the user that the wrapping '<' and '>' characters are not part of the DN string. - DN strings can be quite long. It is often desirable to line-wrap overly long DN strings in presentations. Line wrapping should be done by inserting white space after the RDN separator character or, if @@ -789,32 +666,27 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-15.txt 24 October 2004 the user that the inserted white space is not part of the DN string and is to be removed before use in LDAP. For example, - The following DN string is long: + + + +Zeilenga LDAP: Distinguished Names [Page 12] + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-16.txt 10 February 2005 + + CN=Kurt D. Zeilenga,OU=Engineering,L=Redwood Shores, O=OpenLDAP Foundation,ST=California,C=US so it has been line-wrapped for readability. The extra white space is to be removed before the DN string is used in LDAP. - It is not advised to insert white space otherwise as it may not be obvious to the user which white space is part of the DN string and which white space was added for readability. - Another alternative is to use the LDAP Data Interchange Format (LDIF) - - - - -Zeilenga LDAP: Distinguished Names [Page 12] -INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-15.txt 24 October 2004 - - - [RFC2849]. For example, - # This entry has a long DN... dn: CN=Kurt D. Zeilenga,OU=Engineering,L=Redwood Shores, O=OpenLDAP Foundation,ST=California,C=US @@ -823,14 +695,11 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-15.txt 24 October 2004 objectClass: person - Appendix B. Changes made since RFC 2253 - This appendix is provided for informational purposes only, it is not a normative part of this specification. - The following substantive changes were made to RFC 2253: - Removed IESG Note. The IESG Note has been addressed. - Replaced all references to ISO 10646-1 with [Unicode]. @@ -854,6 +723,14 @@ Appendix B. Changes made since RFC 2253 - Updated Section 2.4 to allow hex pair escaping of all characters and clarified escaping for when multiple octet UTF-8 encodings are present. Indicated that null (U+0000) character is to be escaped. + + + +Zeilenga LDAP: Distinguished Names [Page 13] + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-16.txt 10 February 2005 + + Indicated that equals sign ('=' U+003D) character may be escaped as '\='. - Rewrote Section 3 to use ABNF as defined in RFC 2234. @@ -864,15 +741,6 @@ Appendix B. Changes made since RFC 2253 + do not require escaping of non-leading number sign ('#' U+0023) characters, + allow space (' ' U+0020) to escaped as '\ ', - - - - -Zeilenga LDAP: Distinguished Names [Page 13] -INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-15.txt 24 October 2004 - - - + require hex escaping of null (U+0000) characters, and + removed LDAPv2-only constructs. - Updated Section 3 to describe how to parse elements of the @@ -883,14 +751,11 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-15.txt 24 October 2004 - Added discussion of presentation issues (Appendix A). - Added this appendix. - In addition, numerous editorial changes were made. - Intellectual Property Rights - The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in @@ -900,7 +765,6 @@ Intellectual Property Rights on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be found in BCP 78 and BCP 79. - Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of @@ -908,7 +772,6 @@ Intellectual Property Rights can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at http://www.ietf.org/ipr. - The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement @@ -918,26 +781,21 @@ Intellectual Property Rights -Full Copyright + +Zeilenga LDAP: Distinguished Names [Page 14] + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-16.txt 10 February 2005 - Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). This document is subject +Full Copyright + + Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005). This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights. - This document and the information contained herein are provided on an "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET - - - - -Zeilenga LDAP: Distinguished Names [Page 14] -INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-15.txt 24 October 2004 - - - ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED @@ -980,13 +838,6 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-15.txt 24 October 2004 +Zeilenga LDAP: Distinguished Names [Page 15] + - - - - - - - - -Zeilenga LDAP: Distinguished Names [Page 15] \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/doc/drafts/draft-ietf-ldapbis-filter-xx.txt b/doc/drafts/draft-ietf-ldapbis-filter-xx.txt index 59fa2100cf..8f00270523 100644 --- a/doc/drafts/draft-ietf-ldapbis-filter-xx.txt +++ b/doc/drafts/draft-ietf-ldapbis-filter-xx.txt @@ -1,14 +1,12 @@ - - Network Working Group M. Smith, Editor Request for Comments: DRAFT Pearl Crescent, LLC Obsoletes: RFC 2254 T. Howes -Expires: 24 April 2005 Opsware, Inc. - 24 October 2004 +Expires: 16 May 2005 Opsware, Inc. + 16 November 2004 LDAP: String Representation of Search Filters - + @@ -52,8 +50,8 @@ Status of this Memo Smith & Howes Intended Category: Standards Track [Page 1] - -INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 24 October 2004 + +INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 16 November 2004 Abstract @@ -61,8 +59,8 @@ Abstract LDAP search filters are transmitted in the LDAP protocol using a binary representation that is appropriate for use on the network. This document defines a human-readable string representation of LDAP - search filters that is appropriate for use in LDAP URLs and in other - applications. + search filters that is appropriate for use in LDAP URLs [LDAPURL] and + in other applications. Table of Contents @@ -78,18 +76,19 @@ Table of Contents 7. Normative References...........................................7 8. Informative References.........................................8 9. Acknowledgments................................................8 -10. Authors' Addresses.............................................8 +10. Authors' Addresses.............................................9 11. Appendix A: Changes Since RFC 2254.............................9 11.1. Technical Changes...........................................9 11.2. Editorial Changes...........................................10 12. Appendix B: Changes Since Previous Document Revision...........11 -12.1. Editorial Changes...........................................11 -13. Intellectual Property Rights...................................11 -14. Full Copyright.................................................12 +12.1. Technical Changes...........................................11 +12.2. Editorial Changes...........................................12 + Intellectual Property Rights...................................12 + Full Copyright.................................................13 1. Introduction - The Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) [Protocol] defines a + The Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) [Roadmap] defines a network representation of a search filter transmitted to an LDAP server. Some applications may find it useful to have a common way of representing these search filters in a human-readable form; LDAP URLs @@ -98,19 +97,21 @@ Table of Contents possible LDAP version 3 search filters, including extended match filters. - This document is an integral part of the LDAP Technical Specification - [Roadmap]. + This document is a integral part of the LDAP technical specification + [Roadmap] which obsoletes the previously defined LDAP technical + specification, RFC 3377, in its entirety. - This document replaces RFC 2254. Changes to RFC 2254 are summarized - in Appendix A. Smith & Howes Intended Category: Standards Track [Page 2] - -INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 24 October 2004 +INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 16 November 2004 + + + This document replaces RFC 2254. Changes to RFC 2254 are summarized + in Appendix A. The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this @@ -118,7 +119,7 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 24 October 2004 2. LDAP Search Filter Definition - An LDAPv3 search filter is defined in Section 4.5.1 of [Protocol] as + An LDAP search filter is defined in Section 4.5.1 of [Protocol] as follows: Filter ::= CHOICE { @@ -157,26 +158,27 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 24 October 2004 AttributeValue ::= OCTET STRING - MatchingRuleId ::= LDAPString - - AssertionValue ::= OCTET STRING Smith & Howes Intended Category: Standards Track [Page 3] - -INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 24 October 2004 +INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 16 November 2004 + + + MatchingRuleId ::= LDAPString + + AssertionValue ::= OCTET STRING LDAPString ::= OCTET STRING -- UTF-8 encoded, -- [Unicode] characters - The AttributeDescription is a string representation of the attribute - description and is defined in [Protocol]. The AttributeValue and - AssertionValue OCTET STRING have the form defined in [Syntaxes]. The - Filter is encoded for transmission over a network using the Basic - Encoding Rules (BER) defined in [X.690], with simplifications - described in [Protocol]. + The AttributeDescription, as defined in [Protocol], is a string + representation of the attribute description that is discussed in + [Models]. The AttributeValue and AssertionValue OCTET STRING have + the form defined in [Syntaxes]. The Filter is encoded for + transmission over a network using the Basic Encoding Rules (BER) + defined in [X.690], with simplifications described in [Protocol]. 3. String Search Filter Definition @@ -200,11 +202,10 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 24 October 2004 approx = TILDE EQUALS greaterorequal = RANGLE EQUALS lessorequal = LANGLE EQUALS - extensible = attr [dnattrs] - [matchingrule] COLON EQUALS assertionvalue - / [dnattrs] - matchingrule COLON EQUALS assertionvalue - / COLON EQUALS assertionvalue + extensible = ( attr [dnattrs] + [matchingrule] COLON EQUALS assertionvalue ) + / ( [dnattrs] + matchingrule COLON EQUALS assertionvalue ) present = attr EQUALS ASTERISK substring = attr EQUALS [initial] any [final] initial = assertionvalue @@ -213,17 +214,17 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 24 October 2004 attr = attributedescription ; The attributedescription rule is defined in ; Section 2.5 of [Models]. - dnattrs = COLON "dn" - matchingrule = COLON oid - assertionvalue = valueencoding Smith & Howes Intended Category: Standards Track [Page 4] - -INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 24 October 2004 +INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 16 November 2004 + + dnattrs = COLON "dn" + matchingrule = COLON oid + assertionvalue = valueencoding ; The rule is used to encode an ; from Section 4.1.6 of [Protocol]. valueencoding = 0*(normal / escaped) @@ -259,27 +260,26 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 24 October 2004 For AssertionValues that contain UTF-8 character data, each octet of the character to be escaped is replaced by a backslash and two hex - digits, which form a single octet in the code of the character. - - For example, the filter checking whether the "cn" attribute contained - a value with the character "*" anywhere in it would be represented as + digits, which form a single octet in the code of the character. For + example, the filter checking whether the "cn" attribute contained a + value with the character "*" anywhere in it would be represented as "(cn=*\2a*)". - As indicated by the valueencoding rule, implementations MUST escape + As indicated by the rule, implementations MUST escape all octets greater than 0x7F that are not part of a valid UTF-8 encoding sequence when they generate a string representation of a search filter. Implementations SHOULD accept as input strings that are not valid UTF-8 strings. This is necessary because RFC 2254 did - not clearly define the term "string representation" (and in - particular did not mention that the string representation of an LDAP Smith & Howes Intended Category: Standards Track [Page 5] - -INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 24 October 2004 + +INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 16 November 2004 + not clearly define the term "string representation" (and in + particular did not mention that the string representation of an LDAP search filter is a string of UTF-8 encoded Unicode characters). 4. Examples @@ -295,47 +295,48 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 24 October 2004 The following examples illustrate the use of extensible matching. - (cn:1.2.3.4.5:=Fred Flintstone) + (cn:caseExactMatch:=Fred Flintstone) (cn:=Betty Rubble) (sn:dn:2.4.6.8.10:=Barney Rubble) (o:dn:=Ace Industry) (:1.2.3:=Wilma Flintstone) - (:dn:2.4.6.8.10:=Dino) + (:DN:2.4.6.8.10:=Dino) - The first example shows use of the matching rule "1.2.3.4.5". + The first example shows use of the matching rule "caseExactMatch." The second example demonstrates use of a MatchingRuleAssertion form without a matchingRule. The third example illustrates the use of the ":oid" notation to - indicate that matching rule "2.4.6.8.10" should be used when making - comparisons, and that the attributes of an entry's distinguished name - should be considered part of the entry when evaluating the match - (indicated by the use of ":dn"). + indicate that matching rule identified by the OID "2.4.6.8.10" should + be used when making comparisons, and that the attributes of an + entry's distinguished name should be considered part of the entry + when evaluating the match (indicated by the use of ":dn"). The fourth example denotes an equality match, except that DN components should be considered part of the entry when doing the match. The fifth example is a filter that should be applied to any attribute - supporting the matching rule given (since the attr has been omitted). + supporting the matching rule given (since the has been + omitted). The sixth and final example is also a filter that should be applied to any attribute supporting the matching rule given. Attributes supporting the matching rule contained in the DN should also be considered. - The following examples illustrate the use of the escaping mechanism. - - (o=Parens R Us \28for all your parenthetical needs\29) Smith & Howes Intended Category: Standards Track [Page 6] - -INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 24 October 2004 +INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 16 November 2004 + + + The following examples illustrate the use of the escaping mechanism. + (o=Parens R Us \28for all your parenthetical needs\29) (cn=*\2A*) (filename=C:\5cMyFile) (bin=\00\00\00\04) @@ -348,12 +349,16 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 24 October 2004 substring indicator. The third illustrates the escaping of the backslash character. - The fourth example shows a filter searching for the four-byte value - 0x00000004, illustrating the use of the escaping mechanism to + The fourth example shows a filter searching for the four octet value + 00 00 00 04 (hex), illustrating the use of the escaping mechanism to represent arbitrary data, including NUL characters. The fifth example illustrates the use of the escaping mechanism to - represent various non-ASCII UTF-8 characters. + represent various non-ASCII UTF-8 characters. Specifically, there are + 5 characters in the portion of this example: LATIN + CAPITAL LETTER L (U+004C), LATIN SMALL LETTER U (U+0075), LATIN SMALL + LETTER C WITH CARON (U+010D), LATIN SMALL LETTER I (U+0069), and + LATIN SMALL LETTER C WITH ACUTE (U+0107). The sixth and final example demonstrates assertion of a BER encoded value. @@ -377,20 +382,20 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 24 October 2004 [AuthMeth] Harrison, R. (editor), "LDAP: Authentication Methods and Connection Level Security Mechanisms", - draft-ietf-ldapbis-authmeth-xx.txt, a work in progress. -[Models] Zeilenga, K. (editor), "LDAP: Directory Information Models", - draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-xx.txt, a work in progress. -[Protocol] draft-ietf-ldapbis-protocol-xx.txt, a work in progress. +Smith & Howes Intended Category: Standards Track [Page 7] +INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 16 November 2004 -Smith & Howes Intended Category: Standards Track [Page 7] - -INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 24 October 2004 + draft-ietf-ldapbis-authmeth-xx.txt, a work in progress. +[Models] Zeilenga, K. (editor), "LDAP: Directory Information Models", + draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-xx.txt, a work in progress. + +[Protocol] draft-ietf-ldapbis-protocol-xx.txt, a work in progress. [RFC2119] S. Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14 (also RFC 2119), March 1997. @@ -414,22 +419,31 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 24 October 2004 (http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr27/) and by the "Unicode Standard Annex #28: Unicode 3.2." +8. Informative References + +[LDAPURL] Smith, M. (editor), "LDAP: Uniform Resource Locator", + draft-ietf-ldapbis-url-xx.txt, a work in progress. + [X.690] Specification of ASN.1 encoding rules: Basic, Canonical, and Distinguished Encoding Rules, ITU-T Recommendation X.690, 1994. -8. Informative References +9. Acknowledgments - None. + This document replaces RFC 2254 by Tim Howes. RFC 2254 was a product + of the IETF ASID Working Group. -9. Acknowledgments + Changes included in this revised specification are based upon + discussions among the authors, discussions within the LDAP (v3) + Revision Working Group (ldapbis), and discussions within other IETF + Working Groups. The contributions of individuals in these working + groups is gratefully acknowledged. - This document replaces RFC 2254 by Tim Howes. Changes included in - this revised specification are based upon discussions among the - authors, discussions within the LDAP (v3) Revision Working Group - (ldapbis), and discussions within other IETF Working Groups. The - contributions of individuals in these working groups is gratefully - acknowledged. + + +Smith & Howes Intended Category: Standards Track [Page 8] + +INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 16 November 2004 10. Authors' Addresses @@ -440,14 +454,6 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 24 October 2004 Saline, MI 48176 USA +1 734 944-2856 - - - -Smith & Howes Intended Category: Standards Track [Page 8] - -INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 24 October 2004 - - mcs@pearlcrescent.com @@ -477,6 +483,9 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 24 October 2004 "simple", "extensible", and "substring" ("initial", "any", and "final") rules. This matches a change made in [Syntaxes]. + Added "(" and ")" around the components of the + subproductions for clarity. + Revised the "attr", "matchingrule", and "assertionvalue" ABNF to more precisely reference productions from the [Models] and [Protocol] documents. @@ -484,24 +493,22 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 24 October 2004 "String Search Filter Definition" section: replaced "greater" and "less" with "greaterorequal" and "lessorequal" to avoid confusion. - Introduced the "valueencoding" and associated "normal" and "escaped" - rules to reduce the dependence on descriptive text. The "normal" - production restricts filter strings to valid UTF-8 sequences. - Added a third option to the "extensible" production to allow creation - of a MatchingRuleAssertion that only has a matchValue. - Added a statement about expected behavior in light of RFC 2254's lack - of a clear definition of "string representation." +Smith & Howes Intended Category: Standards Track [Page 9] + +INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 16 November 2004 + Introduced the "valueencoding" and associated "normal" and "escaped" + rules to reduce the dependence on descriptive text. The "normal" + production restricts filter strings to valid UTF-8 sequences. + Added a statement about expected behavior in light of RFC 2254's lack + of a clear definition of "string representation." -Smith & Howes Intended Category: Standards Track [Page 9] - -INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 24 October 2004 11.2. Editorial Changes @@ -526,8 +533,8 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 24 October 2004 this document (instead of RFC 1960). Added reference to the [Roadmap] document. - "LDAP Search Filter Definition" section: made corrections to the - LDAPv3 search filter ABNF so it matches that used in [Protocol]. + "LDAP Search Filter Definition" section: made corrections to the LDAP + search filter ABNF so it matches that used in [Protocol]. Clarified the definition of 'value' (now 'assertionvalue') to take into account the fact that it is not precisely an AttributeAssertion @@ -540,7 +547,22 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 24 October 2004 (cn:=Betty Rubble), (:1.2.3:=Wilma Flintstone), and (1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.0=\04\02\48\69). Replaced one occurrence of "a value" with "an assertion value". Corrected the description of this - example: (sn:dn:2.4.6.8.10:=Barney Rubble). + example: (sn:dn:2.4.6.8.10:=Barney Rubble). Replaced the numeric OID + in the first extensible match example with "caseExactMatch" to + demonstrate use of the descriptive form. Used "DN" (uppercase) in + + + +Smith & Howes Intended Category: Standards Track [Page 10] + +INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 16 November 2004 + + + the last extensible match example to remind the reader to treat the + production as case insensitive. Reworded the description + of the fourth escaping mechanism example to avoid making assumptions + about byte order. Added text to the fifth escaping mechanism example + to spell out what the non-ASCII characters are in Unicode terms. "Security Considerations" section: added references to [Protocol] and [AuthMeth]. @@ -551,16 +573,8 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 24 October 2004 [Models], and [Roadmap] and updated the UTF-8 reference. Replaced RFC 822 reference with a reference to RFC 2234. - - - - -Smith & Howes Intended Category: Standards Track [Page 10] - -INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 24 October 2004 - - - "Informative References" section: added for clarity. + "Informative References" section: (new section) moved [X.690] to this + section. Added a reference to [LDAPURL]. "Acknowledgments" section: added. @@ -569,29 +583,72 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 24 October 2004 "Appendix B: Changes Since Previous Document Revision" section: added. + Surrounded the names of all ABNF productions with "<" and ">" where + they are used in descriptive text. + + Replaced all occurrences of "LDAPv3" with "LDAP." + 12. Appendix B: Changes Since Previous Document Revision This appendix lists all changes relative to the previously published - revision, draft-ietf-ldapbis-filter-07.txt. Note that when + revision, draft-ietf-ldapbis-filter-08.txt. Note that when appropriate these changes are also included in Appendix A, but are also included here for the benefit of the people who have already - reviewed draft-ietf-ldapbis-filter-07.txt. This section will be + reviewed draft-ietf-ldapbis-filter-08.txt. This section will be removed before this document is published as an RFC. -12.1. Editorial Changes +12.1. Technical Changes - "Status of this Memo" section: replaced RFC 3668 (IPR) boilerplate - paragraph with the version that says "each author" instead of "I." + Removed the third option from the "extensible" production that + allowed creation of a MatchingRuleAssertion that only had a + matchValue (disallowed By [Protocol]). Added "(" and ")" around the + components of the subproductions for clarity. - "Status of this Memo" section: added 2 paragraphs that were - accidently removed from the -07 revision (one begins with "The list - of current Internet-Drafts..." and the other begins with "The list of - Internet-Draft Shadow Directories...." -13. Intellectual Property Rights + +Smith & Howes Intended Category: Standards Track [Page 11] + +INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 16 November 2004 + + +12.2. Editorial Changes + + "Introduction" section: referenced [Roadmap] upon first use of LDAP + and expanded the paragraph that begins "This document is an integral + part of the LDAP technical specification..." to match the text used + in [Protocol]. + + "LDAP Search Filter Definition" section: reworded the last paragraph + for clarity. + + "Examples" section: Replaced the numeric OID in the first extensible + match example with "caseExactMatch" to demonstrate use of the + descriptive form. Used "DN" (uppercase) in the last extensible match + example to remind the reader to treat the production as + case insensitive. Reworded the description of the fourth escaping + mechanism example to avoid making assumptions about byte order. + Added text to the fifth escaping mechanism example to spell out what + the non-ASCII characters are in Unicode terms. + + References: added [LDAPURL] and moved [X.690] to "Informative + References." + + "Acknowledgements" section: added the sentence "RFC 2254 was a + product of the IETF ASID Working Group." + + Changed these two sections to unnumbered ones: "Intellectual Property + Rights" and "Full Copyright." + + Surrounded the names of all ABNF productions with "<" and ">" where + they are used in descriptive text. + + Replaced all occurrences of "LDAPv3" with "LDAP." + + +Intellectual Property Rights The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to @@ -605,16 +662,17 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 24 October 2004 Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of - such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this - specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at - http://www.ietf.org/ipr. -Smith & Howes Intended Category: Standards Track [Page 11] - -INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 24 October 2004 +Smith & Howes Intended Category: Standards Track [Page 12] +INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 16 November 2004 + + + such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this + specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at + http://www.ietf.org/ipr. The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary @@ -622,7 +680,7 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 24 October 2004 this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at ietf-ipr@ietf.org. -14. Full Copyright +Full Copyright Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and @@ -637,10 +695,7 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 24 October 2004 WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. -This Internet Draft expires on 24 April 2005. - - - +This Internet Draft expires on 16 May 2005. @@ -666,7 +721,4 @@ This Internet Draft expires on 24 April 2005. - -Smith & Howes Intended Category: Standards Track [Page 12] - - +Smith & Howes Intended Category: Standards Track [Page 13] \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/doc/drafts/draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-xx.txt b/doc/drafts/draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-xx.txt index 7f8a98bd28..43d85caa0b 100644 --- a/doc/drafts/draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-xx.txt +++ b/doc/drafts/draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-xx.txt @@ -1,53 +1,50 @@ + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT Editor: Kurt D. Zeilenga Intended Category: Standard Track OpenLDAP Foundation -Expires in six months 24 October 2004 -Obsoletes: RFC 2251, RFC 2252, RFC 2256 - +Expires in six months 21 February 2005 +Obsoletes: RFC 2251, RFC 2252, RFC 2256, RFC 3674 LDAP: Directory Information Models - - + Status of this Memo - This document is intended to be published as a Standard Track RFC. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. Technical discussion of this document will take place on the IETF LDAP Revision Working Group mailing list . Please send editorial comments directly to the editor . - By submitting this Internet-Draft, I accept the provisions of Section 4 of RFC 3667. By submitting this Internet-Draft, I certify that any applicable patent or other IPR claims of which I am aware have been disclosed, or will be disclosed, and any of which I become aware will be disclosed, in accordance with RFC 3668. - Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. - Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." - The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at - . The list of - Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at - . + http://www.ietf.org/1id-abstracts.html + The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at + http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html - Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). All Rights Reserved. + Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005). All Rights Reserved. Please see the Full Copyright section near the end of this document for more information. @@ -56,26 +53,20 @@ Status of this Memo - - - Zeilenga LDAP Models [Page 1] -INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-12 24 October 2004 - + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-14 21 February 2005 Abstract - The Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) is an Internet protocol for accessing distributed directory services which act in accordance with X.500 data and service models. This document describes the X.500 Directory Information Models, as used in LDAP. - Table of Contents - Status of this Memo 1 Abstract 2 Table of Contents @@ -90,56 +81,52 @@ Table of Contents 2.3. Naming of Entries 8 2.4. Object Classes 9 2.5. Attribute Descriptions 12 - 2.6. Alias Entries 15 + 2.6. Alias Entries 16 3. Directory Administrative and Operational Information 17 3.1. Subtrees - 3.2. Subentries - 3.3. The 'objectClass' attribute 18 + 3.2. Subentries 18 + 3.3. The 'objectClass' attribute 3.4. Operational attributes 19 - 4. Directory Schema 20 + 4. Directory Schema 22 4.1. Schema Definitions 23 - 4.2. Subschema Subentries 30 + 4.2. Subschema Subentries 32 4.3. 'extensibleObject' 35 - 4.4. Subschema Discovery - 5. DSA (Server) Informational Model 36 - 5.1. Server-specific Data Requirements - 6. Other Considerations 39 - 6.1. Preservation of User Information 40 + 4.4. Subschema Discovery 36 + 5. DSA (Server) Informational Model + 5.1. Server-specific Data Requirements 37 + 6. Other Considerations 40 + 6.1. Preservation of User Information 41 6.2. Short Names - 6.3. Cache and Shadowing 41 - 7. Implementation Guidelines + 6.3. Cache and Shadowing + 7. Implementation Guidelines 42 7.1. Server Guidelines 7.2. Client Guidelines - 8. Security Considerations 42 + 8. Security Considerations 43 9. IANA Considerations - 10. Acknowledgments 43 + 10. Acknowledgments 44 11. Editor's Address - 12. References 44 - + 12. References Zeilenga LDAP Models [Page 2] -INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-12 24 October 2004 - + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-14 21 February 2005 - 12.1. Normative References - 12.2. Informative References 45 + 12.1. Normative References 45 + 12.2. Informative References Appendix A. Changes - Intellectual Property Rights 50 + Intellectual Property Rights 51 Full Copyright - 1. Introduction - This document discusses the X.500 Directory Information Models [X.501], as used by the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) [Roadmap]. - The Directory is "a collection of open systems cooperating to provide directory services" [X.500]. The information held in the Directory is collectively known as the Directory Information Base (DIB). A @@ -149,126 +136,107 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-12 24 October 2004 servers (or Directory System Agents (DSA)). A server holds a fragment of the DIB. - The DIB contains two classes of information: - 1) user information (e.g., information provided and administrated by users). Section 2 describes the Model of User Information. - 2) administrative and operational information (e.g., information used to administer and/or operate the directory). Section 3 describes the model of Directory Administrative and Operational Information. - These two models, referred to as the generic Directory Information Models, describe how information is represented in the Directory. These generic models provide a framework for other information models. Section 4 discusses the subschema information model and subschema discovery. Section 5 discusses the DSA (Server) Informational Model. - Other X.500 information models, such as access control distribution knowledge, and replication knowledge information models, may be adapted for use in LDAP. Specification of how these models apply to LDAP is left to future documents. - 1.1. Relationship to Other LDAP Specifications - This document is a integral part of the LDAP technical specification [Roadmap] which obsoletes the previously defined LDAP technical - Zeilenga LDAP Models [Page 3] -INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-12 24 October 2004 - + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-14 21 February 2005 specification, RFC 3377, in its entirety. - This document obsoletes RFC 2251 sections 3.2 and 3.4, as well as - portions of sections 4 and 6. Appendix A.1 summaries changes to these - sections. The remainder of RFC 2251 is obsoleted by the [Protocol], - [AuthMeth], and [Roadmap] documents. - + portions of sections 4 and 6. Appendix A.1 summarizes changes to + these sections. The remainder of RFC 2251 is obsoleted by the + [Protocol], [AuthMeth], and [Roadmap] documents. This document obsoletes RFC 2252 sections 4, 5 and 7. Appendix A.2 - summaries changes to these sections. The remainder of RFC 2252 is + summarizes changes to these sections. The remainder of RFC 2252 is obsoleted by [Syntaxes]. - This document obsoletes RFC 2256 sections 5.1, 5.2, 7.1 and 7.2. Appendix A.3 summarizes changes to these sections. The remainder of RFC 2256 is obsoleted by [Schema] and [Syntaxes]. + This document obsoletes RFC 3674 in its entirety. Appendix A.4 + summarizes changes since RFC 3674. 1.2. Relationship to X.501 - This document includes material, with and without adaptation, from - [X.501]. The material in this document takes precedence over that in - [X.501]. - + [X.501] as necessary to describe this protocol. These adaptations + (and any other differences herein) apply to this protocol, and only + this protocol. 1.3. Conventions - The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119]. - Schema definitions are provided using LDAP description formats (as defined in Section 4.1). Definitions provided here are formatted (line wrapped) for readability. Matching rules and LDAP syntaxes referenced in these definitions are specified in [Syntaxes]. - 1.4. Common ABNF Productions - A number of syntaxes in this document are described using Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF) [RFC2234]. These syntaxes (as well as a number of syntaxes defined in other documents) rely on the following common productions: - keystring = leadkeychar *keychar leadkeychar = ALPHA - keychar = ALPHA / DIGIT / HYPHEN - number = DIGIT / ( LDIGIT 1*DIGIT ) - - - ALPHA = %x41-5A / %x61-7A ; "A"-"Z" / "a"-"z" - Zeilenga LDAP Models [Page 4] -INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-12 24 October 2004 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-14 21 February 2005 + keychar = ALPHA / DIGIT / HYPHEN + number = DIGIT / ( LDIGIT 1*DIGIT ) + ALPHA = %x41-5A / %x61-7A ; "A"-"Z" / "a"-"z" DIGIT = %x30 / LDIGIT ; "0"-"9" LDIGIT = %x31-39 ; "1"-"9" HEX = DIGIT / %x41-46 / %x61-66 ; "0"-"9" / "A"-"F" / "a"-"f" - SP = 1*SPACE ; one or more " " WSP = 0*SPACE ; zero or more " " - NULL = %x00 ; null (0) SPACE = %x20 ; space (" ") DQUOTE = %x22 ; quote (""") @@ -290,7 +258,6 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-12 24 October 2004 LCURLY = %x7B ; left curly brace "{" RCURLY = %x7D ; right curly brace "}" - ; Any UTF-8 [UTF-8] encoded Unicode [Unicode] character UTF8 = UTF1 / UTFMB UTFMB = UTF2 / UTF3 / UTF4 @@ -302,41 +269,32 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-12 24 October 2004 UTF4 = %xF0 %x90-BF 2(UTF0) / %xF1-F3 3(UTF0) / %xF4 %x80-8F 2(UTF0) - OCTET = %x00-FF ; Any octet (8-bit data unit) - Object identifiers (OIDs) [X.680] are represented in LDAP using a dot-decimal format conforming to the ABNF: - numericoid = number 1*( DOT number ) - - - Short names, also known as descriptors, are used as more readable - aliases for object identifiers. Short names are case insensitive and - - Zeilenga LDAP Models [Page 5] -INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-12 24 October 2004 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-14 21 February 2005 + numericoid = number 1*( DOT number ) + Short names, also known as descriptors, are used as more readable + aliases for object identifiers. Short names are case insensitive and conform to the ABNF: - descr = keystring - Where either an object identifier or a short name may be specified, the following production is used: - oid = descr / numericoid - While the form is generally preferred when the usage is restricted to short names referring to object identifiers which identify like kinds of objects (e.g., attribute type descriptions, @@ -345,26 +303,20 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-12 24 October 2004 identify multiple kinds of objects or when an unambiguous short name (descriptor) is not available. - Implementations SHOULD treat short names (descriptors) used in an ambiguous manner (as discussed above) as unrecognized. - Short Names (descriptors) are discussed further in Section 6.2. - 2. Model of Directory User Information - As [X.501] states: - The purpose of the Directory is to hold, and provide access to, information about objects of interest (objects) in some 'world'. An object can be anything which is identifiable (can be named). - An object class is an identified family of objects, or conceivable objects, which share certain characteristics. Every object belongs to at least one class. An object class may be a subclass of other @@ -373,30 +325,25 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-12 24 October 2004 the superclasses. There may be subclasses of subclasses, etc., to an arbitrary depth. - A directory entry, a named collection of information, is the basic unit of information held in the Directory. There are multiple kinds of directory entries. - An object entry represents a particular object. An alias entry - provides alternative naming. A subentry holds administrative and/or - operational information. - - - The set of entries representing the DIB are organized hierarchically - Zeilenga LDAP Models [Page 6] -INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-12 24 October 2004 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-14 21 February 2005 + provides alternative naming. A subentry holds administrative and/or + operational information. + The set of entries representing the DIB are organized hierarchically in a tree structure known as the Directory Information Tree (DIT). - Section 2.1 describes the Directory Information Tree Section 2.2 discusses the structure of entries. Section 2.3 discusses naming of entries. @@ -405,97 +352,87 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-12 24 October 2004 Section 2.6 discusses alias entries. - 2.1. The Directory Information Tree - As noted above, the DIB is composed of a set of entries organized hierarchically in a tree structure known as the Directory Information Tree (DIT). Specifically, a tree where vertices are the entries. - The arcs between vertices define relations between entries. If an arc exists from X to Y, then the entry at X is the immediate superior of Y and Y is the immediate subordinate of X. An entry's superiors are the entry's immediate superior and its superiors. An entry's subordinates are all of its immediate subordinates and their subordinates. - Similarly, the superior/subordinate relationship between object entries can be used to derive a relation between the objects they represent. DIT structure rules can be used to govern relationships between objects. - Note: An entry's immediate superior is also known as the entry's parent and an entry's immediate subordinate is also known as the entry's child. Entries which have the same parent are known as siblings. - 2.2. Structure of an Entry - An entry consists of a set of attributes which hold information about the object which the entry represents. Some attributes represent user information and are called user attributes. Other attributes represent operational and/or administrative information and are called operational attributes. - An attribute is an attribute description (a type and zero or more options) with one or more associated values. An attribute is often referred to by its attribute description. For example, the - 'givenName' attribute is the attribute which consists of the attribute - description 'givenName' (the 'givenName' attribute type [Schema] and - zero options) and one or more associated values. - - Zeilenga LDAP Models [Page 7] -INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-12 24 October 2004 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-14 21 February 2005 + 'givenName' attribute is the attribute which consists of the attribute + description 'givenName' (the 'givenName' attribute type [Schema] and + zero options) and one or more associated values. The attribute type governs whether the attribute can have multiple values, the syntax and matching rules used to construct and compare values of that attribute, and other functions. Options indicate subtypes and other functions. - Attribute values conform to the defined syntax of the attribute type. - No two values of an attribute may be equivalent. Two values are - considered equivalent only if they would match according to the - equality matching rule of the attribute type. If the attribute type + considered equivalent if and only if they would match according to the + equality matching rule of the attribute type or, if the attribute type is defined with no equality matching rule, two values are equivalent if and only if they are identical. (See 2.5.1 for other restrictions.) - For example, a 'givenName' attribute can have more than one value, they must be Directory Strings, and they are case insensitive. A 'givenName' attribute cannot hold both "John" and "JOHN" as these are equivalent values per the equality matching rule of the attribute type. + Additionally, no attribute is to have a value which is not equivalent + to itself. For example, the 'givenName' attribute cannot have as a + value a directory string which includes the REPLACEMENT CHARACTER + (U+FFFD) code point as matching involving that directory string is + Undefined per this attribute's equality matching rule. When an attribute is used for naming of the entry, one and only one value of the attribute is used in forming the Relative Distinguished Name. This value is known as a distinguished value. - 2.3. Naming of Entries - 2.3.1. Relative Distinguished Names - Each entry is named relative to its immediate superior. This relative name, known as its Relative Distinguished Name (RDN) [X.501], is composed of an unordered set of one or more attribute value assertions @@ -503,87 +440,78 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-12 24 October 2004 attribute value. These AVAs are chosen to match attribute values (each a distinguished value) of the entry. - An entry's relative distinguished name must be unique among all immediate subordinates of the entry's immediate superior (i.e., all - siblings). - The following are examples of string representations of RDNs [LDAPDN]: +Zeilenga LDAP Models [Page 8] + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-14 21 February 2005 + + + siblings). + + The following are examples of string representations of RDNs [LDAPDN]: UID=12345 OU=Engineering CN=Kurt Zeilenga+L=Redwood Shores - The last is an example of a multi-valued RDN. That is, an RDN composed of multiple AVAs. - - -Zeilenga LDAP Models [Page 8] -INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-12 24 October 2004 - - - 2.3.2. Distinguished Names - An entry's fully qualified name, known as its Distinguished Name (DN) [X.501], is the concatenation of its RDN and its immediate superior's DN. A Distinguished Name unambiguously refers to an entry in the tree. The following are examples of string representations of DNs [LDAPDN]: - UID=nobody@example.com,DC=example,DC=com CN=John Smith,OU=Sales,O=ACME Limited,L=Moab,ST=Utah,C=US - 2.3.3. Alias Names - An alias, or alias name, is "an name for an object, provided by the use of alias entries" [X.501]. Alias entries are described in Section 2.6. - 2.4. Object Classes - An object class is "an identified family of objects (or conceivable objects) which share certain characteristics" [X.501]. - As defined in [X.501]: - Object classes are used in the Directory for a number of purposes: - - describing and categorising objects and the entries that correspond to these objects; - - where appropriate, controlling the operation of the Directory; - - regulating, in conjunction with DIT structure rule specifications, the position of entries in the DIT; + + +Zeilenga LDAP Models [Page 9] + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-14 21 February 2005 + + - regulating, in conjunction with DIT content rule specifications, the attributes that are contained in entries; - - identifying classes of entry that are to be associated with a particular policy by the appropriate administrative authority. - An object class (a subclass) may be derived from an object class (its direct superclass) which is itself derived from an even more generic object class. For structural object classes, this process @@ -591,19 +519,10 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-12 24 October 2004 2.4.1). An ordered set of superclasses up to the most superior object class of an object class is its superclass chain. - - - -Zeilenga LDAP Models [Page 9] -INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-12 24 October 2004 - - - An object class may be derived from two or more direct superclasses (superclasses not part of the same superclass chain). This feature of subclassing is termed multiple inheritance. - Each object class identifies the set of attributes required to be present in entries belonging to the class and the set of attributes allowed to be present in entries belonging to the class. As an entry @@ -613,202 +532,161 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-12 24 October 2004 attribute allowed by its superclass as being required. If an attribute is a member of both sets, it is required to be present. - Each object class is defined to be one of three kinds of object classes: Abstract, Structural, or Auxiliary. - Each object class is identified by an object identifier (OID) and, optionally, one or more short names (descriptors). - 2.4.1. Abstract Object Classes - An abstract object class, as the name implies, provides a base of characteristics from which other object classes can be defined to inherit from. An entry cannot belong to an abstract object class unless it belongs to a structural or auxiliary class which inherits from that abstract class. - Abstract object classes can not derive from structural nor auxiliary object classes. - All structural object classes derive (directly or indirectly) from the 'top' abstract object class. Auxiliary object classes do not necessarily derive from 'top'. + + +Zeilenga LDAP Models [Page 10] + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-14 21 February 2005 + + The following is the object class definition (see Section 4.1.1) for the 'top' object class: - ( 2.5.6.0 NAME 'top' ABSTRACT MUST objectClass ) - All entries belong to the 'top' abstract object class. - 2.4.2. Structural Object Classes - As stated in [X.501]: - An object class defined for use in the structural specification of - - - - -Zeilenga LDAP Models [Page 10] -INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-12 24 October 2004 - - - the DIT is termed a structural object class. Structural object classes are used in the definition of the structure of the names of the objects for compliant entries. - An object or alias entry is characterised by precisely one structural object class superclass chain which has a single structural object class as the most subordinate object class. This structural object class is referred to as the structural object class of the entry. - Structural object classes are related to associated entries: - - an entry conforming to a structural object class shall represent the real-world object constrained by the object class; - - DIT structure rules only refer to structural object classes; the structural object class of an entry is used to specify the position of the entry in the DIT; - - the structural object class of an entry is used, along with an associated DIT content rule, to control the content of an entry. - The structural object class of an entry shall not be changed. - Each structural object class is a (direct or indirect) subclass of the 'top' abstract object class. - Structural object classes cannot subclass auxiliary object classes. - Each entry is said to belong to its structural object class as well as all classes in its structural object class's superclass chain. -2.4.3. Auxiliary Object Classes +Zeilenga LDAP Models [Page 11] + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-14 21 February 2005 + + +2.4.3. Auxiliary Object Classes + Auxiliary object classes are used to augment the characteristics of entries. They are commonly used to augment the sets of attributes required and allowed to be present in an entry. They can be used to describe entries or classes of entries. - Auxiliary object classes cannot subclass structural object classes. - An entry can belong to any subset of the set of auxiliary object classes allowed by the DIT content rule associated with the structural object class of the entry. If no DIT content rule is associated with the structural object class of the entry, the entry cannot belong to - - - - -Zeilenga LDAP Models [Page 11] -INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-12 24 October 2004 - - - any auxiliary object class. - The set of auxiliary object classes which an entry belongs to can change over time. - 2.5. Attribute Descriptions - An attribute description is composed of an attribute type (see Section 2.5.1) and a set of zero or more attribute options (see Section 2.5.2). - An attribute description is represented by the ABNF: - attributedescription = attributetype options attributetype = oid options = *( SEMI option ) option = 1*keychar - where identifies the attribute type and each