From 35cbe6fe84d727b04e116451f971d8f6d66ccfd1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kurt Zeilenga Date: Mon, 5 Jul 2004 21:44:12 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] fix typos in last commit --- servers/slapd/backend.c | 24 ++++++++++++------------ servers/slapd/bind.c | 9 ++++++--- servers/slapd/result.c | 1 + 3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/servers/slapd/backend.c b/servers/slapd/backend.c index 3b1ccd6dea..b10fbaae5c 100644 --- a/servers/slapd/backend.c +++ b/servers/slapd/backend.c @@ -1072,15 +1072,15 @@ backend_check_restrictions( if( op->o_sasl_ssf < ssf->sss_sasl ) { rs->sr_text = op->o_sasl_ssf - : "stronger SASL confidentiality required" - ? "SASL confidentiality required"; + ? "stronger SASL confidentiality required" + : "SASL confidentiality required"; return rs->sr_err; } if( op->o_ssf < ssf->sss_ssf ) { rs->sr_text = op->o_ssf - : "stronger confidentiality required" - ? "confidentiality required"; + ? "stronger confidentiality required" + : "confidentiality required"; return rs->sr_err; } } @@ -1088,29 +1088,29 @@ backend_check_restrictions( if( updateop ) { if( op->o_transport_ssf < ssf->sss_update_transport ) { rs->sr_text = op->o_transport_ssf - : "stronger transport confidentiality required for update" - ? "transport confidentiality required for update"; + ? "stronger transport confidentiality required for update" + : "transport confidentiality required for update"; return rs->sr_err; } if( op->o_tls_ssf < ssf->sss_update_tls ) { rs->sr_text = op->o_tls_ssf - : "stronger TLS confidentiality required for update" - ? "TLS confidentiality required for update"; + ? "stronger TLS confidentiality required for update" + : "TLS confidentiality required for update"; return rs->sr_err; } if( op->o_sasl_ssf < ssf->sss_update_sasl ) { rs->sr_text = op->o_sasl_ssf - : "stronger SASL confidentiality required for update" - ? "SASL confidentiality required for update"; + ? "stronger SASL confidentiality required for update" + : "SASL confidentiality required for update"; return rs->sr_err; } if( op->o_ssf < ssf->sss_update_ssf ) { rs->sr_text = op->o_ssf - : "stronger confidentiality required for update" - ? "confidentiality required for update"; + ? "stronger confidentiality required for update" + : "confidentiality required for update"; return rs->sr_err; } diff --git a/servers/slapd/bind.c b/servers/slapd/bind.c index 57e164751d..24ce7de52c 100644 --- a/servers/slapd/bind.c +++ b/servers/slapd/bind.c @@ -369,9 +369,11 @@ do_bind( slapi_int_pblock_set_operation( pb, op ); slapi_pblock_set( pb, SLAPI_BIND_TARGET, (void *)dn.bv_val ); slapi_pblock_set( pb, SLAPI_BIND_METHOD, (void *)op->orb_method ); - slapi_pblock_set( pb, SLAPI_BIND_CREDENTIALS, (void *)&op->orb_cred ); + slapi_pblock_set( pb, + SLAPI_BIND_CREDENTIALS, (void *)&op->orb_cred ); slapi_pblock_set( pb, SLAPI_MANAGEDSAIT, (void *)(0) ); - (void) slapi_int_call_plugins( op->o_bd, SLAPI_PLUGIN_POST_BIND_FN, pb ); + (void) slapi_int_call_plugins( op->o_bd, + SLAPI_PLUGIN_POST_BIND_FN, pb ); } #endif /* LDAP_SLAPI */ @@ -620,7 +622,8 @@ do_bind( Statslog( LDAP_DEBUG_STATS, "conn=%lu op=%lu BIND dn=\"%s\" mech=%s (SLAPI) ssf=0\n", op->o_connid, op->o_opid, - op->o_conn->c_dn.bv_val ? op->o_conn->c_dn.bv_val : "", + op->o_conn->c_dn.bv_val + ? op->o_conn->c_dn.bv_val : "", mech.bv_val, 0 ); ldap_pvt_thread_mutex_unlock( &op->o_conn->c_mutex ); } diff --git a/servers/slapd/result.c b/servers/slapd/result.c index a15737129c..3ae8420da6 100644 --- a/servers/slapd/result.c +++ b/servers/slapd/result.c @@ -1346,6 +1346,7 @@ error_return:; * should set it back so that the cleanup functions know * what they're doing. */ + /* FIXME2: I'm thinking this should FOLLOW cleanup callbacks */ if ( op->o_tag == LDAP_REQ_SEARCH && rs->sr_type == REP_SEARCH && rs->sr_entry && (rs->sr_flags & REP_ENTRY_MUSTBEFREED) ) -- 2.39.5