From 5300d5e52201af89f711e2f64e38fbf941e7e0b8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kurt Zeilenga Date: Wed, 18 Aug 1999 20:13:30 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] draft-ietf-ldapext-authmeth-04.txt --- doc/drafts/draft-ietf-ldapext-authmeth-xx.txt | 784 ++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 784 insertions(+) create mode 100644 doc/drafts/draft-ietf-ldapext-authmeth-xx.txt diff --git a/doc/drafts/draft-ietf-ldapext-authmeth-xx.txt b/doc/drafts/draft-ietf-ldapext-authmeth-xx.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..62102e372b --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/drafts/draft-ietf-ldapext-authmeth-xx.txt @@ -0,0 +1,784 @@ + +Network Working Group M. Wahl +INTERNET-DRAFT Innosoft International, Inc. + H. Alvestrand + MaXware AS + J. Hodges + Stanford University + RL "Bob" Morgan + Stanford University +Expires in six months from June 21, 1999 + + + Authentication Methods for LDAP + + +1. Status of this Memo + + This document is an Internet-Draft. Internet-Drafts are working + documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its + areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also + distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. + + Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six + months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other + documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts + as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in + progress." + + To view the entire list of current Internet-Drafts, please check + the "1id-abstracts.txt" listing contained in the Internet-Drafts + Shadow Directories on ftp.is.co.za (Africa), ftp.nordu.net + (Northern Europe), ftp.nis.garr.it (Southern Europe), munnari.oz.au + (Pacific Rim), ftp.ietf.org (US East Coast), or ftp.isi.edu + (US West Coast). + +2. Abstract + + This document specifies particular combinations of security + mechanisms which are required and recommended in LDAP [1] + implementations. + +3. Introduction + + LDAP version 3 is a powerful access protocol for directories. + + It offers means of searching, fetching and manipulating directory + content, and ways to access a rich set of security functions. + + In order to function for the best of the Internet, it is vital + that these security functions be interoperable; therefore there + has to be a minimum subset of security functions that is common to + all implementations that claim LDAPv3 conformance. + + + +Wahl, Alvestrand, Hodges, Morgan Page 1 + +INTERNET-DRAFT Authentication Methods for LDAP June 1999 + + Basic threats to an LDAP directory service include: + + (1) Unauthorized access to data via data-fetching operations, + + (2) Unauthorized access to reusable client authentication + information by monitoring others' access, + + (3) Unauthorized access to data by monitoring others' access, + + (4) Unauthorized modification of data, + + (5) Unauthorized modification of configuration, + + (6) Unauthorized or excessive use of resources (denial of + service), and + + (7) Spoofing of directory: Tricking a client into believing + that information came from the directory when in fact it + did not, either by modifying data in transit or misdirecting + the client's connection. + + Threats (1), (4), (5) and (6) are due to hostile clients. Threats + (2), (3) and (7) are due to hostile agents on the path between client + and server, or posing as a server. + + The LDAP protocol suite can be protected with the following + security mechanisms: + + (1) Client authentication by means of the SASL [2] mechanism set, + possibly backed by the TLS credentials exchange mechanism, + + (2) Client authorization by means of access control based on + the requestor's authenticated identity, + + (3) Data integrity protection by means of the TLS protocol or + data-integrity SASL mechanisms, + + (4) Protection against snooping by means of the TLS protocol + or data-encrypting SASL mechanisms, + + (5) Resource limitation by means of administrative limits on + service controls, and + + (6) Server authentication by means of the TLS protocol or SASL + mechanism. + + At the moment, imposition of access controls is done by means + outside the scope of the LDAP protocol. + + In this document, the term "user" represents any application which + is an LDAP client using the directory to retrieve or store information. + +Wahl, Alvestrand, Hodges, Morgan Page 2 + +INTERNET-DRAFT Authentication Methods for LDAP June 1999 + + The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", + "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in + this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [3]. + +4. Example deployment scenarios + + The following scenarios are typical for LDAP directories on the + Internet, and have different security requirements. (In the + following, "sensitive" means data that will cause real damage to + the owner if revealed; there may be data that is protected but + not sensitive). This is not intended to be a comprehensive list, + other scenarios are possible, especially on physically protected + networks. + + (1) A read-only directory, containing no sensitive data, + accessible to "anyone", and TCP connection hijacking + or IP spoofing is not a problem. This directory requires + no security functions except administrative service limits. + + (2) A read-only directory containing no sensitive data; read + access is granted based on identity. TCP connection + hijacking is not currently a problem. This scenario requires + a secure authentication function. + + (3) A read-only directory containing no sensitive data; and + the client needs to ensure that the directory data is + authenticated by the server and not modified while being + returned from the server. + + (4) A read-write directory, containing no sensitive data; read + access is available to "anyone", update access to properly + authorized persons. TCP connection hijacking is not + currently a problem. This scenario requires a secure + authentication function. + + (5) A directory containing sensitive data. This scenario + requires session confidentiality protection AND secure + authentication. + +5. Authentication and Authorization: Definitions and Concepts + + This section defines basic terms, concepts, and interrelationships + regarding authentication, authorization, credentials, and identity. + These concepts are used in describing how various security + approaches are utilized in client authentication and authorization. + + + + + + + +Wahl, Alvestrand, Hodges, Morgan Page 3 + +INTERNET-DRAFT Authentication Methods for LDAP June 1999 + +5.1. Access Control Policy + + An access control policy is a set of rules defining the protection + of resources, generally in terms of the capabilities of persons or + other entities accessing those resources. A common expression of an + access control policy is an access control list. Security objects + and mechanisms, such as those described here, enable the expression of + access control policies and their enforcement. Access control + policies are typically expressed in terms of access control attributes + as described below. + +5.2. Access Control Factors + + A request, when it is being processed by a server, may be associated + with a wide variety of security-related factors (section 4.2 of [1]). + The server uses these factors to determine whether and how to process + the request. These are called access control factors (ACFs). They + might include source IP address, encryption strength, the type of + operation being requested, time of day, etc. Some factors may be + specific to the request itself, others may be associated with the + connection via which the request is transmitted, others (e.g. time of + day) may be "environmental". + + Access control policies are expressed in terms of access control + factors. E.g., a request having ACFs i,j,k can perform operation Y + on resource Z. The set of ACFs that a server makes available for such + expressions is implementation-specific. + +5.3. Authentication, Credentials, Identity + + Authentication credentials are the evidence supplied by one party to + another, asserting the identity of the supplying party (e.g. a user) + who is attempting to establish an association with the other party + (typically a server). Authentication is the process of generating, + transmitting, and verifying these credentials and thus the identity + they assert. An authentication identity is the name presented in a + credential. + + There are many forms of authentication credentials -- the form used + depends upon the particular authentication mechanism negotiated by the + parties. For example: X.509 certificates, Kerberos tickets, simple + identity and password pairs. Note that an authentication mechanism may + constrain the form of authentication identities used with it. + +5.4. Authorization Identity + + An authorization identity is one kind of access control factor. It is + the name of the user or other entity that requests that operations be + performed. Access control policies are often expressed in terms of + authorization identities; e.g., entity X can perform operation Y on + resource Z. + +Wahl, Alvestrand, Hodges, Morgan Page 4 + +INTERNET-DRAFT Authentication Methods for LDAP June 1999 + + The authorization identity bound to an association is often exactly the + same as the authentication identity presented by the client, but it may + be different. SASL allows clients to specify an authorization identity + distinct from the authentication identity asserted by the client's + credentials. This permits agents such as proxy servers to authenticate + using their own credentials, yet request the access privileges of the + identity for which they are proxying [2]. Also, the form of + authentication identity supplied by a service like TLS may not + correspond to the authorization identities used to express a server's + access control policy, requiring a server-specific mapping to be done. + The method by which a server composes and validates an authorization + identity from the authentication credentials supplied by a client is + implementation-specific. + +6. Required security mechanisms + + It is clear that allowing any implementation, faced with the above + requirements, to pick and choose among the possible alternatives + is not a strategy that is likely to lead to interoperability. In + the absence of mandates, clients will be written that do not + support any security function supported by the server, or worse, + support only mechanisms like cleartext passwords that provide + clearly inadequate security. + + Active intermediary attacks are the most difficult for an attacker + to perform, and for an implementation to protect against. Methods + that protect only against hostile client and passive eavesdropping + attacks are useful in situations where the cost of protection + against active intermediary attacks is not justified based on the + perceived risk of active intermediary attacks. + + Given the presence of the Directory, there is a strong desire to + see mechanisms where identities take the form of a Distinguished + Name and authentication data can be stored in the directory; this + means that either this data is useless for faking authentication + (like the Unix "/etc/passwd" file format used to be), or its + content is never passed across the wire unprotected - that is, + it's either updated outside the protocol or it is only updated in + sessions well protected against snooping. It is also desirable + to allow authentication methods to carry authorization identities + based on existing forms of user identities for backwards compatibility + with non-LDAP-based authentication services. + + Therefore, the following implementation conformance requirements + are in place: + + (1) For a read-only, public directory, anonymous authentication, + described in section 7, can be used. + + + + +Wahl, Alvestrand, Hodges, Morgan Page 5 + +INTERNET-DRAFT Authentication Methods for LDAP June 1999 + + (2) Implementations providing password-based authenticated access + MUST support authentication using Digest, as described in + section 8.1. This provides client authentication with + protection against passive eavesdropping attacks, but does + not provide protection against active intermediary attacks. + + (3) For a directory needing session protection and + authentication, the Start TLS extended operation, and either + the simple authentication choice or the SASL EXTERNAL + mechanism, are to be used together. Implementations SHOULD + support authentication with a password as described in + section 8.2, and SHOULD support authentication with a + certificate as described in section 9.1. Together, these + can provide integrity and disclosure protection of + transmitted data, and authentication of client and server, + including protection against active intermediary attacks. + + If TLS is negotated, the client MUST discard all information about + the server fetched prior to the TLS negotiation. In particular, the + value of supportedSASLMechanisms MAY be different after TLS has been + negotiated (specifically, the EXTERNAL mechanism or the proposed + PLAIN mechanism are likely to only be listed after a TLS negotiation + has been performed). + + If a SASL security layer is negotiated, the client MUST discard all + information about the server fetched prior to SASL. In particular, if + the client is configured to support multiple SASL mechanisms, it SHOULD + fetch supportedSASLMechanisms both before and after the SASL security + layer is negotiated and verify that the value has not changed after the + SASL security layer was negotiated. This detects active attacks which + remove supported SASL mechanisms from the supportedSASLMechanisms list. + +7. Anonymous authentication + + Directory operations which modify entries or access protected + attributes or entries generally require client authentication. + Clients which do not intend to perform any of these operations + typically use anonymous authentication. + + LDAP implementations MUST support anonymous authentication, as + defined in section 7.1. + + LDAP implementations MAY support anonymous authentication with TLS, + as defined in section 7.2. + + While there MAY be access control restrictions to prevent access to + directory entries, an LDAP server SHOULD allow an anonymously-bound + client to retrieve the supportedSASLMechanisms attribute of the root + DSE. + + + +Wahl, Alvestrand, Hodges, Morgan Page 6 + +INTERNET-DRAFT Authentication Methods for LDAP June 1999 + + An LDAP server MAY use other information about the client provided + by the lower layers or external means to grant or deny access even + to anonymously authenticated clients. + +7.1. Anonymous authentication procedure + + An LDAP client which has not successfully completed a bind operation + on a connection is anonymously authenticated. + + An LDAP client MAY also specify anonymous authentication in a bind + request by using a zero-length OCTET STRING with the simple + authentication choice. + +7.2. Anonymous authentication and TLS + + An LDAP client MAY use the Start TLS operation [5] to negotiate the + use of TLS security [6]. If the client has not bound beforehand, + then until the client uses the EXTERNAL SASL mechanism to negotiate + the recognition of the client's certificate, the client is + anonymously authenticated. + + Recommendations on TLS ciphersuites are given in section 12. + + An LDAP server which requests that clients provide their certificate + during TLS negotiation MAY use a local security policy to determine + whether to successfully complete TLS negotiation if the client did not + present a certificate which could be validated. + +8. Password-based authentication + + LDAP implementations MUST support authentication with a password using + the DIGEST-MD5 mechanism for password protection, as defined in section + 8.1. + + LDAP implementations SHOULD support authentication with the "simple" + password choice when the connection is protected against eavesdropping + using TLS, as defined in section 8.2. + +8.1. Digest authentication + + An LDAP client MAY determine whether the server supports this + mechanism by performing a search request on the root DSE, requesting + the supportedSASLMechanisms attribute, and checking whether the + string "DIGEST-MD5" is present as a value of this attribute. + + In the first stage of authentication, when the client is performing + an "initial authentication" as defined in section 2.1 of [4], the + client sends a bind request in which the version number is 3, the + authentication choice is sasl, the sasl mechanism name is "DIGEST-MD5", + and the credentials are absent. The client then waits for a response + from the server to this request. + +Wahl, Alvestrand, Hodges, Morgan Page 7 + +INTERNET-DRAFT Authentication Methods for LDAP June 1999 + + The server will respond with a bind response in which the resultCode + is saslBindInProgress, and the serverSaslCreds field is present. The + contents of this field is a string defined by "digest-challenge" in + section 2.1.1 of [4]. The server SHOULD include a realm indication and + MUST indicate support for UTF-8. + + The client will send a bind request with a distinct mesage id, in which + the version number is 3, the authentication choice is sasl, the sasl + mechanism name is "DIGEST-MD5", and the credentials contain the string + defined by "digest-response" in section 2.1.2 of [4]. The serv-type + is "ldap". + + The server will respond with a bind response in which the resultCode + is either success, or an error indication. If the authentication is + successful and the server does not support subsequent authentication, + then the credentials field is absent. If the authentication is + successful and the server supports subsequent authentication, then + the crendentials field contains the string defined by "response-auth" + in section 2.1.3 of [4]. Support for subsequent authentication is + OPTIONAL in clients and servers. + +8.2. "simple" authentication choice under TLS encryption + + A user who has a directory entry containing a userPassword attribute + MAY authenticate to the directory by performing a simple password + bind sequence following the negotiation of a TLS ciphersuite + providing connection confidentiality [6]. + + The client will use the Start TLS operation [5] to negotiate the + use of TLS security [6] on the connection to the LDAP server. The + client need not have bound to the directory beforehand. + + For this authentication procedure to be successful, the client and + server MUST negotiate a ciphersuite which contains a bulk encryption + algorithm of appropriate strength. Recommendations on cipher + suites are given in section 12. + + Following the successful completion of TLS negotiation, the client + MUST send an LDAP bind request with the version number of 3, the + name field containing the name of the user's entry, and the "simple" + authentication choice, containing a password. + + The server will, for each value of the userPassword attribute in + the named user's entry, compare these for case-sensitive equality + with the client's presented password. If there is a match, then the + server will respond with resultCode success, otherwise the server will + respond with resultCode invalidCredentials. + + + + + +Wahl, Alvestrand, Hodges, Morgan Page 8 + +INTERNET-DRAFT Authentication Methods for LDAP June 1999 + +8.3. Other authentication choices with TLS + + It is also possible to perform a SASL authentication exchange of + passwords following the negotiation of TLS. In this case the + client and server need not negotiate a ciphersuite which provides + confidentiality if the only service required is data integrity. + +9. Certificate-based authentication + + LDAP implementations SHOULD support authentication via a client + certificate in TLS, as defined in section 9.1. + +9.1. Certificate-based authentication with TLS + + A user who has a public/private key pair in which the public key has + been signed by a Certification Authority may use this key pair to + authenticate to the directory server if the user's certificate is + requested by the server. The user's certificate subject field + SHOULD be the name of the user's directory entry, and the + Certification Authority must be sufficiently trusted by the + directory server to have issued the certificate in order that the + server can process the certificate. The means by which servers + validate certificate paths is outside the scope of this document. + + A server MAY support mappings for certificates in which the subject + field name is different from the name of the user's directory entry. + A server which supports mappings of names MUST be capable of being + configured to support certificates for which no mapping is required. + + The client will use the Start TLS operation [5] to negotiate the + use of TLS security [6] on the connection to the LDAP server. The + client need not have bound to the directory beforehand. + + In the TLS negotiation, the server MUST request a certificate. The + client will provide its certificate to the server, and MUST perform + a private key-based encryption, proving it has it private key + associated with the certificate. + + As deployments will require protection of sensitive data in transit, + the client and server MUST negotiate a ciphersuite which contains a + bulk encryption algorithm of appropriate strength. Recommendations + of cipher suites are given in section 12. + + The server MUST verify that the client's certificate is valid. + The server will normally check that the certificate is issued by a + known CA, and that none of the certificates on the client's + certificate chain are invalid or revoked. There are several + procedures by which the server can perform these checks. + + Following the successful completion of TLS negotiation, the client + will send an LDAP bind request with the SASL "EXTERNAL" mechanism. + +Wahl, Alvestrand, Hodges, Morgan Page 9 + +INTERNET-DRAFT Authentication Methods for LDAP June 1999 + +10. Other mechanisms + + The LDAP "simple" authentication choice is not suitable for + authentication on the Internet where there is no network or transport + layer confidentiality. + + As LDAP includes a native anonymous and plaintext authentication + methods, the "ANONYMOUS" and "PLAIN" SASL mechanisms are not used + with LDAP. If an authorization identity of a form different from + a DN is requested by the client, a mechanism that protects the + password in transit SHOULD be used. + + The following SASL-based mechanisms are not considered in this + document: KERBEROS_V4, GSSAPI and SKEY. + + The "EXTERNAL" SASL mechanism can be used to request the LDAP server + make use of security credentials exchanged by a lower layer. If a + TLS session has not been established between the client and server + prior to making the SASL EXTERNAL Bind request and there is no other + external source of authentication credentials (e.g. IP-level + security [8]), or if, during the process of establishing the + TLS session, the server did not request the client's authentication + credentials, the SASL EXTERNAL bind MUST fail with a result code of + inappropriateAuthentication. Any authentication identity and + authorization identity, as well as TLS connection, which were in + effect prior to making the Bind request, MUST remain in force. + +11. Authorization Identity + + The authorization identity is carried as part of the SASL credentials + field in the LDAP Bind request and response. + + When the "EXTERNAL" mechanism is being negotiated, if the + credentials field is present, it contains an authorization identity + of the authzId form described below. + + Other mechanisms define the location of the authorization + identity in the credentials field. + + The authorization identity is a string in the UTF-8 character set, + corresponding to the following ABNF [7]: + + ; Specific predefined authorization (authz) id schemes are + ; defined below -- new schemes may be defined in the future. + + authzId = dnAuthzId / uAuthzId + + ; distinguished-name-based authz id. + dnAuthzId = "dn:" dn + dn = utf8string ; with syntax defined in RFC 2253 + + +Wahl, Alvestrand, Hodges, Morgan Page 10 + +INTERNET-DRAFT Authentication Methods for LDAP June 1999 + + ; unspecified userid, UTF-8 encoded. + uAuthzId = "u:" userid + userid = utf8string ; syntax unspecified + + A utf8string is defined to be the UTF-8 encoding of one or more + ISO 10646 characters. + + All servers which support the storage of authentication credentials, + such as passwords or certificates, in the directory MUST support the + dnAuthzId choice. + + The uAuthzId choice allows for compatibility with client applications + which wish to authenticate to a local directory but do not know their + own Distinguished Name or have a directory entry. The format of the + string is defined as only a sequence of UTF-8 encoded ISO 10646 + characters, and further interpretation is subject to prior agreement + between the client and server. + + For example, the userid could identify a user of a specific directory + service, or be a login name or the local-part of an RFC 822 email + address. In general a uAuthzId MUST NOT be assumed to be globally + unique. + + Additional authorization identity schemes MAY be defined in future + versions of this document. + +12. TLS Ciphersuites + + The following ciphersuites defined in [6] MUST NOT be used for + confidentiality protection of passwords or data: + + TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL + TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5 + TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA + + The following ciphersuites defined in [6] can be cracked easily + (less than a week of CPU time on a standard CPU in 1997). The + client and server SHOULD carefully consider the value of the + password or data being protected before using these ciphersuites: + + TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5 + TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5 + TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA + TLS_DH_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA + TLS_DH_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA + TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA + TLS_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA + TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5 + TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA + + + +Wahl, Alvestrand, Hodges, Morgan Page 11 + +INTERNET-DRAFT Authentication Methods for LDAP June 1999 + + The following ciphersuites are vulnerable to man-in-the-middle + attacks, and SHOULD NOT be used to protect passwords or sensitive + data, unless the network configuration is such that the danger of + a man-in-the-middle attack is tolerable: + + TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5 + TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 + TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA + TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA + TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA + + A client or server that supports TLS MUST support at least + TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA. + +13. SASL service name for LDAP + + For use with SASL [2], a protocol must specify a service name to be + used with various SASL mechanisms, such as GSSAPI. For LDAP, the + service name is "ldap", which has been registered with the IANA + as a GSSAPI service name. + +14. Security Considerations + + Security issues are discussed throughout this memo; the + (unsurprising) conclusion is that mandatory security is important, + and that session encryption is required when snooping is a + problem. + + Servers are encouraged to prevent modifications by anonymous + users. Servers may also wish to minimize denial of service attacks + by timing out idle connections, and returning the unwillingToPerform + result code rather than performing computationally expensive + operations requested by unauthorized clients. + + A connection on which the client has not performed the Start TLS + operation or negotiated a suitable SASL mechanism for connection + integrity and encryption services is subject to man-in-the-middle + attacks to view and modify information in transit. + + Additional security considerations relating to the EXTERNAL + EXTERNAL mechanism to negotiate TLS can be found in [2], [5] + and [6]. + +15. Acknowledgements + + This document is a product of the LDAPEXT Working Group of the + IETF. The contributions of its members is greatly appreciated. + + + + + +Wahl, Alvestrand, Hodges, Morgan Page 12 + +INTERNET-DRAFT Authentication Methods for LDAP June 1999 + +16. Bibliography + + [1] M. Wahl, T. Howes, S. Kille, "Lightweight Directory Access + Protocol (v3)", Dec. 1997, RFC 2251. + + [2] J. Myers, "Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL)", + Oct. 1997, RFC 2222. + + [3] S. Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement + Levels", RFC 2119. + + [4] P. Leach, C. Newman, "Using Digest Authentication as a SASL + Mechanism", INTERNET DRAFT . + + [5] J. Hodges, RL Morgan, M. Wahl, "LDAPv3 Extension for Transport + Layer Security", Oct. 1998, INTERNET DRAFT + . + + [6] T. Diers, C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0", Jan. 1999, + RFC 2246. + + [7] D. Crocker, Ed., P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax + Specifications: ABNF", RFC 2234. + + [8] S. Kent, R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture for the Internet + Protocol", Nov. 1998, RFC 2401. + +17. Authors Address + + Mark Wahl + Innosoft International, Inc. + 8911 Capital of Texas Hwy, Suite 4140 + Austin, TX 78759 + USA + Phone: +1 512 231 1600 + EMail: Mark.Wahl@innosoft.com + + Harald Tveit Alvestrand + EMail: Harald.Alvestrand@maxware.no + + Jeff Hodges + Computing & Communication Services + Stanford University + Pine Hall + 241 Panama Street + Stanford, CA 94305-4122 + USA + Phone: +1-650-723-2452 + EMail: Jeff.Hodges@Stanford.edu + + + +Wahl, Alvestrand, Hodges, Morgan Page 13 + +INTERNET-DRAFT Authentication Methods for LDAP June 1999 + + RL "Bob" Morgan + Computing & Communication Services + Stanford University + Pine Hall + 241 Panama Street + Stanford, CA 94305-4122 + USA + Phone: +1-650-723-9711 + EMail: Bob.Morgan@Stanford.edu + +Full Copyright Statement + + Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1998). All Rights Reserved. + + This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to + others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it + or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published + and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any + kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are + included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this + document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing + the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other + Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of + developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for + copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be + followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than + English. + + The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be + revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns. + + This document and the information contained herein is provided on an + "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING + TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING + BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION + HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Wahl, Alvestrand, Hodges, Morgan Page 14 + -- 2.39.5