From: Kurt Zeilenga Date: Sat, 25 Jun 2005 23:06:51 +0000 (+0000) Subject: Latest revisions X-Git-Tag: OPENLDAP_AC_BP~499 X-Git-Url: https://git.sur5r.net/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=7f8a49cbf7380e32232cc26ac587986fd2c4ac0e;p=openldap Latest revisions --- diff --git a/doc/drafts/draft-ietf-ldapbis-authmeth-xx.txt b/doc/drafts/draft-ietf-ldapbis-authmeth-xx.txt index 859fd449d3..958e5c6a57 100644 --- a/doc/drafts/draft-ietf-ldapbis-authmeth-xx.txt +++ b/doc/drafts/draft-ietf-ldapbis-authmeth-xx.txt @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT Editor: R. Harrison -draft-ietf-ldapbis-authmeth-13.txt Novell, Inc. -Obsoletes: 2829, 2830 October, 2004 +draft-ietf-ldapbis-authmeth-14.txt Novell, Inc. +Obsoletes: 2829, 2830 February, 2005 Intended Category: Draft Standard @@ -9,22 +9,18 @@ Intended Category: Draft Standard - LDAP: Authentication Methods and Connection Level Security Mechanisms - Status of this Memo - By submitting this Internet-Draft, I accept the provisions of Section 4 of RFC 3667. By submitting this Internet-Draft, I certify that any applicable patent or other IPR claims of which I am aware have been disclosed, and any of which I become aware will be disclosed, in accordance with RFC 3668. - This document is intended to be, after appropriate review and revision, submitted to the RFC Editor as a Standard Track document. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. Technical discussion of @@ -33,71 +29,55 @@ Status of this Memo editorial comments directly to the author . - Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- Drafts. - Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." - The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt - The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. - Copyright Notice - Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). All Rights Reserved. - Abstract - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 1] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 1] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 This document describes authentication methods and connection level security mechanisms of the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP). - This document details establishment of TLS (Transport Layer Security) using the StartTLS operation. - This document details the simple Bind authentication method including anonymous, unauthenticated, and plain-text password mechanisms and the SASL (Simple Authentication and Security Layer) Bind authentication method including DIGEST-MD5 and EXTERNAL mechanisms. - This document discusses various authentication and authorization states through which a connection to an LDAP server may pass and the actions that trigger these state changes. - Table of Contents - 1. Introduction.....................................................3 1.1. Relationship to Other Documents................................5 - 1.2. Conventions Used in this Document..............................6 - 1.2.1. Glossary of Terms............................................6 - 1.2.2. Security Terms and Concepts..................................6 - 1.2.3. Keywords.....................................................6 + 1.2. Conventions....................................................5 2. Implementation Requirements......................................6 3. StartTLS Operation...............................................7 3.1. Sequencing of the StartTLS Operation...........................7 @@ -105,124 +85,105 @@ Table of Contents 3.1.2. StartTLS Response............................................8 3.1.3. TLS Version Negotiation......................................8 3.1.4. Client Certificate...........................................8 - 3.1.5. Discovery of Resultant Security Level........................9 + 3.1.5. Discovery of Resultant Security Level........................8 3.1.6. Server Identity Check........................................9 - 3.1.7. Refresh of Server Capabilities Information..................10 + 3.1.7. Refresh of Server Capabilities Information...................9 3.2. Effects of TLS on a Client's Authorization Identity...........10 - 3.2.1. TLS Connection Establishment Effects........................10 - 3.2.2. Client Assertion of Authorization Identity..................10 - 3.2.3. TLS Connection Closure Effects..............................10 - 3.3. TLS Ciphersuites..............................................11 - 3.3.1. TLS Ciphersuites Recommendations............................11 - 4. Associations....................................................12 - 4.1. Anonymous Association on Unbound Connections..................12 + 3.3. TLS Ciphersuites..............................................10 + 3.3.1. TLS Ciphersuites Recommendations............................10 + 4. Associations....................................................11 + 4.1. Anonymous Association on Unbound Connections..................11 4.2. Anonymous Association After Failed Bind.......................12 4.3. Invalidated Associations......................................12 - 5. Bind Operation..................................................13 - 5.1. Simple Authentication Choice..................................13 - 5.2. SASL Authentication Choice....................................13 + 5. Bind Operation..................................................12 + 5.1. Simple Authentication Choice..................................12 + 5.2. SASL Authentication Choice....................................12 6. Anonymous Authentication Mechanism of Simple Bind...............13 7. Unauthenticated Authentication Mechanism of Simple Bind.........13 - - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 2] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - - 8. Simple Authentication Mechanism of Simple Bind .................14 - 9. SASL Protocol Profile...........................................15 - 9.1. SASL Service Name for LDAP....................................15 - 9.2. SASL Authentication Initiation and Protocol Exchange..........15 - 9.3. Octet Where Negotiated Security Mechanisms Take Effect........16 - 9.4. Determination of Supported SASL Mechanisms....................16 - 9.5. Rules for Using SASL Security Layers..........................17 - 9.6 Support for Multiple Authentications...........................17 - 10. SASL EXTERNAL Authentication Mechanism.........................17 - 10.1. Implicit Assertion...........................................17 - 10.2. Explicit Assertion...........................................18 - 10.3. SASL Authorization Identity..................................18 - 10.4. SASL Authorization Identity Syntax...........................18 - 11. SASL DIGEST-MD5 Authentication Mechanism.......................19 - 12. Security Considerations........................................19 - 12.1. General LDAP Security Considerations.........................19 - 12.1.1. Password-related Security Considerations...................20 + 8. Simple Authentication Mechanism of Simple Bind .................13 + 9. SASL Protocol Profile...........................................14 + 9.1. SASL Service Name for LDAP....................................14 + 9.2. SASL Authentication Initiation and Protocol Exchange..........14 + 9.3. Octet Where Negotiated Security Mechanisms Take Effect........15 + 9.4. Determination of Supported SASL Mechanisms....................15 + + +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 2] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 + + 9.5. Rules for Using SASL Layers...................................16 + 9.6 Support for Multiple Authentications...........................16 + 9.7. SASL Authorization Identities.................................16 + 10. SASL DIGEST-MD5 Authentication Mechanism.......................17 + 11. SASL EXTERNAL Authentication Mechanism.........................17 + 11.1. Implicit Assertion...........................................18 + 11.2. Explicit Assertion...........................................18 + 12. Security Considerations........................................18 + 12.1. General LDAP Security Considerations.........................18 + 12.1.1. Password-related Security Considerations...................19 12.2. StartTLS Security Considerations.............................20 - 12.3. Unauthenticated Mechanism Security Considerations............21 + 12.3. Unauthenticated Mechanism Security Considerations............20 12.4. Simple Mechanism Security Considerations.....................21 12.5. SASL DIGEST-MD5 Mechanism Security Considerations............21 - 12.6. Related Security Considerations..............................22 - 13. IANA Considerations............................................22 - Acknowledgments....................................................22 - Normative References...............................................22 + 12.6. Related Security Considerations..............................21 + 13. IANA Considerations............................................21 + Acknowledgments....................................................21 + Normative References...............................................21 Informative References.............................................23 - Author's Address...................................................24 - Appendix A. Association State Transition Tables....................24 - A.1. Association States............................................24 - A.2. Actions that Affect Association State.........................25 - A.3. Decisions Used in Making Association State Changes............25 - A.4. Association State Transition Table............................25 - Appendix B. Authentication and Authorization Concepts..............26 - B.1. Access Control Policy.........................................26 - B.2. Access Control Factors........................................26 - B.3. Authentication, Credentials, Identity.........................27 - B.4. Authorization Identity........................................27 - Appendix C. RFC 2829 Change History................................27 - Appendix D. RFC 2830 Change History................................31 - Appendix E. RFC 2251 Change History................................32 - Appendix F. Change History to Combined Document....................32 - Added implementation requirement that server implementations ......45 + Author's Address...................................................23 + Appendix A. Association State Transition Tables....................23 + A.1. Association States............................................23 + A.2. Actions that Affect Association State.........................24 + A.3. Association State Transition Table............................24 + Appendix B. Authentication and Authorization Concepts..............25 + B.1. Access Control Policy.........................................25 + B.2. Access Control Factors........................................25 + B.3. Authentication, Credentials, Identity.........................25 + B.4. Authorization Identity........................................25 + Appendix C. RFC 2829 Change History................................26 + Appendix D. RFC 2830 Change History................................30 + Appendix E. RFC 2251 Change History................................30 + Appendix F. Change History to Combined Document....................31 Intellectual Property Rights.......................................45 - 1. Introduction - The Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) [Roadmap] is a powerful protocol for accessing directories. It offers means of - - - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 3] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - searching, retrieving and manipulating directory content, and ways to access a rich set of security functions. - It is vital that these security functions be interoperable among all LDAP clients and servers on the Internet; therefore there has to be a minimum subset of security functions that is common to all implementations that claim LDAP conformance. - Basic threats to an LDAP directory service include: - (1) Unauthorized access to directory data via data-retrieval - operations, - - (2) Unauthorized access to directory data by monitoring others' - access, +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 3] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 - (3) Unauthorized access to reusable client authentication - information by monitoring others' access, + (1) Unauthorized access to directory data via data-retrieval + operations. + (2) Unauthorized access to directory data by monitoring others' + access. - (4) Unauthorized modification of directory data, + (3) Unauthorized access to reusable client authentication + information by monitoring others' access. + (4) Unauthorized modification of directory data. (5) Unauthorized modification of configuration information, - (6) Denial of Service: Use of resources (commonly in excess) in a - manner intended to deny service to others, - + manner intended to deny service to others. (7) Spoofing: Tricking a user or client into believing that information came from the directory when in fact it did not, @@ -231,67 +192,54 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 information to a hostile entity that appears to be the directory server but is not. Tricking a directory server into believing that information came from a particular client when in fact it - came from a hostile entity, and - + came from a hostile entity. (8) Hijacking: An attacker seizes control of an established protocol session. - Threats (1), (4), (5), (6), (7) are (8) are active attacks. Threats (2) and (3) are passive attacks. - Threats (1), (4), (5) and (6) are due to hostile clients. Threats (2), (3), (7) and (8) are due to hostile agents on the path between client and server or hostile agents posing as a server, e.g. IP spoofing. - - LDAP offers the following security mechanisms: - (1) Authentication by means of the Bind operation. The Bind operation provides a simple method which supports anonymous, - unauthenticated, and authenticated with password mechanisms, and + unauthenticated, and authenticated-with-password mechanisms, and the Secure Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) method which supports a wide variety of authentication mechanisms, - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 4] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - - (2) Mechanisms to support vendor-specific access control facilities (LDAP does not offer a standard access control facility) - (3) Data integrity protection by means of security layers in TLS or SASL mechanisms, - (4) Data confidentiality protection by means of security layers in TLS or SASL mechanisms, + +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 4] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 + (5) Server resource usage limitation by means of administrative limits configured on the server, and - (6) Server authentication by means of the TLS protocol or SASL - mechanism. - + mechanisms. LDAP may also be protected by means outside the LDAP protocol, e.g. with IP-level security [RFC2401]. - At the moment, imposition of access controls is done by means outside the scope of LDAP. - Considering the above requirements, experience has shown that simply allowing implementations to pick and choose among the possible alternatives is not a strategy that leads to interoperability. In @@ -300,7 +248,6 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 they will support only clear text passwords that provide inadequate security for most circumstances. - It is desirable to allow clients to authenticate using a variety of mechanisms including mechanisms where identities are represented as distinguished names [X.501] [Models] in string form [LDAPDN] or are @@ -311,7 +258,6 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 implement mechanism for establishing transport-layer security services. - The set of security mechanisms provided in LDAP and described in this document is intended to meet the security needs for a wide range of deployment scenarios and still provide a high degree of @@ -320,58 +266,53 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 mechanisms that might be used to achieve a reasonable level of security in various circumstances. - 1.1. Relationship to Other Documents - This document is an integral part of the LDAP Technical Specification [Roadmap]. - This document obsoletes RFC 2829. - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 5] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - - Sections 2 and 4 of RFC 2830 are obsoleted by [Protocol]. The remainder of RFC 2830 is obsoleted by this document. +1.2. Conventions -1.2. Conventions Used in this Document - - -1.2.1. Glossary of Terms - - - The following terms are used in this document. To aid the reader, - these terms are defined here. - - - - "user" represents any human or application entity which is - accessing the directory using a directory client. A directory - client (or client) is also known as a directory user agent (DUA). + The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", + "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this + document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. - - "connection" refers to the underlying transport protocol - connection used to carry the protocol exchange. +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 5] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 - - "TLS connection" refers to an LDAP connection with TLS - protection [TLS]. + The term "user" represents any human or application entity which is + accessing the directory using a directory client. A directory + client (or client) is also known as a directory user agent (DUA). + The term "transport connection" refers to the underlying transport + services used to carry the protocol exchange, as well as + associations established by these services. - - "association" refers to the association that exists between the - connection to its current authorization state. As a shorthand, - an association with an authorization state of can be - referred to as a " association", e.g. an association with - an anonymous authorization state is an anonymous association. + The term "TLS layer" refers to TLS services used in providing + security services, as well as associations established by these + services. + The term "SASL layer" refers to SASL services used in providing + security services, as well as associations established by these + services. -1.2.2. Security Terms and Concepts + The term "LDAP message layer" refers to the LDAP Message (PDU) + services used in providing directory services, as well as + associations established by these services. + The term "association" refers to the association that exists between + the transport connection and its current authorization state. As a + shorthand, an association with an authorization state of can + be referred to as a " association", e.g. an association with + an anonymous authorization state is an anonymous association. In general, security terms in this document are used consistently with the definitions provided in [RFC2828]. In addition, several @@ -383,109 +324,87 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 unfamiliar with security-related concepts are encouraged to review Appendix C before reading the remainder of this document. - -1.2.3. Keywords - - - The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", - "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this - document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. - - 2. Implementation Requirements - LDAP server implementations MUST support the anonymous - authentication mechanism of simple bind (as discussed in Section 6). - + authentication mechanism of simple bind (section 6). LDAP implementations that support any authentication mechanism other than the anonymous authentication mechanism of simple bind MUST - support the DIGEST-MD5 [DIGEST-MD5] mechanism of SASL bind (as - detailed in section 11). DIGEST-MD5 is a reasonably strong - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 6] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - + support the DIGEST-MD5 [DIGEST-MD5] mechanism of SASL bind (section + 10). DIGEST-MD5 is a reasonably strong authentication mechanism + that provides (mandatory-to-implement) data security (data integrity + and data confidentiality) services. - authentication mechanism that provides (mandatory-to-implement) data - security (data integrity and data confidentiality) services. + LDAP implementations SHOULD support the simple (DN and password) + authentication mechanism of simple bind (section 8). + Implementations that support this authentication mechanism MUST be + capable of protecting using TLS as established by the StartTLS + operation (section 3), SHOULD disallow the use of this +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 6] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 - LDAP impementations SHOULD support the simple (DN and password) - authentication mechanism of simple bind (as detailed in section 8). - Implementations that support this mechanism MUST be capable of - protecting it by establishment of TLS (as discussed in section 3) or - other suitable suitable data confidentiality and data integrity - protection (e.g. IPSec). - + authentication mechanism by default when suitable data security + services are not in place, and MAY provide other suitable data + security services for use with this authentication mechanism. Implementations MAY support additional authentication mechanisms. Some of these mechanisms are discussed below. - LDAP server implementations SHOULD support client assertion of authorization identity via the SASL EXTERNAL mechanism (sections 3.2.2 and 9). - - LDAP server implementations SHOULD support the StartTLS operation, - and server implementations that do support the StartTLS operation - MUST support the TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA ciphersuite. - + LDAP server implementations SHOULD support the StartTLS operation + (section 3), and server implementations that do support the StartTLS + operation MUST support the TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + ciphersuite. 3. StartTLS Operation - The Start Transport Layer Security (StartTLS) operation defined in section 4.14 of [Protocol] provides the ability to establish TLS [TLS] on an LDAP connection. - The goals of using the TLS [TLS] protocol with LDAP are to ensure data confidentiality and integrity, and to optionally provide for authentication. TLS expressly provides these capabilities, although the authentication services of TLS are available to LDAP only in combination with the SASL EXTERNAL authentication method (see - section 10), and then only if the SASL EXTERNAL implementation + section 11), and then only if the SASL EXTERNAL implementation chooses to make use of the TLS credentials. - 3.1. Sequencing of the StartTLS Operation - This section describes the overall procedures clients and servers must follow for TLS establishment. These procedures take into consideration various aspects of the association including discovery of resultant security level and assertion of the client's authorization identity. - 3.1.1. StartTLS Request - A client may send the StartTLS extended request at any time after establishing an LDAP connection, except: - - when TLS is currently established on the connection, - when a multi-stage SASL negotiation is in progress on the connection, or - when it has not yet received responses for all operation requests previously issued on the connection. - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 7] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - As described in [Protocol] Section 4.14.2.2, a (detected) violation of any of these requirements results in a return of the operationsError resultCode. + +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 7] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 + Client implementers should ensure that they strictly follow these operation sequencing requirements to prevent interoperability issues. Operational experience has shown that violating these @@ -494,216 +413,143 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 these requirements due to server hardware speed, network latencies, etc. - There is no general requirement that the client have or have not already performed a Bind operation (section 4) before sending a StartTLS operation request. - - If the client did not establish a TLS connection before sending a - request and the server requires the client to establish a TLS - connection before performing that request, the server MUST reject - that request by sending a resultCode of confidentialityRequired. - - 3.1.2. StartTLS Response - The server will return an extended response with the resultCode of success if it is willing and able to negotiate TLS. - - It will return a resultCode other than success (documented in + It will return a resultCode other than success (as documented in [Protocol] section 4.13.2.2) if it is unwilling or unable to do so. The state of the association is unaffected if a non-success resultCode is returned. - In the successful case, the client (which has ceased to transfer LDAP requests on the connection) MUST either begin a TLS negotiation or close the connection. The client will send PDUs in the TLS Record Protocol directly over the underlying transport connection to the - server to initiate [TLS] negotiation. - + server during TLS negotiation. 3.1.3. TLS Version Negotiation - Negotiating the version of TLS to be used is a part of the TLS Handshake Protocol [TLS]. Please refer to that document for details. - 3.1.4. Client Certificate - If an LDAP server requests a client to provide its certificate during TLS negotiation and the client does not present a suitable certificate (e.g. one that can be validated), the server may use a local security policy to determine whether to successfully complete - TLS negotiation. - - - If the client provides a certificate that can be validated, - information in the certificate may be used by the server in - establishing the client's authorization identity by use of the SASL - EXTERNAL mechanism as discussed in Section 9. - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 8] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - + TLS negotiation. + If a client that has provided a suitable certificate subsequently + binds using the SASL EXTERNAL authentication mechanism (section 9), + information in the certificate may be used by the server to + establish the client's authorization identity. 3.1.5. Discovery of Resultant Security Level - - After a TLS connection is established on an LDAP connection, both + After a TLS layer is established on a transport connection, both parties are to individually decide whether or not to continue based on the security level achieved. The procedure for ascertaining the - TLS connection's security level is implementation dependent. + TLS layer's security level is implementation dependent. + + +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 8] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 If the client or server decides that the security level is not high - enough for it to continue, it SHOULD gracefully close the TLS + enough for it to continue, it SHOULD gracefully remove the TLS connection immediately after the TLS negotiation has completed (see [Protocol] section 4.13.3.1 and section 3.2.3 below). The client - may then close the connection, attempt to StartTLS again, send an - unbind request, or send any other LDAP request. - + may then close the transport connection, attempt to StartTLS again, + send an unbind request, or send any other LDAP request. 3.1.6. Server Identity Check - The client MUST check its understanding of the server's hostname against the server's identity as presented in the server's Certificate message in order to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks. - Matching is performed according to these rules: - - The client MUST use the server name provided by the user (or other trusted entity) as the value to compare against the server name as expressed in the server's certificate. A hostname derived from user input is to be considered provided by the user only if derived in a secure fashion (e.g., DNSSEC). - - If a subjectAltName extension of type dNSName is present in the certificate, it SHOULD be used as the source of the server's identity. - - The string values to be compared MUST be prepared according to the rules described in [Matching]. - - The "*" wildcard character is allowed. If present, it applies only to the left-most name component. - For example, *.bar.com would match a.bar.com and b.bar.com, but it would not match a.x.bar.com nor would it match bar.com. If more than one identity of a given type is present in the - certificate (e.g. more than one dNSName name), a match in any + certificate (e.g. more than one dNSName name), a match with any one of the set is considered acceptable. - If the hostname does not match the dNSName-based identity in the certificate per the above check, user-oriented clients SHOULD either notify the user (clients may give the user the opportunity to - continue with the connection in any case) or terminate the + continue with the LDAP session in this case) or close the transport connection and indicate that the server's identity is suspect. - Automated clients SHOULD close the connection, returning and/or - logging an error indicating that the server's identity is suspect. - - - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 9] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - + Automated clients SHOULD close the connection and then return + and/or log an error indicating that the server's identity is suspect. Beyond the server identity checks described in this section, clients SHOULD be prepared to do further checking to ensure that the server - is authorized to provide the service it is observed to provide. The + is authorized to provide the service it is requested to provide. The client may need to make use of local policy information in making this determination. - 3.1.7. Refresh of Server Capabilities Information - Upon TLS session establishment, the client SHOULD discard or refresh + +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 9] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 + + Upon installing a TLS layer, the client SHOULD discard or refresh all information about the server it obtained prior to the initiation of the TLS negotiation and not obtained through secure mechanisms. This protects against man-in-the-middle attacks that may have altered any server capabilities information retrieved prior to TLS - establishment. - + layer installation. - The server may advertise different capabilities after TLS - establishment. In particular, the value of supportedSASLMechanisms - may be different after TLS has been negotiated (specifically, the + The server may advertise different capabilities after installing a + TLS layer. In particular, the value of supportedSASLMechanisms may + be different after a TLS layer has been installed (specifically, the EXTERNAL and PLAIN [PLAIN] mechanisms are likely to be listed only - after a TLS negotiation has been performed). - + after a TLS layer has been installed). 3.2. Effects of TLS on a Client's Authorization Identity - - This section describes the effects on a client's authorization - identity brought about by establishing TLS on an LDAP connection. - The default effects are described first, and next the facilities for - client assertion of authorization identity are discussed including - error conditions. Finally, the effects of closing the TLS connection - are described. - - - Authorization identities and related concepts are described in - Appendix B. - - -3.2.1. TLS Connection Establishment Effects - - - The decision to keep or invalidate the established state of the - association (section 4.3) after TLS connection establishment is a - matter of local server policy. - - -3.2.2. Client Assertion of Authorization Identity - - - After successfully establishing a TLS session, a client may request - that its certificate exchanged during the TLS establishment be - utilized to determine the authorization identity of the association. - The client accomplishes this via an LDAP Bind request specifying a - SASL mechanism of EXTERNAL [SASL] (section 10). - - -3.2.3. TLS Connection Closure Effects - - The decision to keep or invalidate the established state of the - association after TLS closure is a matter of local server policy. - + association (section 4.3) after TLS layer installation or removal is + a matter of local server policy. 3.3. TLS Ciphersuites - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 10] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - Several issues should be considered when selecting TLS ciphersuites that are appropriate for use in a given circumstance. These issues include the following: - - The ciphersuite's ability to provide adequate confidentiality - protection for passwords and other data sent over the LDAP + protection for passwords and other data sent over the transport connection. Client and server implementers should recognize that some TLS ciphersuites provide no confidentiality protection while other ciphersuites that do provide confidentiality @@ -711,104 +557,91 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 methods, especially in light of ever-increasing CPU speeds that reduce the time needed to successfully mount such attacks. - - Client and server implementers should carefully consider the + - Client and server implementers should carefully consider the value of the password or data being protected versus the level of confidentially protection provided by the ciphersuite to ensure that the level of protection afforded by the ciphersuite is appropriate. - - The ciphersuite's vulnerability (or lack thereof) to man-in-the- middle attacks. Ciphersuites vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks SHOULD NOT be used to protect passwords or sensitive data, unless the network configuration is such that the danger of a man-in-the-middle attack is tolerable. - 3.3.1. TLS Ciphersuites Recommendations - [[TODO: Kurt will have someone from security to look at this and will propose how to handle discussion of specific TLS ciphersuites in this draft.]] - As of the writing of this document, the following recommendations regarding TLS ciphersuites are applicable. Because circumstances are + +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 10] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 + constantly changing, this list must not be considered exhaustive, but is hoped that it will serve as a useful starting point for implementers. - The following ciphersuites defined in [TLS] MUST NOT be used for confidentiality protection of passwords or data: - TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5 TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA - The following ciphersuites defined in [TLS] can be cracked easily (less than a day of CPU time on a standard CPU in 2000) and are NOT RECOMMENDED for use in confidentiality protection of passwords or data: - TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5 TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5 TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA TLS_DH_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA TLS_DH_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 11] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA TLS_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5 TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA - The following ciphersuites are vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks: - TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5 TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA - 4. Associations - Every LDAP connection has an associated authorization state referred to as the "association". The Bind operation defined in section 4.2 of [Protocol] and discussed further in section 5 below allows information to be exchanged between the client and server to change the authorization state of the association. - 4.1. Anonymous Association on Unbound Connections - Prior to the successful completion of a Bind operation and during any subsequent authentication exchange, the association has an anonymous authorization state. Among other things this implies that - the client need not send a Bind Request in the first PDU of the - connection. The client may send any operation request prior to + the client need not send a Bind Request in the first PDU of the LDAP + message layer. The client may send any operation request prior to binding, and the server MUST treat it as if it had been performed after an anonymous bind operation (section 6). This association state is sometimes referred to as an implied anonymous bind. -4.2. Anonymous Association After Failed Bind +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 11] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 +4.2. Anonymous Association After Failed Bind Upon receipt of a Bind request, the association is moved to an anonymous state and only upon successful completion of the @@ -816,196 +649,146 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 moved to an authenticated state. Thus, a failed Bind operation produces an anonymous association. - 4.3. Invalidated Associations - The server may move the association to an invalidated state at any time, e.g. if an established security layer between the client and - server has unexpectedly failed or been compromised. While the - connection has an invalid association, the server may reject any + server has unexpectedly failed or been compromised. While the LDAP + session has an invalidated association, the server may reject any operation request other than Bind, Unbind, and StartTLS by - responding with a resultCode of strongAuthRequired to indicate that - the server requires stronger authentication before it will attempt - to perform the requested operation. In practice, this means that the - client needs to bind to(re)establish a suitably strong authorization - - - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 12] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - - state on the association before the server will attempt to perform - the requested operation. - + responding with a resultCode of strongerAuthRequired to indicate + that the server requires stronger authentication before it will + attempt to perform the requested operation. In practice, this means + that the client needs to bind to(re)establish a suitably strong + authorization state on the association before the server will + attempt to perform the requested operation. 5. Bind Operation - The Bind operation ([Protocol] section 4.2) allows authentication information to be exchanged between the client and server to establish a new authorization state on the association. - The Bind request typically specifies the desired authentication identity. Some Bind mechanisms also allow the client to specify the authorization identity. If the authorization identity is not specified, the server derives it from the authentication identity in an implementation-specific manner. - If the authorization identity is specified the server MUST verify that the client's authentication identity is permitted to assume (e.g. proxy for) the asserted authorization identity. The server MUST reject the Bind operation with an invalidCredentials resultCode in the Bind response if the client is not so authorized. - 5.1. Simple Authentication Choice - The simple authentication choice of the Bind Operation provides three authentication mechanisms: + 1. An anonymous authentication mechanism (section 6), - 1. an anonymous authentication mechanism (section 6), - + 2. An unauthenticated authentication mechanism (section 7), and - 2. an unauthenticated authentication mechanism (section 7), and - - - 3. a simple authentication mechanism using credentials consisting + 3. A simple authentication mechanism using credentials consisting of a name (in the form of an LDAP distinguished name [LDAPDN]) and a password (section 8). - 5.2. SASL Authentication Choice +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 12] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 + The sasl authentication choice of the Bind Operation provides facilities for using any SASL mechanism (sections 9-11) including authentication mechanisms and other services (e.g. data security services). - 6. Anonymous Authentication Mechanism of Simple Bind - An LDAP client may use the anonymous authentication mechanism of the simple Bind choice to explicitly establish an anonymous association - by sending a Bind request with a name value of zero length and with - the simple authentication choice containing a password value of zero - length. - + by sending a Bind request with a name value of zero length and + specifying the simple authentication choice containing a password + value of zero length. 7. Unauthenticated Authentication Mechanism of Simple Bind - An LDAP client may use the unauthenticated authentication mechanism of the simple Bind choice to establish an anonymous association by sending a Bind request with a name value, a distinguished name in - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 13] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - - LDAP string form [LDAPDN], of non-zero length, and specifying the - the simple authentication choice containing a password value of zero + LDAP string form [LDAPDN] of non-zero length, and specifying the the + simple authentication choice containing a password value of zero length. - Unauthenticated binds can have significant security issues (see section 12.3). Servers SHOULD by default reject unauthenticated bind requests with a resultCode of invalidCredentials, and clients may need to actively detect situations where they would unintentionally make an unauthenticated bind request. - 8. Simple Authentication Mechanism of Simple Bind - An LDAP client may use the simple authentication mechanism of the simple Bind choice to establish an authenticated association by sending a Bind request with a name value, a distinguished name in - LDAP string form [LDAPDN], and specifying the simple authentication - choice containing an OCTET STRING password value of non-zero length. - + LDAP string form [LDAPDN] of non-zero length, and specifying the + simple authentication choice containing an OCTET STRING password + value of non-zero length. Servers that map the DN sent in the bind request to a directory entry with an associated set of one or more passwords used with this - mechanism, will compare the presented password to that set of + mechanism will compare the presented password to that set of passwords. The presented password is considered valid if it matches any member of this set. - - If the DN is syntactically invalid, the server returns the - invalidDNSyntax result code. If the DN is syntactically correct but - not valid for purposes of authentication, or the password is not + A resultCode of invalidDNSyntax indicates that the DN sent in the + name value is syntactically invalid. A resultCode of + invalidCredentials indicates that the DN is syntactically correct + but not valid for purposes of authentication, or the password is not valid for the DN, or the server otherwise considers the credentials - to be invalid, the server returns the invalidCredentials result - code. The server is only to return the success result code when the - credentials are valid and the server is willing to provide service - to the entity these credentials identify. + to be invalidA resultCode of success indicates that the credentials + are valid and the server is willing to provide service to the entity + these credentials identify. + + +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 13] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 Server behavior is undefined for bind requests specifying the simple authentication mechanism with a zero-length name value and a password value of non-zero length. - - The simple authentication mechanism of simple bind is not suitable for authentication in environments where there is no network or - transport layer confidentiality. LDAP implementations SHALL NOT - support this mechanism unless they are capable of protecting it by - establishment of TLS (as discussed in section 3) or other suitable - data confidentiality and data integrity protection(e.g. IPSec). LDAP - implementations SHOULD support authentication with the "simple" - authentication choice when the connection is protected against - eavesdropping using TLS, as defined in section 3. LDAP - implementations SHOULD NOT support authentication with the "simple" - authentication choice unless the data on the connection is protected - using TLS or other data confidentiality and data integrity - protection. - + transport layer confidentiality.x 9. SASL Protocol Profile - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 14] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - LDAP allows authentication via any SASL mechanism [SASL]. As LDAP includes native anonymous and simple (plain text) authentication methods, the ANONYMOUS [ANONYMOUS] and PLAIN [PLAIN] SASL mechanisms are typically not used with LDAP. - Each protocol that utilizes SASL services is required to supply certain information profiling the way they are exposed through the protocol ([SASL] section 5). This section explains how each of these profiling requirements are met by LDAP. - 9.1. SASL Service Name for LDAP - The SASL service name for LDAP is "ldap", which has been registered with the IANA as a SASL service name. - 9.2. SASL Authentication Initiation and Protocol Exchange - - SASL authentication is initiated via an LDAP bind request + SASL authentication is initiated via an LDAP Bind request ([Protocol] section 4.2) with the following parameters: - - The version is 3. - The AuthenticationChoice is sasl. - The mechanism element of the SaslCredentials sequence contains @@ -1015,55 +798,52 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 mechanisms that are defined to have the client send data first (see [SASL] sections 5 and 5.1). - In general, a SASL authentication protocol exchange consists of a series of server challenges and client responses, the contents of which are specific to and defined by the SASL mechanism. Thus for some SASL authentication mechanisms, it may be necessary for the client to respond to one or more server challenges by invoking the - BindRequest multiple times. A challenge is indicated by the server - sending a BindResponse with the resultCode set to + Bind operation multiple times. A challenge is indicated by the + server sending a BindResponse PDU with the resultCode set to saslBindInProgress. This indicates that the server requires the - client to send a new bind request with the same sasl mechanism to + client to send a new BindRequest PDU with the same sasl mechanism to continue the authentication process. - - To the LDAP protocol, these challenges and responses are opaque + To LDAP message layer, these challenges and responses are opaque binary tokens of arbitrary length. LDAP servers use the - serverSaslCreds field, an OCTET STRING, in a bind response message - to transmit each challenge. LDAP clients use the credentials field, - an OCTET STRING, in the SaslCredentials sequence of a bind request - message to transmit each response. Note that unlike some Internet - protocols where SASL is used, LDAP is not text-based, thus no Base64 - transformations are performed on these challenge and response values. + serverSaslCreds field, an OCTET STRING, in a BindResponse PDU + message to transmit each challenge. LDAP clients use the credentials + +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 14] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 + field, an OCTET STRING, in the SaslCredentials sequence of a + BindRequest PDU message to transmit each response. Note that unlike + some Internet protocols where SASL is used, LDAP is not text based, + thus no Base64 transformations are performed on these challenge and + response values. - Clients sending a bind request with the sasl choice selected SHOULD + Clients sending a BindRequest with the sasl choice selected SHOULD send an zero-length value in the name field. Servers receiving a bind request with the sasl choice selected SHALL ignore any value in the name field. - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 15] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - A client may abort a SASL bind negotiation by sending a BindRequest with a different value in the mechanism field of SaslCredentials, or an AuthenticationChoice other than sasl. If the client sends a BindRequest with the sasl mechanism field as - an empty string, the server MUST return a BindResponse with - authMethodNotSupported as the resultCode. This will allow clients to + an empty string, the server MUST return a BindResponse with a + resultCode of authMethodNotSupported. This will allow the client to abort a negotiation if it wishes to try again with the same SASL mechanism. The server indicates completion of the SASL challenge-response - exchange by responding with a bind response in which the resultCode - is either success, or an error indication. - + exchange by responding with a BindResponse in which the resultCode + is not saslBindInProgress (either success or another error + indication). The serverSaslCreds field in the BindResponse can be used to include an optional challenge with a success notification for mechanisms @@ -1073,218 +853,121 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 SHALL omit the serverSaslCreds field (rather than including the field with a zero-length value). - 9.3. Octet Where Negotiated Security Mechanisms Take Effect + SASL layers take effect following the transmission by the server and + reception by the client of the final successful BindResponse in the + exchange. - SASL security layers take effect following the transmission by the - server and reception by the client of the final successful - BindResponse in the exchange. - - - Once a SASL security layer providing data integrity or - confidentiality services takes effect, the layer remains in effect - until a new layer is installed (i.e. at the first octet following - the final BindResponse of the bind operation that caused the new - layer to take effect). Thus, an established SASL security layer is - not affected by a failed or non-SASL Bind. - + Once a SASL layer providing data integrity or confidentiality + services takes effect, the layer remains in effect until a new layer + is installed (i.e. at the first octet following the final + BindResponse of the bind operation that caused the new layer to take + effect). Thus, an established SASL layer is not affected by a + failed or non-SASL Bind. 9.4. Determination of Supported SASL Mechanisms - Clients may determine the SASL mechanisms a server supports by reading the supportedSASLMechanisms attribute from the root DSE (DSA-Specific Entry) ([Models] section 5.1). The values of this attribute, if any, list the mechanisms the server supports in the - current LDAP session state. LDAP servers SHOULD allow an - anonymously-bound client to retrieve the supportedSASLMechanisms - attribute of the root DSE. +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 15] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 - Because SASL mechanisms provide critical security functions, clients + current LDAP session state. LDAP servers SHOULD allow a client with + an anonymous association to retrieve the supportedSASLMechanisms + attribute of the root DSE. + + Because SASL mechanisms provide critical security functions, clients and servers should be configurable to specify what mechanisms are acceptable and allow only those mechanisms to be used. Both clients and servers must confirm that the negotiated security level meets their requirements before proceeding to use the connection. +9.5. Rules for Using SASL Layers -9.5. Rules for Using SASL Security Layers - - - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 16] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - - If a SASL security layer is negotiated, the client SHOULD discard - information about the server it obtained prior to the initiation of - the SASL negotiation and not obtained through secure mechanisms. - - - If a lower level security layer (such as TLS) is negotiated, any - SASL security services SHALL be layered on top of such security - layers regardless of the order of their negotiation. In all other - respects, SASL security services and other security layers act - independently, e.g. if both TLS and SASL security service are in - effect then removing the SASL security service does not affect the - continuing service of TLS and vice versa. + If a SASL layer is installed, the client SHOULD discard information + about the server it obtained prior to the initiation of the SASL + negotiation and not obtained through secure mechanisms. + If a lower level security layer (such as TLS) is installed, any SASL + layer SHALL be layered on top of such security layers regardless of + the order of their negotiation. In all other respects, the SASL + layer and other security layers act independently, e.g. if both a + TLS layer and a SASL layer are in effect then removing the SASL + layer does not affect the continuing service of the TLS layer and + vice versa. 9.6 Support for Multiple Authentications - LDAP supports multiple SASL authentications as defined in [SASL] section 6.3. +9.7. SASL Authorization Identities -10. SASL EXTERNAL Authentication Mechanism - - - A client can use the SASL EXTERNAL [SASL] mechanism to request the - LDAP server to authenticate and establish a resulting authorization - identity using security credentials exchanged by a lower security - layer (such as by TLS authentication or IP-level security - [RFC2401]). - - - The authorization identity used to determine the state of the - association is derived from the security credentials in an - implementation-specific manner. If the client's authentication - credentials have not been established at a lower security layer, the - SASL EXTERNAL bind MUST fail with a resultCode of - inappropriateAuthentication. Although this situation has the effect - of leaving the association in an anonymous state (section 5), the - state of any established security layer is unaffected. - - - A client may either implicitly request that its authorization - identity be derived from its authentication credentials exchanged at - a lower security layer or it may explicitly provide an authorization - identity and assert that it be used in combination with those - authentication credentials. The former is known as an implicit - assertion, and the latter as an explicit assertion. - - -10.1. Implicit Assertion - - - An implicit authorization identity assertion is performed by - invoking a Bind request of the SASL form using the EXTERNAL - mechanism name that does not include the optional credentials octet - string (found within the SaslCredentials sequence in the Bind - Request). The server will derive the client's authorization identity - from the authentication identity supplied by the security layer - (e.g., a public key certificate used during TLS establishment) - according to local policy. The underlying mechanics of how this is - accomplished are implementation specific. - - -10.2. Explicit Assertion - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 17] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - - - An explicit authorization identity assertion is performed by - invoking a Bind request of the SASL form using the EXTERNAL - mechanism name that includes the credentials octet string. This - string MUST be constructed as documented in section 10.4. - - -10.3. SASL Authorization Identity - - - When the EXTERNAL SASL mechanism is being negotiated, if the - SaslCredentials credentials field is present, it contains an - authorization identity. Other mechanisms define the location of the - authorization identity in the credentials field. In either case, the - authorization identity is represented in the authzId form described - below. - - -10.4. SASL Authorization Identity Syntax - - - The authorization identity is a string of UTF-8 [RFC3629] encoded - [Unicode] characters corresponding to the following ABNF [RFC2234] - grammar: - + Some SASL mechanisms allow clients to request a desired + authorization identity for the association. The decision to allow or + disallow the current authentication identity to have access to the + requested authorization identity is a matter of local policy ([SASL] + section 4.2). The authorization identity is a string of UTF-8 + [RFC3629] encoded [Unicode] characters corresponding to the + following ABNF [RFC2234] grammar: authzId ::= dnAuthzId / uAuthzId - DNCOLON ::= %x64 %x6e %x3a ; "dn:" UCOLON ::= %x75 %x3a ; "u:" - ; distinguished-name-based authz id. dnAuthzId ::= DNCOLON distinguishedName - ; unspecified authorization id, UTF-8 encoded. uAuthzId ::= UCOLON userid userid ::= *UTF8 ; syntax unspecified - where the production is defined in section 3 of - [LDAPDN] and production is defined in section 1.3 of [Models]. + [LDAPDN] and the production is defined in section 1.3 of + [Models]. + +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 16] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 In order to support additional specific authorization identity forms, future updates to this specification may add new choices supporting other forms of the authzId production. - The dnAuthzId choice is used to assert authorization identities in the form of a distinguished name to be matched in accordance with - the distinguishedNameMatch matching rule [Syntaxes]. The decision to - allow or disallow an authentication identity to have access to the - requested authorization identity is a matter of local policy ([SASL] - section 4.2). For this reason there is no requirement that the - asserted dn be that of an entry in the directory. - + the distinguishedNameMatch matching rule [Syntaxes]. There is no + requirement that the asserted distinguishedName value be that of an + entry in the directory. The uAuthzId choice allows clients to assert an authorization identity that is not in distinguished name form. The format of userid is defined as only a sequence of UTF-8 [RFC3629] encoded [Unicode] characters, and any further interpretation is a local - matter. To compare uAuthzID values, each uAuthzID value MUST be - - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 18] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - - prepared using [SASLPrep] and then the two values are compared - octet-wise. - - - For example, the userid could identify a user of a specific + matter. For example, the userid could identify a user of a specific directory service, be a login name, or be an email address. A - uAuthzId SHOULD NOT be assumed to be globally unique. - + uAuthzId SHOULD NOT be assumed to be globally unique. To compare + uAuthzID values, each uAuthzID value MUST be prepared using + [SASLPrep] and then the two values are compared octet-wise. -11. SASL DIGEST-MD5 Authentication Mechanism +10. SASL DIGEST-MD5 Authentication Mechanism - - LDAP servers that implement any authentication method or mechanism - other than simple anonymous bind MUST implement the SASL - DIGEST-MD5 mechanism [DIGEST-MD5]. This provides client + The SASL DIGEST-MD5 mechanism [DIGEST-MD5] provides client authentication with protection against passive eavesdropping attacks but does not provide protection against man-in-the-middle attacks. DIGEST-MD5 also provides data integrity and data confidentiality capabilities. - Support for subsequent authentication ([DIGEST-MD5] section 2.2) is OPTIONAL in clients and servers. - Implementers must take care to ensure that they maintain the semantics of the DIGEST-MD5 specification even when handling data that has different semantics in the LDAP protocol. @@ -1301,33 +984,78 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 being compared semantically as LDAP DNs because the cn attribute is defined to be case insensitive, however the two values are not equivalent if they represent username values in DIGEST-MD5 because - [SASLPrep] semantics are used by DIGEST-MD5. + [SASLPrep] semantics are used by DIGEST-MD5. +11. SASL EXTERNAL Authentication Mechanism -12. Security Considerations + A client can use the SASL EXTERNAL [SASL] mechanism to request the + LDAP server to authenticate and establish a resulting authorization +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 17] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 + + identity using security credentials exchanged by a lower security + layer (such as by TLS authentication or IP-level security + [RFC2401]). + + The authorization identity used to determine the resulting + association is derived from the security credentials in an + implementation-specific manner. If the client's authentication + credentials have not been established at a lower security layer, the + SASL EXTERNAL bind MUST fail with a resultCode of + inappropriateAuthentication. Although this situation has the effect + of leaving the association in an anonymous state (section 5), the + state of any installed security layer is unaffected. + + A client may either request that its authorization identity be + automatically derived from its authentication credentials exchanged + at a lower security layer or it may explicitly provide an + authorization identity desired for the association. The former is + known as an implicit assertion, and the latter as an explicit + assertion. + +11.1. Implicit Assertion + + An implicit authorization identity assertion is performed by + invoking a Bind request of the SASL form using the EXTERNAL + mechanism name that does not include the optional credentials field + (found within the SaslCredentials sequence in the BindRequest). The + server will derive the client's authorization identity from the + authentication identity supplied by a security layer (e.g., a public + key certificate used during TLS layer installation) according to + local policy. The underlying mechanics of how this is accomplished + are implementation specific. + +11.2. Explicit Assertion + + An explicit authorization identity assertion is performed by + invoking a Bind request of the SASL form using the EXTERNAL + mechanism name that includes the credentials field (found within the + SaslCredentials sequence in the BindRequest). The value of the + credentials field, an octet string, is the asserted authorization + identity and MUST be constructed as documented in section 9.7. + +12. Security Considerations Security issues are discussed throughout this document. The unsurprising conclusion is that security is an integral and necessary part of LDAP. This section discusses a number of LDAP- related security considerations. - 12.1. General LDAP Security Considerations - LDAP itself provides no security or protection from accessing or updating the directory by other means than through the LDAP protocol, e.g. from inspection by database administrators. Access - control SHOULD always be applied when reading sensitive information - or updating directory information. - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 19] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 18] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 + control SHOULD always be applied when reading sensitive information + or updating directory information. Servers can minimize denial of service attacks by providing the ability to configure and enforce administrative limits on @@ -1335,28 +1063,31 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 unwillingToPerform resultCode rather than performing computationally expensive operations requested by unauthorized clients. - A connection on which the client has not established connection integrity and privacy services (e.g via StartTLS, IPSec or a suitable SASL mechanism) is subject to man-in-the-middle attacks to view and modify information in transit. Client and server - implementors SHOULD take measures to protect confidential data from - these attacks by using data protection services as discussed in this - document. - + implementors SHOULD take measures to protect confidential data in + the LDAP session from these attacks by using data protection + services as discussed in this document. Clients and servers should + provide the ability to be configured to require these protections. + A resultCode of confidentialityRequired indicates that the server + requires establishment of (stronger) data confidentiality protection + in order to perform the requested operation. 12.1.1. Password-related Security Considerations - LDAP allows multi-valued password attributes. In systems where entries are expected to have one and only one password, administrative controls should be provided to enforce this behavior. - The use of clear text passwords and other unprotected authentication credentials is strongly discouraged over open networks when the - underlying transport service cannot guarantee confidentiality. - + underlying transport service cannot guarantee confidentiality. LDAP + implementations SHOULD NOT support authentication methods using + cleartext passwords and other unprotected authentication credentials + unless the data on the connection is protected using TLS or other + data confidentiality and data integrity protection. The transmission of passwords in the clear--typically for authentication or modification--poses a significant security risk. @@ -1365,26 +1096,25 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 negotiating transport or session layer data confidentiality services before transmitting password values. - To mitigate the security risks associated with the transfer of passwords, a server implementation that supports any password-based authentication mechanism that transmits passwords in the clear MUST support a policy mechanism that at the time of authentication or password modification, requires: - - A StartTLS encryption layer has been successfully negotiated. - + A TLS layer has been successfully installed. OR - Some other data confidentiality mechanism that protects the password value from snooping has been provided. +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 19] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 - OR + OR The server returns a resultCode of confidentialityRequired for the operation (i.e. simple bind with password value, SASL bind @@ -1392,22 +1122,12 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 including a userPassword value, etc.), even if the password value is correct. - 12.2. StartTLS Security Considerations - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 20] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - - - All security gained via use of the StartTLS operation is gained by the use of TLS itself. The StartTLS operation, on its own, does not provide any additional security. - The level of security provided though the use of TLS depends directly on both the quality of the TLS implementation used and the style of usage of that implementation. Additionally, a man-in-the- @@ -1415,29 +1135,24 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 supportedExtension attribute of the root DSE. Both parties SHOULD independently ascertain and consent to the security level achieved once TLS is established and before beginning use of the TLS - connection. For example, the security level of the TLS connection - might have been negotiated down to plaintext. - + connection. For example, the security level of the TLS layer might + have been negotiated down to plaintext. - Clients SHOULD by default either warn the user when the security + Clients SHOULD by default either warn the user when the security level achieved does not provide an acceptable level of data confidentiality and/or data integrity protection, or be configured to refuse to proceed without an acceptable level of security. - Server implementors SHOULD allow server administrators to elect whether and when data confidentiality and integrity are required, as well as elect whether authentication of the client during the TLS handshake is required. - Implementers should be aware of and understand TLS security considerations as discussed in the TLS specification [TLS]. - 12.3. Unauthenticated Mechanism Security Considerations - Operational experience shows that clients can (and frequently do) misuse the unauthenticated authentication mechanism of simple bind (see section 7). For example, a client program might make a @@ -1446,160 +1161,135 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 implementations may return a success response to an unauthenticated bind request thus leaving the client with the impression that the server has successfully authenticated the identity represented by - the user name, when in effect, an anonymous association has been + the user name when in reality, an anonymous association has been established. Clients that use the results from a simple bind operation to make authorization decisions should actively detect unauthenticated bind requests (by verifying that the supplied password is not empty) and react appropriately. -12.4. Simple Mechanism Security Considerations +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 20] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 +12.4. Simple Mechanism Security Considerations The simple authentication mechanism of simple bind discloses the password to the server, which is an inherent security risk. There are other mechanisms such as DIGEST-MD5 that do not disclose password to server. - 12.5. SASL DIGEST-MD5 Mechanism Security Considerations - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 21] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - The SASL DIGEST-MD5 mechanism is prone to the qop substitution attack, as discussed in 3.6 of [DIGEST-MD5]. The qop substitution attack can be mitigated (as discussed in 3.6 of [DIGEST-MD5]). - The SASL DIGEST-MD5 mechanism [DIGEST-MD5] provides client authentication with protection against passive eavesdropping attacks but does not provide protection against man-in-the-middle attacks. - Implementers should be aware of and understand DIGEST-MD5 security considerations as discussed in the DIGEST-MD5 specification [DIGEST- MD5]. - 12.6. Related Security Considerations - Additional security considerations relating to the various authentication methods and mechanisms discussed in this document - apply and can be found in [SASL], [SASLPrep], [StringPrep] and + apply and can be found in [SASL], [SASLPrep], [StringPrep] and [RFC3629]. - 13. IANA Considerations - The following IANA considerations apply to this document: - It is requested that the IANA update the LDAP Protocol Mechanism registry to indicate that this document and [Protocol] provide the definitive technical specification for the StartTLS (1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.20037) extended operation. - [[TODO: add any missing IANA Considerations.]] - Acknowledgments - This document combines information originally contained in RFC 2829 and RFC 2830. The editor acknowledges the work of Harald Tveit Alvestrand, Jeff Hodges, Tim Howes, Steve Kille, RL "Bob" Morgan , and Mark Wahl, each of whom authored one or more of these documents. - This document is based upon input of the IETF LDAP Revision working group. The contributions and suggestions made by its members in shaping the contents and technical accuracy of this document is greatly appreciated. - Normative References + +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 21] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 + [[Note to the RFC Editor: please replace the citation tags used in referencing Internet-Drafts with tags of the form RFCnnnn.]] - [RFC2234] Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax Specifications: ABNF", RFC 2234, November 1997. - [DIGEST-MD5] Leach, P. C. Newman, and A. Melnikov, "Using Digest Authentication as a SASL Mechanism", draft-ietf-sasl- rfc2831bis-xx.txt, a work in progress. - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 22] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key Words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. - [LDAPDN] Zeilenga, Kurt D. (editor), "LDAP: String Representation of Distinguished Names", draft-ietf- ldapbis-dn-xx.txt, a work in progress. - [Matching] Hoffman, Paul and Steve Hanna, "Matching Text Strings in PKIX Certificates", draft-hoffman-pkix-stringmatch- xx.txt, a work in progress. - [Models] Zeilenga, Kurt D. (editor), "LDAP: Directory Information Models", draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-xx.txt, a work in progress. - [Protocol] Sermersheim, J., "LDAP: The Protocol", draft-ietf- ldapbis-protocol-xx.txt, a work in progress. - [Roadmap] K. Zeilenga, "LDAP: Technical Specification Road Map", draft-ietf-ldapbis-roadmap-xx.txt, a work in progress. - [SASL] Melnikov, A. (editor), "Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL)", draft-ietf-sasl-rfc2222bis- xx.txt, a work in progress. - [SASLPrep] Zeilenga, K., "Stringprep profile for user names and passwords", draft-ietf-sasl-saslprep-xx.txt, (a work in progress). - [StringPrep] M. Blanchet, "Preparation of Internationalized Strings ('stringprep')", draft-hoffman-rfc3454bis-xx.txt, a work in progress. - [Syntaxes] Legg, S. (editor), "LDAP: Syntaxes and Matching Rules", draft-ietf-ldapbis-syntaxes-xx.txt, a work in progress. - [TLS] Dierks, T. and C. Allen. "The TLS Protocol Version 1.1", draft-ietf-tls-rfc2246-bis-xx.txt, a work in progress. - [RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646", RFC 3629, STD 63, November 2003. + +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 22] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 + [Unicode] The Unicode Consortium, "The Unicode Standard, Version 3.2.0" is defined by "The Unicode Standard, Version 3.0" (Reading, MA, Addison-Wesley, 2000. ISBN 0-201- @@ -1609,34 +1299,22 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 "Unicode Standard Annex #28: Unicode 3.2" (http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr28/). - Informative References - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 23] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - [ANONYMOUS] Zeilenga, K.,"Anonymous SASL Mechanism", draft- zeilenga-sasl-anon-xx.txt, a work in progress. - [RFC2828] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary", RFC 2828, May 2000. - [PLAIN] Zeilenga, K.,"Plain SASL Mechanism", draft-zeilenga- sasl-plain-xx.txt, a work in progress. - [RFC2401] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol", RFC 2401, November 1998. - Author's Address - Roger Harrison Novell, Inc. 1800 S. Novell Place @@ -1645,167 +1323,108 @@ Author's Address +1 801 861 2642 roger_harrison@novell.com - Appendix A. Association State Transition Tables - This section provides a state transition table to represent a state diagram for the various authentication states through which an association may pass during the course of its existence and the actions that cause these changes in state. - This section is based entirely on information found in this document and other documents that are part of the LDAP Technical Specification [Roadmap]. As such, it is strictly informational in nature. - A.1. Association States - The following table lists the valid association states and provides a description of each state. The ID for each state is used in the - state transition table in section A.4. - + state transition table in section A.3. - ID State Description + ID Association State Description -- -------------------------------------------------------------- + + +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 23] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 + S1 Anonymous no Authentication ID is associated with the LDAP connection no Authorization ID is in force S2 Authenticated Authentication ID = I Authorization ID = X - S3 Authenticated SASL EXTERNAL, implicit authorization ID - Authentication ID = J - Authorization ID = Y - - - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 24] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - - S4 Authenticated SASL EXTERNAL, explicit authorization ID Z - Authentication ID = J - Authorization ID = Z - S5 Invalidated - + S3 Invalidated A.2. Actions that Affect Association State - The following table lists the actions that can affect the authentication and authorization state of an association. The ID for - each action is used in the state transition table in section A.4. - + each action is used in the state transition table in section A.3. ID Action -- -------------------------------------------------------------- A1 Client bind request fails A2 Client successfully performs anonymous simple bind or unauthenticated simple bind - A3 Client successfully performs simple bind with name and password - OR SASL bind with any mechanism except EXTERNAL using an - authentication ID = I that maps to authorization ID X - A4 Client Binds SASL EXTERNAL with implicit assertion of - authorization ID (section 9.1). The current authentication ID - maps to authorization ID = Y. - A5 Client Binds SASL EXTERNAL with explicit assertion of - authorization ID = Z (section 9.2). - A6 Client StartTLS request fails - A7 Client StartTLS request succeeds - A8 Client or Server: graceful TLS removal - A9 Server decides to invalidate current association state - - -A.3. Decisions Used in Making Association State Changes - - - Certain changes in the authentication and authorization state of an - association are only allowed if the server can affirmatively answer - a question. These questions are applied as part of the criteria for - allowing or disallowing a state transition in the state transition - table in section A.4. - - - ID Decision Question - -- -------------------------------------------------------------- - D1 Are lower-layer credentials available? - D2 Can lower-layer credentials for Auth ID "K" be mapped to - asserted AuthZID "L"? - - -A.4. Association State Transition Table - + A3 Client successfully binds producing an authentication ID of I. + Authentication ID I maps to authorization ID X. Depending on + the bind mechanism and associated parameters authorization ID X + was either derived from authentication ID I or was explicitly + requested as part of the bind operation. + A4 Client StartTLS request fails + A5 Client StartTLS request succeeds + A6 Client or Server: graceful TLS layer removal + A7 Server decides to invalidate current association state + +A.3. Association State Transition Table The Association table below lists the the actions that could affect the authorization state of an association and the resulting state of an association after a given action occurs. - S1, the initial state for the state machine described in this table, is the association state when an LDAP connection is initially established. + Next State + Action Comment + ---------------- --------------- ------------------------------- + A1 S1 Section 4 + A2 S1 Sections 6 and 7 + A3 S2 + A4 no change [Protocol] section 4.14.2.2 + A5 no change or S3* [Protocol] section 4.14.2.1 + A6 no change or S3* [Protocol] section 4.14.3.1 + A7 S3 + * The server may invalidate the association after installing or + removing a TLS layer (section 3.2). -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 25] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - - Next State - Action Comment - ------------------ ----------- -------------------------------- - A1 S1 Section 4 - A2 S1 Sections 6 & 7 - A3 S2 Sections 8, 9 - A4, S1 Failed bind, section 10.1 - D1=no - A4, S3 - D1=yes - A5, S1 Failed bind, section 10.2 - D1=no - A5, S1 Failed bind, section 10.2 - D1=yes, - D2=no - A5, S4 - D1=yes, D2=yes - A6 no change* [Protocol] section 4.14.2.2 - A7 no change* [Protocol] section 4.14.2.1 - A8 S1 [Protocol] section 4.14.3.1 - A9 S5 - - - * The server may invalidate the association after TLS - establishment or closure (section 3.2). +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 24] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 Appendix B. Authentication and Authorization Concepts - This appendix defines basic terms, concepts, and interrelationships regarding authentication, authorization, credentials, and identity. These concepts are used in describing how various security approaches are utilized in client authentication and authorization. - B.1. Access Control Policy - An access control policy is a set of rules defining the protection of resources, generally in terms of the capabilities of persons or other entities accessing those resources. Security objects and mechanisms, such as those described here, enable the expression of access control policies and their enforcement. - B.2. Access Control Factors - A request, when it is being processed by a server, may be associated with a wide variety of security-related factors (section 4.2 of [Protocol]). The server uses these factors to determine whether and @@ -1816,22 +1435,13 @@ B.2. Access Control Factors associated with the connection via which the request is transmitted, others (e.g. time of day) may be "environmental". - Access control policies are expressed in terms of access control factors. E.g., a request having ACFs i,j,k can perform operation Y - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 26] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - on resource Z. The set of ACFs that a server makes available for such expressions is implementation-specific. - B.3. Authentication, Credentials, Identity - Authentication credentials are the evidence supplied by one party to another, asserting the identity of the supplying party (e.g. a user) who is attempting to establish a new association state with the @@ -1840,7 +1450,6 @@ B.3. Authentication, Credentials, Identity the identity they assert. An authentication identity is the name presented in a credential. - There are many forms of authentication credentials -- the form used depends upon the particular authentication mechanism negotiated by the parties. For example: X.509 certificates, Kerberos tickets, @@ -1848,17 +1457,20 @@ B.3. Authentication, Credentials, Identity mechanism may constrain the form of authentication identities used with it. - B.4. Authorization Identity - An authorization identity is one kind of access control factor. It is the name of the user or other entity that requests that operations be performed. Access control policies are often expressed + + +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 25] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 + in terms of authorization identities; e.g., entity X can perform operation Y on resource Z. - The authorization identity bound to an association is often exactly the same as the authentication identity presented by the client, but it may be different. SASL allows clients to specify an authorization @@ -1873,160 +1485,118 @@ B.4. Authorization Identity authorization identity from the authentication credentials supplied by a client is performed in an implementation-specific manner. - Appendix C. RFC 2829 Change History - This appendix lists the changes made to the text of RFC 2829 in preparing this document. - C.0. General Editorial Changes Version -00 - - Changed other instances of the term LDAP to LDAP where v3 of the protocol is implied. Also made all references to LDAP use the same wording. - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 27] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - - Miscellaneous grammatical changes to improve readability. - - Made capitalization in section headings consistent. - Version -01 - - Changed title to reflect inclusion of material from RFC 2830 and 2251. - C.1. Changes to Section 1 - Version -01 - - Moved conventions used in document to a separate section. - C.2. Changes to Section 2 - Version -01 - - Moved section to an appendix. - C.3. Changes to Section 3 - Version -01 - - Moved section to an appendix. +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 26] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 + - Moved section to an appendix. C.4 Changes to Section 4 - Version -00 - - Changed "Distinguished Name" to "LDAP distinguished name". - C.5. Changes to Section 5 - Version -00 - - Added the following sentence: "Servers SHOULD NOT allow clients with anonymous authentication to modify directory entries or access sensitive information in directory entries." - C.5.1. Changes to Section 5.1 - Version -00 - - Replaced the text describing the procedure for performing an anonymous bind (protocol) with a reference to section 4.2 of RFC 2251 (the protocol spec). - Version -01 - - Brought text describing procedure for performing an anonymous bind from section 4.2 of RFC 2251 bis. This text will be removed from the draft standard version of that document. - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 28] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - - C.6. Changes to Section 6. - Version -00 - Reorganized text in section 6.1 as follows: - 1. Added a new section (6.1) titled "Simple Authentication" and moved one of two introductory paragraphs for section 6 into section 6.1. Added sentences to the paragraph indicating: - a. simple authentication is not suitable for environments where confidentiality is not available. - b. LDAP implementations SHOULD NOT support simple authentication unless confidentiality and data integrity mechanisms are in force. - 2. Moved first paragraph of section 6 (beginning with "LDAP implementations MUST support authentication with a password...") to section on Digest Authentication (Now section 6.2). - C.6.1. Changes to Section 6.1. - Version -00 Renamed section to 6.2 +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 27] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 + - Added sentence from original section 6 indicating that the DIGEST-MD5 SASL mechanism is required for all conforming LDAP implementations - C.6.2. Changes to Section 6.2 - Version -00 - - Renamed section to 6.3 - - Reworded first paragraph to remove reference to user and the userPassword password attribute Made the first paragraph more general by simply saying that if a directory supports simple @@ -2034,422 +1604,311 @@ C.6.2. Changes to Section 6.2 following negotiation of a TLS ciphersuite that supports confidentiality. - - Replaced "the name of the user's entry" with "a DN" since not all bind operations are performed on behalf of a "user." - - Added Section 6.3.1 heading just prior to paragraph 5. - - Paragraph 5: replaced "The server" with "DSAs that map the DN sent in the bind request to a directory entry with a userPassword attribute." - C.6.3. Changes to section 6.3. - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 29] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - Version -00 - - Renamed to section 6.4. - C.7. Changes to section 7. - none - C.7.1. Changes to section 7.1. - Version -00 - - Clarified the entity issuing a certificate by moving the phrase "to have issued the certificate" immediately after "Certification Authority." - C.8. Changes to section 8. - Version -00 - - Removed the first paragraph because simple authentication is covered explicitly in section 6. - - Added section 8.1. heading just prior to second paragraph. - - Added section 8.2. heading just prior to third paragraph. +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 28] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 + - Added section 8.2. heading just prior to third paragraph. - Added section 8.3. heading just prior to fourth paragraph. - Version -01 - - Moved entire section 8 of RFC 2829 into section 3.4 (Using SASL for Other Security Services) to bring material on SASL mechanisms together into one location. - C.9. Changes to section 9. - Version -00 - - Paragraph 2: changed "EXTERNAL mechanism" to "EXTERNAL SASL mechanism." - - Added section 9.1. heading. - - Modified a comment in the ABNF from "unspecified userid" to "unspecified authz id". - - Deleted sentence, "A utf8string is defined to be the UTF-8 encoding of one or more ISO 10646 characters," because it is redundant. - - Added section 9.1.1. heading. - - Added section 9.1.2. heading. - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 30] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - - Version -01 - - Moved entire section 9 to become section 3.5 so that it would be with other SASL material. - C.10. Changes to Section 10. - Version -00 - - Updated reference to cracking from a week of CPU time in 1997 to be a day of CPU time in 2000. - - Added text: "These ciphersuites are NOT RECOMMENDED for use... and server implementers SHOULD" to sentence just prior the second list of ciphersuites. - - Added text: "and MAY support other ciphersuites offering equivalent or better protection," to the last paragraph of the section. - C.11. Changes to Section 11. - Version -01 - - Moved to section 3.6 to be with other SASL material. +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 29] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 + - Moved to section 3.6 to be with other SASL material. C.12. Changes to Section 12. - Version -00 - - Inserted new section 12 that specifies when SASL protections begin following SASL negotiation, etc. The original section 12 is renumbered to become section 13. - Version -01 - - Moved to section 3.7 to be with other SASL material. - C.13. Changes to Section 13 (original section 12). - None - Appendix D. RFC 2830 Change History - This appendix lists the changes made to the text of RFC 2830 in preparing this document. - D.0. General Editorial Changes - - Material showing the PDUs for the StartTLS response was broken out into a new section. - - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 31] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - - The wording of the definition of the StartTLS request and StartTLS response was changed to make them parallel. NO changes were made to the ASN.1 definition or the associated values of the parameters. - - A separate section heading for graceful TLS closure was added for parallelism with section on abrupt TLS closure. - Appendix E. RFC 2251 Change History - This appendix lists the changes made to the text of RFC 2251 in preparing this document. - E.0. General Editorial Changes - - All material from section 4.2 of RFC 2251 was moved into this document. - - A new section was created for the Bind Request - - Section 4.2.1 of RFC 2251 (Sequencing Bind Request) was moved after the section on the Bind Response for parallelism with the presentation of the StartTLS operations. The section was also subdivided to explicitly call out the various effects being described within it. + +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 30] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 + - All SASL profile information from RFC 2829 was brought within the discussion of the Bind operation (primarily sections 4.4 - 4.7). - Appendix F. Change History to Combined Document - F.1. Changes for draft-ldap-bis-authmeth-02 - General - - Added references to other LDAP standard documents, to sections within the document, and fixed broken references. - - General editorial changes--punctuation, spelling, formatting, etc. - Section 1. - - Added glossary of terms and added sub-section headings - Section 2. - - Clarified security mechanisms 3, 4, & 5 and brought language in line with IETF security glossary. - Section 3. - - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 32] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - - Brought language in requirement (3) in line with security glossary. - - Clarified that information fetched prior to initiation of TLS negotiation must be discarded - -Clarified that information fetched prior to initiation of SASL negotiation must be discarded - - Rewrote paragraph on SASL negotiation requirements to clarify intent - Section 4.4. - - Added stipulation that sasl choice allows for any SASL mechanism not prohibited by this document. (Resolved conflict between this statement and one that prohibited use of ANONYMOUS and PLAIN SASL mechanisms.) - Section 5.3.6 - - Added a.x.bar.com to wildcard matching example on hostname check. - Section 6 + + +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 31] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 + - Added Association State Transition Tables to show the various states through which an association may pass along with the actions and decisions required to traverse from state to state. - Appendix A - - Brought security terminology in line with IETF security glossary throughout the appendix. - F.2. Changes for draft-ldapbis-authmeth-03 - General - - Added introductory notes and changed title of document and references to conform to WG chair suggestions for the overall technical specification. - - Several issues--H.13, H.14, H.16, H.17--were resolved without requiring changes to the document. - Section 3 - - Removed reference to /etc/passwd file and associated text. - Section 4 - - Removed sections 4.1, 4.2 and parts of section 4.3. This information was being duplicated in the protocol specification and will now reside there permanently. - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 33] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - Section 4.2 - - changed words, "not recommended" to "strongly discouraged" - Section 4.3 - - Based on ldapbis WG discussion at IETF52 two sentences were added indicating that clients SHOULD NOT send a DN value when binding with the sasl choice and servers SHALL ignore any value received in this circumstance. - - Section 8.3.1 - - Generalized the language of this section to not refer to any specific password attribute or to refer to the directory entry as a "user" entry. - Section 11 - - Added security consideration regarding misuse of unauthenticated access. - - Added security consideration requiring access control to be applied only to authenticated users and recommending it be + +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 32] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 + applied when reading sensitive information or updating directory information. - F.3. Changes for draft-ldapbis-authmeth-04 - General - - Changed references to use [RFCnnnn] format wherever possible. (References to works in progress still use [name] format.) - Various edits to correct typos and bring field names, etc. in line with specification in [Protocol] draft. - - Several issues--H.13, H.14, H.16, H.17--were resolved without requiring changes to the document. - Section 4.4.1. - - Changed ABNF grammar to use productions that are like those in the model draft. - Section 5 - - Removed sections 5.1, 5.2, and 5.4 that will be added to [Protocol]. Renumbered sections to accommodate this change. - - Section 6 - - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 34] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - - Reviewed Association State table for completeness and accuracy. Renumbered actions A3, , and A5 to be A5, A3, and A4 respectively. Re-ordered several lines in the table to ensure @@ -2458,10 +1917,8 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 was missing and valid. Added actions A7 and A8 placeholders to states S1, S2, S4 and S5 pending resolution of issue H.28. - Section 11 - - Modified security consideration (originally added in -03) requiring access control to be applied only to authenticated users. This seems nonsensical because anonymous users may have @@ -2469,34 +1926,32 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - Section 13 - - Verified all normative references and moved informative references to a new section 14. - F.4. Changes for draft-ldapbis-authmeth-05 - General - - General editory changes to fix punctuation, spelling, line length issues, etc. + +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 33] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 + - Verified and updated intra- and inter-document references throughout. - Document-wide review for proper usage of RFC 2119 keywords with several changes to correct improper usage. - Abstract - Updated to match current contents of documents. This was needed due to movement of material on Bind and StartTLS operations to [Protocol] in this revision. - Section 3. - - Renamed section to "Rationale for LDAP Security Mechanisms" and removed text that did not support this theme. Part of the motivation for this change was to remove the implication of the @@ -2504,351 +1959,259 @@ F.4. Changes for draft-ldapbis-authmeth-05 other text found in the section that everything in the section was a requirement - - Information from several removed paragraphs that describe deployment scenarios will be added Appendix A in the next revision of the draft. - - Paragraph beginning, " If TLS is negotiated, the client MUST discard all information..." was moved to section 5.1.7 and integrated with related material there. - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 35] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - - Paragraph beginning, "If a SASL security layer is negotiated..." was moved to section 4.2 - Section 4.l. - - Changed wording of first paragraph to clarify meaning. - Section 4.2. - Added paragraph from section 3 of -04 beginning, "If a SASL security layer is negotiated..." - Section 4.3.3. - Renamed to "Other SASL Mechanisms" and completely rewrote the section (one sentence) to generalize the treatment of SASL mechanisms not explicitly mentioned in this document. - Section 4.4.1. - - Added paragraph beginning, "The dnAuthzID choice allows client applications..." to clarify whether DN form authorization identities have to also have a corresponding directory entry. This change was based on editor's perception of WG consensus. - - Made minor clarifying edits in the paragraph beginning, "The uAuthzID choice allows for compatibility..." - Section 5.1.1. +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 34] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 + Section 5.1.1. - Made minor clarifying edits in the last paragraph of the section. - Section 5.1.7. - - Wording from section 3 paragraph beginning " If TLS is negotiated, the client MUST discard all information..." was moved to this section and integrated with existing text. - Section 5.2. - - Changed usage of "TLS connection" to "TLS session" throughout. - - Removed empty section 5.2.1 and renumbered sections it had previously contained. - Section 8. - - Added introductory paragraph at beginning of section. + Section 8.1. - Section 8.1. - - - - Changed term "data privacy" to "data confidentiality" to be - consistent with usage in rest of document. - - - Section 8.2. - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 36] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - + - Changed term "data privacy" to "data confidentiality" to be + consistent with usage in rest of document. + Section 8.2. - Changed first paragraph to require implementations that implement *password-based* authentication to implement and support DIGEST-MD5 SASL authentication. - Section 11. - - First paragraph: changed "session encryption" to "session confidentiality protection" to be consistent with usage in rest of document. - Appendix B. - - Began changes to incorporate information on deployment scenarios removed from section 3. - F.5. Changes for draft-ldapbis-authmeth-06 - General - - Combined Section 2 (Introduction) and Section 3 (Motivation) and moved Introduction to section 1. All following sections numbers were decremented by one as result. - - Edits to fix typos, I-D nits, etc. +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 35] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 + - Opened several new issues in Appendix G based on feedback from WG. Some of these have been resolved. Others require further discussion. - Section 1 - - Added additional example of spoofing under threat (7). - Section 2.1 - - Changed definition of "association" and added terms, "connection" and "TLS connection" to bring usage in line with [Protocol]. - Section 4.1.6 - - Clarified sentence stating that the client MUST NOT use derived forms of DNS names. - Section 5.1 - - Began edits to association state table to clarify meaning of various states and actions. - - Added action A9 to cover abandoned bind operation and added appropriate transitions to the state transition table to accommodate it. - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 37] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - Section 7.2 - - Replaced first paragraph to clarify that the "DIGEST-MD5" SASL mechanism is required to implement. - Section 9 - - Rewrote the section to make the advice more applicable over the long term, i.e. more "timeless." The intent of content in the original section was preserved. - Section 10 - - Added a clarifying example to the consideration regarding misuse of unauthenticated access. - F.6. Changes for draft-ldapbis-authmeth-07 - General - - Updated external and internal references to accommodate changes in recent drafts. - - Opened several new issues in Appendix G based on feedback from WG. Some of these have been resolved. Others require further discussion. +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 36] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 - Section 3 + Section 3 - Rewrote much of section 3.3 to meet the SASL profile requirements of draft-ietf-sasl-rfc2222bis-xx.txt section 5. - - Changed treatement of SASL ANONYMOUS and PLAIN mechanisms to bring in line with WG consensus. - Section 4 - - Note to implementers in section 4.1.1 based on operational experience. - - Clarification on client continuing by performing a StartTLS with TLS already established in section 4.1.4. - - Moved verification of mapping of client's authentication ID to asserted authorization ID to apply only to explicit assertion. The local policy in place for implicit assertion is adequate. - Section 7 - - Removed most of section 7.2 as the information is now covered adequately via the new SASL profile in section 3.3. Added note to implementors regarding the treatment of username and realm values in DIGEST-MD5. - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 38] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - - Section 7.3. Minor clarifications in wording. - - Section 7.3.1. Clarification that a match of the presented value to any member of the set of stored passwords constitutes a successful authentication. - F.7. Changes for draft-ldapbis-authmeth-08 - General - - Changed usage from LDAPv3 to LDAP for usage consistency across LDAP technical specification. - - Fixed a number of usage nits for consistency and to bring doc in conformance with publication guidelines. - Abstract - - Significant cleanup and rewording of abstract based on WG feedback. - Section 2.1 - - New definition of user. - Section 3 +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 37] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 + - Added 1.5 sentences at end of introductory paragraph indicating the effect of the Bind op on the association. - Section 3.1 - - Retitled section and clarified wording - Section 3.2 - - Clarified that simple authentication choice provides three types of authentication: anonymous, unauthenticated, and simple password. - Section 3.3.3 - - New wording clarifying when negotiated security mechanisms take effect. - Section 3.3.5 - - Changed requirement to discard information about server fetched prior to SASL negotiation from MUST to SHOULD to allow for information obtained through secure mechanisms. - Section 3.3.6 - - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 39] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - - Simplified wording of first paragraph based on suggestion from WG. - Section 3.4 - - Minor clarifications in wording. - Section 3.4.1 - - Minor clarifications in wording in first sentence. - Explicitly called out that the DN value in the dnAuthzID form is to be matched using DN matching rules. @@ -2857,104 +2220,85 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - Clarified requirement on assuming global uniqueness by changing a "generally... MUST" wording to "SHOULD". - Section 4.1.1 - - Simplified wording describing conditions when StartTLS cannot be sent. - Simplified wording in note to implementers regarding race condition with outstanding LDAP operations on connection. - Section 4.1.5 - - Removed section and moved relevant text to section 4.2.2. +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 38] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 - Section 4.1.6 + Section 4.1.6 - Renumbered to 4.1.5. - Updated server identity check rules for server's name based on WG list discussion. - Section 4.1.7 - - Renumbered to 4.1.6 - Changed requirement to discard information about server fetched prior to TLS negotion from MUST to SHOULD to allow for information obtained through secure mechanisms. - Section 6.1 - - Clarified wording. - Added definition of anonymous and unauthenticated binds. - Section 10 - - Added security consideration (moved from elsewhere) discouraging use of cleartext passwords on unprotected communication channels. - Section 11 - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 40] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - - Added an IANA consideration to update GSSAPI service name registry to point to [Roadmap] and [Authmeth] - F.8. Changes for draft-ldapbis-authmeth-09 - General - - Updated section references within document - Changed reference tags to match other docs in LDAP TS - Used non-quoted names for all SASL mechanisms - Abstract - - Inspected keyword usage and removed several improper usages. - - Removed sentence saying DIGEST-MD5 is LDAP's mandatory-to- implement mechanism. This is covered elsewhere in document. - - Moved section 5, authentication state table, of -08 draft to section 8 of -09 and completely rewrote it. - Section 1 - - Reworded sentence beginning, "It is also desirable to allow authentication methods to carry identities based on existing, non-LDAP DN-forms..." + + +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 39] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 + - Clarified relationship of this document to other documents in the LDAP TS. - Section 3.3.5 - - Removed paragraph beginning,"If the client is configured to support multiple SASL mechanisms..." because the actions specified in the paragraph do not provide the protections @@ -2962,91 +2306,67 @@ F.8. Changes for draft-ldapbis-authmeth-09 server should allow specification of acceptable mechanisms and only allow those mechanisms to be used. - - Clarified independent behavior when TLS and SASL security layers are both in force (e.g. one being removed doesn't affect the other). - Section 3.3.6 - - Moved most of section 4.2.2, Client Assertion of Authorization Identity, to sections 3.3.6, 3.3.6.1, and 3.3.6.2. - Section 3.3.6.4 - - Moved some normative comments into text body. - Section 4.1.2 - - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 41] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - - Non success resultCode values are valid if server is *unwilling* or unable to negotiate TLS. - Section 4.2.1 - - Rewrote entire section based on WG feedback. - Section 4.2.2 - - Moved most of this section to 3.3.6 for better document flow. - Section 4.2.3 - - Rewrote entire section based on WG feedback. - Section 5.1 - - Moved imperative language regarding unauthenticated access from security considerations to here. - Section 6 - - Added several paragraphs regarding the risks of transmitting passwords in the clear and requiring server implementations to provide a specific configuration that reduces these risks. - Section 6.2 +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 40] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 + - Added sentence describing protections provided by DIGEST-MD5 method. - Changed DNs in exmple to be dc=example,dc=com. - Section 10 - - Updated consideration on use of cleartext passwords to include other unprotected authentication credentials - Substantial rework of consideration on misuse of unauthenticated bind. - F.9. Changes for draft-ldapbis-authmeth-10 - - Reorganized content of sections 3-9 to improve document flow and reduce redundancy. - Resolved issue of effect of Start TLS and TLS closure on @@ -3058,18 +2378,10 @@ F.9. Changes for draft-ldapbis-authmeth-10 - Moved authentication state table to appendix and relettered appendices. - F.10. Changes for draft-ldapbis-authmeth-11 - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 42] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - General - - Many editorial changes throughout to clarify wording and better express intent, primarily based on suggestions from WG mail list. @@ -3077,204 +2389,219 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 document, e.g. "Anonymous Authentication Mechanism of the Simple Bind Choice". - Section 1 - - Editorial changes to add clarity. - Moved section 2 of authmeth -09 into section 1 - Section 2 - - New section outlining implementation requirements. - Section 3.1.1 - - Editorial clarification on need for following operation sequencing requirements. - Section 3.1.4 + + +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 41] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 + - New section added to describe use of client certificates with StartTLS. Incorporates material moved from other sections of authmeth -09. - Section 4 - New section added to discuss associations. Related material was moved from various other sections of authmeth -09 and incorporated into this new section. - Section 5 - - Added several paragraphs regarding transmission and derivation of authentication and authorization identities using the Bind operation. - Section 8 - - Clarified rules for determining valid credentials and situations where invalidCredentials result is to be returned. - Section 14 - - Added three security considerations based on WG feedback. - Appendix A - - Simplfied state tables by removing two unnecessary actions from the actions table, and removing the current state column of the - - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 43] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - state transition table. Updated references to authmeth and [Protocol]. - F.11. Changes for draft-ldapbis-authmeth-12 - General - - Changed refererences from Start TLS to StartTLS. - Removed Appendix B: Example Deployment Scenarios - Removed Appendix H as all issues listed in the appendix are now resolved. - Section 2 - - Added implementation requirement that server implementations that SUPPORT StartTLS MUST support the TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA ciphersuite. - Section 3.1.2 - - Added wording clarifying that a client's association is unaffected if a non-success resultCode is returned in the StartTLS response. - Section 9.2 +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 42] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 + - Final paragraph of this section details requirements for serverSaslCreds field when no challenge value is sent. - Section 10 - - Clarified language on uAuthzID usage. - Section 12 - - Moved entire section into security considerations. New section number is 12.1.1. - Reorganized security considerations by topic. - Added several security considerations based on WG feedback. - Section 13 - - Moved section to become section 3.3. - F.12. Changes for draft-ldapbis-authmeth-13 - General - - General edits for clarity and to remove errors. - Reworded definition of association (section 1.2) and reworked usage of association throughout document. Current semantics: every connection has an association with the same lifetime as the connection, and that association passes through various authorization states. - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 44] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - - Made usage of data confidentiality consistent throughout document. - Section 1 - Reworded mechanisms 3 and 4 for more parallelism. - - Changed language on rationale for required mechansisms from + - Changed language on rationale for required mechanisms from future to past tense. - Section 2 - Clarified that implementations may support any additional authentication mechanism, not just mechanisms associated with simple and SASL bind choices. - Section 3 - Moved paragraph explaining goals for using TLS with LDAP from security considerations to here. - Section 4.3 - Reworked text to better explain meaning of strongAuthRequired - result code when for invalidated associations. - + resultCode when for invalidated associations. Section 8 - Clarified action when simple bind request has a DN with invalid syntax. - Section 12.1 + +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 43] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 + - Added ability to configure and enforce administrative service limits as a way to protect against denial of service attacks. - Section 12.2 - Clarified that this security consideration relates to performing client authentication during the TLS handshake and not to subsequent SASL EXTERNAL authentication. - Appendix A - Updated tables by collapsing identical states and actions. Also added an invalidated association state and accompanying actions. -Added implementation requirement that server implementations +F.13. Changes for draft-ldapbis-authmeth-14 -Intellectual Property Rights + General + + - Moved to standardized LDAP TS terms: transport connection, TLS + layer, SASL layer, and LDAP message layer. Reworked usage of + terminology throughout document to conform to latest usage. + - Changed language on resultCode values to be less prescriptive + and more descriptive. + + Section 1 + - Changed format and definitions of terms to parallel latest + revision of [Protocol]. + + Section 2 + - Updated implementation requirements for protecting LDAP simple + bind mechanism to conform to WG consensus. + + Section 3.1.1 + - Moved last paragraph to security considerations and made + generalized discussion of use of confidentialityRequired + resultCode general for all data confidentiality services not + just TLS. + + Section 3.1.4 + ûRewrote last paragraph to clarify that SASL EXTERNAL is a + client action when server uses certificate information to + derive authorization ID. + Section 3.2 + ûCollapsed three subsections into a single subsection. Removed + text that implied that the TLS credentials were the only lower + layer credentials that are used by SASL EXTERNAL in determining + authentication ID and authorization ID. + + Section 8 + - Removed most of last paragraph that was redundant with + implementation requirements in section 2. + + Section 10 + +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 44] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods February 2005 + + - Changed to SASL DIGEST-MD5 (was section 11 in -13 revision) + + Section 11 + - Changed to SASL EXTERNAL (was section 10 in -13 revision). Moved + discussion of SASL authorization identities to Section 9.7. + Clarified language around implicit and explicit assertion of + authroization identities. + + Appendix A + - Further collapsed identical states and actions continuing work + in previous revisions. + +Intellectual Property Rights The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed @@ -3285,36 +2612,25 @@ Intellectual Property Rights Information on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be found in BCP 78 and BCP 79. - Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 45] -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 25 October 2004 - - of such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at http://www.ietf.org/ipr. - The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at ietf- ipr@ietf.org. - Full Copyright Statement - Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights. - This document and the information contained herein are provided on an "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE @@ -3328,30 +2644,5 @@ Full Copyright Statement - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Harrison Expires April 2005 [Page 46] \ No newline at end of file +Harrison Expires August 2005 [Page 45] + diff --git a/doc/drafts/draft-ietf-ldapbis-bcp64-xx.txt b/doc/drafts/draft-ietf-ldapbis-bcp64-xx.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a2465e3a99 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/drafts/draft-ietf-ldapbis-bcp64-xx.txt @@ -0,0 +1,1177 @@ + + + + +INTERNET-DRAFT Kurt D. Zeilenga +Intended Category: BCP OpenLDAP Foundation +Expires in six months 21 February 2005 +Obsoletes: RFC 3383 + + + IANA Considerations for LDAP + + + + +Status of Memo + + This document is intended to be, after appropriate review and + revision, submitted to the RFC Editor as a Best Current Practice + document. This document is intended to replace RFC 3383. + Distribution of this memo is unlimited. Technical discussion of this + document will take place on the IETF LDAP Revision Working Group + (LDAPBIS) mailing list . Please send + editorial comments directly to the document editor + . + + By submitting this Internet-Draft, I accept the provisions of Section + 4 of RFC 3667. By submitting this Internet-Draft, I certify that any + applicable patent or other IPR claims of which I am aware have been + disclosed, or will be disclosed, and any of which I become aware will + be disclosed, in accordance with RFC 3668. + + Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering + Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other + groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. + + Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months + and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any + time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference + material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." + + The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at + http://www.ietf.org/1id-abstracts.html + + The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at + http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html + + + Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005). All Rights Reserved. + + Please see the Full Copyright section near the end of this document + for more information. + + + +Zeilenga IANA Considerations for LDAP [Page 1] + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-bcp64-05.txt 21 February 2005 + + +Abstract + + This document provides procedures for registering extensible elements + of Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP). The document also + provides guidelines to Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) + describing conditions under which new values can be assigned. + + +1. Introduction + + The Lightweight Directory Access Protocol [Roadmap] (LDAP) is an + extensible protocol. LDAP supports: + + - addition of new operations, + - extension of existing operations, and + - extensible schema. + + This document details procedures for registering values of used to + unambiguously identify extensible elements of the protocol including: + + - LDAP message types; + - LDAP extended operations and controls; + - LDAP result codes; + - LDAP authentication methods; + - LDAP attribute description options; and + - Object Identifier descriptors. + + These registries are maintained by the Internet Assigned Numbers + Authority (IANA). + + In addition, this document provides guidelines to IANA describing the + conditions under which new values can be assigned. + + This document replaces RFC 3383. + + +2. Terminology and Conventions + + This section details terms and conventions used in this document. + + +2.1. Policy Terminology + + The terms "IESG Approval", "Standards Action", "IETF Consensus", + "Specification Required", "First Come First Served", "Expert Review", + and "Private Use" are used as defined in BCP 26 [RFC2434]. + + + + + +Zeilenga IANA Considerations for LDAP [Page 2] + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-bcp64-05.txt 21 February 2005 + + +2.2. Requirement Terminology + + The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", + "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this + document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119]. In + this case, "the specification" as used by BCP 14 refers to the + processing of protocols being submitted to the IETF standards + process. + + +2.3. Common ABNF Productions + + A number of syntaxes in this document are described using ABNF + [RFC2234]. These syntaxes rely on the following common productions: + + ALPHA = %x41-5A / %x61-7A ; "A"-"Z" / "a"-"z" + LDIGIT = %x31-39 ; "1"-"9" + DIGIT = %x30 / LDIGIT ; "0"-"9" + HYPHEN = %x2D ; "-" + DOT = %x2E ; "." + number = DIGIT / ( LDIGIT 1*DIGIT ) + keychar = ALPHA / DIGIT / HYPHEN + leadkeychar = ALPHA + keystring = leadkeychar *keychar + + A keyword is a case-insensitive string of UTF-8 [RFC3629] encoded + Unicode [Unicode] restricted to the production. + + +3. IANA Considerations for LDAP + + This section details each kind of protocol value which can be + registered and provides IANA guidelines on how to assign new values. + + IANA may reject obviously bogus registrations described. + + LDAP values specified in RFCs MUST be registered. Other LDAP values, + expecting those in private-use name spaces, SHOULD be registered. + RFCs SHOULD NOT reference, use, or otherwise recongize unregistered + LDAP values. + + +3.1. Object Identifiers + + Numerous LDAP schema and protocol elements are identified by Object + Identifiers (OIDs) [X.680]. Specifications which assign OIDs to + elements SHOULD state who delegated the OIDs for its use. + + + + +Zeilenga IANA Considerations for LDAP [Page 3] + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-bcp64-05.txt 21 February 2005 + + + For IETF developed elements, specifications SHOULD use OIDs under + "Internet Directory Numbers" (1.3.6.1.1.x). For elements developed + by others, any properly delegated OID can be used, including those + under "Internet Directory Numbers" (1.3.6.1.1.x) or "Internet Private + Enterprise Numbers" (1.3.6.1.4.1.x). + + Internet Directory Numbers (1.3.6.1.1.x) will be assigned upon Expert + Review with Specification Required. Only one OID per specification + will be assigned. The specification MAY then assign any number of + OIDs within this arc without further coordination with IANA. + + Internet Private Enterprise Numbers (1.3.6.1.4.1.x) are assigned by + IANA . Practices for IANA + assignment of Internet Private Enterprise Numbers is detailed in STD + 16 [RFC1155]. + + To avoid interoperability problems between early implementations of a + "work in progress" and implementations of the published specification + (e.g., the RFC), experimental OIDs SHOULD be used in "works in + progress" and early implementations. OIDs under the Internet + Experimental OID arc (1.3.6.1.3.x) may be used for this purpose. + Practices for IANA assignment of these Internet Experimental numbers + is detailed in STD 16 [RFC1155]. + + +3.2 Protocol Mechanisms + + LDAP provides a number of Root DSE attributes for discovery of + protocol mechanisms identified by OIDs, including the + supportedControl, supportedExtension, and supportedFeatures + attributes [Models], + + A registry of OIDs used for discover of protocol mechanisms is + provided to allow implementors and others to locate the technical + specification for these protocol mechanisms. Future specifications + of additional Root DSE attributes holding values identifying protocol + mechanisms MAY extend this registry for their values. + + Protocol Mechanisms are registered on a First Come First Served + basis. + + +3.3 LDAP Syntaxes + + This registry provides a listing of LDAP syntaxes [Models]. Each + LDAP syntax is identified by an object identifier (OID). This + registry is provided to allow implementors and others to locate the + technical specification describing a particular LDAP Syntax. + + + +Zeilenga IANA Considerations for LDAP [Page 4] + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-bcp64-05.txt 21 February 2005 + + + LDAP Syntaxes are registered on a First Come First Served with + Specification Required basis. + + Note: unlike object classes, attribute types and various other kinds + of schema elements, descriptors are not used in LDAP to identify LDAP + Syntaxes. + + +3.4. Object Identifier Descriptors + + LDAP allows short descriptive names (or descriptors) to be used + instead of a numeric Object Identifier to identify select protocol + extensions [Protocol], schema elements [Models], LDAP URL [LDAPURL] + extensions, and other objects. + + While the protocol allows the same descriptor to refer to different + object identifiers in certain cases and the registry supports + multiple registrations of the same descriptor (each indicating a + different kind of schema element and different object identifier), + multiple registrations of the same descriptor are to be avoided. All + such registration requests require Expert Review. + + Descriptors are restricted to strings of UTF-8 encoded Unicode + characters restricted by the following ABNF: + + name = keystring + + Descriptors are case-insensitive. + + Multiple names may be assigned to a given OID. For purposes of + registration, an OID is to be represented in numeric OID form (e.g., + 1.1.0.23.40) conforming to the ABNF: + + numericoid = number 1*( DOT number ) + + While the protocol places no maximum length restriction upon + descriptors, they should be short. Descriptors longer than 48 + characters may be viewed as too long to register. + + A value ending with a hyphen ("-") reserves all descriptors which + start with that value. For example, the registration of the option + "descrFamily-" reserves all options which start with "descrFamily-" + for some related purpose. + + Descriptors beginning with "x-" are for Private Use and cannot be + registered. + + Descriptors beginning with "e-" are reserved for experiments and will + + + +Zeilenga IANA Considerations for LDAP [Page 5] + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-bcp64-05.txt 21 February 2005 + + + be registered on a First Come First Served basis. + + All other descriptors require Expert Review to be registered. + + The registrant need not "own" the OID being named. + + The OID name space is managed by The ISO/IEC Joint Technical + Committee 1 - Subcommittee 6. + + +3.5. AttributeDescription Options + + An AttributeDescription [Models] can contain zero or more options + specifying additional semantics. An option SHALL be restricted to a + string UTF-8 encoded Unicode characters limited by the following + ABNF: + + option = keystring + + Options are case-insensitive. + + While the protocol places no maximum length restriction upon option + strings, they should be short. Options longer than 24 characters may + be viewed as too long to register. + + Values ending with a hyphen ("-") reserve all option names which + start with the name. For example, the registration of the option + "optionFamily-" reserves all options which start with "optionFamily-" + for some related purpose. + + Options beginning with "x-" are for Private Use and cannot be + registered. + + Options beginning with "e-" are reserved for experiments and will be + registered on a First Come First Served basis. + + All other options require Standards Action or Expert Review with + Specification Required to be registered. + + +3.6. LDAP Message Types + + Each protocol message is encapsulated in an LDAPMessage envelope + [Protocol]. The protocolOp CHOICE indicates the type of message + encapsulated. Each message type consists of an ASN.1 identifier in + the form of a keyword and a non-negative choice number. The choice + number is combined with the class (APPLICATION) and data type + (CONSTRUCTED or PRIMITIVE) to construct the BER tag in the message's + + + +Zeilenga IANA Considerations for LDAP [Page 6] + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-bcp64-05.txt 21 February 2005 + + + encoding. The choice numbers for existing protocol messages are + implicit in the protocol's ASN.1 defined in [Protocol]. + + New values will be registered upon Standards Action. + + Note: LDAP provides extensible messages which reduces, but does not + eliminate, the need to add new message types. + + +3.7. LDAP Authentication Method + + The LDAP Bind operation supports multiple authentication methods + [Protocol]. Each authentication choice consists of an ASN.1 + identifier in the form of a keyword and a non-negative integer. + + The registrant SHALL classify the authentication method usage using + one of the following terms: + + COMMON - method is appropriate for common use on the + Internet, + LIMITED USE - method is appropriate for limited use, + OBSOLETE - method has been deprecated or otherwise found to + be inappropriate for any use. + + Methods without publicly available specifications SHALL NOT be + classified as COMMON. New registrations of class OBSOLETE cannot be + registered. + + New authentication method integers in the range 0-1023 require + Standards Action to be registered. New authentication method + integers in the range 1024-4095 require Expert Review with + Specification Required. New authentication method integers in the + range 4096-16383 will be registered on a First Come First Served + basis. Keywords associated with integers in the range 0-4095 SHALL + NOT start with "e-" or "x-". Keywords associated with integers in + the range 4096-16383 SHALL start with "e-". Values greater than or + equal to 16384 and keywords starting with "x-" are for Private Use + and cannot be registered. + + Note: LDAP supports Simple Authentication and Security Layers [SASL] + as an authentication choice. SASL is an extensible + authentication framework. + + +3.8. LDAP Result Codes + + LDAP result messages carry an resultCode enumerated value to indicate + the outcome of the operation [Protocol]. Each result code consists + + + +Zeilenga IANA Considerations for LDAP [Page 7] + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-bcp64-05.txt 21 February 2005 + + + of a ASN.1 identifier in the form of a keyword and a non-negative + integer. + + New resultCodes integers in the range 0-1023 require Standards Action + to be registered. New resultCode integers in the range 1024-4095 + require Expert Review with Specification Required. New resultCode + integers in the range 4096-16383 will be registered on a First Come + First Served basis. Keywords associated with integers in the range + 0-4095 SHALL NOT start with "e-" or "x-". Keywords associated with + integers in the range 4096-16383 SHALL start with "e-". Values + greater than or equal to 16384 and keywords starting with "x-" are + for Private Use and cannot be registered. + + +3.9. LDAP Search Scope + + LDAP SearchRequest messages carry a scope enumerated value to + indicate the extend of search within the DIT [Protocol] Each search + value consists of a ASN.1 identifier in the form of a keyword and a + non-negative integer. + + New scope integers in the range 0-1023 require Standards Action to be + registered. New scope integers in the range 1024-4095 require Expert + Review with Specification Required. New scope integers in the range + 4096-16383 will be registered on a First Come First Served basis. + Keywords associated with integers in the range 0-4095 SHALL NOT start + with "e-" or "x-". Keywords associated with integers in the range + 4096-16383 SHALL start with "e-". Values greater than or equal to + 16384 and keywords starting with "x-" are for Private Use and cannot + be registered. + + +3.10. LDAP Filter Choice + + LDAP filters are used in making assertions against an object + represented in the directory [Protocol]. The Filter CHOICE indicates + a type of assertion. Each Filter CHOICE consists of an ASN.1 + identifier in the form of a keyword and a non-negative choice number. + The choice number is combined with the class (APPLICATION) and data + type (CONSTRUCTED or PRIMITIVE) to construct the BER tag in the + message's encoding. + + Note: LDAP provides the extensibleMatching choice which reduces, but + does not eliminate, the need to add new filter choices. + + +3.11. LDAP ModifyRequest Operation Type + + + + +Zeilenga IANA Considerations for LDAP [Page 8] + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-bcp64-05.txt 21 February 2005 + + + The LDAP ModifyRequest carries a sequence of modification operations + [Protocol]. Each kind (e.g., add, delete, replace) of operation is + consists of a ASN.1 identifier in the form of a keyword and a + non-negative integer. + + New operation type integers in the range 0-1023 require Standards + Action to be registered. New operation type integers in the range + 1024-4095 require Expert Review with Specification Required. New + operation type integers in the range 4096-16383 will be registered on + a First Come First Served basis. Keywords associated with integers + in the range 0-4095 SHALL NOT start with "e-" or "x-". Keywords + associated with integers in the range 4096-16383 SHALL start with + "e-". Values greater than or equal to 16384 and keywords starting + with "x-" are for Private Use and cannot be registered. + + +3.12. LDAP authzId Prefixes + + Authorization Identities in LDAP are strings conforming to the + production [AuthMeth]. This production is extensible. + Each new specific authorization form is identified by a prefix string + conforming to the following ABNF: + + prefix = keystring COLON + COLON = %x3A ; COLON (":" U+003A) + + Prefixes are case-insensitive. + + While the protocol places no maximum length restriction upon prefix + strings, they should be short. Prefixes longer than 12 characters + may be viewed as too long to register. + + Prefixes beginning with "x-" are for Private Use and cannot be + registered. + + Prefixes beginning with "e-" are reserved for experiments and will be + registered on a First Come First Served basis. + + All other prefixes require Standards Action or Expert Review with + Specification Required to be registered. + + +3.13. Directory Systems Names + + The IANA-maintained "Directory Systems Names" registry [IANADSN] of + valid keywords for well known attributes was used in the LDAPv2 + string representation of a distinguished name [RFC1779]. LDAPv2 is + now Historic [RFC3494]. + + + +Zeilenga IANA Considerations for LDAP [Page 9] + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-bcp64-05.txt 21 February 2005 + + + Directory systems names are not known to be used in any other + context. LDAPv3 [LDAPDN] uses Object Identifier Descriptors [Section + 3.2] (which have a different syntax than directory system names). + + New Directory System Names will no longer be accepted. For + historical purposes, the current list of registered names should + remain publicly available. + + +4. Registration Procedure + + The procedure given here MUST be used by anyone who wishes to use a + new value of a type described in Section 3 of this document. + + The first step is for the requester to fill out the appropriate form. + Templates are provided in Appendix A. + + If the policy is Standards Action, the completed form SHOULD be + provided to the IESG with the request for Standards Action. Upon + approval of the Standards Action, the IESG SHALL forward the request + (possibly revised) to IANA. The IESG SHALL be viewed as the owner of + all values requiring Standards Action. + + If the policy is Expert Review, the requester SHALL post the + completed form to the mailing list for + public review. The review period is two (2) weeks. If a revised + form is later submitted, the review period is restarted. Anyone may + subscribe to this list by sending a request to + . During the review, objections may + be raised by anyone (including the Expert) on the list. After + completion of the review, the Expert, based upon public comments, + SHALL either approve the request and forward it to the IESG OR deny + the request. In either case, the Expert SHALL promptly notify the + requester of the action. Actions of the Expert may be appealed + [RFC2026]. The Expert is appointed by Applications Area Director(s). + The requester is viewed as the owner of values registered under + Expert Review. + + If the policy is First Come First Served, the requester SHALL submit + the completed form directly to the IANA: . The + requester is viewed as the owner of values registered under First + Come First Served. + + Neither the Expert nor IANA will take position on the claims of + copyright or trademarks issues regarding completed forms. + + Prior to submission of the Internet Draft (I-D) to the RFC Editor but + after IESG review and tentative approval, the document editor SHOULD + + + +Zeilenga IANA Considerations for LDAP [Page 10] + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-bcp64-05.txt 21 February 2005 + + + revise the I-D to use registered values. + + +5. Registration Maintenance + + This section discusses maintenance of registrations. + + +5.1. Lists of Registered Values + + IANA makes lists of registered values readily available to the + Internet community on their web site: . + + +5.2. Change Control + + The registration owner MAY update the registration subject to the + same constraints and review as with new registrations. In cases + where the owner is not unable or unwilling to make necessary updates, + the IESG MAY assume ownership in order to update the registration. + + +5.3. Comments + + For cases where others (anyone other than the owner) have significant + objections to the claims in a registration and the owner does not + agree to change the registration, comments MAY be attached to a + registration upon Expert Review. For registrations owned by the + IESG, the objections SHOULD be addressed by initiating a request for + Expert Review. + + The form to these requests is ad hoc, but MUST include the specific + objections to be reviewed and SHOULD contain (directly or by + reference) materials supporting the objections. + + +6. Security Considerations + + The security considerations detailed in BCP 26 [RFC2434] are + generally applicable to this document. Additional security + considerations specific to each name space are discussed in Section 3 + where appropriate. + + Security considerations for LDAP are discussed in documents + comprising the technical specification [Roadmap]. + + +7. Acknowledgment + + + +Zeilenga IANA Considerations for LDAP [Page 11] + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-bcp64-05.txt 21 February 2005 + + + This document is a product of the IETF LDAP Revision (LDAPBIS) + Working Group (WG). This document is a revision of RFC 3383, also a + product of the LDAPBIS WG. + + This document includes text borrowed from "Guidelines for Writing an + IANA Considerations Section in RFCs" [RFC2434] by Thomas Narten and + Harald Alvestrand. + + +8. Author's Address + + Kurt D. Zeilenga + OpenLDAP Foundation + + Email: Kurt@OpenLDAP.org + + +9. References + + [[Note to the RFC Editor: please replace the citation tags used in + referencing Internet-Drafts with tags of the form RFCnnnn where + possible.]] + + +9.1. Normative References + + [RFC1155] Rose, M. and K. McCloghrie, "Structure and + Identification of Management Information for TCP/IP- + based Internets", STD 16 (also RFC 1155), May 1990. + + [RFC2026] Bradner, S., "The Internet Standards Process -- Revision + 3", BCP 9 (also RFC 2026), October 1996. + + [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate + Requirement Levels", BCP 14 (also RFC 2119), March 1997. + + [RFC2234] Crocker, D. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax + Specifications: ABNF", RFC 2234, November 1997. + + [RFC2434] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an + IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26 (also RFC + 2434), October 1998. + + [RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO + 10646", RFC 3629 (also STD 63), November 2003. + + [Roadmap] Zeilenga, K. (editor), "LDAP: Technical Specification + Road Map", draft-ietf-ldapbis-roadmap-xx.txt, a work in + + + +Zeilenga IANA Considerations for LDAP [Page 12] + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-bcp64-05.txt 21 February 2005 + + + progress. + + [AuthMeth] Harrison, R. (editor), "LDAP: Authentication Methods and + Connection Level Security Mechanisms", + draft-ietf-ldapbis-authmeth-xx.txt, a work in progress. + + [Models] Zeilenga, K. (editor), "LDAP: Directory Information + Models", draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-xx.txt, a work in + progress. + + [Protocol] Sermersheim, J. (editor), "LDAP: The Protocol", + draft-ietf-ldapbis-protocol-xx.txt, a work in progress. + + [LDAPURL] Smith, M. (editor), "LDAP: Uniform Resource Locator", + draft-ietf-ldapbis-url-xx.txt, a work in progress. + + [Unicode] The Unicode Consortium, "The Unicode Standard, Version + 3.2.0" is defined by "The Unicode Standard, Version 3.0" + (Reading, MA, Addison-Wesley, 2000. ISBN 0-201-61633-5), + as amended by the "Unicode Standard Annex #27: Unicode + 3.1" (http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr27/) and by the + "Unicode Standard Annex #28: Unicode 3.2" + (http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr28/). + + [X.680] International Telecommunication Union - + Telecommunication Standardization Sector, "Abstract + Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) - Specification of Basic + Notation", X.680(2002) (also ISO/IEC 8824-1:2002). + + +9.2. Informative References + + [RFC1779] Kille, S., "A String Representation of Distinguished + Names", RFC 1779, March 1995. + + [RFC3494] Zeilenga, K., "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol + version 2 (LDAPv2) to Historic Status", RFC 3494, March + 2003. + + [Syntaxes] Legg, S. (editor), "LDAP: Syntaxes and Matching Rules", + draft-ietf-ldapbis-syntaxes-xx.txt, a work in progress. + + [LDAPDN] Zeilenga, K. (editor), "LDAP: String Representation of + Distinguished Names", draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-xx.txt, a + work in progress. + + [SASL] Melnikov, A. (Editor), "Simple Authentication and + Security Layer (SASL)", + + + +Zeilenga IANA Considerations for LDAP [Page 13] + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-bcp64-05.txt 21 February 2005 + + + draft-ietf-sasl-rfc2222bis-xx.txt, a work in progress. + + [IANADSN] IANA, "Directory Systems Names", + http://www.iana.org/assignments/directory-system-names. + + +Appendix A. Registration Templates + + This appendix provides registration templates for registering new + LDAP values. Note that more than one value may be requested by + extending the template by listing multiple values, or through use of + tables. + + +A.1. LDAP Object Identifier Registration Template + + Subject: Request for LDAP OID Registration + + Person & email address to contact for further information: + + Specification: (I-D) + + Author/Change Controller: + + Comments: + + (Any comments that the requester deems relevant to the request) + + +A.2. LDAP Protocol Mechanism Registration Template + + Subject: Request for LDAP Protocol Mechanism Registration + + Object Identifier: + + Description: + + Person & email address to contact for further information: + + Usage: (One of Control or Extension or Feature or other) + + Specification: (RFC, I-D, URI) + + Author/Change Controller: + + Comments: + + (Any comments that the requester deems relevant to the request) + + + +Zeilenga IANA Considerations for LDAP [Page 14] + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-bcp64-05.txt 21 February 2005 + + +A.3. LDAP Syntax Registration Template + + Subject: Request for LDAP Syntax Registration + + Object Identifier: + + Description: + + Person & email address to contact for further information: + + Specification: (RFC, I-D, URI) + + Author/Change Controller: + + Comments: + + (Any comments that the requester deems relevant to the request) + + +A.4. LDAP Descriptor Registration Template + + Subject: Request for LDAP Descriptor Registration + + Descriptor (short name): + + Object Identifier: + + Person & email address to contact for further information: + + Usage: (One of administrative role, attribute type, matching rule, + name form, object class, URL extension, or other) + + Specification: (RFC, I-D, URI) + + Author/Change Controller: + + Comments: + + (Any comments that the requester deems relevant to the request) + + +A.5. LDAP Attribute Description Option Registration Template + + Subject: Request for LDAP Attribute Description Option Registration + + Option Name: + + Family of Options: (YES or NO) + + + +Zeilenga IANA Considerations for LDAP [Page 15] + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-bcp64-05.txt 21 February 2005 + + + Person & email address to contact for further information: + + Specification: (RFC, I-D, URI) + + Author/Change Controller: + + Comments: + + (Any comments that the requester deems relevant to the request) + + +A.6. LDAP Message Type Registration Template + + Subject: Request for LDAP Message Type Registration + + LDAP Message Name: + + Person & email address to contact for further information: + + Specification: (Approved I-D) + + Comments: + + (Any comments that the requester deems relevant to the request) + + +A.7. LDAP Authentication Method Registration Template + + Subject: Request for LDAP Authentication Method Registration + + Authentication Method Name: + + Person & email address to contact for further information: + + Specification: (RFC, I-D, URI) + + Intended Usage: (One of COMMON, LIMITED-USE, OBSOLETE) + + Author/Change Controller: + + Comments: + + (Any comments that the requester deems relevant to the request) + + +A.8. LDAP Result Code Registration Template + + Subject: Request for LDAP Result Code Registration + + + +Zeilenga IANA Considerations for LDAP [Page 16] + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-bcp64-05.txt 21 February 2005 + + + Result Code Name: + + Person & email address to contact for further information: + + Specification: (RFC, I-D, URI) + + Author/Change Controller: + + Comments: + + (Any comments that the requester deems relevant to the request) + + +A.8. LDAP Search Scope Registration Template + + Subject: Request for LDAP Search Scope Registration + + Search Scope Name: + + Filter Scope String: + + Person & email address to contact for further information: + + Specification: (RFC, I-D, URI) + + Author/Change Controller: + + Comments: + + (Any comments that the requester deems relevant to the request) + + +A.9. LDAP Filter Choice Registration Template + + Subject: Request for LDAP Filter Choice Registration + + Filter Choice Name: + + Person & email address to contact for further information: + + Specification: (RFC, I-D, URI) + + Author/Change Controller: + + Comments: + + (Any comments that the requester deems relevant to the request) + + + + +Zeilenga IANA Considerations for LDAP [Page 17] + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-bcp64-05.txt 21 February 2005 + + +A.10. LDAP ModifyRequest Operation Registration Template + + Subject: Request for LDAP ModifyRequest Operation Registration + + ModifyRequest Operation Name: + + Person & email address to contact for further information: + + Specification: (RFC, I-D, URI) + + Author/Change Controller: + + Comments: + + (Any comments that the requester deems relevant to the request) + + +Appendix B. Changes since RFC 3383 + + This informative appendix provides a summary of changes made since RFC + 3383. + + - Object Identifier Descriptors practices were updated to require + all descriptors defined in RFCs to be registered and + recommending all other descriptors (excepting those in + private-use name space) be registered. Additionally, all + requests for multiple registrations of the same descriptor are + now subject to Expert Review. + + - Protocol Mechanisms practices were updated to include values of + the 'supportedFeatures' attribute type. + + - LDAP Syntax, Search Scope, Filter Choice, ModifyRequest + operation, and authzId prefixes registries were added. + [[Initial values provided in Appendix C. This Appendix is to be + removed by the RFC Editor before publication as an RFC.]] + + - References to RFCs comprising the LDAP technical specifications + have been updated to latest revisions. + + - References to ISO 10646 have been replaced with [Unicode]. + + - The "Assigned Values" appendix providing initial registry values + was removed. + + - Numerous editorial changes were made. + + + + + +Zeilenga IANA Considerations for LDAP [Page 18] + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-bcp64-05.txt 21 February 2005 + + +Appendix C. Initial Values for new registries + + This appendix provides initial values for new registries. + + +C.1. LDAP Syntaxes + + Object Identifier Syntax Owner Reference + ----------------------------- -------------------------- ----- --- + 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.3 Attribute Type Description IESG [Syntaxes] + 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.6 Bit String IESG [Syntaxes] + 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.7 Boolean IESG [Syntaxes] + 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.11 Country String IESG [Syntaxes] + 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.12 DN IESG [Syntaxes] + 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.14 Delivery Method IESG [Syntaxes] + 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.15 Directory String IESG [Syntaxes] + 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.16 DIT Content Rule Description IESG [Syntaxes] + 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.17 DIT Structure Rule Description IESG [Syntaxes] + 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.21 Enhanced Guide IESG [Syntaxes] + 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.22 Facsimile Telephone Number IESG [Syntaxes] + 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.23 Fax IESG [Syntaxes] + 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.24 Generalized Time IESG [Syntaxes] + 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.25 Guide IESG [Syntaxes] + 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.26 IA5 String IESG [Syntaxes] + 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.27 Integer IESG [Syntaxes] + 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.28 JPEG IESG [Syntaxes] + 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.30 Matching Rule Description IESG [Syntaxes] + 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.31 Matching Rule Use Description IESG [Syntaxes] + 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.34 Name And Optional UID IESG [Syntaxes] + 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.35 Name Form Description IESG [Syntaxes] + 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.36 Numeric String IESG [Syntaxes] + 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.37 Object Class Description IESG [Syntaxes] + 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.38 OID IESG [Syntaxes] + 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.39 Other Mailbox IESG [Syntaxes] + 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.40 Octet String IESG [Syntaxes] + 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.41 Postal Address IESG [Syntaxes] + 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.44 Printable String IESG [Syntaxes] + 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.50 Telephone Number IESG [Syntaxes] + 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.51 Teletex Terminal Identifier IESG [Syntaxes] + 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.52 Telex Number IESG [Syntaxes] + 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.53 UTC Time IESG [Syntaxes] + 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.54 LDAP Syntax Description IESG [Syntaxes] + 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.58 Substring Assertion IESG [Syntaxes] + + +C.2. LDAP Search Scopes + + Name URLString Value Owner Reference + + + +Zeilenga IANA Considerations for LDAP [Page 19] + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-bcp64-05.txt 21 February 2005 + + + ---------------- --------- ----- ----- ------------------- + baseObject base 0 IESG [Protocol][LDAPURL] + singleLevel one 1 IESG [Protocol][LDAPURL] + wholeSubtree sub 2 IESG [Protocol][LDAPURL] + + +C.3. LDAP Filter Choices + + Name Value Owner Reference + ---------------- ----- ----- --------- + and 0 IESG [Protocol] + or 1 IESG [Protocol] + not 2 IESG [Protocol] + equalityMatch 3 IESG [Protocol] + substrings 4 IESG [Protocol] + greaterOrEqual 5 IESG [Protocol] + lessOrEqual 6 IESG [Protocol] + present 7 IESG [Protocol] + approxMatch 8 IESG [Protocol] + extensibleMatch 9 IESG [Protocol] + + +C.4. LDAP ModifyRequest Operations + + Name Value Owner Reference + ---------------- ----- ----- --------- + add 0 IESG [Protocol] + delete 1 IESG [Protocol] + replace 2 IESG [Protocol] + + +C.5. LDAP authzId prefixes + + Name Prefix Owner Reference + ---------------- ------ ----- --------- + dnAuthzId dn: IESG [AuthMeth] + uAuthzId u: IESG [AuthMeth] + + +Full Copyright + + Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005). This document is subject + to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and + except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights. + + This document and the information contained herein are provided on an + "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS + OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET + + + +Zeilenga IANA Considerations for LDAP [Page 20] + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-bcp64-05.txt 21 February 2005 + + + ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, + INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE + INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED + WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + + + +Intellectual Property Rights + + The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any + Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to + pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in + this document or the extent to which any license under such rights + might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has + made any independent effort to identify any such rights. Information + on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be found + in BCP 78 and BCP 79. + + Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any + assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an + attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of + such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this specification + can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at + http://www.ietf.org/ipr. + + The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any + copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary + rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement + this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at + ietf-ipr@ietf.org. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Zeilenga IANA Considerations for LDAP [Page 21] + diff --git a/doc/drafts/draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-xx.txt b/doc/drafts/draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-xx.txt index eb38efdbec..458f65eea1 100644 --- a/doc/drafts/draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-xx.txt +++ b/doc/drafts/draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-xx.txt @@ -1,20 +1,22 @@ + + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT Editor: Kurt D. Zeilenga Intended Category: Standard Track OpenLDAP Foundation -Expires in six months 24 October 2004 -Obsoletes: 2253 - +Expires in six months 10 February 2005 +Obsoletes: RFC 2253 LDAP: String Representation of Distinguished Names - - + Status of Memo - This document is intended to be, after appropriate review and revision, submitted to the RFC Editor as a Standard Track document replacing RFC 2253. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. @@ -23,50 +25,42 @@ Status of Memo . Please send editorial comments directly to the document editor . - By submitting this Internet-Draft, I accept the provisions of Section 4 of RFC 3667. By submitting this Internet-Draft, I certify that any applicable patent or other IPR claims of which I am aware have been disclosed, or will be disclosed, and any of which I become aware will be disclosed, in accordance with RFC 3668. - Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. - Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." - The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at - . The list of - Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at - . + http://www.ietf.org/1id-abstracts.html + The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at + http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html - Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). All Rights Reserved. + Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005). All Rights Reserved. Please see the Full Copyright section near the end of this document for more information. - - - Zeilenga LDAP: Distinguished Names [Page 1] -INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-15.txt 24 October 2004 - + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-16.txt 10 February 2005 Abstract - The X.500 Directory uses distinguished names (DNs) as primary keys to entries in the directory. This document defines the string representation used in the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol @@ -75,23 +69,19 @@ Abstract names, while being able to represent any distinguished name. - 1. Background and Intended Usage - In X.500-based directory systems [X.500], including those accessed using the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) [Roadmap], distinguished names (DNs) are used to unambiguously refer to directory entries [X.501][Models]. - The structure of a DN [X.501] is described in terms of ASN.1 [X.680]. In the X.500 Directory Access Protocol [X.511] (and other ITU-defined directory protocols), DNs are encoded using the Basic Encoding Rules (BER) [X.690]. In LDAP, DNs are represented in the string form described in this document. - It is important to have a common format to be able to unambiguously represent a distinguished name. The primary goal of this specification is ease of encoding and decoding. A secondary goal is @@ -101,84 +91,68 @@ Abstract translations (such as expressing attribute type names in the local national language). - This document defines the string representation of Distinguished Names used in LDAP [Protocol][Syntaxes]. Section 2 details the RECOMMENDED algorithm for converting a DN from its ASN.1 structured representation to a string. Section 3 details how to convert a DN from a string to a ASN.1 structured representation. - While other documents may define other algorithms for converting a DN from its ASN.1 structured representation to a string, all algorithms MUST produce strings which adhere to the requirements of Section 3. - This document does not define a canonical string representation for DNs. Comparison of DNs for equality is to be performed in accordance with the distinguishedNameMatch matching rule [Syntaxes]. - - This document is an integral part of the LDAP Technical Specification - [Roadmap]. This document obsoletes RFC 2253. Changes since RFC 2253 - + This document is a integral part of the LDAP technical specification + [Roadmap] which obsoletes the previously defined LDAP technical Zeilenga LDAP: Distinguished Names [Page 2] -INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-15.txt 24 October 2004 - - + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-16.txt 10 February 2005 - are summarized in Appendix B. + specification, RFC 3377, in its entirety. This document obsoletes RFC + 2253. Changes since RFC 2253 are summarized in Appendix B. This specification assumes familiarity with X.500 [X.500] and the concept of Distinguished Name [X.501][Models]. - 1.1. Conventions - The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119]. - Character names in this document use the notation for code points and names from the Unicode Standard [Unicode]. For example, the letter "a" may be represented as either or . - Note: a glossary of terms used in Unicode can be found in [Glossary]. Information on the Unicode character encoding model can be found in [CharModel]. - 2. Converting DistinguishedName from ASN.1 to a String - X.501 [X.501] defines the ASN.1 [X.680] structure of distinguished name. The following is a variant provided for discussion purposes. - DistinguishedName ::= RDNSequence - RDNSequence ::= SEQUENCE OF RelativeDistinguishedName - RelativeDistinguishedName ::= SET SIZE (1..MAX) OF AttributeTypeAndValue - AttributeTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE { type AttributeType, value AttributeValue } - This section defines the RECOMMENDED algorithm for converting a distinguished name from an ASN.1 structured representation to an UTF-8 [RFC3629] encoded Unicode [Unicode] character string representation. @@ -188,63 +162,51 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-15.txt 24 October 2004 implementations. - 2.1. Converting the RDNSequence - - Zeilenga LDAP: Distinguished Names [Page 3] -INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-15.txt 24 October 2004 - + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-16.txt 10 February 2005 If the RDNSequence is an empty sequence, the result is the empty or zero length string. - Otherwise, the output consists of the string encodings of each RelativeDistinguishedName in the RDNSequence (according to Section 2.2), starting with the last element of the sequence and moving backwards toward the first. - The encodings of adjoining RelativeDistinguishedNames are separated by a comma (',' U+002C) character. - 2.2. Converting RelativeDistinguishedName - When converting from an ASN.1 RelativeDistinguishedName to a string, the output consists of the string encodings of each AttributeTypeAndValue (according to Section 2.3), in any order. - Where there is a multi-valued RDN, the outputs from adjoining AttributeTypeAndValues are separated by a plus sign ('+' U+002B) character. - 2.3. Converting AttributeTypeAndValue - The AttributeTypeAndValue is encoded as the string representation of the AttributeType, followed by an equals sign ('=' U+003D) character, followed by the string representation of the AttributeValue. The encoding of the AttributeValue is given in Section 2.4. - - If the AttributeType is defined to have a short name and that short - name is known to be registered [REGISTRY][BCP64bis] as identifying the - AttributeType, that short name, a , is used. Otherwise the - AttributeType is encoded as the dotted-decimal encoding, a - , of its OBJECT IDENTIFIER. The and - is defined in [Models]. - + If the AttributeType is defined to have a short name (descriptor) + [Models] and that short name is known to be registered + [REGISTRY][BCP64bis] as identifying the AttributeType, that short + name, a , is used. Otherwise the AttributeType is encoded as + the dotted-decimal encoding, a , of its OBJECT IDENTIFIER. + The and is defined in [Models]. Implementations are not expected to dynamically update their knowledge of registered short names. However, implementations SHOULD provide a @@ -252,20 +214,17 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-15.txt 24 October 2004 updated. - 2.4. Converting an AttributeValue from ASN.1 to a String - If the AttributeType is of the dotted-decimal form, the AttributeValue is represented by an number sign ('#' U+0023) character followed by the hexadecimal encoding of each of the octets of the BER encoding of - Zeilenga LDAP: Distinguished Names [Page 4] -INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-15.txt 24 October 2004 - + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-16.txt 10 February 2005 the X.500 AttributeValue. This form is also used when the syntax of @@ -275,7 +234,6 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-15.txt 24 October 2004 form may also be used in other cases, such as when a reversible string representation is desired (see Section 5.2). - Otherwise, if the AttributeValue is of a syntax which has a LDAP-specific string encoding, the value is converted first to a UTF-8 encoded Unicode string according to its syntax specification (see @@ -284,62 +242,49 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-15.txt 24 October 2004 escaping, then that string can be used as the string representation of the value. - - a space (' ' U+0020) or number sign ('#' U+0023) occurring at the beginning of the string; - - a space (' ' U+0020) character occurring at the end of the string; - - one of the characters '"', '+', ',', ';', '<', '>', or '\' (U+0022, U+002B, U+002C, U+003B, U+003C, U+003E, or U+005C respectively); - - the null (U+0000) character. - Other characters may be escaped. - Each octet of the character to be escaped is replaced by a backslash and two hex digits, which form a single octet in the code of the character. Alternatively, if and only if the character to be escaped is one of - ' ', '"', '#', '+', ',', ';', '<', '=', '>', or '\' (U+0020, U+0022, U+0023, U+002B, U+002C, U+003B, U+003C, U+003D, U+003E, U+005C respectively) - - it can be prefixed by a backslash ('\' U+0005C). - + it can be prefixed by a backslash ('\' U+005C). Examples of the escaping mechanism are shown in Section 4. - 3. Parsing a String back to a Distinguished Name - The string representation of Distinguished Names is restricted to UTF-8 [RFC3629] encoded Unicode [Unicode] characters. The structure of this string representation is specified using the following - Zeilenga LDAP: Distinguished Names [Page 5] -INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-15.txt 24 October 2004 - + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-16.txt 10 February 2005 Augmented BNF [RFC2234] grammar: - distinguishedName = [ relativeDistinguishedName *( COMMA relativeDistinguishedName ) ] relativeDistinguishedName = attributeTypeAndValue @@ -348,47 +293,39 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-15.txt 24 October 2004 attributeType = descr / numericoid attributeValue = string / hexstring - ; The following characters are to be escaped when they appear ; in the value to be encoded: ESC, one of , leading ; SHARP or SPACE, trailing SPACE, and NULL. string = [ ( leadchar / pair ) [ *( stringchar / pair ) ( trailchar / pair ) ] ] - leadchar = LUTF1 / UTFMB LUTF1 = %x01-1F / %x21 / %x24-2A / %x2D-3A / %x3D / %x3F-5B / %x5D-7F - trailchar = TUTF1 / UTFMB TUTF1 = %x01-1F / %x21 / %x23-2A / %x2D-3A / %x3D / %x3F-5B / %x5D-7F - stringchar = SUTF1 / UTFMB SUTF1 = %x01-21 / %x23-2A / %x2D-3A / %x3D / %x3F-5B / %x5D-7F - pair = ESC ( ESC / special / hexpair ) special = escaped / SPACE / SHARP / EQUALS escaped = DQUOTE / PLUS / COMMA / SEMI / LANGLE / RANGLE hexstring = SHARP 1*hexpair hexpair = HEX HEX - where the productions , , , , , , , , , , , , , , are defined in [Models]. - Each , either a or a , refers to an attribute type of an attribute value assertion (AVA). The is followed by a and an . The is either in or form. - If in form, a LDAP string representation asserted value can be obtained by replacing (left-to-right, non-recursively) each appearing in the as follows: @@ -397,33 +334,27 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-15.txt 24 October 2004 - Zeilenga LDAP: Distinguished Names [Page 6] -INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-15.txt 24 October 2004 - + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-16.txt 10 February 2005 replace with the octet indicated by the . - If in form, a BER representation can be obtained from converting each of the to the octet indicated by the . - One or more attribute values assertions, separated by , for a relative distinguished name. - Zero or more relative distinguished names, separated by , for a distinguished name. - Implementations MUST recognize AttributeType name strings (descriptors) listed in the following table, but MAY recognize other name strings. - String X.500 AttributeType ------ -------------------------------------------- CN commonName (2.5.4.3) @@ -436,7 +367,6 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-15.txt 24 October 2004 DC domainComponent (0.9.2342.19200300.100.1.25) UID userId (0.9.2342.19200300.100.1.1) - Implementations MAY recognize other DN string representations (such as that described in RFC 1779). However, as there is no requirement that alternative DN string representations to be recognized (and, if so, @@ -444,59 +374,46 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-15.txt 24 October 2004 with Section 2 of this document. - 4. Examples - This notation is designed to be convenient for common forms of name. This section gives a few examples of distinguished names written using this notation. First is a name containing three relative distinguished names (RDNs): - UID=jsmith,DC=example,DC=net - Here is an example name containing three RDNs, in which the first RDN is multi-valued: - OU=Sales+CN=J. Smith,DC=example,DC=net - Zeilenga LDAP: Distinguished Names [Page 7] -INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-15.txt 24 October 2004 - + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-16.txt 10 February 2005 This example shows the method of escaping of a special characters appearing in a common name: - CN=James \"Jim\" Smith\, III,DC=example,DC=net - The following shows the method for encoding a value which contains a carriage return character: - CN=Before\0dAfter,DC=example,DC=net - In this RDN example, the type in the RDN is unrecognized, and the value is the BER encoding of an OCTET STRING containing two octets 0x48 and 0x69. - 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.0=#04024869 - Finally, this example shows an RDN whose commonName value consisting of 5 letters: - Unicode Character Code UTF-8 Escaped ------------------------------- ------ ------ -------- LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L U+004C 0x4C L @@ -505,28 +422,22 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-15.txt 24 October 2004 LATIN SMALL LETTER I U+0069 0x69 i LATIN SMALL LETTER C WITH ACUTE U+0107 0xC487 \C4\87 - could be encoded in printable ASCII (useful for debugging purposes) as: - CN=Lu\C4\8Di\C4\87 - 5. Security Considerations - The following security considerations are specific to the handling of distinguished names. LDAP security considerations are discussed in [Protocol] and other documents comprising the LDAP Technical Specification [Roadmap]. - 5.1. Disclosure - Distinguished Names typically consist of descriptive information about the entries they name, which can be people, organizations, devices or other real-world objects. This frequently includes some of the @@ -535,10 +446,9 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-15.txt 24 October 2004 - Zeilenga LDAP: Distinguished Names [Page 8] -INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-15.txt 24 October 2004 - + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-16.txt 10 February 2005 - the common name of the object (i.e. a person's full name) @@ -546,22 +456,27 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-15.txt 24 October 2004 - its physical location (country, locality, city, street address) - organizational attributes (such as department name or affiliation) - - Most countries have privacy laws regarding the publication of - information about people. - + In some cases, such information can be considered sensitive. In many + countries, privacy laws exist which prohibit disclosure of certain + kinds of descriptive information (e.g., email addresses). Hence, + servers implementors are encouraged to support DIT structural rules + and name forms [Models] as these provide a mechanism for + administrators to select appropriate naming attributes for entries. + Administrators are encouraged to use these mechanisms, access + controls, and other administrative controls which may be available to + restrict use of attributes containing sensitive information in naming + of entries. Additionally, use of authentication and data security + services in LDAP [AuthMeth][Protocol] should be considered. 5.2. Use of Distinguished Names in Security Applications - The transformations of an AttributeValue value from its X.501 form to an LDAP string representation are not always reversible back to the same BER (Basic Encoding Rules) or DER (Distinguished Encoding rules) form. An example of a situation which requires the DER form of a distinguished name is the verification of an X.509 certificate. - For example, a distinguished name consisting of one RDN with one AVA, in which the type is commonName and the value is of the TeletexString choice with the letters 'Sam' would be represented in LDAP as the @@ -569,7 +484,6 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-15.txt 24 October 2004 still 'Sam' but of the PrintableString choice would have the same representation . - Applications which require the reconstruction of the DER form of the value SHOULD NOT use the string representation of attribute syntaxes when converting a distinguished name to the LDAP format. Instead, @@ -577,69 +491,57 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-15.txt 24 October 2004 U+0023) as described in the first paragraph of Section 2.4. - 6. Acknowledgment - This document is an update to RFC 2253, by Mark Wahl, Tim Howes, and Steve Kille. RFC 2253 was a product of the IETF ASID Working Group. - This document is a product of the IETF LDAPBIS Working Group. -7. Document Editor's Address - - Kurt D. Zeilenga - OpenLDAP Foundation - - - - -8. References +Zeilenga LDAP: Distinguished Names [Page 9] + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-16.txt 10 February 2005 +7. Document Editor's Address + Kurt D. Zeilenga + OpenLDAP Foundation -Zeilenga LDAP: Distinguished Names [Page 9] -INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-15.txt 24 October 2004 + Email: Kurt@OpenLDAP.org +8. References [[Note to the RFC Editor: please replace the citation tags used in - referencing Internet-Drafts with tags of the form RFCnnnn.]] - + referencing Internet-Drafts with tags of the form RFCnnnn where + possible.]] 8.1. Normative References - [X.501] International Telecommunication Union - Telecommunication Standardization Sector, "The Directory -- Models," X.501(1993) (also ISO/IEC 9594-2:1994). - [X.680] International Telecommunication Union - Telecommunication Standardization Sector, "Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) - Specification of Basic Notation", X.680(1997) (also ISO/IEC 8824-1:1998). - [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14 (also RFC 2119), March 1997. - [RFC2234] Crocker, D. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax Specifications: ABNF", RFC 2234, November 1997. - [RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646", RFC 3629 (also STD 63), November 2003. - [Unicode] The Unicode Consortium, "The Unicode Standard, Version 3.2.0" is defined by "The Unicode Standard, Version 3.0" (Reading, MA, Addison-Wesley, 2000. ISBN 0-201-61633-5), @@ -648,56 +550,45 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-15.txt 24 October 2004 "Unicode Standard Annex #28: Unicode 3.2" (http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr28/). - [Models] Zeilenga, K. (editor), "LDAP: Directory Information Models", draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-xx.txt, a work in progress. - [Roadmap] Zeilenga, K. (editor), "LDAP: Technical Specification + + + +Zeilenga LDAP: Distinguished Names [Page 10] + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-16.txt 10 February 2005 + + Road Map", draft-ietf-ldapbis-roadmap-xx.txt, a work in progress. - [Protocol] Sermersheim, J. (editor), "LDAP: The Protocol", draft-ietf-ldapbis-protocol-xx.txt, a work in progress. - [Syntaxes] Legg, S. (editor), "LDAP: Syntaxes and Matching Rules", draft-ietf-ldapbis-syntaxes-xx.txt, a work in progress. - [Schema] Dally, K. (editor), "LDAP: User Schema", draft-ietf-ldapbis-user-schema-xx.txt, a work in - - - - -Zeilenga LDAP: Distinguished Names [Page 10] -INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-15.txt 24 October 2004 - - - progress. - [REGISTRY] IANA, Object Identifier Descriptors Registry, . - 8.2. Informative References - [ASCII] Coded Character Set--7-bit American Standard Code for Information Interchange, ANSI X3.4-1986. - [X.500] International Telecommunication Union - Telecommunication Standardization Sector, "The Directory -- Overview of concepts, models and services," X.500(1993) (also ISO/IEC 9594-1:1994). - [X.690] International Telecommunication Union - Telecommunication Standardization Sector, "Specification of ASN.1 encoding rules: Basic Encoding Rules (BER), @@ -705,61 +596,49 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-15.txt 24 October 2004 Encoding Rules (DER)", X.690(1997) (also ISO/IEC 8825-1:1998). - [RFC2849] Good, G., "The LDAP Data Interchange Format (LDIF) - Technical Specification", RFC 2849, June 2000. - [BCP64bis] Zeilenga, K., "IANA Considerations for LDAP", draft-ietf-ldapbis-bcp64-xx.txt, a work in progress. - [CharModel] Whistler, K. and M. Davis, "Unicode Technical Report #17, Character Encoding Model", UTR17, , August 2000. - [Glossary] The Unicode Consortium, "Unicode Glossary", . -Appendix A. Presentation Issues +Zeilenga LDAP: Distinguished Names [Page 11] + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-16.txt 10 February 2005 + + +Appendix A. Presentation Issues This appendix is provided for informational purposes only, it is not a normative part of this specification. - The string representation described in this document is not intended to be presented to humans without translation. However, at times it may be desirable to present non-translated DN strings to users. This section discusses presentation issues associated with non-translated DN strings. Presentation of translated DN strings issues are not - - - - -Zeilenga LDAP: Distinguished Names [Page 11] -INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-15.txt 24 October 2004 - - - discussed in this appendix. Transcoding issues are also not discussed in this appendix. - This appendix provides guidance for applications presenting DN strings to users. This section is not comprehensive, it does not discuss all presentation issues which implementors may face. - Not all user interfaces are capable of displaying the full set of Unicode characters. Some Unicode characters are not displayable. - It is recommended that human interfaces use the optional hex pair escaping mechanism (Section 2.3) to produce a string representation suitable for display to the user. For example, an application can @@ -767,7 +646,6 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-15.txt 24 October 2004 characters appearing in the AttributeValue's string representation (as demonstrated in the final example of Section 4). - When a DN string is displayed in free form text, it is often necessary to distinguish the DN string from surrounding text. While this is often done with white space (as demonstrated in Section 4), it is @@ -781,7 +659,6 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-15.txt 24 October 2004 be noted to the user that the wrapping '<' and '>' characters are not part of the DN string. - DN strings can be quite long. It is often desirable to line-wrap overly long DN strings in presentations. Line wrapping should be done by inserting white space after the RDN separator character or, if @@ -789,32 +666,27 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-15.txt 24 October 2004 the user that the inserted white space is not part of the DN string and is to be removed before use in LDAP. For example, - The following DN string is long: + + + +Zeilenga LDAP: Distinguished Names [Page 12] + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-16.txt 10 February 2005 + + CN=Kurt D. Zeilenga,OU=Engineering,L=Redwood Shores, O=OpenLDAP Foundation,ST=California,C=US so it has been line-wrapped for readability. The extra white space is to be removed before the DN string is used in LDAP. - It is not advised to insert white space otherwise as it may not be obvious to the user which white space is part of the DN string and which white space was added for readability. - Another alternative is to use the LDAP Data Interchange Format (LDIF) - - - - -Zeilenga LDAP: Distinguished Names [Page 12] -INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-15.txt 24 October 2004 - - - [RFC2849]. For example, - # This entry has a long DN... dn: CN=Kurt D. Zeilenga,OU=Engineering,L=Redwood Shores, O=OpenLDAP Foundation,ST=California,C=US @@ -823,14 +695,11 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-15.txt 24 October 2004 objectClass: person - Appendix B. Changes made since RFC 2253 - This appendix is provided for informational purposes only, it is not a normative part of this specification. - The following substantive changes were made to RFC 2253: - Removed IESG Note. The IESG Note has been addressed. - Replaced all references to ISO 10646-1 with [Unicode]. @@ -854,6 +723,14 @@ Appendix B. Changes made since RFC 2253 - Updated Section 2.4 to allow hex pair escaping of all characters and clarified escaping for when multiple octet UTF-8 encodings are present. Indicated that null (U+0000) character is to be escaped. + + + +Zeilenga LDAP: Distinguished Names [Page 13] + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-16.txt 10 February 2005 + + Indicated that equals sign ('=' U+003D) character may be escaped as '\='. - Rewrote Section 3 to use ABNF as defined in RFC 2234. @@ -864,15 +741,6 @@ Appendix B. Changes made since RFC 2253 + do not require escaping of non-leading number sign ('#' U+0023) characters, + allow space (' ' U+0020) to escaped as '\ ', - - - - -Zeilenga LDAP: Distinguished Names [Page 13] -INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-15.txt 24 October 2004 - - - + require hex escaping of null (U+0000) characters, and + removed LDAPv2-only constructs. - Updated Section 3 to describe how to parse elements of the @@ -883,14 +751,11 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-15.txt 24 October 2004 - Added discussion of presentation issues (Appendix A). - Added this appendix. - In addition, numerous editorial changes were made. - Intellectual Property Rights - The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in @@ -900,7 +765,6 @@ Intellectual Property Rights on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be found in BCP 78 and BCP 79. - Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of @@ -908,7 +772,6 @@ Intellectual Property Rights can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at http://www.ietf.org/ipr. - The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement @@ -918,26 +781,21 @@ Intellectual Property Rights -Full Copyright + +Zeilenga LDAP: Distinguished Names [Page 14] + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-16.txt 10 February 2005 - Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). This document is subject +Full Copyright + + Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005). This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights. - This document and the information contained herein are provided on an "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET - - - - -Zeilenga LDAP: Distinguished Names [Page 14] -INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-15.txt 24 October 2004 - - - ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED @@ -980,13 +838,6 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-15.txt 24 October 2004 +Zeilenga LDAP: Distinguished Names [Page 15] + - - - - - - - - -Zeilenga LDAP: Distinguished Names [Page 15] \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/doc/drafts/draft-ietf-ldapbis-filter-xx.txt b/doc/drafts/draft-ietf-ldapbis-filter-xx.txt index 59fa2100cf..8f00270523 100644 --- a/doc/drafts/draft-ietf-ldapbis-filter-xx.txt +++ b/doc/drafts/draft-ietf-ldapbis-filter-xx.txt @@ -1,14 +1,12 @@ - - Network Working Group M. Smith, Editor Request for Comments: DRAFT Pearl Crescent, LLC Obsoletes: RFC 2254 T. Howes -Expires: 24 April 2005 Opsware, Inc. - 24 October 2004 +Expires: 16 May 2005 Opsware, Inc. + 16 November 2004 LDAP: String Representation of Search Filters - + @@ -52,8 +50,8 @@ Status of this Memo Smith & Howes Intended Category: Standards Track [Page 1] - -INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 24 October 2004 + +INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 16 November 2004 Abstract @@ -61,8 +59,8 @@ Abstract LDAP search filters are transmitted in the LDAP protocol using a binary representation that is appropriate for use on the network. This document defines a human-readable string representation of LDAP - search filters that is appropriate for use in LDAP URLs and in other - applications. + search filters that is appropriate for use in LDAP URLs [LDAPURL] and + in other applications. Table of Contents @@ -78,18 +76,19 @@ Table of Contents 7. Normative References...........................................7 8. Informative References.........................................8 9. Acknowledgments................................................8 -10. Authors' Addresses.............................................8 +10. Authors' Addresses.............................................9 11. Appendix A: Changes Since RFC 2254.............................9 11.1. Technical Changes...........................................9 11.2. Editorial Changes...........................................10 12. Appendix B: Changes Since Previous Document Revision...........11 -12.1. Editorial Changes...........................................11 -13. Intellectual Property Rights...................................11 -14. Full Copyright.................................................12 +12.1. Technical Changes...........................................11 +12.2. Editorial Changes...........................................12 + Intellectual Property Rights...................................12 + Full Copyright.................................................13 1. Introduction - The Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) [Protocol] defines a + The Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) [Roadmap] defines a network representation of a search filter transmitted to an LDAP server. Some applications may find it useful to have a common way of representing these search filters in a human-readable form; LDAP URLs @@ -98,19 +97,21 @@ Table of Contents possible LDAP version 3 search filters, including extended match filters. - This document is an integral part of the LDAP Technical Specification - [Roadmap]. + This document is a integral part of the LDAP technical specification + [Roadmap] which obsoletes the previously defined LDAP technical + specification, RFC 3377, in its entirety. - This document replaces RFC 2254. Changes to RFC 2254 are summarized - in Appendix A. Smith & Howes Intended Category: Standards Track [Page 2] - -INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 24 October 2004 +INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 16 November 2004 + + + This document replaces RFC 2254. Changes to RFC 2254 are summarized + in Appendix A. The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this @@ -118,7 +119,7 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 24 October 2004 2. LDAP Search Filter Definition - An LDAPv3 search filter is defined in Section 4.5.1 of [Protocol] as + An LDAP search filter is defined in Section 4.5.1 of [Protocol] as follows: Filter ::= CHOICE { @@ -157,26 +158,27 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 24 October 2004 AttributeValue ::= OCTET STRING - MatchingRuleId ::= LDAPString - - AssertionValue ::= OCTET STRING Smith & Howes Intended Category: Standards Track [Page 3] - -INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 24 October 2004 +INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 16 November 2004 + + + MatchingRuleId ::= LDAPString + + AssertionValue ::= OCTET STRING LDAPString ::= OCTET STRING -- UTF-8 encoded, -- [Unicode] characters - The AttributeDescription is a string representation of the attribute - description and is defined in [Protocol]. The AttributeValue and - AssertionValue OCTET STRING have the form defined in [Syntaxes]. The - Filter is encoded for transmission over a network using the Basic - Encoding Rules (BER) defined in [X.690], with simplifications - described in [Protocol]. + The AttributeDescription, as defined in [Protocol], is a string + representation of the attribute description that is discussed in + [Models]. The AttributeValue and AssertionValue OCTET STRING have + the form defined in [Syntaxes]. The Filter is encoded for + transmission over a network using the Basic Encoding Rules (BER) + defined in [X.690], with simplifications described in [Protocol]. 3. String Search Filter Definition @@ -200,11 +202,10 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 24 October 2004 approx = TILDE EQUALS greaterorequal = RANGLE EQUALS lessorequal = LANGLE EQUALS - extensible = attr [dnattrs] - [matchingrule] COLON EQUALS assertionvalue - / [dnattrs] - matchingrule COLON EQUALS assertionvalue - / COLON EQUALS assertionvalue + extensible = ( attr [dnattrs] + [matchingrule] COLON EQUALS assertionvalue ) + / ( [dnattrs] + matchingrule COLON EQUALS assertionvalue ) present = attr EQUALS ASTERISK substring = attr EQUALS [initial] any [final] initial = assertionvalue @@ -213,17 +214,17 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 24 October 2004 attr = attributedescription ; The attributedescription rule is defined in ; Section 2.5 of [Models]. - dnattrs = COLON "dn" - matchingrule = COLON oid - assertionvalue = valueencoding Smith & Howes Intended Category: Standards Track [Page 4] - -INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 24 October 2004 +INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 16 November 2004 + + dnattrs = COLON "dn" + matchingrule = COLON oid + assertionvalue = valueencoding ; The rule is used to encode an ; from Section 4.1.6 of [Protocol]. valueencoding = 0*(normal / escaped) @@ -259,27 +260,26 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 24 October 2004 For AssertionValues that contain UTF-8 character data, each octet of the character to be escaped is replaced by a backslash and two hex - digits, which form a single octet in the code of the character. - - For example, the filter checking whether the "cn" attribute contained - a value with the character "*" anywhere in it would be represented as + digits, which form a single octet in the code of the character. For + example, the filter checking whether the "cn" attribute contained a + value with the character "*" anywhere in it would be represented as "(cn=*\2a*)". - As indicated by the valueencoding rule, implementations MUST escape + As indicated by the rule, implementations MUST escape all octets greater than 0x7F that are not part of a valid UTF-8 encoding sequence when they generate a string representation of a search filter. Implementations SHOULD accept as input strings that are not valid UTF-8 strings. This is necessary because RFC 2254 did - not clearly define the term "string representation" (and in - particular did not mention that the string representation of an LDAP Smith & Howes Intended Category: Standards Track [Page 5] - -INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 24 October 2004 + +INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 16 November 2004 + not clearly define the term "string representation" (and in + particular did not mention that the string representation of an LDAP search filter is a string of UTF-8 encoded Unicode characters). 4. Examples @@ -295,47 +295,48 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 24 October 2004 The following examples illustrate the use of extensible matching. - (cn:1.2.3.4.5:=Fred Flintstone) + (cn:caseExactMatch:=Fred Flintstone) (cn:=Betty Rubble) (sn:dn:2.4.6.8.10:=Barney Rubble) (o:dn:=Ace Industry) (:1.2.3:=Wilma Flintstone) - (:dn:2.4.6.8.10:=Dino) + (:DN:2.4.6.8.10:=Dino) - The first example shows use of the matching rule "1.2.3.4.5". + The first example shows use of the matching rule "caseExactMatch." The second example demonstrates use of a MatchingRuleAssertion form without a matchingRule. The third example illustrates the use of the ":oid" notation to - indicate that matching rule "2.4.6.8.10" should be used when making - comparisons, and that the attributes of an entry's distinguished name - should be considered part of the entry when evaluating the match - (indicated by the use of ":dn"). + indicate that matching rule identified by the OID "2.4.6.8.10" should + be used when making comparisons, and that the attributes of an + entry's distinguished name should be considered part of the entry + when evaluating the match (indicated by the use of ":dn"). The fourth example denotes an equality match, except that DN components should be considered part of the entry when doing the match. The fifth example is a filter that should be applied to any attribute - supporting the matching rule given (since the attr has been omitted). + supporting the matching rule given (since the has been + omitted). The sixth and final example is also a filter that should be applied to any attribute supporting the matching rule given. Attributes supporting the matching rule contained in the DN should also be considered. - The following examples illustrate the use of the escaping mechanism. - - (o=Parens R Us \28for all your parenthetical needs\29) Smith & Howes Intended Category: Standards Track [Page 6] - -INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 24 October 2004 +INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 16 November 2004 + + + The following examples illustrate the use of the escaping mechanism. + (o=Parens R Us \28for all your parenthetical needs\29) (cn=*\2A*) (filename=C:\5cMyFile) (bin=\00\00\00\04) @@ -348,12 +349,16 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 24 October 2004 substring indicator. The third illustrates the escaping of the backslash character. - The fourth example shows a filter searching for the four-byte value - 0x00000004, illustrating the use of the escaping mechanism to + The fourth example shows a filter searching for the four octet value + 00 00 00 04 (hex), illustrating the use of the escaping mechanism to represent arbitrary data, including NUL characters. The fifth example illustrates the use of the escaping mechanism to - represent various non-ASCII UTF-8 characters. + represent various non-ASCII UTF-8 characters. Specifically, there are + 5 characters in the portion of this example: LATIN + CAPITAL LETTER L (U+004C), LATIN SMALL LETTER U (U+0075), LATIN SMALL + LETTER C WITH CARON (U+010D), LATIN SMALL LETTER I (U+0069), and + LATIN SMALL LETTER C WITH ACUTE (U+0107). The sixth and final example demonstrates assertion of a BER encoded value. @@ -377,20 +382,20 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 24 October 2004 [AuthMeth] Harrison, R. (editor), "LDAP: Authentication Methods and Connection Level Security Mechanisms", - draft-ietf-ldapbis-authmeth-xx.txt, a work in progress. -[Models] Zeilenga, K. (editor), "LDAP: Directory Information Models", - draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-xx.txt, a work in progress. -[Protocol] draft-ietf-ldapbis-protocol-xx.txt, a work in progress. +Smith & Howes Intended Category: Standards Track [Page 7] +INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 16 November 2004 -Smith & Howes Intended Category: Standards Track [Page 7] - -INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 24 October 2004 + draft-ietf-ldapbis-authmeth-xx.txt, a work in progress. +[Models] Zeilenga, K. (editor), "LDAP: Directory Information Models", + draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-xx.txt, a work in progress. + +[Protocol] draft-ietf-ldapbis-protocol-xx.txt, a work in progress. [RFC2119] S. Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14 (also RFC 2119), March 1997. @@ -414,22 +419,31 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 24 October 2004 (http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr27/) and by the "Unicode Standard Annex #28: Unicode 3.2." +8. Informative References + +[LDAPURL] Smith, M. (editor), "LDAP: Uniform Resource Locator", + draft-ietf-ldapbis-url-xx.txt, a work in progress. + [X.690] Specification of ASN.1 encoding rules: Basic, Canonical, and Distinguished Encoding Rules, ITU-T Recommendation X.690, 1994. -8. Informative References +9. Acknowledgments - None. + This document replaces RFC 2254 by Tim Howes. RFC 2254 was a product + of the IETF ASID Working Group. -9. Acknowledgments + Changes included in this revised specification are based upon + discussions among the authors, discussions within the LDAP (v3) + Revision Working Group (ldapbis), and discussions within other IETF + Working Groups. The contributions of individuals in these working + groups is gratefully acknowledged. - This document replaces RFC 2254 by Tim Howes. Changes included in - this revised specification are based upon discussions among the - authors, discussions within the LDAP (v3) Revision Working Group - (ldapbis), and discussions within other IETF Working Groups. The - contributions of individuals in these working groups is gratefully - acknowledged. + + +Smith & Howes Intended Category: Standards Track [Page 8] + +INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 16 November 2004 10. Authors' Addresses @@ -440,14 +454,6 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 24 October 2004 Saline, MI 48176 USA +1 734 944-2856 - - - -Smith & Howes Intended Category: Standards Track [Page 8] - -INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 24 October 2004 - - mcs@pearlcrescent.com @@ -477,6 +483,9 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 24 October 2004 "simple", "extensible", and "substring" ("initial", "any", and "final") rules. This matches a change made in [Syntaxes]. + Added "(" and ")" around the components of the + subproductions for clarity. + Revised the "attr", "matchingrule", and "assertionvalue" ABNF to more precisely reference productions from the [Models] and [Protocol] documents. @@ -484,24 +493,22 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 24 October 2004 "String Search Filter Definition" section: replaced "greater" and "less" with "greaterorequal" and "lessorequal" to avoid confusion. - Introduced the "valueencoding" and associated "normal" and "escaped" - rules to reduce the dependence on descriptive text. The "normal" - production restricts filter strings to valid UTF-8 sequences. - Added a third option to the "extensible" production to allow creation - of a MatchingRuleAssertion that only has a matchValue. - Added a statement about expected behavior in light of RFC 2254's lack - of a clear definition of "string representation." +Smith & Howes Intended Category: Standards Track [Page 9] + +INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 16 November 2004 + Introduced the "valueencoding" and associated "normal" and "escaped" + rules to reduce the dependence on descriptive text. The "normal" + production restricts filter strings to valid UTF-8 sequences. + Added a statement about expected behavior in light of RFC 2254's lack + of a clear definition of "string representation." -Smith & Howes Intended Category: Standards Track [Page 9] - -INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 24 October 2004 11.2. Editorial Changes @@ -526,8 +533,8 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 24 October 2004 this document (instead of RFC 1960). Added reference to the [Roadmap] document. - "LDAP Search Filter Definition" section: made corrections to the - LDAPv3 search filter ABNF so it matches that used in [Protocol]. + "LDAP Search Filter Definition" section: made corrections to the LDAP + search filter ABNF so it matches that used in [Protocol]. Clarified the definition of 'value' (now 'assertionvalue') to take into account the fact that it is not precisely an AttributeAssertion @@ -540,7 +547,22 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 24 October 2004 (cn:=Betty Rubble), (:1.2.3:=Wilma Flintstone), and (1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.0=\04\02\48\69). Replaced one occurrence of "a value" with "an assertion value". Corrected the description of this - example: (sn:dn:2.4.6.8.10:=Barney Rubble). + example: (sn:dn:2.4.6.8.10:=Barney Rubble). Replaced the numeric OID + in the first extensible match example with "caseExactMatch" to + demonstrate use of the descriptive form. Used "DN" (uppercase) in + + + +Smith & Howes Intended Category: Standards Track [Page 10] + +INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 16 November 2004 + + + the last extensible match example to remind the reader to treat the + production as case insensitive. Reworded the description + of the fourth escaping mechanism example to avoid making assumptions + about byte order. Added text to the fifth escaping mechanism example + to spell out what the non-ASCII characters are in Unicode terms. "Security Considerations" section: added references to [Protocol] and [AuthMeth]. @@ -551,16 +573,8 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 24 October 2004 [Models], and [Roadmap] and updated the UTF-8 reference. Replaced RFC 822 reference with a reference to RFC 2234. - - - - -Smith & Howes Intended Category: Standards Track [Page 10] - -INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 24 October 2004 - - - "Informative References" section: added for clarity. + "Informative References" section: (new section) moved [X.690] to this + section. Added a reference to [LDAPURL]. "Acknowledgments" section: added. @@ -569,29 +583,72 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 24 October 2004 "Appendix B: Changes Since Previous Document Revision" section: added. + Surrounded the names of all ABNF productions with "<" and ">" where + they are used in descriptive text. + + Replaced all occurrences of "LDAPv3" with "LDAP." + 12. Appendix B: Changes Since Previous Document Revision This appendix lists all changes relative to the previously published - revision, draft-ietf-ldapbis-filter-07.txt. Note that when + revision, draft-ietf-ldapbis-filter-08.txt. Note that when appropriate these changes are also included in Appendix A, but are also included here for the benefit of the people who have already - reviewed draft-ietf-ldapbis-filter-07.txt. This section will be + reviewed draft-ietf-ldapbis-filter-08.txt. This section will be removed before this document is published as an RFC. -12.1. Editorial Changes +12.1. Technical Changes - "Status of this Memo" section: replaced RFC 3668 (IPR) boilerplate - paragraph with the version that says "each author" instead of "I." + Removed the third option from the "extensible" production that + allowed creation of a MatchingRuleAssertion that only had a + matchValue (disallowed By [Protocol]). Added "(" and ")" around the + components of the subproductions for clarity. - "Status of this Memo" section: added 2 paragraphs that were - accidently removed from the -07 revision (one begins with "The list - of current Internet-Drafts..." and the other begins with "The list of - Internet-Draft Shadow Directories...." -13. Intellectual Property Rights + +Smith & Howes Intended Category: Standards Track [Page 11] + +INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 16 November 2004 + + +12.2. Editorial Changes + + "Introduction" section: referenced [Roadmap] upon first use of LDAP + and expanded the paragraph that begins "This document is an integral + part of the LDAP technical specification..." to match the text used + in [Protocol]. + + "LDAP Search Filter Definition" section: reworded the last paragraph + for clarity. + + "Examples" section: Replaced the numeric OID in the first extensible + match example with "caseExactMatch" to demonstrate use of the + descriptive form. Used "DN" (uppercase) in the last extensible match + example to remind the reader to treat the production as + case insensitive. Reworded the description of the fourth escaping + mechanism example to avoid making assumptions about byte order. + Added text to the fifth escaping mechanism example to spell out what + the non-ASCII characters are in Unicode terms. + + References: added [LDAPURL] and moved [X.690] to "Informative + References." + + "Acknowledgements" section: added the sentence "RFC 2254 was a + product of the IETF ASID Working Group." + + Changed these two sections to unnumbered ones: "Intellectual Property + Rights" and "Full Copyright." + + Surrounded the names of all ABNF productions with "<" and ">" where + they are used in descriptive text. + + Replaced all occurrences of "LDAPv3" with "LDAP." + + +Intellectual Property Rights The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to @@ -605,16 +662,17 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 24 October 2004 Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of - such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this - specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at - http://www.ietf.org/ipr. -Smith & Howes Intended Category: Standards Track [Page 11] - -INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 24 October 2004 +Smith & Howes Intended Category: Standards Track [Page 12] +INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 16 November 2004 + + + such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this + specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at + http://www.ietf.org/ipr. The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary @@ -622,7 +680,7 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 24 October 2004 this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at ietf-ipr@ietf.org. -14. Full Copyright +Full Copyright Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and @@ -637,10 +695,7 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 24 October 2004 WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. -This Internet Draft expires on 24 April 2005. - - - +This Internet Draft expires on 16 May 2005. @@ -666,7 +721,4 @@ This Internet Draft expires on 24 April 2005. - -Smith & Howes Intended Category: Standards Track [Page 12] - - +Smith & Howes Intended Category: Standards Track [Page 13] \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/doc/drafts/draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-xx.txt b/doc/drafts/draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-xx.txt index 7f8a98bd28..43d85caa0b 100644 --- a/doc/drafts/draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-xx.txt +++ b/doc/drafts/draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-xx.txt @@ -1,53 +1,50 @@ + + + + INTERNET-DRAFT Editor: Kurt D. Zeilenga Intended Category: Standard Track OpenLDAP Foundation -Expires in six months 24 October 2004 -Obsoletes: RFC 2251, RFC 2252, RFC 2256 - +Expires in six months 21 February 2005 +Obsoletes: RFC 2251, RFC 2252, RFC 2256, RFC 3674 LDAP: Directory Information Models - - + Status of this Memo - This document is intended to be published as a Standard Track RFC. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. Technical discussion of this document will take place on the IETF LDAP Revision Working Group mailing list . Please send editorial comments directly to the editor . - By submitting this Internet-Draft, I accept the provisions of Section 4 of RFC 3667. By submitting this Internet-Draft, I certify that any applicable patent or other IPR claims of which I am aware have been disclosed, or will be disclosed, and any of which I become aware will be disclosed, in accordance with RFC 3668. - Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. - Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." - The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at - . The list of - Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at - . + http://www.ietf.org/1id-abstracts.html + The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at + http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html - Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). All Rights Reserved. + Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005). All Rights Reserved. Please see the Full Copyright section near the end of this document for more information. @@ -56,26 +53,20 @@ Status of this Memo - - - Zeilenga LDAP Models [Page 1] -INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-12 24 October 2004 - + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-14 21 February 2005 Abstract - The Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) is an Internet protocol for accessing distributed directory services which act in accordance with X.500 data and service models. This document describes the X.500 Directory Information Models, as used in LDAP. - Table of Contents - Status of this Memo 1 Abstract 2 Table of Contents @@ -90,56 +81,52 @@ Table of Contents 2.3. Naming of Entries 8 2.4. Object Classes 9 2.5. Attribute Descriptions 12 - 2.6. Alias Entries 15 + 2.6. Alias Entries 16 3. Directory Administrative and Operational Information 17 3.1. Subtrees - 3.2. Subentries - 3.3. The 'objectClass' attribute 18 + 3.2. Subentries 18 + 3.3. The 'objectClass' attribute 3.4. Operational attributes 19 - 4. Directory Schema 20 + 4. Directory Schema 22 4.1. Schema Definitions 23 - 4.2. Subschema Subentries 30 + 4.2. Subschema Subentries 32 4.3. 'extensibleObject' 35 - 4.4. Subschema Discovery - 5. DSA (Server) Informational Model 36 - 5.1. Server-specific Data Requirements - 6. Other Considerations 39 - 6.1. Preservation of User Information 40 + 4.4. Subschema Discovery 36 + 5. DSA (Server) Informational Model + 5.1. Server-specific Data Requirements 37 + 6. Other Considerations 40 + 6.1. Preservation of User Information 41 6.2. Short Names - 6.3. Cache and Shadowing 41 - 7. Implementation Guidelines + 6.3. Cache and Shadowing + 7. Implementation Guidelines 42 7.1. Server Guidelines 7.2. Client Guidelines - 8. Security Considerations 42 + 8. Security Considerations 43 9. IANA Considerations - 10. Acknowledgments 43 + 10. Acknowledgments 44 11. Editor's Address - 12. References 44 - + 12. References Zeilenga LDAP Models [Page 2] -INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-12 24 October 2004 - + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-14 21 February 2005 - 12.1. Normative References - 12.2. Informative References 45 + 12.1. Normative References 45 + 12.2. Informative References Appendix A. Changes - Intellectual Property Rights 50 + Intellectual Property Rights 51 Full Copyright - 1. Introduction - This document discusses the X.500 Directory Information Models [X.501], as used by the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) [Roadmap]. - The Directory is "a collection of open systems cooperating to provide directory services" [X.500]. The information held in the Directory is collectively known as the Directory Information Base (DIB). A @@ -149,126 +136,107 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-12 24 October 2004 servers (or Directory System Agents (DSA)). A server holds a fragment of the DIB. - The DIB contains two classes of information: - 1) user information (e.g., information provided and administrated by users). Section 2 describes the Model of User Information. - 2) administrative and operational information (e.g., information used to administer and/or operate the directory). Section 3 describes the model of Directory Administrative and Operational Information. - These two models, referred to as the generic Directory Information Models, describe how information is represented in the Directory. These generic models provide a framework for other information models. Section 4 discusses the subschema information model and subschema discovery. Section 5 discusses the DSA (Server) Informational Model. - Other X.500 information models, such as access control distribution knowledge, and replication knowledge information models, may be adapted for use in LDAP. Specification of how these models apply to LDAP is left to future documents. - 1.1. Relationship to Other LDAP Specifications - This document is a integral part of the LDAP technical specification [Roadmap] which obsoletes the previously defined LDAP technical - Zeilenga LDAP Models [Page 3] -INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-12 24 October 2004 - + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-14 21 February 2005 specification, RFC 3377, in its entirety. - This document obsoletes RFC 2251 sections 3.2 and 3.4, as well as - portions of sections 4 and 6. Appendix A.1 summaries changes to these - sections. The remainder of RFC 2251 is obsoleted by the [Protocol], - [AuthMeth], and [Roadmap] documents. - + portions of sections 4 and 6. Appendix A.1 summarizes changes to + these sections. The remainder of RFC 2251 is obsoleted by the + [Protocol], [AuthMeth], and [Roadmap] documents. This document obsoletes RFC 2252 sections 4, 5 and 7. Appendix A.2 - summaries changes to these sections. The remainder of RFC 2252 is + summarizes changes to these sections. The remainder of RFC 2252 is obsoleted by [Syntaxes]. - This document obsoletes RFC 2256 sections 5.1, 5.2, 7.1 and 7.2. Appendix A.3 summarizes changes to these sections. The remainder of RFC 2256 is obsoleted by [Schema] and [Syntaxes]. + This document obsoletes RFC 3674 in its entirety. Appendix A.4 + summarizes changes since RFC 3674. 1.2. Relationship to X.501 - This document includes material, with and without adaptation, from - [X.501]. The material in this document takes precedence over that in - [X.501]. - + [X.501] as necessary to describe this protocol. These adaptations + (and any other differences herein) apply to this protocol, and only + this protocol. 1.3. Conventions - The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119]. - Schema definitions are provided using LDAP description formats (as defined in Section 4.1). Definitions provided here are formatted (line wrapped) for readability. Matching rules and LDAP syntaxes referenced in these definitions are specified in [Syntaxes]. - 1.4. Common ABNF Productions - A number of syntaxes in this document are described using Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF) [RFC2234]. These syntaxes (as well as a number of syntaxes defined in other documents) rely on the following common productions: - keystring = leadkeychar *keychar leadkeychar = ALPHA - keychar = ALPHA / DIGIT / HYPHEN - number = DIGIT / ( LDIGIT 1*DIGIT ) - - - ALPHA = %x41-5A / %x61-7A ; "A"-"Z" / "a"-"z" - Zeilenga LDAP Models [Page 4] -INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-12 24 October 2004 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-14 21 February 2005 + keychar = ALPHA / DIGIT / HYPHEN + number = DIGIT / ( LDIGIT 1*DIGIT ) + ALPHA = %x41-5A / %x61-7A ; "A"-"Z" / "a"-"z" DIGIT = %x30 / LDIGIT ; "0"-"9" LDIGIT = %x31-39 ; "1"-"9" HEX = DIGIT / %x41-46 / %x61-66 ; "0"-"9" / "A"-"F" / "a"-"f" - SP = 1*SPACE ; one or more " " WSP = 0*SPACE ; zero or more " " - NULL = %x00 ; null (0) SPACE = %x20 ; space (" ") DQUOTE = %x22 ; quote (""") @@ -290,7 +258,6 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-12 24 October 2004 LCURLY = %x7B ; left curly brace "{" RCURLY = %x7D ; right curly brace "}" - ; Any UTF-8 [UTF-8] encoded Unicode [Unicode] character UTF8 = UTF1 / UTFMB UTFMB = UTF2 / UTF3 / UTF4 @@ -302,41 +269,32 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-12 24 October 2004 UTF4 = %xF0 %x90-BF 2(UTF0) / %xF1-F3 3(UTF0) / %xF4 %x80-8F 2(UTF0) - OCTET = %x00-FF ; Any octet (8-bit data unit) - Object identifiers (OIDs) [X.680] are represented in LDAP using a dot-decimal format conforming to the ABNF: - numericoid = number 1*( DOT number ) - - - Short names, also known as descriptors, are used as more readable - aliases for object identifiers. Short names are case insensitive and - - Zeilenga LDAP Models [Page 5] -INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-12 24 October 2004 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-14 21 February 2005 + numericoid = number 1*( DOT number ) + Short names, also known as descriptors, are used as more readable + aliases for object identifiers. Short names are case insensitive and conform to the ABNF: - descr = keystring - Where either an object identifier or a short name may be specified, the following production is used: - oid = descr / numericoid - While the form is generally preferred when the usage is restricted to short names referring to object identifiers which identify like kinds of objects (e.g., attribute type descriptions, @@ -345,26 +303,20 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-12 24 October 2004 identify multiple kinds of objects or when an unambiguous short name (descriptor) is not available. - Implementations SHOULD treat short names (descriptors) used in an ambiguous manner (as discussed above) as unrecognized. - Short Names (descriptors) are discussed further in Section 6.2. - 2. Model of Directory User Information - As [X.501] states: - The purpose of the Directory is to hold, and provide access to, information about objects of interest (objects) in some 'world'. An object can be anything which is identifiable (can be named). - An object class is an identified family of objects, or conceivable objects, which share certain characteristics. Every object belongs to at least one class. An object class may be a subclass of other @@ -373,30 +325,25 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-12 24 October 2004 the superclasses. There may be subclasses of subclasses, etc., to an arbitrary depth. - A directory entry, a named collection of information, is the basic unit of information held in the Directory. There are multiple kinds of directory entries. - An object entry represents a particular object. An alias entry - provides alternative naming. A subentry holds administrative and/or - operational information. - - - The set of entries representing the DIB are organized hierarchically - Zeilenga LDAP Models [Page 6] -INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-12 24 October 2004 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-14 21 February 2005 + provides alternative naming. A subentry holds administrative and/or + operational information. + The set of entries representing the DIB are organized hierarchically in a tree structure known as the Directory Information Tree (DIT). - Section 2.1 describes the Directory Information Tree Section 2.2 discusses the structure of entries. Section 2.3 discusses naming of entries. @@ -405,97 +352,87 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-12 24 October 2004 Section 2.6 discusses alias entries. - 2.1. The Directory Information Tree - As noted above, the DIB is composed of a set of entries organized hierarchically in a tree structure known as the Directory Information Tree (DIT). Specifically, a tree where vertices are the entries. - The arcs between vertices define relations between entries. If an arc exists from X to Y, then the entry at X is the immediate superior of Y and Y is the immediate subordinate of X. An entry's superiors are the entry's immediate superior and its superiors. An entry's subordinates are all of its immediate subordinates and their subordinates. - Similarly, the superior/subordinate relationship between object entries can be used to derive a relation between the objects they represent. DIT structure rules can be used to govern relationships between objects. - Note: An entry's immediate superior is also known as the entry's parent and an entry's immediate subordinate is also known as the entry's child. Entries which have the same parent are known as siblings. - 2.2. Structure of an Entry - An entry consists of a set of attributes which hold information about the object which the entry represents. Some attributes represent user information and are called user attributes. Other attributes represent operational and/or administrative information and are called operational attributes. - An attribute is an attribute description (a type and zero or more options) with one or more associated values. An attribute is often referred to by its attribute description. For example, the - 'givenName' attribute is the attribute which consists of the attribute - description 'givenName' (the 'givenName' attribute type [Schema] and - zero options) and one or more associated values. - - Zeilenga LDAP Models [Page 7] -INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-12 24 October 2004 + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-14 21 February 2005 + 'givenName' attribute is the attribute which consists of the attribute + description 'givenName' (the 'givenName' attribute type [Schema] and + zero options) and one or more associated values. The attribute type governs whether the attribute can have multiple values, the syntax and matching rules used to construct and compare values of that attribute, and other functions. Options indicate subtypes and other functions. - Attribute values conform to the defined syntax of the attribute type. - No two values of an attribute may be equivalent. Two values are - considered equivalent only if they would match according to the - equality matching rule of the attribute type. If the attribute type + considered equivalent if and only if they would match according to the + equality matching rule of the attribute type or, if the attribute type is defined with no equality matching rule, two values are equivalent if and only if they are identical. (See 2.5.1 for other restrictions.) - For example, a 'givenName' attribute can have more than one value, they must be Directory Strings, and they are case insensitive. A 'givenName' attribute cannot hold both "John" and "JOHN" as these are equivalent values per the equality matching rule of the attribute type. + Additionally, no attribute is to have a value which is not equivalent + to itself. For example, the 'givenName' attribute cannot have as a + value a directory string which includes the REPLACEMENT CHARACTER + (U+FFFD) code point as matching involving that directory string is + Undefined per this attribute's equality matching rule. When an attribute is used for naming of the entry, one and only one value of the attribute is used in forming the Relative Distinguished Name. This value is known as a distinguished value. - 2.3. Naming of Entries - 2.3.1. Relative Distinguished Names - Each entry is named relative to its immediate superior. This relative name, known as its Relative Distinguished Name (RDN) [X.501], is composed of an unordered set of one or more attribute value assertions @@ -503,87 +440,78 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-12 24 October 2004 attribute value. These AVAs are chosen to match attribute values (each a distinguished value) of the entry. - An entry's relative distinguished name must be unique among all immediate subordinates of the entry's immediate superior (i.e., all - siblings). - The following are examples of string representations of RDNs [LDAPDN]: +Zeilenga LDAP Models [Page 8] + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-14 21 February 2005 + + + siblings). + + The following are examples of string representations of RDNs [LDAPDN]: UID=12345 OU=Engineering CN=Kurt Zeilenga+L=Redwood Shores - The last is an example of a multi-valued RDN. That is, an RDN composed of multiple AVAs. - - -Zeilenga LDAP Models [Page 8] -INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-12 24 October 2004 - - - 2.3.2. Distinguished Names - An entry's fully qualified name, known as its Distinguished Name (DN) [X.501], is the concatenation of its RDN and its immediate superior's DN. A Distinguished Name unambiguously refers to an entry in the tree. The following are examples of string representations of DNs [LDAPDN]: - UID=nobody@example.com,DC=example,DC=com CN=John Smith,OU=Sales,O=ACME Limited,L=Moab,ST=Utah,C=US - 2.3.3. Alias Names - An alias, or alias name, is "an name for an object, provided by the use of alias entries" [X.501]. Alias entries are described in Section 2.6. - 2.4. Object Classes - An object class is "an identified family of objects (or conceivable objects) which share certain characteristics" [X.501]. - As defined in [X.501]: - Object classes are used in the Directory for a number of purposes: - - describing and categorising objects and the entries that correspond to these objects; - - where appropriate, controlling the operation of the Directory; - - regulating, in conjunction with DIT structure rule specifications, the position of entries in the DIT; + + +Zeilenga LDAP Models [Page 9] + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-14 21 February 2005 + + - regulating, in conjunction with DIT content rule specifications, the attributes that are contained in entries; - - identifying classes of entry that are to be associated with a particular policy by the appropriate administrative authority. - An object class (a subclass) may be derived from an object class (its direct superclass) which is itself derived from an even more generic object class. For structural object classes, this process @@ -591,19 +519,10 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-12 24 October 2004 2.4.1). An ordered set of superclasses up to the most superior object class of an object class is its superclass chain. - - - -Zeilenga LDAP Models [Page 9] -INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-12 24 October 2004 - - - An object class may be derived from two or more direct superclasses (superclasses not part of the same superclass chain). This feature of subclassing is termed multiple inheritance. - Each object class identifies the set of attributes required to be present in entries belonging to the class and the set of attributes allowed to be present in entries belonging to the class. As an entry @@ -613,202 +532,161 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-12 24 October 2004 attribute allowed by its superclass as being required. If an attribute is a member of both sets, it is required to be present. - Each object class is defined to be one of three kinds of object classes: Abstract, Structural, or Auxiliary. - Each object class is identified by an object identifier (OID) and, optionally, one or more short names (descriptors). - 2.4.1. Abstract Object Classes - An abstract object class, as the name implies, provides a base of characteristics from which other object classes can be defined to inherit from. An entry cannot belong to an abstract object class unless it belongs to a structural or auxiliary class which inherits from that abstract class. - Abstract object classes can not derive from structural nor auxiliary object classes. - All structural object classes derive (directly or indirectly) from the 'top' abstract object class. Auxiliary object classes do not necessarily derive from 'top'. + + +Zeilenga LDAP Models [Page 10] + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-14 21 February 2005 + + The following is the object class definition (see Section 4.1.1) for the 'top' object class: - ( 2.5.6.0 NAME 'top' ABSTRACT MUST objectClass ) - All entries belong to the 'top' abstract object class. - 2.4.2. Structural Object Classes - As stated in [X.501]: - An object class defined for use in the structural specification of - - - - -Zeilenga LDAP Models [Page 10] -INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-12 24 October 2004 - - - the DIT is termed a structural object class. Structural object classes are used in the definition of the structure of the names of the objects for compliant entries. - An object or alias entry is characterised by precisely one structural object class superclass chain which has a single structural object class as the most subordinate object class. This structural object class is referred to as the structural object class of the entry. - Structural object classes are related to associated entries: - - an entry conforming to a structural object class shall represent the real-world object constrained by the object class; - - DIT structure rules only refer to structural object classes; the structural object class of an entry is used to specify the position of the entry in the DIT; - - the structural object class of an entry is used, along with an associated DIT content rule, to control the content of an entry. - The structural object class of an entry shall not be changed. - Each structural object class is a (direct or indirect) subclass of the 'top' abstract object class. - Structural object classes cannot subclass auxiliary object classes. - Each entry is said to belong to its structural object class as well as all classes in its structural object class's superclass chain. -2.4.3. Auxiliary Object Classes +Zeilenga LDAP Models [Page 11] + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-14 21 February 2005 + + +2.4.3. Auxiliary Object Classes + Auxiliary object classes are used to augment the characteristics of entries. They are commonly used to augment the sets of attributes required and allowed to be present in an entry. They can be used to describe entries or classes of entries. - Auxiliary object classes cannot subclass structural object classes. - An entry can belong to any subset of the set of auxiliary object classes allowed by the DIT content rule associated with the structural object class of the entry. If no DIT content rule is associated with the structural object class of the entry, the entry cannot belong to - - - - -Zeilenga LDAP Models [Page 11] -INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-12 24 October 2004 - - - any auxiliary object class. - The set of auxiliary object classes which an entry belongs to can change over time. - 2.5. Attribute Descriptions - An attribute description is composed of an attribute type (see Section 2.5.1) and a set of zero or more attribute options (see Section 2.5.2). - An attribute description is represented by the ABNF: - attributedescription = attributetype options attributetype = oid options = *( SEMI option ) option = 1*keychar - where identifies the attribute type and each