From a7e1b43cece9b7a42abf09a52d18bb8222b538ec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kurt Zeilenga Date: Fri, 19 Mar 2004 18:11:08 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] Sync with HEAD --- doc/drafts/draft-ietf-ldapbis-authmeth-xx.txt | 2006 ++++++++--------- doc/drafts/draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-xx.txt | 338 +-- doc/drafts/draft-ietf-ldapbis-filter-xx.txt | 218 +- doc/drafts/draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-xx.txt | 1166 +++++----- doc/drafts/draft-ietf-ldapbis-protocol-xx.txt | 1908 +++++++++------- doc/drafts/draft-ietf-ldapbis-roadmap-xx.txt | 78 +- doc/drafts/draft-ietf-ldapbis-strprep-xx.txt | 208 +- doc/drafts/draft-ietf-ldapbis-url-xx.txt | 303 ++- doc/drafts/draft-zeilenga-ldup-sync-xx.txt | 1775 +++++++++------ 9 files changed, 4385 insertions(+), 3615 deletions(-) diff --git a/doc/drafts/draft-ietf-ldapbis-authmeth-xx.txt b/doc/drafts/draft-ietf-ldapbis-authmeth-xx.txt index e4ed2a4dff..65242f95d3 100644 --- a/doc/drafts/draft-ietf-ldapbis-authmeth-xx.txt +++ b/doc/drafts/draft-ietf-ldapbis-authmeth-xx.txt @@ -1,13 +1,13 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT Editor: R. Harrison -draft-ietf-ldapbis-authmeth-09.txt Novell, Inc. -Obsoletes: 2251, 2829, 2830 5 December 2003 +draft-ietf-ldapbis-authmeth-10.txt Novell, Inc. +Obsoletes: 2829, 2830 10 February 2003 Intended Category: Draft Standard - LDAP: Authentication Methods + LDAP: Authentication Methods and - Connection Level Security Mechanisms + Connection Level Security Mechanisms Status of this Memo @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ Status of this Memo This document is intended to be, after appropriate review and revision, submitted to the RFC Editor as a Standard Track document. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. Technical discussion of - this document will take place on the IETF LDAP Extension Working + this document will take place on the IETF LDAP Revision Working Group mailing list . Please send editorial comments directly to the author . @@ -46,24 +46,97 @@ Abstract security mechanisms of the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP). - This document details the simple Bind authentication method + This document also details establishment of TLS (Transport Layer + Security) using the Start TLS operation. + + This document also details the simple Bind authentication method including anonymous, unauthenticated, and plain-text password methods and the SASL (Simple Authentication and Security Layer) Bind - authentication method including the use of DIGEST-MD5 and EXTERNAL - mechanisms. - -Harrison Expires June 2004 [Page 1] +Harrison Expires July 2004 [Page 1] Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 - This document also details establishment of TLS (Transport Layer - Security) using the Start TLS operation. + authentication method including the use of DIGEST-MD5 and EXTERNAL + mechanisms. This document describes various authentication and authorization states through which a connection to an LDAP server may pass and the actions that trigger these state changes. +Table of Contents + + 1. Introduction................................................3 + 1.1. Relationship to Other Documents...........................5 + 2. Conventions Used in this Document...........................5 + 2.1. Glossary of Terms.........................................5 + 2.2. Security Terms and Concepts...............................5 + 2.3. Keywords..................................................6 + 3. Start TLS Operation.........................................6 + 3.1. Sequencing of the Start TLS Operation ....................6 + 3.1.1. Start TLS Request.......................................6 + 3.1.2. Start TLS Response......................................7 + 3.1.3. TLS Version Negotiation.................................7 + 3.1.4. Discovery of Resultant Security Level...................7 + 3.1.5. Server Identity Check...................................7 + 3.1.6. Refresh of Server Capabilities Information..............8 + 3.2. Effects of TLS on a Client's Authorization Identity.......8 + 3.2.1. TLS Connection Establishment Effects....................9 + 3.2.2. Client Assertion of Authorization Identity..............9 + 3.2.3. TLS Connection Closure Effects..........................9 + 4. Bind Operation..............................................9 + 4.1. Simple Authentication.....................................9 + 4.2. SASL Authentication.......................................9 + 5. Anonymous LDAP Association on Unbound Connections......... 10 + 6. Anonymous Authentication ................................. 10 + 7. Simple Authentication..................................... 10 + 8. SASL Authentication Profile............................... 11 + 8.1. SASL Service Name for LDAP.............................. 11 + 8.2. SASL Authentication Initiation and Protocol Exchange.... 11 + 8.3. Octet Where Negotiated Security Mechanisms Take Effect.. 12 + 8.4. Determination of Supported SASL Mechanisms.............. 12 + 8.5. Rules for Using SASL Security Layers.................... 13 + 9. SASL EXTERNAL Mechanism................................... 13 + 9.1. Implicit Assertion...................................... 13 + 9.2. Explicit Assertion...................................... 14 + 9.3. SASL Authorization Identity............................. 14 + 9.4 Authorization Identity Syntax............................ 14 + 10. SASL DIGEST-MD5 Mechanism................................ 15 + 11. General Requirements for Password-based Authentication .. 15 + 12. Invalidated Associations................................. 16 + 13. TLS Ciphersuites......................................... 16 + + +Harrison Expires July 2004 [Page 2] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 + + 13.1. TLS Ciphersuites Recommendations....................... 17 + 14. Security Considerations ................................. 18 + 14.1. Start TLS Security Considerations...................... 18 + 15. IANA Considerations...................................... 19 + Acknowledgements............................................. 19 + Normative References......................................... 19 + Informative References....................................... 21 + Author's Address............................................. 21 + Appendix A. LDAP Association State Transition Tables......... 21 + A.1. LDAP Association States................................. 21 + A.2. Actions that Affect LDAP Association State.............. 22 + A.3. Decisions Used in Making LDAP Association State Changes. 22 + A.4. LDAP Association State Transition Table................. 22 + Appendix B. Example Deployment Scenarios..................... 23 + Appendix C. Authentication and Authorization Concepts........ 24 + C.1. Access Control Policy................................... 24 + C.2. Access Control Factors ................................. 24 + C.3. Authentication, Credentials, Identity .................. 25 + C.4. Authorization Identity ................................. 25 + Appendix D. RFC 2829 Change History ......................... 25 + Appendix E. RFC 2830 Change History ......................... 29 + Appendix F. RFC 2251 Change History ......................... 30 + Appendix G. Change History to Combined Document.............. 30 + Appendix H. Issues to be Resolved............................ 41 + + 1. Introduction The Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) [Protocol] is a @@ -81,41 +154,48 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 (1) Unauthorized access to directory data via data-retrieval operations, - (2) Unauthorized access to reusable client authentication + (2) Unauthorized access to directory data by monitoring others' + access, + + (3) Unauthorized access to reusable client authentication information by monitoring others' access, + + (4) Unauthorized modification of directory data, - (3) Unauthorized access to directory data by monitoring others' - access, - (4) Unauthorized modification of directory data, +Harrison Expires July 2004 [Page 3] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 (5) Unauthorized modification of configuration information, - (6) Unauthorized or excessive use of resources (denial of service), - and + (6) Denial of Service: Use of resources (commonly in excess) in a + manner intended to deny service to others. and - (7) Spoofing of directory: Tricking a client into believing that + (7) Spoofing: Tricking a user or client into believing that information came from the directory when in fact it did not, either by modifying data in transit or misdirecting the client's - connection. Also, tricking a client into sending privileged + connection. Tricking a user or client into sending privileged information to a hostile entity that appears to be the directory - but is not. + server but is not. Tricking a directory server into believing + that information came from a particular client when in fact it + came from a hostile entity. + + (8) Hijacking of prototocol sessions. Threats (1), (4), (5) and (6) are due to hostile clients. Threats (2), (3) and (7) are due to hostile agents on the path between - client and server or hostile agents posing as a server. - - LDAP can be protected with the following security mechanisms: - - (1) Client authentication by means of the Secure Authentication and - Security Layer (SASL) [SASL] mechanism set, possibly backed by - the Transport Layer Security (TLS) [TLS] credentials exchange - mechanism, + client and server or hostile agents posing as a server, e.g. IP + spoofing. -Harrison Expires June 2004 [Page 2] - -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 + LDAP offers the following security mechanisms: + (1) Authentication by means of the Bind operation. The Bind + operation provides a simple method which supports anonymous, + unauthenticated, and authenticated with password mechanisms, and + the Secure Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) method which + supports a wide variety of authentication mechanisms and which + may be extended to support additional methods of authentication. (2) Client authorization by means of access control based on the requestor's authenticated identity, @@ -141,9 +221,13 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 alternatives is not a strategy that is likely to lead to interoperability. In the absence of mandates, clients will be written that do not support any security function supported by the - server, or worse, they will support only mechanisms like the LDAP - simple bind using clear text passwords that provide inadequate - security for most circumstances. + +Harrison Expires July 2004 [Page 4] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 + + server, or worse, they will support only clear text passwords that + provide inadequate security for most circumstances. Given the presence of the Directory, there is a strong desire to see mechanisms where identities take the form of an LDAP distinguished @@ -154,13 +238,13 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 carry identities not represented as LDAP DNs that are familiar to the user or that are used in other systems. - The set of security mechanisms provided in LDAP and described in - this document is intended to meet the security needs for a wide - range of deployment scenarios and still provide a high degree of - interoperability among various LDAP implementations and - deployments. Appendix A contains example deployment scenarios that - list the mechanisms that might be used to achieve a reasonable - level of security in various circumstances. + The set of security mechanisms provided in LDAP and described in + this document is intended to meet the security needs for a wide + range of deployment scenarios and still provide a high degree of + interoperability among various LDAP implementations and deployments. + Appendix B contains example deployment scenarios that list the + mechanisms that might be used to achieve a reasonable level of + security in various circumstances. 1.1. Relationship to Other Documents @@ -169,12 +253,6 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 This document obsoletes RFC 2829. - - -Harrison Expires June 2004 [Page 3] - -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 - Sections 2 and 4 of RFC 2830 are obsoleted by [Protocol]. The remainder of RFC 2830 is obsoleted by this document. @@ -193,7 +271,8 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 - "connection" and "LDAP connection" both refer to the underlying transport protocol connection between two protocol peers. - - "TLS connection" refers to a TLS-protected LDAP connection. + - "TLS connection" refers to a TLS-protected [TLS] LDAP + connection. - "association" and "LDAP association" both refer to the association of the LDAP connection and its current @@ -201,39 +280,254 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 2.2. Security Terms and Concepts + +Harrison Expires July 2004 [Page 5] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 + In general, security terms in this document are used consistently - with the definitions provided in [RFC2828]. In addition, several + with the definitions provided in [Glossary]. In addition, several terms and concepts relating to security, authentication, and - authorization are presented in Appendix B of this document. While + authorization are presented in Appendix C of this document. While the formal definition of these terms and concepts is outside the scope of this document, an understanding of them is prerequisite to understanding much of the material in this document. Readers who are unfamiliar with security-related concepts are encouraged to review - Appendix B before reading the remainder of this document. + Appendix C before reading the remainder of this document. 2.3. Keywords The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this - document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. + document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [Keyword]. + +3. Start TLS Operation + + The Start Transport Layer Security (Start TLS) operation defined in + section 4.13 of [Protocol] provides the ability to establish [TLS] + on an LDAP connection. + +3.1. Sequencing of the Start TLS Operation + + This section describes the overall procedures clients and servers + must follow for TLS establishment. These procedures take into + consideration various aspects of the overall security of the LDAP + association including discovery of resultant security level and + assertion of the client's authorization identity. + + Note that the precise effects, on a client's authorization identity, + of establishing TLS on an LDAP connection are described in detail in + section 3.2. + +3.1.1. Start TLS Request + + A client may send the Start TLS extended request at any time after + establishing an LDAP connection, except: + + - when TLS is currently established on the connection, + - when a multi-stage SASL negotiation is in progress on the + connection, or + - when there are outstanding LDAP operations on the connection. + + The result of violating any of these requirements is a resultCode of + operationsError, as described in [Protocol] section 4.13.2.2. Client + implementers should note that it is possible to receive a resultCode + of success for a Start TLS operation that is sent on a connection + with outstanding LDAP operations if the server has sufficient time + to process them prior to its receiving the Start TLS request. + Implementors of clients should ensure that they do not inadvertently + depend upon this race condition. + + + +Harrison Expires July 2004 [Page 6] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 + + There is no requirement that the client have or have not already + performed a Bind operation (section 4) before sending a Start TLS + operation request. + + If the client did not establish a TLS connection before sending some + other request, and the server requires the client to establish a TLS + connection before performing that request, the server MUST reject + that request by sending a resultCode of confidentialityRequired or + strongAuthRequired. + + An LDAP server which requests that clients provide their certificate + during TLS negotiation MAY use a local security policy to determine + whether to successfully complete TLS negotiation if the client did + not present a certificate which could be validated. + +3.1.2. Start TLS Response + + The server will return an extended response with the resultCode of + success if it is willing and able to negotiate TLS. It will return + other resultCode values (documented in [Protocol] section 4.13.2.2) + if it is unwilling or unable to do so. + + In the successful case, the client (which has ceased to transfer + LDAP requests on the connection) MUST either begin a TLS negotiation + or close the connection. The client will send PDUs in the TLS Record + Protocol directly over the underlying transport connection to the + server to initiate [TLS] negotiation. + +3.1.3. TLS Version Negotiation + + Negotiating the version of TLS to be used is a part of the TLS + Handshake Protocol [TLS]. Please refer to that document for details. + +3.1.4. Discovery of Resultant Security Level + + After a TLS connection is established on an LDAP connection, both + parties must individually decide whether or not to continue based on + the security level achieved. Ascertaining the TLS connection's + security level is implementation dependent and accomplished by + communicating with one's respective local TLS implementation. + + If the client or server decides that the level of authentication or + security is not high enough for it to continue, it SHOULD gracefully + close the TLS connection immediately after the TLS negotiation has + completed (see [Protocol] section 4.13.3.1 and section 3.2.3 below). + If the client decides to continue, it may gracefully close the TLS + connection and attempt to Start TLS again, it may send an unbind + request, or it may send any other LDAP request. + +3.1.5. Server Identity Check + + The client MUST check its understanding of the server's hostname + against the server's identity as presented in the server's + Certificate message in order to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks. + +Harrison Expires July 2004 [Page 7] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 + + + Matching is performed according to these rules: + + - The client MUST use the server provided by the user (or other + trusted entity) as the value to compare against the server name + as expressed in the server's certificate. A hostname derived + from the user input is to be considered provided by the user + only if derived in a secure fashion (e.g., DNSSEC). + + - If a subjectAltName extension of type dNSName is present in the + certificate, it SHOULD be used as the source of the server's + identity. + + - Matching is case-insensitive. + + - The "*" wildcard character is allowed. If present, it applies + only to the left-most name component. + + For example, *.bar.com would match a.bar.com and b.bar.com, but + it would not match a.x.bar.com nor would it match bar.com. If + more than one identity of a given type is present in the + certificate (e.g. more than one dNSName name), a match in any + one of the set is considered acceptable. + + If the hostname does not match the dNSName-based identity in the + certificate per the above check, user-oriented clients SHOULD either + notify the user (clients may give the user the opportunity to + continue with the connection in any case) or terminate the + connection and indicate that the server's identity is suspect. + Automated clients SHOULD close the connection, returning and/or + logging an error indicating that the server's identity is suspect. + + Beyond the server identity checks described in this section, clients + SHOULD be prepared to do further checking to ensure that the server + is authorized to provide the service it is observed to provide. The + client may need to make use of local policy information in making + this determination. + +3.1.6. Refresh of Server Capabilities Information + + Upon TLS session establishment, the client SHOULD discard or refresh + all information about the server it obtained prior to the initiation + of the TLS negotiation and not obtained through secure mechanisms. + This protects against active-intermediary attacks that may have + altered any server capabilities information retrieved prior to TLS + establishment. + + The server may advertise different capabilities after TLS + establishment. In particular, the value of supportedSASLMechanisms + may be different after TLS has been negotiated (specifically, the + EXTERNAL and PLAIN [PLAIN] mechanisms are likely to be listed only + after a TLS negotiation has been performed). + +3.2. Effects of TLS on a Client's Authorization Identity + +Harrison Expires July 2004 [Page 8] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 + + + This section describes the effects on a client's authorization + identity brought about by establishing TLS on an LDAP connection. + The default effects are described first, and next the facilities for + client assertion of authorization identity are discussed including + error conditions. Finally, the effects of closing the TLS connection + are described. + + Authorization identities and related concepts are described in + Appendix C. + +3.2.1. TLS Connection Establishment Effects + + The decision to keep or invalidate the established authentication + and authorization identities in place after TLS closure is a matter + of local server policy. + +3.2.2. Client Assertion of Authorization Identity + + After successfully establishing a TLS session, a client may request + that its credentials exchanged during the TLS establishment be + utilized to authenticate the LDAP association and thus determine the + client's authorization status. The client accomplishes this via an + LDAP Bind request specifying a SASL mechanism of EXTERNAL [SASL] + (section 9). LDAP server implementations SHOULD support this + authentication method. + +3.2.3. TLS Connection Closure Effects + + The decision to keep or invalidate the established authentication + and authorization identities in place after TLS closure is a matter + of local server policy. -3. Bind Operation +4. Bind Operation The Bind operation defined in section 4.2 of [Protocol] allows authentication information to be exchanged between the client and - server to establish a new LDAP association. The new LDAP association - is established upon successful completion of the authentication - exchange. + server to establish a new LDAP association. -3.1. Implied Anonymous Bind on LDAP Association + Upon receipt of a Bind request, the LDAP association is moved to an + anonymous state and only upon successful completion of the + authentication exchange (and the Bind operation) is the association + moved to an authenticated state. + +4.1. Simple Authentication + + The simple authentication choice of the Bind Operation provides + minimal facilities for establishing an anonymous association + (section 6) or for establishing an LDAP association based upon + credentials consisting of a name (in the form of an LDAP + distinguished name [LDAPDN]) and a password (section 7). + +4.2. SASL Authentication - Prior to the successful completion of a Bind operation and during - any subsequent authentication exchange, the session has an anonymous -Harrison Expires June 2004 [Page 4] +Harrison Expires July 2004 [Page 9] Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 + The sasl authentication choice of the Bind Operation provides + facilities for authenticating via SASL mechanisms (sections 8-10). + +5. Anonymous LDAP Association on Unbound Connections + + Prior to the successful completion of a Bind operation and during + any subsequent authentication exchange, the session has an anonymous LDAP association. Among other things this implies that the client need not send a Bind Request in the first PDU of the connection. The client may send any operation request prior to binding, and the @@ -241,21 +535,65 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 bind operation. This authentication state on an LDAP association is sometimes referred to as an implied anonymous bind. -3.2. Simple Authentication +6. Anonymous Authentication + + Directory operations that modify entries or access protected + attributes or entries generally require client authentication. + Clients that do not intend to perform any of these operations + typically use anonymous authentication. + + An LDAP client may explicitly establish an anonymous association by + sending a Bind Request with the simple authentication choice + containing a value--construed as the password--of zero length. A + bind request where both the name and password are of zero length is + said to be an anonymous bind. A bind request where the name, a DN, + is of non-zero length, and the password is of zero length is said to + be an unauthenticated bind. Both variations produce an anonymous + association. + + Unauthenticated binds can have significant security issues (see + section 14). Servers SHOULD by default reject unauthenticated bind + requests with a resultCode of invalidCredentials, and clients may + need to actively detect situations where they would make an + unauthenticated bind request. + + An LDAP server may use other information about the client provided + by the lower layers or external means to grant or deny access even + to anonymously authenticated clients. + + LDAP implementations MUST support anonymous authentication. + +7. Simple Authentication + + An LDAP client may establish an LDAP association by sending a Bind + Request with a name value consisting of an LDAP distinguished name + [LDAPDN] and specifying the simple authentication choice with a + password value. - The simple authentication choice provides minimal facilities for - establishing an anonymous association or for establishing an LDAP - association based upon credentials consisting of a name (in the form - of an [LDAPDN] and a password. + DSAs that map the DN sent in the bind request to a directory entry + with an associated set of one or more passwords will compare the + presented password to the set of passwords associated with that + entry. If the presented password matches any member of that set, + - The simple authentication choice provides two different methods - for establishing an anonymous association: anonymous bind and - unauthenticated bind (see section 5.1). +Harrison Expires July 2004 [Page 10] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 - The simple authentication choice provides one method for - establishing a non-anonymous association: simple password bind. + then the server will respond with a success resultCode, otherwise + the server will respond with an invalidCredentials resultCode. -3.3. SASL Authentication Profile + The simple authentication choice is not suitable for authentication + in environments where there is no network or transport layer + confidentiality. LDAP implementations SHOULD support authentication + with the "simple" authentication choice when the connection is + protected against eavesdropping using TLS, as defined in section 4. + LDAP implementations SHOULD NOT support authentication with the + "simple" authentication choice unless the data on the connection is + protected using TLS or other data confidentiality and data integrity + protection. + +8. SASL Authentication Profile LDAP allows authentication via any SASL mechanism [SASL]. As LDAP includes native anonymous and plaintext authentication methods, the @@ -267,12 +605,12 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 protocol ([SASL] section 5). This section explains how each of these profiling requirements are met by LDAP. -3.3.1. SASL Service Name for LDAP +8.1. SASL Service Name for LDAP The SASL service name for LDAP is "ldap", which has been registered with the IANA as a GSSAPI service name. -3.3.2. SASL authentication initiation and protocol exchange +8.2. SASL Authentication Initiation and Protocol Exchange SASL authentication is initiated via an LDAP bind request ([Protocol] section 4.2) with the following parameters: @@ -288,19 +626,19 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 In general, a SASL authentication protocol exchange consists of a series of server challenges and client responses, the contents of - -Harrison Expires June 2004 [Page 5] - -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 - which are specific to and defined by the SASL mechanism. Thus for some SASL authentication mechanisms, it may be necessary for the client to respond to one or more server challenges by invoking the BindRequest multiple times. A challenge is indicated by the server sending a BindResponse with the resultCode set to saslBindInProgress. This indicates that the server requires the - client to send a new bind request, with the same sasl mechanism to + client to send a new bind request with the same sasl mechanism to continue the authentication process. + +Harrison Expires July 2004 [Page 11] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 + To the encapsulating protocol, these challenges and responses are opaque binary tokens of arbitrary length. LDAP servers use the @@ -336,10 +674,10 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 mechanisms which are defined to have the server send additional data along with the indication of successful completion. -3.3.3. Octet where negotiated security mechanisms take effect +8.3. Octet Where Negotiated Security Mechanisms Take Effect - When negotiated, SASL security layers take effect following the - transmission by the server and reception by the client of the final + SASL security layers take effect following the transmission by the + server and reception by the client of the final successful BindResponse in the exchange. Once a SASL security layer providing integrity or confidentiality @@ -347,20 +685,24 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 is installed (i.e. at the first octet following the final BindResponse of the bind operation that caused the new layer to take effect). + +8.4. Determination of Supported SASL Mechanisms + + Clients may determine the SASL mechanisms a server supports by + reading the 'supportedSASLMechanisms ' attribute from the root DSE + (DSA-Specific Entry) ([Models] section 5.1). The values of this + attribute, if any, list the mechanisms the server supports in the + current LDAP session state. -Harrison Expires June 2004 [Page 6] +Harrison Expires July 2004 [Page 12] Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 - -3.3.4. Determination of supported SASL mechanisms - - An LDAP client may determine the SASL mechanisms a server supports - by performing a search request on the root DSE, requesting the - supportedSASLMechanisms attribute. The values of this attribute, if - any, list the mechanisms the server supports. -3.3.5. Rules for using SASL security layers + LDAP servers SHOULD allow an anonymously-bound client to retrieve + the supportedSASLMechanisms attribute of the root DSE. + +8.5. Rules for Using SASL Security Layers If a SASL security layer is negotiated, the client SHOULD discard information about the server it obtained prior to the initiation of @@ -378,12 +720,12 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 and servers should allow the user to specify what mechanisms are acceptable and allow only those mechanisms to be used. -3.3.6. Use of EXTERNAL SASL Mechanism +9. SASL EXTERNAL Mechanism A client can use the EXTERNAL SASL [SASL] mechanism to request the LDAP server to make use of security credentials exchanged by a lower security layer (such as by TLS authentication or IP-level security - [RFC2401]). + [SecArch]). If the client's authentication credentials have not been established at a lower security layer, the SASL EXTERNAL bind MUST fail with a @@ -399,37 +741,37 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 with its authenticated TLS credentials. The former is known as an implicit assertion, and the latter as an explicit assertion. -3.3.6.1. Implicit Assertion +9.1. Implicit Assertion An implicit authorization identity assertion is performed by invoking a Bind request of the SASL form using the EXTERNAL - mechanism name that SHALL NOT include the optional credentials octet + mechanism name that does not include the optional credentials octet string (found within the SaslCredentials sequence in the Bind Request). The server will derive the client's authorization identity - -Harrison Expires June 2004 [Page 7] - -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 - from the authentication identity supplied by the security layer (e.g., a public key certificate used during TLS establishment) according to local policy. The underlying mechanics of how this is accomplished are implementation specific. + +Harrison Expires July 2004 [Page 13] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 + -3.3.6.2. Explicit Assertion +9.2. Explicit Assertion An explicit authorization identity assertion is performed by invoking a Bind request of the SASL form using the EXTERNAL - mechanism name that SHALL include the credentials octet string. This + mechanism name that includes the credentials octet string. This string MUST be constructed as documented in section 3.4.1. - The server MUST that the client's authentication identity as + The server MUST verify that the client's authentication identity as supplied in its TLS credentials is permitted to be mapped to the asserted authorization identity. The server MUST reject the Bind operation with an invalidCredentials resultCode in the Bind response if the client is not so authorized. -3.3.6.3. SASL Authorization Identity +9.3. SASL Authorization Identity When the EXTERNAL SASL mechanism is being negotiated, if the SaslCredentials credentials field is present, it contains an @@ -438,7 +780,7 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 authorization identity is represented in the authzId form described below. -3.3.6.4 Authorization Identity Syntax +9.4 Authorization Identity Syntax The authorization identity is a string of [UTF-8] encoded [Unicode] characters corresponding to the following [ABNF] grammar: @@ -465,14 +807,15 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 The dnAuthzId choice allows clients to assert authorization identities in the form of a distinguished name to be matched in + accordance with the distinguishedNameMatch matching rule [Syntaxes]. + The decision to allow or disallow an authentication identity to have + access to the requested authorization identity is a matter of local + -Harrison Expires June 2004 [Page 8] +Harrison Expires July 2004 [Page 14] Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 - accordance with the distinguishedName matching rule [Syntaxes]. The - decision to allow or disallow an authentication identity to have - access to the requested authorization identity is a matter of local policy ([SASL] section 4.2). For this reason there is no requirement that the asserted dn be that of an entry in directory. @@ -480,7 +823,7 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 to assert an authorization identity to a local directory but do not have that identity in distinguished name form. The value contained within a uAuthzId MUST be prepared using [SASLPrep] before being - compared octet-wise. The format of utf8string is defined as only a + compared octet-wise. The format of userid is defined as only a sequence of [UTF-8] encoded [Unicode] characters, and further interpretation is subject to prior agreement between the client and server. @@ -490,293 +833,51 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 email address. A uAuthzId SHOULD NOT be assumed to be globally unique. -4. Start TLS Operation +10. SASL DIGEST-MD5 Mechanism - The Start Transport Layer Security (Start TLS) operation defined in - section 4.13 of [Protocol] provides the ability to establish [TLS] - on an LDAP association. - -4.1. Sequencing of the Start TLS Operation - - This section describes the overall procedures clients and servers - must follow for TLS establishment. These procedures take into - consideration various aspects of the overall security of the LDAP - association including discovery of resultant security level and - assertion of the client's authorization identity. - - Note that the precise effects, on a client's authorization identity, - of establishing TLS on an LDAP association are described in detail - in section 4.2. - -4.1.1. Start TLS Request - - The client MAY send the Start TLS extended request at any time after - establishing an LDAP connection, except: - - - when TLS is currently established on the connection, - - when a multi-stage SASL negotiation is in progress on the - connection, or - - when there are one or more outstanding LDAP operations on the - connection. - - The result of violating any of these requirements is a resultCode of - operationsError, as described in [Protocol] section 4.13.2.2. Client - implementers should note that it is possible to receive a resultCode - of success for a Start TLS operation that is sent on a connection - with outstanding LDAP operations and the server has sufficient time - -Harrison Expires June 2004 [Page 9] - -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 - - to process them prior to its receiving the Start TLS request. - Implementors of clients should ensure that they do not inadvertently - depend upon this race condition. - - In particular, there is no requirement that the client have or have - not already performed a Bind operation before sending a Start TLS - operation request. The client may have already performed a Bind - operation when it sends a Start TLS request, or the client might - have not yet bound. - - If the client did not establish a TLS connection before sending any - other requests, and the server requires the client to establish a - TLS connection before performing a particular request, the server - MUST reject that request by sending a resultCode of - confidentialityRequired or strongAuthRequired. - -4.1.2. Start TLS Response - - The server will return an extended response with the resultCode of - success if it is willing and able to negotiate TLS. It will return - other resultCode values (documented in [Protocol] section 4.13.2.2) - if it is unwilling or unable to do so. - - In the successful case, the client (which has ceased to transfer - LDAP requests on the connection) MUST either begin a TLS negotiation - or close the connection. The client will send PDUs in the TLS Record - Protocol directly over the underlying transport connection to the - server to initiate [TLS] negotiation. - -4.1.3. TLS Version Negotiation - - Negotiating the version of TLS or SSL to be used is a part of the - [TLS] Handshake Protocol. Please refer to that document for details. - -4.1.4. Discovery of Resultant Security Level - - After a TLS connection is established on an LDAP association, both - parties must individually decide whether or not to continue based on - the security level achieved. Ascertaining the TLS connection's - security level is implementation dependent and accomplished by - communicating with one's respective local TLS implementation. - - If the client or server decides that the level of authentication or - security is not high enough for it to continue, it SHOULD gracefully - close the TLS connection immediately after the TLS negotiation has - completed (see [Protocol] section 4.13.3.1 and section 4.2.3 below). - If the client decides to continue, it may gracefully close the TLS - connection and attempt to Start TLS again, it may send an unbind - request, or it may send any other LDAP request. - -4.1.5. Server Identity Check - - - - -Harrison Expires June 2004 [Page 10] - -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 - - The client MUST check its understanding of the server's hostname - against the server's identity as presented in the server's - Certificate message in order to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks. - - Matching is performed according to these rules: - - - The client MUST use the server provided by the user (or other - trusted entity) as the value to compare against the server name - as expressed in the server's certificate. A hostname derived - from the user input is to be considered provided by the user - only if derived in a secure fashion (e.g., DNSSEC). - - - If a subjectAltName extension of type dNSName is present in the - certificate, it SHOULD be used as the source of the server's - identity. - - - Matching is case-insensitive. - - - The "*" wildcard character is allowed. If present, it applies - only to the left-most name component. - - For example, *.bar.com would match a.bar.com and b.bar.com, but - it would not match a.x.bar.com nor would it match bar.com. If - more than one identity of a given type is present in the - certificate (e.g. more than one dNSName name), a match in any - one of the set is considered acceptable. - - If the hostname does not match the dNSName-based identity in the - certificate per the above check, user-oriented clients SHOULD either - notify the user (clients may give the user the opportunity to - continue with the connection in any case) or terminate the - connection and indicate that the server's identity is suspect. - Automated clients SHOULD close the connection, returning and/or - logging an error indicating that the server's identity is suspect. - - Beyond the server identity checks described in this section, clients - SHOULD be prepared to do further checking to ensure that the server - is authorized to provide the service it is observed to provide. The - client may need to make use of local policy information in making - this determination. - -4.1.6. Refresh of Server Capabilities Information - - Upon TLS session establishment, the client SHOULD discard or refresh - all information about the server it obtained prior to the initiation - of the TLS negotiation and not obtained through secure mechanisms. - This protects against active-intermediary attacks that may have - altered any server capabilities information retrieved prior to TLS - establishment. - - The server may advertise different capabilities after TLS - establishment. In particular, the value of supportedSASLMechanisms - may be different after TLS has been negotiated (specifically, the - - -Harrison Expires June 2004 [Page 11] - -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 - - EXTERNAL and PLAIN [PLAIN] mechanisms are likely to be listed only - after a TLS negotiation has been performed). - -4.2. Effects of TLS on a Client's Authorization Identity - - This section describes the effects on a client's authorization - identity brought about by establishing TLS on an LDAP association. - The default effects are described first, and next the facilities for - client assertion of authorization identity are discussed including - error conditions. Finally, the effects of closing the TLS connection - are described. - - Authorization identities and related concepts are described in - Appendix B. - -4.2.1. TLS Connection Establishment Effects - - The decision to keep or invalidate the established authentication - and authorization identities in place after TLS is negotiated is a - matter of local server policy. If a server chooses to invalidate - established authentication and authorization identities after TLS is - negotiated, it MUST reply to subsequent valid operation requests - until the next TLS closure or successful bind request with a - resultCode of strongAuthRequired to indicate that the client needs - to bind to reestablish its authentication. If the client attempts to - bind using a method the server is unwilling to support, it responds - to the with a resultCode of authMethodNotSupported (per [Protocol]) - to indicate that a different authentication method should be used. - -4.2.2. Client Assertion of Authorization Identity + LDAP servers that implement any authentication method or mechanism + other than simple anonymous bind MUST implement the SASL + DIGEST-MD5 mechanism [DIGEST-MD5]. This provides client + authentication with protection against passive eavesdropping attacks + but does not provide protection against active intermediary attacks. + DIGEST-MD5 also provides data integrity and data confidentiality + capabilities. - After successfully establishing a TLS session, a client may request - that its credentials exchanged during the TLS establishment be - utilized to determine the client's authorization status. The client - accomplishes this via an LDAP Bind request specifying a SASL - mechanism of EXTERNAL [SASL]. See section 3.3.6 for additional - details. -4.2.3. TLS Connection Closure Effects + Support for subsequent authentication ([DIGEST-MD5] section 2.2) is + OPTIONAL in clients and servers. - The decision to keep or invalidate the established authentication - and authorization identities in place after TLS closure is a matter - of local server policy. If a server chooses to invalidate - established authentication and authorization identities after TLS is - negotiated, it MUST reply to subsequent valid operation requests - until the next TLS closure or successful bind request with a - resultCode of strongAuthRequired to indicate that the client needs - to bind to reestablish its authentication. If the client attempts to - bind using a method the server is unwilling to support, it responds - to the with a resultCode of authMethodNotSupported (per [Protocol]) - to indicate that a different authentication method should be used. - -5. Anonymous Authentication - - -Harrison Expires June 2004 [Page 12] - -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 - - Directory operations that modify entries or access protected - attributes or entries generally require client authentication. - Clients that do not intend to perform any of these operations - typically use anonymous authentication. - - LDAP implementations MUST support anonymous authentication, as - defined in section 5.1. - - LDAP implementations MAY support anonymous authentication with TLS, - as defined in section 5.2. - - While there may be access control restrictions to prevent access to - directory entries, an LDAP server SHOULD allow an anonymously-bound - client to retrieve the supportedSASLMechanisms attribute of the root - DSE. - - An LDAP server may use other information about the client provided - by the lower layers or external means to grant or deny access even - to anonymously authenticated clients. - -5.1. Anonymous Authentication Procedure - - Prior to successfully completing a Bind operation, the LDAP - association is anonymous. See section 3.1. + Implementers must take care to ensure that they maintain the + semantics of the DIGEST-MD5 specification even when handling data + that has different semantics in the LDAP protocol. + For example, the SASL DIGEST-MD5 authentication mechanism utilizes + realm and username values ([DIGEST-MD5] section 2.1) which are + syntactically simple strings and semantically simple realm and + username values. These values are not LDAP DNs, and there is no + requirement that they be represented or treated as such. Username + and realm values that look like LDAP DNs in form, e.g. , are syntactically allowed, however DIGEST-MD5 + treats them as simple strings for comparison purposes. To illustrate + further, the two DNs (upper case "B") and + (lower case "b") are equivalent when + being compared semantically as LDAP DNs because the cn attribute is + defined to be case insensitive, however the two values are not + equivalent if they represent username values in DIGEST-MD5 because + [SASLPrep] semantics are used by DIGEST-MD5. - An LDAP client may also explicitly establish an anonymous - association by sending a Bind Request with the simple authentication - option and a password of zero length. A bind request where both the - name and password are of zero length is said to be an anonymous - bind. A bind request where the name, a DN, is of non-zero length, - and the password is of zero length is said to be an unauthenticated - bind. Both variations produce an anonymous association. +11. General Requirements for Password-based Authentication - Unauthenticated binds can have significant security issues (see - section 10). Servers SHOULD by default reject unauthenticated bind - requests with a resultCode of invalidCredentials, and clients may - need to actively detect situations where they would make an - unauthenticated bind request. - -5.2. Anonymous Authentication and TLS - - An LDAP client may use the Start TLS operation (section 5) to - negotiate the use of [TLS] security. If the client has not bound - beforehand, then until the client uses the EXTERNAL SASL mechanism - to negotiate the recognition of the client's certificate, the client - is anonymously authenticated. - - Recommendations on TLS ciphersuites are given in section 9. - - An LDAP server which requests that clients provide their certificate - during TLS negotiation MAY use a local security policy to determine - whether to successfully complete TLS negotiation if the client did - not present a certificate which could be validated. - + The transmission of passwords in the clear--typically for + authentication or modification--poses a significant security risk. + This risk can be avoided by using SASL authentication [SASL] -Harrison Expires June 2004 [Page 13] +Harrison Expires July 2004 [Page 15] Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 -6. Password-based Authentication - - This section discusses various options for performing password-based - authentication to LDAP compliant servers and the environments - suitable for their use. - - The transmission of passwords in the clear--typically for - authentication or modification--poses a significant security risk. - This risk can be avoided by using SASL bind [SASL] mechanisms that - do not transmit passwords in the clear and by negotiating transport - or session layer confidentiality services before transmitting - password values. + mechanisms that do not transmit passwords in the clear or by + negotiating transport or session layer confidentiality services + before transmitting password values. To mitigate the security risks associated with the use of passwords, a server implementation MUST implement a configuration that at the @@ -797,285 +898,25 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 including a userPassword value, etc.), even if the password value is correct. -6.1. Simple Authentication - - The LDAP "simple" authentication choice is not suitable for - authentication in environments where there is no network or - transport layer confidentiality. LDAP implementations SHOULD support - authentication with the "simple" authentication choice when the - connection is protected against eavesdropping using TLS, as defined - in section 4. LDAP implementations SHOULD NOT support authentication - with the "simple" authentication choice unless the data on the - connection is protected using TLS or other data confidentiality and - data integrity protection. - -6.2. Digest Authentication - - LDAP servers that implement any authentication method or mechanism - (other than simple anonymous bind) MUST implement the SASL - DIGEST-MD5 mechanism [DIGEST-MD5]. This provides client - authentication with protection against passive eavesdropping - attacks, but does not provide protection against active intermediary - attacks. DIGEST-MD5 also provides data integrity and data - confidentiality capabilities. - - -Harrison Expires June 2004 [Page 14] - -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 - - - Support for subsequent authentication is OPTIONAL in clients and - servers. - - Implementors must take care to ensure that they maintain the - semantics of the DIGEST-MD5 specification even when handling data - that has different semantics in the LDAP protocol. - For example, the SASL DIGEST-MD5 authentication mechanism utilizes - realm and username values ([DigestAuth section 2.1) which are - syntactically simple strings and semsantically simple realm and - username values. These values are not LDAP DNs, and there is no - requirement that they be represented or treated as such. Username - and realm values that look like LDAP DNs in form, e.g. , are syntactically allowed, however DIGEST-MD5 - treats them as simple strings for comparison purposes. To illustrate - further, the two DNs (upper case "B") and - (lower case "b") are equivalent when - being compared semantically as LDAP DNs because the cn attribute is - defined to be case insensitive, however the two values are not - equivalent if they represent username values in DIGEST-MD5 because - [SASLPrep] semantics are used by DIGEST-MD5. - -6.3. simple authentication choice under TLS encryption - - Following the negotiation of an appropriate TLS ciphersuite - providing connection confidentiality, a client MAY authenticate to a - directory that supports the simple authentication choice by - performing a simple bind operation - - Simple authentication with TLS encryption protection is performed as - follows: - - 1. The client will use the Start TLS operation [Protocol] to - negotiate the use of TLS security [TLS] on the connection to - the LDAP server. The client need not have bound to the - directory beforehand. - - For the subsequent authentication procedure to be performed - securely, the client and server MUST negotiate a ciphersuite - which contains a bulk encryption algorithm of appropriate - strength. Recommendations on cipher suites are given in - section 9. - - 2. Following the successful completion of TLS negotiation, the - client MUST send an LDAP bind request with the version number - of 3, the name field containing a DN, and the simple - authentication choice, containing a password. - -6.3.1. simple Authentication Choice - - DSAs that map the DN sent in the bind request to a directory entry - with an associated set of one or more passwords will compare the - presented password to the set of passwords associated with that - entry. If the presented password matches any member of that set, - -Harrison Expires June 2004 [Page 15] - -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 - - then the server will respond with a success resultCode, otherwise - the server will respond with an invalidCredentials resultCode. - -6.4. Other authentication choices with TLS - - It is also possible, following the negotiation of TLS, to perform a - SASL authentication that does not involve the exchange of plaintext - reusable passwords. In this case the client and server need not - negotiate a ciphersuite that provides confidentiality if the only - service required is data integrity. - -7. Certificate-based authentication - - LDAP server implementations SHOULD support authentication via a - client certificate in TLS, as defined in section 7.1. - -7.1. Certificate-based authentication with TLS - - A user who has a public/private key pair in which the public key has - been signed by a Certification Authority may use this key pair to - authenticate to the directory server if the user's certificate is - requested by the server. The user's certificate subject field SHOULD - be the name of the user's directory entry, and the Certification - Authority that issued the user's certificate must be sufficiently - trusted by the directory server in order for the server to process - the certificate. The means by which servers validate certificate - paths is outside the scope of this document. - - A server MAY support mappings for certificates in which the subject - field name is different from the name of the user's directory entry. - A server which supports mappings of names MUST be capable of being - configured to support certificates for which no mapping is required. - - The client will use the Start TLS operation [Protocol] to negotiate - the use of TLS security [TLS] on the connection to the LDAP server. - The client need not have bound to the directory beforehand. - - In the TLS negotiation, the server MUST request a certificate. The - client will provide its certificate to the server, and the server - MUST perform a private key-based encryption, proving it has the - private key associated with the certificate. - - In deployments that require protection of sensitive data in transit, - the client and server MUST negotiate a ciphersuite that contains a - bulk encryption algorithm of appropriate strength. Recommendations - of cipher suites are given in section 9. - - The server MUST verify that the client's certificate is valid. The - server will normally check that the certificate is issued by a known - certification authority (CA), and that none of the certificates on - the client's certificate chain are invalid or revoked. There are - several procedures by which the server can perform these checks. +12. Invalidated Associations - - -Harrison Expires June 2004 [Page 16] - -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 - - Following the successful completion of TLS negotiation, the client - will send an LDAP bind request with the SASL EXTERNAL mechanism. - -8. LDAP Association State Transition Tables - - To comprehensively diagram the various authentication and TLS states - through hich an LDAP association may pass, this section provides a - state transition table to represent a state diagram for the various - states through which an LDAP association may pass during the course - of its existence and the actions that cause these changes in state. - -8.1. LDAP Association States - - The following table lists the valid LDAP association states and - provides a description of each state. The ID for each state is used - in the state transition table in section 8.4. - - ID State Description - -- -------------------------------------------------------------- - S1 Anonymous - no Authentication ID is associated with the LDAP connection - no Authorization ID is in force - S2 Authenticated - Authentication ID = I - Authorization ID = X - S3 Authenticated SASL EXTERNAL, implicit authorization ID - Authentication ID = J - Authorization ID = Y - S4 Authenticated SASL EXTERNAL, explicit authorization ID - Authentication ID = J - Authorization ID = Z - -8.2. Actions that Affect LDAP Association State - - The following table lists the actions that can affect the - authentication and authorization state of an LDAP association. The - ID for each action is used in the state transition table in section - 8.4. - - ID Action - -- -------------------------------------------------------------- - A1 Client bind request fails - A2 Client successfully performs anonymous simple bind - A3 Client successfully performs unauthenticated simple bind - A4 Client successfully performs simple bind with name and - password OR SASL bind with any mechanism except EXTERNAL using - an authentication ID = I that maps to authorization ID X - A5 Client Binds SASL EXTERNAL with implicit assertion of - authorization ID (section 3.3.6.1)]. The current - authentication ID maps to authorization ID = Y. - A6 Client Binds SASL EXTERNAL with explicit assertion of - authorization ID = Z (section 3.3.6.2)] - - -Harrison Expires June 2004 [Page 17] - -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 - - A7 Client abandons a bind operation, and server processes the - abandon - A8 Client abandons a bind operation, and server does not process - the abandon - A9 Client Start TLS request fails - A10 Client Start TLS request succeeds - A11 Client or Server: graceful TLS closure ([Protocol] section - 4.13.3.1.) - -8.3. Decisions Used in Making LDAP Association State Changes - - Certain changes in the authentication and authorization state of an - LDAP association are only allowed if the server can affirmatively - answer a question. These questions are applied as part of the - criteria for allowing or disallowing a state transition in the state - transition table in section 8.4. - - ID Decision Question - -- -------------------------------------------------------------- - D1 Are lower-layer credentials available? - D2 Can lower-layer credentials for Auth ID "K" be mapped asserted - AuthZID "L"? - -8.4. LDAP Association State Transition Table - - The LDAP Association table below lists the valid authentication and - authorization states for an LDAP association and the actions that - could affect them. For any given row in the table, the Current State - column gives the state of an LDAP association, the Action column - gives an action that could affect the state of an LDAP assocation, - and the Next State column gives the resulting state of an LDAP - association after the action occurs. - - S1, the initial state for the state machine described in this table, - is the authentication state when an LDAP connection is initially - established. - - Current Next - State Action State Comment - ------- ------- ----- --------------------------------------- - Any A1 S1 [Protocol] section 4.2.1 - Any A2 S1 Section 6 - Any A3 S1 Section 6 - Any A4 S2 Sections 6.1, 6.2 - Any A5, S1 Failed bind, section 3.3.6 - D1=no - Any A5, S3 - D1=yes - Any A6, S1 failed bind, section 3.3.6 - D1=no - Any A6, S1 failed bind, section 3.3.6.2 - D1=yes, - D2=no - -Harrison Expires June 2004 [Page 18] - -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 - - Any A6, S4 - D1=yes, - D2=yes - Any A7 S1 [Protocol] section 4.2.1. Clients - cannot detect this state. - Any A8 no [Protocol] section 4.2.1. Clients - change cannot detect this state. - Any A9 no [Protocol] section 4.13.2.2 - change - Any A10 no Section 4.2.1 - change - Any A11 S1 Section 4.2.3 + The server may, at any time, invalidate the association, e.g. if the + established security association between the client and server has + unexpectedly failed or been compromised. The association remains + invalidated until the next successful bind request. While the + association is invalidated, the server may reject any operation + request other than Bind, Unbind, and Start TLS by responding with a + resultCode of strongAuthRequired to indicate that the client needs + to bind to reestablish its authentication state before performing + the requested operation. -9. TLS Ciphersuites +13. TLS Ciphersuites - A client or server that supports TLS MUST support - TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA and MAY support other ciphersuites - offering equivalent or better protection. + A client or server that supports TLS MUST support + TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA. Servers SHOULD NOT support + weaker ciphersuites unless other data integrity and + confidentiality protection (such as a SASL security layer) is + in place Several issues should be considered when selecting TLS ciphersuites that are appropriate for use in a given circumstance. These issues @@ -1087,6 +928,12 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 some TLS ciphersuites provide no confidentiality protection while other ciphersuites that do provide confidentiality protection may be vulnerable to being cracked using brute force + + +Harrison Expires July 2004 [Page 16] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 + methods, especially in light of ever-increasing CPU speeds that reduce the time needed to successfully mount such attacks. @@ -1102,7 +949,7 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 data, unless the network configuration is such that the danger of a man-in-the-middle attack is tolerable. -9.1. TLS Ciphersuites Recommendations +13.1. TLS Ciphersuites Recommendations As of the writing of this document, the following recommendations regarding TLS ciphersuites are applicable. Because circumstances are @@ -1110,12 +957,6 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 but is hoped that it will serve as a useful starting point for implementers. - - -Harrison Expires June 2004 [Page 19] - -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 - The following ciphersuites defined in [TLS] MUST NOT be used for confidentiality protection of passwords or data: @@ -1147,16 +988,18 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA - -10. Security Considerations +Harrison Expires July 2004 [Page 17] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 + - Security issues are discussed throughout this memo; the - (unsurprising) conclusion is that mandatory security is important - and that session confidentiality protection is required when - snooping is a problem. + +14. Security Considerations - Servers are encouraged to prevent modifications by anonymous users. + Security issues are discussed throughout this memo; the unsurprising + conclusion is that mandatory security is important and that session + confidentiality protection is required when snooping is a problem. Servers can minimize denial of service attacks by timing out idle connections, and returning the unwillingToPerform resultCode rather @@ -1170,11 +1013,6 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 Operational experience shows that clients can (and frequently do) misuse unauthenticated bind (see section 5.1). For example, a client program might make a decision to grant access to non- - -Harrison Expires June 2004 [Page 20] - -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 - directory information on the basis of completing a successful bind operation. Some LDAP server implementations will return a success response to an unauthenticated bind thus leaving the client with the @@ -1188,12 +1026,12 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 Access control SHOULD always be applied when reading sensitive information or updating directory information. - A connection on which the client has not performed the Start TLS - operation or negotiated a suitable SASL mechanism for connection - integrity and encryption services is subject to man-in-the-middle - attacks to view and modify information in transit. + A connection on which the client has not established connection + integrity and privacy services (e.g via Start TLS, IPSec or a + suitable SASL mechanism) is subject to man-in-the-middle attacks to + view and modify information in transit. -10.1. Start TLS Security Considerations +14.1. Start TLS Security Considerations The goals of using the TLS protocol with LDAP are to ensure connection confidentiality and integrity, and to optionally provide @@ -1205,35 +1043,36 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 Once established, TLS only provides for and ensures confidentiality and integrity of the operations and data in transit over the LDAP - association--and only if the implementations on the client and - server support and negotiate it. The use of TLS does not provide or - ensure for confidentiality and/or non-repudiation of the data housed - by an LDAP-based directory server. Nor does it secure the data from + connection--and only if the implementations on the client and server + support and negotiate it. The use of TLS does not provide or ensure + for confidentiality and/or non-repudiation of the data housed by an + + +Harrison Expires July 2004 [Page 18] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 + + LDAP-based directory server. Nor does it secure the data from inspection by the server administrators. The level of security provided though the use of TLS depends directly on both the quality of the TLS implementation used and the style of usage of that implementation. Additionally, an active- intermediary attacker can remove the Start TLS extended operation - from the supportedExtension attribute of the root DSE. Therefore, - both parties SHOULD independently ascertain and consent to the - security level achieved once TLS is established and before beginning - use of the TLS connection. For example, the security level of the - TLS connection might have been negotiated down to plaintext. + from the supported attribute of the root DSE. Therefore, both + parties SHOULD independently ascertain and consent to the security + level achieved once TLS is established and before beginning use of + the TLS connection. For example, the security level of the TLS + connection might have been negotiated down to plaintext. Clients SHOULD either warn the user when the security level achieved - does not provide confidentiality and/or integrity protection, or be - configurable to refuse to proceed without an acceptable level of - security. + does not provide data confidentiality and/or integrity protection, + or be configurable to refuse to proceed without an acceptable level + of security. Client and server implementors SHOULD take measures to ensure proper protection of credentials and other confidential data where such measures are not otherwise provided by the TLS implementation. - -Harrison Expires June 2004 [Page 21] - -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 - Server implementors SHOULD allow for server administrators to elect whether and when connection confidentiality and/or integrity is @@ -1243,7 +1082,7 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 Additional security considerations relating to the EXTERNAL mechanism to negotiate TLS can be found in [SASL] and [TLS]. -11. IANA Considerations +15. IANA Considerations The following IANA considerations apply to this document: @@ -1266,76 +1105,85 @@ Acknowledgements Normative References - [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key Words for use in RFCs to Indicate - Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. - - [ABNF] Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax - Specifications: ABNF", RFC 2234, November 1997. + +Harrison Expires July 2004 [Page 19] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 + + [ABNF] Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for + Syntax Specifications: ABNF", RFC 2234, November 1997. + [DIGEST-MD5] Leach, P. C. Newman, and A. Melnikov, "Using Digest - Authentication as a SASL Mechanism", draft-ietf-sasl-rfc2831bis- - xx.txt, a work in progress. + Authentication as a SASL Mechanism", draft-ietf-sasl- + rfc2831bis-xx.txt, a work in progress. - [LDAPDN] Zeilenga, Kurt D. (editor), "LDAP: String Representation of - Distinguished Names", draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-xx.txt, a work in - progress. + [Keyword] Bradner, S., "Key Words for use in RFCs to Indicate + Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. - [Models] Zeilenga, Kurt D. (editor), "LDAP: Directory Information - Models", draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-xx.txt, a work in progress. + [LDAPDN] Zeilenga, Kurt D. (editor), "LDAP: String + Representation of Distinguished Names", draft-ietf- + ldapbis-dn-xx.txt, a work in progress. - [Protocol] Sermersheim, J., "LDAP: The Protocol", draft-ietf- - ldapbis-protocol-xx.txt, a work in progress. + [Models] Zeilenga, Kurt D. (editor), "LDAP: Directory + Information Models", draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-xx.txt, + a work in progress. - [Roadmap] K. Zeilenga, "LDAP: Technical Specification Road Map", - draft-ietf-ldapbis-roadmap-xx.txt, a work in progress. - -Harrison Expires June 2004 [Page 22] - -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 - + [Protocol] Sermersheim, J., "LDAP: The Protocol", draft-ietf- + ldapbis-protocol-xx.txt, a work in progress. - [SASL] Melnikov, A. (editor), "Simple Authentication and Security - Layer (SASL)", draft-ietf-sasl-rfc2222bis-xx.txt, a work in - progress. + [Roadmap] K. Zeilenga, "LDAP: Technical Specification Road Map", + draft-ietf-ldapbis-roadmap-xx.txt, a work in progress. - [SASLPrep] Zeilenga, K., "Stringprep profile for user names and - passwords", draft-ietf-sasl-saslprep-xx.txt, (a work in - progress). + [SASL] Melnikov, A. (editor), "Simple Authentication and + Security Layer (SASL)", draft-ietf-sasl-rfc2222bis- + xx.txt, a work in progress. - [StringPrep] Hoffman P. and M. Blanchet, "Preparation of - Internationalized Strings ('stringprep')", draft-hoffman- - rfc3454bis-xx.txt, a work in progress. + [SASLPrep] Zeilenga, K., "Stringprep profile for user names and + passwords", draft-ietf-sasl-saslprep-xx.txt, (a work in + progress). - [Syntaxes] Legg, S. (editor), "LDAP: Syntaxes and Matching Rules", - draft-ietf-ldapbis-syntaxes-xx.txt, a work in progress. + [StringPrep] Hoffman P. and M. Blanchet, "Preparation of + Internationalized Strings ('stringprep')", draft- + hoffman-rfc3454bis-xx.txt, a work in progress. - [TLS] Dierks, T. and C. Allen. "The TLS Protocol Version 1.1", - draft-ietf-tls-rfc2246-bis-xx.txt, a work in progress. - - [UTF-8] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646", - RFC 3629, STD 63, November 2003. + [Syntaxes] Legg, S. (editor), "LDAP: Syntaxes and Matching Rules", + draft-ietf-ldapbis-syntaxes-xx.txt, a work in progress. + + [TLS] Dierks, T. and C. Allen. "The TLS Protocol Version + 1.1", draft-ietf-tls-rfc2246-bis-xx.txt, a work in + progress. - [Unicode] The Unicode Consortium, "The Unicode Standard, Version - 3.2.0" is defined by "The Unicode Standard, Version 3.0" - (Reading, MA, Addison-Wesley, 2000. ISBN 0-201-61633-5), as - amended by the "Unicode Standard Annex #27: Unicode 3.1" - (http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr27/) and by the öUnicode - Standard Annex #28: Unicode 3.2" - (http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr28/). + [UTF-8] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO + 10646", RFC 3629, STD 63, November 2003. + + [Unicode] The Unicode Consortium, "The Unicode Standard, Version + 3.2.0" is defined by "The Unicode Standard, Version + 3.0" (Reading, MA, Addison-Wesley, 2000. ISBN 0-201- + 61633-5), as amended by the "Unicode Standard Annex + #27: Unicode 3.1" + (http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr27/) and by the + "Unicode Standard Annex #28: Unicode 3.2" + (http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr28/). + +Harrison Expires July 2004 [Page 20] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 + Informative References - [ANONYMOUS] Zeilenga, K.,"Anonymous SASL Mechanism", draft-zeilenga- - sasl-anon-xx.txt, a work in progress. + [ANONYMOUS] Zeilenga, K.,"Anonymous SASL Mechanism", draft- + zeilenga-sasl-anon-xx.txt, a work in progress. - [PLAIN] Zeilenga, K.,"Plain SASL Mechanism", draft-zeilenga-sasl- - plain-xx.txt, a work in progress. + [Glossary] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary", RFC 2828, May + 2000. - [RFC2828] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary", RFC 2828, May - 2000. + [PLAIN] Zeilenga, K.,"Plain SASL Mechanism", draft-zeilenga- + sasl-plain-xx.txt, a work in progress. - [RFC2401] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture for the - Internet Protocol", RFC 2401, November 1998. + [SecArch] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture for + the Internet Protocol", RFC 2401, November 1998. Author's Address @@ -1344,15 +1192,140 @@ Author's Address Novell, Inc. 1800 S. Novell Place Provo, UT 84606 + USA +1 801 861 2642 roger_harrison@novell.com +Appendix A. LDAP Association State Transition Tables + + This section provides a state transition table to represent a state + diagram for the various authentication and TLS states through which + an LDAP association may pass during the course of its existence and + the actions that cause these changes in state. + + This section is based entirely on information found in this document + and other documents that are part of the LDAP Technical + Specification [Roadmap]. As such, it is strictly informational in + nature. + +A.1. LDAP Association States + + The following table lists the valid LDAP association states and + provides a description of each state. The ID for each state is used + in the state transition table in section A.4. + + ID State Description + -- -------------------------------------------------------------- + S1 Anonymous + no Authentication ID is associated with the LDAP connection + no Authorization ID is in force + S2 Authenticated + Authentication ID = I + Authorization ID = X + S3 Authenticated SASL EXTERNAL, implicit authorization ID -Harrison Expires June 2004 [Page 23] +Harrison Expires July 2004 [Page 21] Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 -Appendix A. Example Deployment Scenarios + Authentication ID = J + Authorization ID = Y + S4 Authenticated SASL EXTERNAL, explicit authorization ID + Authentication ID = J + Authorization ID = Z + +A.2. Actions that Affect LDAP Association State + + The following table lists the actions that can affect the + authentication and authorization state of an LDAP association. The + ID for each action is used in the state transition table in section + A.4. + + ID Action + -- -------------------------------------------------------------- + A1 Client bind request fails + A2 Client successfully performs anonymous simple bind + A3 Client successfully performs unauthenticated simple bind + A4 Client successfully performs simple bind with name and + password OR SASL bind with any mechanism except EXTERNAL using + an authentication ID = I that maps to authorization ID X + A5 Client Binds SASL EXTERNAL with implicit assertion of + authorization ID (section 3.3.6.1)]. The current + authentication ID maps to authorization ID = Y. + A6 Client Binds SASL EXTERNAL with explicit assertion of + authorization ID = Z (section 3.3.6.2)] + A7 Client abandons a bind operation, and server processes the + abandon + A8 Client abandons a bind operation, and server does not process + the abandon + A9 Client Start TLS request fails + A10 Client Start TLS request succeeds + A11 Client or Server: graceful TLS closure ([Protocol] section + 4.13.3.1.) + +A.3. Decisions Used in Making LDAP Association State Changes + + Certain changes in the authentication and authorization state of an + LDAP association are only allowed if the server can affirmatively + answer a question. These questions are applied as part of the + criteria for allowing or disallowing a state transition in the state + transition table in section A.4. + + ID Decision Question + -- -------------------------------------------------------------- + D1 Are lower-layer credentials available? + D2 Can lower-layer credentials for Auth ID "K" be mapped to + asserted AuthZID "L"? + +A.4. LDAP Association State Transition Table + + The LDAP Association table below lists the valid authentication and + authorization states for an LDAP association and the actions that + +Harrison Expires July 2004 [Page 22] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 + + could affect them. For any given row in the table, the Current State + column gives the state of an LDAP association, the Action column + gives an action that could affect the state of an LDAP assocation, + and the Next State column gives the resulting state of an LDAP + association after the action occurs. + + S1, the initial state for the state machine described in this table, + is the authentication state when an LDAP connection is initially + established. + + Current Next + State Action State Comment + ------- ------- ----- --------------------------------------- + Any A1 S1 [Protocol] section 4.2.1 + Any A2 S1 Section 6 + Any A3 S1 Section 6 + Any A4 S2 Sections 6.1, 6.2 + Any A5, S1 Failed bind, section 3.3.6 + D1=no + Any A5, S3 + D1=yes + Any A6, S1 failed bind, section 3.3.6 + D1=no + Any A6, S1 failed bind, section 3.3.6.2 + D1=yes, + D2=no + Any A6, S4 + D1=yes, + D2=yes + Any A7 S1 [Protocol] section 4.2.1. Clients + cannot detect this state. + Any A8 no [Protocol] section 4.2.1. Clients + change cannot detect this state. + Any A9 no [Protocol] section 4.13.2.2 + change + Any A10 no Section 4.2.1 + change + Any A11 S1 Section 4.2.3 + +Appendix B. Example Deployment Scenarios The following scenarios are typical for LDAP directories on the Internet, and have different security requirements. (In the @@ -1366,6 +1339,11 @@ Appendix A. Example Deployment Scenarios (1) A read-only directory, containing no sensitive data, accessible to "anyone", and TCP connection hijacking or IP spoofing is not a problem. Anonymous authentication, described in section 7, is + +Harrison Expires July 2004 [Page 23] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 + suitable for this type of deployment, and requires no additional security functions except administrative service limits. @@ -1391,30 +1369,22 @@ Appendix A. Example Deployment Scenarios (5) A directory containing sensitive data. This scenario requires data confidentiality protection AND secure authentication. -Appendix B. Authentication and Authorization: Definitions and Concepts +Appendix C. Authentication and Authorization Concepts This appendix defines basic terms, concepts, and interrelationships regarding authentication, authorization, credentials, and identity. These concepts are used in describing how various security approaches are utilized in client authentication and authorization. -B.1. Access Control Policy +C.1. Access Control Policy An access control policy is a set of rules defining the protection of resources, generally in terms of the capabilities of persons or - other entities accessing those resources. A common expression of an - access control policy is an access control list. Security objects - and mechanisms, such as those described here, enable the expression - of access control policies and their enforcement. Access control - -Harrison Expires June 2004 [Page 24] - -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 + other entities accessing those resources. Security objects and + mechanisms, such as those described here, enable the expression of + access control policies and their enforcement. - policies are typically expressed in terms of access control factors - as described below. - -B.2. Access Control Factors +C.2. Access Control Factors A request, when it is being processed by a server, may be associated with a wide variety of security-related factors (section 4.2 of @@ -1428,10 +1398,15 @@ B.2. Access Control Factors Access control policies are expressed in terms of access control factors. E.g., a request having ACFs i,j,k can perform operation Y + +Harrison Expires July 2004 [Page 24] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 + on resource Z. The set of ACFs that a server makes available for such expressions is implementation-specific. -B.3. Authentication, Credentials, Identity +C.3. Authentication, Credentials, Identity Authentication credentials are the evidence supplied by one party to another, asserting the identity of the supplying party (e.g. a user) @@ -1448,7 +1423,7 @@ B.3. Authentication, Credentials, Identity mechanism may constrain the form of authentication identities used with it. -B.4. Authorization Identity +C.4. Authorization Identity An authorization identity is one kind of access control factor. It is the name of the user or other entity that requests that @@ -1465,28 +1440,28 @@ B.4. Authorization Identity privileges of the identity for which they are proxying [SASL]. Also, the form of authentication identity supplied by a service like TLS may not correspond to the authorization identities used to express a - -Harrison Expires June 2004 [Page 25] - -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 - server's access control policy, requiring a server-specific mapping to be done. The method by which a server composes and validates an authorization identity from the authentication credentials supplied by a client is implementation-specific. -Appendix C. RFC 2829 Change History +Appendix D. RFC 2829 Change History This appendix lists the changes made to the text of RFC 2829 in preparing this document. -C.0. General Editorial Changes +D.0. General Editorial Changes Version -00 - Changed other instances of the term LDAP to LDAP where v3 of the protocol is implied. Also made all references to LDAP use the same wording. + +Harrison Expires July 2004 [Page 25] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 + - Miscellaneous grammatical changes to improve readability. - Made capitalization in section headings consistent. @@ -1496,44 +1471,39 @@ C.0. General Editorial Changes - Changed title to reflect inclusion of material from RFC 2830 and 2251. -C.1. Changes to Section 1 +D.1. Changes to Section 1 Version -01 - Moved conventions used in document to a separate section. -C.2. Changes to Section 2 +D.2. Changes to Section 2 Version -01 - Moved section to an appendix. -C.3. Changes to Section 3 +D.3. Changes to Section 3 Version -01 - Moved section to an appendix. -C.4 Changes to Section 4 +D.4 Changes to Section 4 Version -00 - Changed "Distinguished Name" to "LDAP distinguished name". -C.5. Changes to Section 5 +D.5. Changes to Section 5 Version -00 - -Harrison Expires June 2004 [Page 26] - -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 - - Added the following sentence: "Servers SHOULD NOT allow clients with anonymous authentication to modify directory entries or access sensitive information in directory entries." -C.5.1. Changes to Section 5.1 +D.5.1. Changes to Section 5.1 Version -00 @@ -1546,8 +1516,13 @@ C.5.1. Changes to Section 5.1 - Brought text describing procedure for performing an anonymous bind from section 4.2 of RFC 2251 bis. This text will be removed from the draft standard version of that document. + +Harrison Expires July 2004 [Page 26] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 + -C.6. Changes to Section 6. +D.6. Changes to Section 6. Version -00 @@ -1568,7 +1543,7 @@ C.6. Changes to Section 6. implementations MUST support authentication with a password...") to section on Digest Authentication (Now section 6.2). -C.6.1. Changes to Section 6.1. +D.6.1. Changes to Section 6.1. Version -00 Renamed section to 6.2 @@ -1576,18 +1551,12 @@ C.6.1. Changes to Section 6.1. DIGEST-MD5 SASL mechanism is required for all conforming LDAP implementations -C.6.2. Changes to Section 6.2 +D.6.2. Changes to Section 6.2 Version -00 - Renamed section to 6.3 - - -Harrison Expires June 2004 [Page 27] - -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 - - Reworded first paragraph to remove reference to user and the userPassword password attribute Made the first paragraph more general by simply saying that if a directory supports simple @@ -1604,17 +1573,22 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 sent in the bind request to a directory entry with a userPassword attribute." -C.6.3. Changes to section 6.3. +D.6.3. Changes to section 6.3. + +Harrison Expires July 2004 [Page 27] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 + Version -00 - Renamed to section 6.4. -C.7. Changes to section 7. +D.7. Changes to section 7. none -C.7.1. Changes to section 7.1. +D.7.1. Changes to section 7.1. Version -00 @@ -1622,7 +1596,7 @@ C.7.1. Changes to section 7.1. "to have issued the certificate" immediately after "Certification Authority." -C.8. Changes to section 8. +D.8. Changes to section 8. Version -00 @@ -1641,12 +1615,7 @@ C.8. Changes to section 8. for Other Security Services) to bring material on SASL mechanisms together into one location. -C.9. Changes to section 9. - -Harrison Expires June 2004 [Page 28] - -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 - +D.9. Changes to section 9. Version -00 @@ -1665,13 +1634,18 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 - Added section 9.1.1. heading. - Added section 9.1.2. heading. + +Harrison Expires July 2004 [Page 28] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 + Version -01 - Moved entire section 9 to become section 3.5 so that it would be with other SASL material. -C.10. Changes to Section 10. +D.10. Changes to Section 10. Version -00 @@ -1686,13 +1660,13 @@ C.10. Changes to Section 10. equivalent or better protection," to the last paragraph of the section. -C.11. Changes to Section 11. +D.11. Changes to Section 11. Version -01 - Moved to section 3.6 to be with other SASL material. -C.12. Changes to Section 12. +D.12. Changes to Section 12. Version -00 @@ -1701,28 +1675,29 @@ C.12. Changes to Section 12. is renumbered to become section 13. Version -01 - -Harrison Expires June 2004 [Page 29] - -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 - - Moved to section 3.7 to be with other SASL material. -C.13. Changes to Section 13 (original section 12). +D.13. Changes to Section 13 (original section 12). None -Appendix D. RFC 2830 Change History +Appendix E. RFC 2830 Change History This appendix lists the changes made to the text of RFC 2830 in preparing this document. -D.0. General Editorial Changes +E.0. General Editorial Changes - Material showing the PDUs for the Start TLS response was broken out into a new section. + + +Harrison Expires July 2004 [Page 29] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 + - The wording of the definition of the Start TLS request and Start TLS response was changed to make them parallel. NO changes were made to the ASN.1 definition or the associated values of the @@ -1731,12 +1706,12 @@ D.0. General Editorial Changes - A separate section heading for graceful TLS closure was added for parallelism with section on abrupt TLS closure. -Appendix E. RFC 2251 Change History +Appendix F. RFC 2251 Change History This appendix lists the changes made to the text of RFC 2251 in preparing this document. -E.0. General Editorial Changes +F.0. General Editorial Changes - All material from section 4.2 of RFC 2251 was moved into this document. @@ -1753,18 +1728,12 @@ E.0. General Editorial Changes the discussion of the Bind operation (primarily sections 4.4 - 4.7). -Appendix F. Change History to Combined Document +Appendix G. Change History to Combined Document -F.1. Changes for draft-ldap-bis-authmeth-02 +G.1. Changes for draft-ldap-bis-authmeth-02 General - - -Harrison Expires June 2004 [Page 30] - -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 - - Added references to other LDAP standard documents, to sections within the document, and fixed broken references. @@ -1782,6 +1751,12 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 Section 3. + + +Harrison Expires July 2004 [Page 30] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 + - Brought language in requirement (3) in line with security glossary. @@ -1818,12 +1793,7 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 - Brought security terminology in line with IETF security glossary throughout the appendix. -F.2. Changes for draft-ldap-bis-authmeth-03 - -Harrison Expires June 2004 [Page 31] - -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 - +G.2. Changes for draft-ldap-bis-authmeth-03 General @@ -1831,7 +1801,7 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 references to conform to WG chair suggestions for the overall technical specification. - - Several issues--G.13, G.14, G.16, G.17--were resolved without + - Several issues--H.13, H.14, H.16, H.17--were resolved without requiring changes to the document. Section 3 @@ -1840,6 +1810,12 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 Section 4 + + +Harrison Expires July 2004 [Page 31] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 + - Removed sections 4.1, 4.2 and parts of section 4.3. This information was being duplicated in the protocol specification and will now reside there permanently. @@ -1872,21 +1848,16 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 information. -F.3. Changes for draft-ldap-bis-authmeth-04 +G.3. Changes for draft-ldap-bis-authmeth-04 General - Changed references to use [RFCnnnn] format wherever possible. (References to works in progress still use [name] format.) - -Harrison Expires June 2004 [Page 32] - -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 - - Various edits to correct typos and bring field names, etc. in line with specification in [Protocol] draft. - - Several issues--G.13, G.14, G.16, G.17--were resolved without + - Several issues--H.13, H.14, H.16, H.17--were resolved without requiring changes to the document. Section 4.4.1. @@ -1899,6 +1870,11 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 - Removed sections 5.1, 5.2, and 5.4 that will be added to [Protocol]. Renumbered sections to accommodate this change. - + +Harrison Expires July 2004 [Page 32] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 + Section 6 @@ -1908,7 +1884,7 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 that actions are in ascending order (makes analyzing the table much more logical). Added action A2 to several states where it was missing and valid. Added actions A7 and A8 placeholders to - states S1, S2, S4 and S5 pending resolution of issue G.28. + states S1, S2, S4 and S5 pending resolution of issue H.28. Section 11 @@ -1922,7 +1898,7 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 - Verified all normative references and moved informative references to a new section 14. -F.4. Changes for draft-ldap-bis-authmeth-05 +G.4. Changes for draft-ldap-bis-authmeth-05 General @@ -1937,11 +1913,6 @@ F.4. Changes for draft-ldap-bis-authmeth-05 - Updated to match current contents of documents. This was needed due to movement of material on Bind and Start TLS operations to [Protocol] in this revision. - -Harrison Expires June 2004 [Page 33] - -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 - Section 3. @@ -1957,6 +1928,12 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 revision of the draft. + + +Harrison Expires July 2004 [Page 33] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 + - Paragraph beginning, " If TLS is negotiated, the client MUST discard all information..." was moved to section 5.1.7 and integrated with related material there. @@ -1994,13 +1971,6 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 Section 5.1.7. - - - -Harrison Expires June 2004 [Page 34] - -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 - - Wording from section 3 paragraph beginning " If TLS is negotiated, the client MUST discard all information..." was moved to this section and integrated with existing text. @@ -2018,6 +1988,11 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 Section 8.1. + +Harrison Expires July 2004 [Page 34] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 + - Changed term "data privacy" to "data confidentiality" to be consistent with usage in rest of document. @@ -2033,12 +2008,12 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 confidentiality protection" to be consistent with usage in rest of document. - Appendix A. + Appendix B. - Began changes to incorporate information on deployment scenarios removed from section 3. -F.5. Changes for draft-ldap-bis-authmeth-06 +G.5. Changes for draft-ldap-bis-authmeth-06 General @@ -2055,11 +2030,6 @@ F.5. Changes for draft-ldap-bis-authmeth-06 Section 1 - -Harrison Expires June 2004 [Page 35] - -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 - - Added additional example of spoofing under threat (7). Section 2.1 @@ -2077,6 +2047,11 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 - Began edits to LDAP Association state table to clarify meaning of various states and actions. + +Harrison Expires July 2004 [Page 35] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 + - Added action A9 to cover abandoned bind operation and added appropriate transitions to the state transition table to @@ -2098,7 +2073,7 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 - Added a clarifying example to the consideration regarding misuse of unauthenticated access. -F.6. Changes for draft-ldap-bis-authmeth-07 +G.6. Changes for draft-ldap-bis-authmeth-07 General @@ -2114,11 +2089,6 @@ F.6. Changes for draft-ldap-bis-authmeth-07 - Rewrote much of section 3.3 to meet the SASL profile requirements of draft-ietf-sasl-rfc2222bis-xx.txt section 5. - -Harrison Expires June 2004 [Page 36] - -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 - - Changed treatement of SASL ANONYMOUS and PLAIN mechanisms to bring in line with WG consensus. @@ -2136,6 +2106,11 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 The local policy in place for implicit assertion is adequate. Section 7 + +Harrison Expires July 2004 [Page 36] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 + - Removed most of section 7.2 as the information is now covered adequately via the new SASL profile in section 3.3. Added note @@ -2148,7 +2123,7 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 to any member of the set of stored passwords constitutes a successful authentication. -F.6. Changes for draft-ldap-bis-authmeth-08 +G.7. Changes for draft-ldap-bis-authmeth-08 General @@ -2173,11 +2148,6 @@ F.6. Changes for draft-ldap-bis-authmeth-08 - Added 1.5 sentences at end of introductory paragraph indicating the effect of the Bind op on the LDAP association. - -Harrison Expires June 2004 [Page 37] - -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 - Section 3.1 - Retitled section and clarified wording @@ -2195,6 +2165,11 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 Section 3.3.5 + +Harrison Expires July 2004 [Page 37] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 + - Changed requirement to discard information about server fetched prior to SASL negotiation from MUST to SHOULD to allow for information obtained through secure mechanisms. @@ -2232,11 +2207,6 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 Section 4.1.6 - Renumbered to 4.1.5. - -Harrison Expires June 2004 [Page 38] - -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 - - Updated server identity check rules for server's name based on WG list discussion. @@ -2254,6 +2224,11 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 Section 10 + +Harrison Expires July 2004 [Page 38] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 + - Added security consideration (moved from elsewhere) discouraging use of cleartext passwords on unprotected communication channels. @@ -2263,7 +2238,7 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 - Added an IANA consideration to update GSSAPI service name registry to point to [Roadmap] and [Authmeth] -F.7. Changes for draft-ldap-bis-authmeth-09 +G.8. Changes for draft-ldap-bis-authmeth-09 General @@ -2286,16 +2261,11 @@ F.7. Changes for draft-ldap-bis-authmeth-09 - Reworded sentence beginning, "It is also desireable to allow authentication methods to carry identities based on existingù - non-LDAP DNùforms..." + non-LDAP DN-forms..." - Clarified relationship of this document to other documents in the LDAP TS. Section 3.3.5 - -Harrison Expires June 2004 [Page 39] - -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 - - Removed paragraph beginning,"If the client is configured to support multiple SASL mechanisms..." because the actions @@ -2313,6 +2283,11 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 - Moved most of section 4.2.2, Client Assertion of Authorization Identity, to sections 3.3.6, 3.3.6.1, and 3.3.6.2. + +Harrison Expires July 2004 [Page 39] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 + Section 3.3.6.4 - Moved some normative comments into text body. @@ -2350,11 +2325,6 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 - Added sentence describing protections provided by DIGEST-MD5 method. - Changed DNs in exmple to be dc=example,dc=com. - -Harrison Expires June 2004 [Page 40] - -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 - Section 10 @@ -2363,12 +2333,31 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 - Substantial rework of consideration on misuse of unauthenticated bind. -Appendix G. Issues to be Resolved +G.9. Changes for draft-ldap-bis-authmeth-10 + + + - Reorganized content of sections 3-9 to improve document flow and + reduce redundancy. + - Resolved issue of effect of Start TLS and TLS closure on LDAP + association state. + - Made numerous minor wording changes based on WG feedback. + - Updated list of threats for Section 1. + +Harrison Expires July 2004 [Page 40] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 + + - Recommendation that servers should not support weaker TLS + ciphersuites unless other protection is in place. + - Moved authentication state table to appendix and relettered + appendices. + +Appendix H. Issues to be Resolved This appendix lists open questions and issues that need to be resolved before work on this document is deemed complete. -G.1. +H.1. Section 1 lists 6 security mechanisms that can be used by LDAP servers. I'm not sure what mechanism 5, "Resource limitation by @@ -2377,7 +2366,7 @@ G.1. Status: resolved. Changed wording to "administrative service limits" to clarify meaning. -G.2. +H.2. Section 2 paragraph 1 defines the term, "sensitive." Do we want to bring this term and other security-related terms in alignment with @@ -2386,7 +2375,7 @@ G.2. Status: resolved. WG input at IETF 51 was that we should do this, so the appropriate changes have been made. -G.3. +H.3. Section 2, deployment scenario 2: What is meant by the term "secure authentication function?" @@ -2396,7 +2385,7 @@ G.3. data confidentiality for sensitive authentication information and data integrity for all authentication information. -G.4. +H.4. Section 3, deployment scenario 3: What is meant by the phrase, "directory data is authenticated by the server?" @@ -2405,19 +2394,18 @@ G.4. the identity of the directory server and the integrity of the data sent from that server to the client, and explictly stated such. -G.5. +H.5. - + Section 4 paragraph 3: What is meant by the phrase, "this means that + either this data is useless for faking authentication (like the Unix + "/etc/passwd" file format used to be)?" + -Harrison Expires June 2004 [Page 41] +Harrison Expires July 2004 [Page 41] Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 - Section 4 paragraph 3: What is meant by the phrase, "this means that - either this data is useless for faking authentication (like the Unix - "/etc/passwd" file format used to be)?" - Status: resolved. Discussion at IETF 52 along with discussions with the original authors of this material have convinced us that this reference is simply too arcane to be left in place. In -03 the text @@ -2426,7 +2414,7 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 update it in session well protected against snooping, and the reference to /etc/passwd has been removed. -G.6. +H.6. Section 4 paragraph 7 begins: "For a directory needing session protection..." Is this referring to data confidentiality or data @@ -2435,7 +2423,7 @@ G.6. Status: resolved. Changed wording to say, "For a directory needing data security (both data integrity and data confidentiality)..." -G.7. +H.7. Section 4 paragraph 8 indicates that "information about the server fetched prior to the TLS negotiation" must be discarded. Do we want @@ -2446,7 +2434,7 @@ G.7. meeting, this has been changed to explicitly state, "fetched prior to the initiation of the TLS negotiation..." -G.8. +H.8. Section 4 paragraph 9 indicates that clients SHOULD check the supportedSASLMechanisms list both before and after a SASL security @@ -2467,20 +2455,21 @@ G.8. Approach 2: Clients MUST check the supportedSASLMechanisms list both before and after SASL negotiation UNLESS they use a + different trusted source to determine available supported SASL + mechanisms. + + -Harrison Expires June 2004 [Page 42] +Harrison Expires July 2004 [Page 42] Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 - different trusted source to determine available supported SASL - mechanisms. - Status: resolved. WG input at IETF 51 was that Approach 1 was probably best. I ended up keeping the basic structure similar to the original to meet this intent. -G.9. +H.9. Section 6.3.1 states: "DSAs that map the DN sent in the bind request to a directory entry with a userPassword attribute will... compare @@ -2495,7 +2484,7 @@ G.9. "user" in referring to the directory entry specified by the DN in the bind request. -G.10 userPassword and simple bind +H.10 userPassword and simple bind We need to be sure that we don't require userPassword to be the only attribute used for authenticating via simple bind. (See 2251 sec 4.2 @@ -2509,7 +2498,7 @@ G.10 userPassword and simple bind "user" in referring to the directory entry specified by the DN in the bind request. -G.11. Meaning of LDAP Association +H.11. Meaning of LDAP Association The original RFC 2830 uses the term "LDAP association" in describing a connection between an LDAP client and server regardless of the @@ -2522,19 +2511,19 @@ G.11. Meaning of LDAP Association clarified somewhere in the draft. Added "LDAP association" to a glossary in section 1. -G.12. Is DIGEST-MD5 mandatory for all implementations? +H.12. Is DIGEST-MD5 mandatory for all implementations? Reading 2829bis I think DIGEST-MD5 is mandatory ONLY IF your server supports password based authentication...but the following makes it sound mandatory to provide BOTH password authentication AND DIGEST- + MD5: + + "6.2. Digest authentication -Harrison Expires June 2004 [Page 43] +Harrison Expires July 2004 [Page 43] Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 - MD5: - - "6.2. Digest authentication LDAP implementations MUST support authentication with a password using the DIGEST-MD5 SASL mechanism for password protection, as @@ -2549,7 +2538,7 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 beginning of section 8.2 stating that LDAP server implementations must support this method. -G.13. Ordering of authentication levels requested +H.13. Ordering of authentication levels requested Again on the subject of authentication level, is it possible to define an ordering on authentication levels which defines their @@ -2564,7 +2553,7 @@ G.13. Ordering of authentication levels requested Status: out of scope. This is outside the scope of this document and will not be addressed. -G.14. Document vulnerabilities of various mechanisms +H.14. Document vulnerabilities of various mechanisms While I'm here...in 2829, I think it would be good to have some comments or explicit reference to a place where the security @@ -2579,7 +2568,7 @@ G.14. Document vulnerabilities of various mechanisms Status: out of scope. This is outside the scope of this document and will not be addressed. -G.15. Include a Start TLS state transition table +H.15. Include a Start TLS state transition table The pictoral representation it is nominally based on is here (URL possibly folded): @@ -2587,13 +2576,13 @@ G.15. Include a Start TLS state transition table http://www.stanford.edu/~hodges/doc/LDAPAssociationStateDiagram- 1999-12-14.html -Harrison Expires June 2004 [Page 44] + (Source: Jeff Hodges) + + +Harrison Expires July 2004 [Page 44] Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 - - (Source: Jeff Hodges) - Status: Resolved. Table provided in -03. Review of content for accuracy in -04. @@ -2605,7 +2594,7 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 were based on suggestions from WG and greatly simplified overall table. -G.16. Empty sasl credentials question +H.16. Empty sasl credentials question I spent some more time looking microscopically at ldap-auth-methods and ldap-ext-tls drafts. The drafts say that the credential must @@ -2621,7 +2610,7 @@ G.16. Empty sasl credentials question discussion at IETF 52 that SASL AuthzID credentials empty and absent are equivalent in the latest SASL ID. This resolves the issue. -G.17. Hostname check from MUST to SHOULD? +H.17. Hostname check from MUST to SHOULD? I am uneasy about the hostname check. My experience from PKI with HTTP probably is a contributing factor; we have people using the @@ -2645,15 +2634,15 @@ G.17. Hostname check from MUST to SHOULD? Status: resolved. Based on discussion at IETF 52 ldapbis WG meeting, this text will stand as it is. The check is a MUST, but the behavior + afterward is a SHOULD. This gives server implementations the room to + maneuver as needed. + -Harrison Expires June 2004 [Page 45] +Harrison Expires July 2004 [Page 45] Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 - afterward is a SHOULD. This gives server implementations the room to - maneuver as needed. - -G.18. Must SASL DN exist in the directory? +H.18. Must SASL DN exist in the directory? If the 'dn:' form of sasl creds is used, is it the intention of the draft(ers) that this DN must exist in the directory and the client @@ -2678,7 +2667,7 @@ G.18. Must SASL DN exist in the directory? policy driven [SASL] section 4.2, and (3) keeping this paragraph is not required for interoperability. -G.19. DN used in conjunction with SASL mechanism +H.19. DN used in conjunction with SASL mechanism We need to specify whether the DN field in Bind operation can/cannot be used when SASL mechanism is specified. (source: RL Bob) @@ -2691,7 +2680,7 @@ G.19. DN used in conjunction with SASL mechanism conflicts with this draft. The editor of [Protocol] has been notified of the discrepancy, and they have been handled. -G.20. Bind states +H.20. Bind states Differences between unauthenticated and anonymous. There are four states you can get into. One is completely undefined (this is now @@ -2704,13 +2693,14 @@ G.20. Bind states called out in [AuthMeth]. State 3 is called out in [Protocol]; this seems appropriate based on review of alternatives. +H.21. Misuse of unauthenticated access + + -Harrison Expires June 2004 [Page 46] +Harrison Expires July 2004 [Page 46] Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 -G.21. Misuse of unauthenticated access - Add a security consideration that operational experience shows that clients can misuse unauthenticated access (simple bind with name but no password). Servers SHOULD by default reject authentication @@ -2719,17 +2709,17 @@ G.21. Misuse of unauthenticated access Status: Resolved. Added to security considerations in -03. -G.22. Need to move Start TLS protocol information to [Protocol] +H.22. Need to move Start TLS protocol information to [Protocol] Status: Resolved. Removed Sections 5.1, 5.2, and 5.4 for -04 and they are [Protocol] -11. -G.23. Split Normative and Non-normative references into separate +H.23. Split Normative and Non-normative references into separate sections. Status: Resolved. Changes made in -04 -G.24. What is the authentication state if a Bind operation is +H.24. What is the authentication state if a Bind operation is abandoned? Status: Resolved. @@ -2745,7 +2735,7 @@ abandoned? (6/28/03): The state table in section 6 of [AuthMeth] has been updated to reflect this wording. -G.25. Difference between checking server hostname and server's +H.25. Difference between checking server hostname and server's canonical DNS name in Server Identity Check? Section 4.1.6: I now understand the intent of the check (prevent @@ -2763,13 +2753,13 @@ canonical DNS name in Server Identity Check? (11/21/02): RL Bob Morgan will provide wording that allows derivations of the name that are provided securely. + (6/28/03): posted to the WG list asking Bob or any other WG member + who is knowledgeable about the issues involved to help me with -Harrison Expires June 2004 [Page 47] +Harrison Expires July 2004 [Page 47] Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 - (6/28/03): posted to the WG list asking Bob or any other WG member - who is knowledgeable about the issues involved to help me with wording or other information I can use to make this change and close the work item. @@ -2782,7 +2772,7 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 (e.g., DNSSEC)." -G.26. Server Identity Check using servers located via SRV records +H.26. Server Identity Check using servers located via SRV records Section 4.1.6: What should be done if the server was found using SRV records based on the "locate" draft/RFC? (Source: Tim Hahn). @@ -2793,7 +2783,7 @@ G.26. Server Identity Check using servers located via SRV records This is the right location for this information, and the coverage appears to be adequate. -G.27 Inconsistency in effect of TLS closure on LDAP association. +H.27 Inconsistency in effect of TLS closure on LDAP association. Section 4.4.1 of authmeth -03 (section 4.1 of RFC2830) states that TLS closure alert will leave the LDAP association intact. Contrast @@ -2820,15 +2810,15 @@ G.27 Inconsistency in effect of TLS closure on LDAP association. intact. The authentication state table in [AuthMeth] specifies the effect on the LDAP association. -G.28 Ordering of external sources of authorization identities +H.28 Ordering of external sources of authorization identities + Section 4.3.2 implies that external sources of authorization + identities other than TLS are permitted. What is the behavior when -Harrison Expires June 2004 [Page 48] +Harrison Expires July 2004 [Page 48] Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 - Section 4.3.2 implies that external sources of authorization - identities other than TLS are permitted. What is the behavior when two external sources of authentication credentials are available (e.g. TLS and IPsec are both present (is this possible?)) and a SASL EXTERNAL Bind operation is performed? @@ -2837,7 +2827,7 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 states that the decision to allow or disallow the asserted identity is based on an implementation defined policy. -G.29 Rewrite of Section 9, TLS Ciphersuites +H.29 Rewrite of Section 9, TLS Ciphersuites This section contains anachronistic references and needs to be updated/rewritten in a way that provides useful guidance for future @@ -2847,14 +2837,14 @@ G.29 Rewrite of Section 9, TLS Ciphersuites general issues and considerations involved in selecting TLS ciphersuites. -G.30 Update to Appendix A, Example Deployment Scenarios +H.30 Update to Appendix A, Example Deployment Scenarios This section needs to be updated to indicate which security mechanisms and/or combinations of security mechanisms described elsewhere in the document can provide the types of protections suggested in this appendix. -G.31 Use of PLAIN SASL Mechanism +H.31 Use of PLAIN SASL Mechanism At least one LDAP server implementer has found the SASL "PLAIN" mechanism useful in authenticating to legacy systems that do not @@ -2877,16 +2867,17 @@ G.31 Use of PLAIN SASL Mechanism allow any SASL mechanism. -G.32 Clarification on use of SASL mechanisms +H.32 Clarification on use of SASL mechanisms Section 3.3.1: BTW, what _are_ the "ANONYMOUS" and "PLAIN" SASL mechanisms? They are not defined in RFC2222. If you refer to other + SASL mechanisms than those in rfc2222, Maybe you should only list + -Harrison Expires June 2004 [Page 49] +Harrison Expires July 2004 [Page 49] Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 - SASL mechanisms than those in rfc2222, Maybe you should only list which mechanisms _are_used, instead of which ones are _not. (Source: Hallvard Furuseth) @@ -2906,7 +2897,7 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 -G.33 Clarification on use of password protection based on AuthZID form +H.33 Clarification on use of password protection based on AuthZID form Section 3.3.1: "If an authorization identity of a form different from a DN is requested by the client, a mechanism that protects the @@ -2920,7 +2911,7 @@ G.33 Clarification on use of password protection based on AuthZID form security consideration that covers this issue. -G.34 Clarification on use of matching rules in Server Identity Check +H.34 Clarification on use of matching rules in Server Identity Check The text in section 4.1.6 isn't explicit on whether all rules apply to both CN and dNSName values. The text should be clear as to which @@ -2928,7 +2919,7 @@ G.34 Clarification on use of matching rules in Server Identity Check rules. (Source: Kurt Zeilenga) -G.35 Requested Additions to Security Considerations +H.35 Requested Additions to Security Considerations Requested to mention hostile servers which the user might have been fooled to into contacting. Which mechanisms that are standardized by @@ -2940,8 +2931,9 @@ G.35 Requested Additions to Security Considerations Requested list of methods that need/don't need the server to know the user's plaintext password. (I say 'know' instead of 'store' + -Harrison Expires June 2004 [Page 50] +Harrison Expires July 2004 [Page 50] Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 @@ -2950,7 +2942,7 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 (Source: Hallvard Furuseth) -G.36 Add reference to definition of DIGEST-MD5 +H.36 Add reference to definition of DIGEST-MD5 Need a reference to the definition of DIGEST-MD5 SASL mechanism in section 7.2 (Source: Hallvard Furuseth) @@ -2958,7 +2950,7 @@ G.36 Add reference to definition of DIGEST-MD5 Status: Resolved. A reference to to the DIGEST-MD5 SASL mechanism, [DigestAuth], is included in the -07 revision. -G.37 Clarification on procedure for certificate-based authentication +H.37 Clarification on procedure for certificate-based authentication 8.1. Certificate-based authentication with TLS states: "Following @@ -2967,13 +2959,21 @@ G.37 Clarification on procedure for certificate-based authentication immediately following, or just some time later? Should the wording, "the client will send..." actually read, "the client MUST send..."? -G.38 Effect of Start TLS on authentication state + Status: Resolved. In -10 this text has been absorbed into the SASL + EXTERNAL mechanism section. + +H.38 Effect of Start TLS on authentication state Should the server drop all knowledge of connection, i.e. return to anonymous state, if it gets a Start TLS request on a connection that has successfully bound using the simple method? -G.39 Be sure that there is a consideration in [SCHEMA] that discusses + Status: Resolved. In -09 the effect on an LDAP association by a + Start TLS operation is made a matter of local policy. This is based + on editorÆs perception of WG consensus gaged by conversations at + IETF 58 and subsequent discussion on the WG mail list. + +H.39 Be sure that there is a consideration in [SCHEMA] that discusses multiple password values in userPassword Allowing multiple values obviously does raise a number of security @@ -2985,12 +2985,17 @@ multiple password values in userPassword implementations should be encouraged to provide administrative controls which, if enabled, restrict userPassword to one value. -G.40. Clarify need to verify mapping between authentication identity +H.40. Clarify need to verify mapping between authentication identity and resulting authorization identity on implicit assertion of AuthZID. 4.2.2.3. Error Conditions "For either form of assertion, the server MUST verify that the + +Harrison Expires July 2004 [Page 51] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 + client's authentication identity as supplied in its TLS credentials is permitted to be mapped to the asserted authorization identity." @@ -2999,11 +3004,6 @@ and resulting authorization identity on implicit assertion of AuthZID. IMHO, the mapping can be done as two steps: a). deriving LDAP authentication identity from TLS credentials; If t this steps fails, EXTERNAL mechanism returns failure. - -Harrison Expires June 2004 [Page 51] - -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 - b). verify that the authorization identity is allowed for the derived authentication identity. This is always "noop" for the implicit case. @@ -3017,7 +3017,7 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 This text has been moved to apply only to the explicit assertion case. -G.41. Section 7.2 contains unnecessary and misleading detail. +H.41. Section 7.2 contains unnecessary and misleading detail. " I am not sure why this section is required in the document. DIGEST-MD5 is defined in a separate document and there should be @@ -3037,7 +3037,7 @@ G.41. Section 7.2 contains unnecessary and misleading detail. rfc2831bis. I then dramatically reduced the material in section 7.2 to a bare minimum and let the SASL profile stand on its own. -G.42. Does change for G.41 cause interoperability issue? +H.42. Does change for H.41 cause interoperability issue? There is one issue with the way the authmeth draft is currently written that changes the SASL DIGEST-MD5 behavior on the way the @@ -3049,20 +3049,20 @@ G.42. Does change for G.41 cause interoperability issue? Status: Resolved + + +Harrison Expires July 2004 [Page 52] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 + (10/08/03) This item was discussed on the WG list between 5/2/03 and 5/9/03. Consensus apppears to support the notion that RFC 2829 was in error and that the semantics of RFC 2831 are correct and should be reflected in authmeth. This is already the case as of the -07 draft. -G.43. DIGEST-MD5 Realms recommendations for LDAP +H.43. DIGEST-MD5 Realms recommendations for LDAP - - -Harrison Expires June 2004 [Page 52] - -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 - From http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-sasl-rfc2222bis- 02.txt: A protocol profile SHOULD provide a guidance how realms are to be constructed and used in the protocol and MAY further restrict @@ -3108,7 +3108,12 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 submissions to provide guidance on the use of realm and realm values in LDAP. -G.44. Use of DNs in usernames and realms in DIGEST-MD5 +H.44. Use of DNs in usernames and realms in DIGEST-MD5 + +Harrison Expires July 2004 [Page 53] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 + In reading the discussion on the mailing list, I reach the following conclusions: @@ -3117,11 +3122,6 @@ G.44. Use of DNs in usernames and realms in DIGEST-MD5 these strings allows strings that look like DNs in form, however, DIGEST-MD5 treats them a simple strings for comparision purposes. For example, the DNs cn=roger, o=US and cn=roger,o=us are equivalent - -Harrison Expires June 2004 [Page 53] - -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 - when being compared semantically as DNs, however, these would be considered two different username values in DIGEST-MD5 because simple octet-wise semantics (rather than DN semantics) are used to @@ -3132,7 +3132,7 @@ Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 In -07 revision I added notes to implementors expressing this issue in section 7.2. -G.45: Open Issue: Is Simple+TLS mandatory to implement? +H.45: Open Issue: Is Simple+TLS mandatory to implement? Going forward, it would be much better to clarify that simple +TLS is to be used for DN/password credentials and DIGEST-MD5 @@ -3168,6 +3168,11 @@ Intellectual Property Rights IETF's procedures with respect to rights in standards-track and standards-related documentation can be found in BCP-11. Copies of claims of rights made available for publication and any assurances + +Harrison Expires July 2004 [Page 54] + +Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 + of licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of such proprietary rights by implementors or users of this specification @@ -3176,11 +3181,6 @@ Intellectual Property Rights The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary rights which may cover technology that may be required to practice - -Harrison Expires June 2004 [Page 54] - -Internet-Draft LDAP Authentication Methods 5 December 2003 - this standard. Please address the information to the IETF Executive Director. @@ -3218,14 +3218,6 @@ Full Copyright - - - - - - - - @@ -3236,6 +3228,6 @@ Full Copyright -Harrison Expires June 2004 [Page 55] +Harrison Expires July 2004 [Page 55] diff --git a/doc/drafts/draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-xx.txt b/doc/drafts/draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-xx.txt index da95fd3f3f..49b4a0b8d8 100644 --- a/doc/drafts/draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-xx.txt +++ b/doc/drafts/draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-xx.txt @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT Editor: Kurt D. Zeilenga Intended Category: Standard Track OpenLDAP Foundation -Expires in six months 27 October 2003 +Expires in six months 15 February 2004 Obsoletes: 2253 LDAP: String Representation of Distinguished Names - + @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ Status of Memo Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at . - Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003). All Rights Reserved. + Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). All Rights Reserved. Please see the Full Copyright section near the end of this document for more information. @@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ Status of Memo Zeilenga LDAP: Distinguished Names [Page 1] -INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-12.txt 27 October 2003 +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-13.txt 15 Febrary 2004 Abstract @@ -70,13 +70,6 @@ Abstract names, while being able to represent any distinguished name. -Conventions - - The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", - "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this - document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119]. - - 1. Background and Intended Usage In X.500-based directory systems [X.500], including those accessed @@ -109,25 +102,39 @@ Conventions from its ASN.1 structured representation to a string, all algorithms MUST produce strings which adhere to the requirements of Section 3. + This document does not define a canonical string representation for + DNs. Comparison of DNs for equality is to be performed in accordance + with the distinguishedNameMatch matching rule [Syntaxes]. + + This document is an integral part of the LDAP Technical Specification + [Roadmap]. This document obsoletes RFC 2253. Changes since RFC 2253 + Zeilenga LDAP: Distinguished Names [Page 2] -INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-12.txt 27 October 2003 +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-13.txt 15 Febrary 2004 - This document does not define a canonical string representation for - DNs. Comparison of DNs for equality is to be performed in accordance - with the distinguishedNameMatch matching rule [Syntaxes]. + are summarized in Appendix B. - This document is an integral part of the LDAP Technical Specification - [Roadmap]. + This specification assumes familiarity with X.500 [X.500] and the + concept of Distinguished Name [X.501][Models]. - This document obsoletes RFC 2253. Changes since RFC 2253 are - summarized in Appendix B. - This specification assumes familiarity with X.500 [X.500], and the - concept of Distinguished Name [X.501][Models]. +1.1. Conventions + + The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", + "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this + document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119]. + + Character names in this document use the notation for code points and + names from the Unicode Standard [Unicode]. For example, the letter + "a" may be represented as either or . + + Note: a glossary of terms used in Unicode can be found in [Glossary]. + Information on the Unicode character encoding model can be found in + [CharModel]. 2. Converting DistinguishedName from ASN.1 to a String @@ -148,15 +155,23 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-12.txt 27 October 2003 This section defines the RECOMMENDED algorithm for converting a distinguished name from an ASN.1 structured representation to an UTF-8 - [UTF-8] encoded Universal Character Set (UCS) [ISO10646] character - string representation. Other documents may describe other algorithms - for converting a distinguished name to a string, but only strings - which conform to the grammar defined in Section 3 MUST be produced by - LDAP implementations. + [RFC3629] encoded Unicode [Unicode] character string representation. + Other documents may describe other algorithms for converting a + distinguished name to a string, but only strings which conform to the + grammar defined in Section 3 SHALL be produced by LDAP + implementations. 2.1. Converting the RDNSequence + + + +Zeilenga LDAP: Distinguished Names [Page 3] + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-13.txt 15 Febrary 2004 + + If the RDNSequence is an empty sequence, the result is the empty or zero length string. @@ -165,15 +180,8 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-12.txt 27 October 2003 2.2), starting with the last element of the sequence and moving backwards toward the first. - - -Zeilenga LDAP: Distinguished Names [Page 3] - -INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-12.txt 27 October 2003 - - The encodings of adjoining RelativeDistinguishedNames are separated by - a comma ("," U+002C) character. + a comma (',' U+002C) character. 2.2. Converting RelativeDistinguishedName @@ -183,14 +191,14 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-12.txt 27 October 2003 AttributeTypeAndValue (according to Section 2.3), in any order. Where there is a multi-valued RDN, the outputs from adjoining - AttributeTypeAndValues are separated by a plus sign ("+" U+002B) + AttributeTypeAndValues are separated by a plus sign ('+' U+002B) character. 2.3. Converting AttributeTypeAndValue The AttributeTypeAndValue is encoded as the string representation of - the AttributeType, followed by an equals ("=" U+003D) character, + the AttributeType, followed by an equals ('=' U+003D) character, followed by the string representation of the AttributeValue. The encoding of the AttributeValue is given in Section 2.4. @@ -210,37 +218,38 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-12.txt 27 October 2003 2.4. Converting an AttributeValue from ASN.1 to a String If the AttributeType is of the dotted-decimal form, the AttributeValue - is represented by an number sign ("#" U+0023) character followed by + is represented by an number sign ('#' U+0023) character followed by the hexadecimal encoding of each of the octets of the BER encoding of - the X.500 AttributeValue. This form is also used when the syntax of - the AttributeValue does not have a native string encoding defined for - it or the native string encoding is not restricted to UTF-8 encoded - UCS (or a subset of UCS) characters. This form may also be used in - other cases, such as when a reversible string representation is - desired (see Section 5.2). - - Otherwise, if the AttributeValue is of a syntax which has a native Zeilenga LDAP: Distinguished Names [Page 4] -INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-12.txt 27 October 2003 - +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-13.txt 15 Febrary 2004 - string encoding, the value is converted first to a UTF-8 encoded UCS - string according to its syntax specification (see for example Section - 6 of [Syntaxes]). If that UTF-8 encoded UCS string does not have any - of the following characters which need escaping, then that string can - be used as the string representation of the value. - - a space (" " U+0020) or number sign ("#" U+0023) occurring at + the X.500 AttributeValue. This form is also used when the syntax of + the AttributeValue does not have a LDAP-specific [Syntaxes, Section + 3.1] string encoding defined for it or the LDAP-specific string + encoding is not restricted to UTF-8 encoded Unicode characters. This + form may also be used in other cases, such as when a reversible string + representation is desired (see Section 5.2). + + Otherwise, if the AttributeValue is of a syntax which has a + LDAP-specific string encoding, the value is converted first to a UTF-8 + encoded Unicode string according to its syntax specification (see + [Syntaxes, Section 3.3] for examples). If that UTF-8 encoded Unicode + string does not have any of the following characters which need + escaping, then that string can be used as the string representation of + the value. + + - a space (' ' U+0020) or number sign ('#' U+0023) occurring at the beginning of the string; - - a space (" " U+0020) character occurring at the end of the + - a space (' ' U+0020) character occurring at the end of the string; - - one of the characters """, "+", ",", ";", "<", ">", or "\" + - one of the characters '"', '+', ',', ';', '<', '>', or '\' (U+0022, U+002B, U+002C, U+003B, U+003C, U+003E, or U+005C respectively); @@ -253,11 +262,11 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-12.txt 27 October 2003 character. Alternatively, if and only if the character to be escaped is one of - " ", """, "#", "+", ",", ";", "<", "=", ">", or "\" + ' ', '"', '#', '+', ',', ';', '<', '=', '>', or '\' (U+0020, U+0022, U+0023, U+002B, U+002C, U+003B, U+003C, U+003D, U+003E, U+005C respectively) - it can be prefixed by a backslash ("\" U+0005C). + it can be prefixed by a backslash ('\' U+0005C). Examples of the escaping mechanism are shown in Section 4. @@ -265,34 +274,31 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-12.txt 27 October 2003 3. Parsing a String back to a Distinguished Name The string representation of Distinguished Names is restricted to - UTF-8 [UTF-8] encoded characters from the Universal Character Set - (UCS) [ISO10646]. The structure of this string representation is - specified using the following Augmented BNF [RFC2234] grammar: - - distinguishedName = [ relativeDistinguishedName - *( COMMA relativeDistinguishedName ) ] - - relativeDistinguishedName = attributeTypeAndValue - *( PLUS attributeTypeAndValue ) - - attributeTypeAndValue = attributeType EQUALS attributeValue + UTF-8 [RFC3629] encoded Unicode [Unicode] characters. The structure + of this string representation is specified using the following Zeilenga LDAP: Distinguished Names [Page 5] -INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-12.txt 27 October 2003 +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-13.txt 15 Febrary 2004 - attributeType = descr / numericoid + Augmented BNF [RFC2234] grammar: + distinguishedName = [ relativeDistinguishedName + *( COMMA relativeDistinguishedName ) ] + relativeDistinguishedName = attributeTypeAndValue + *( PLUS attributeTypeAndValue ) + attributeTypeAndValue = attributeType EQUALS attributeValue + attributeType = descr / numericoid attributeValue = string / hexstring - ; The UTF-8 string shall not contain NULL, ESC, or - ; one of escaped, shall not start with SHARP or SPACE, - ; and shall must not end with SPACE. + ; The following characters are to be escaped when they appear + ; in the value to be encoded: ESC, one of , leading + ; SHARP or SPACE, trailing SPACE, and NULL. string = [ (leadchar / pair) - [ *( stringchar / pair ) ( trailchar / pair ) ] ] + [ *( stringchar / pair ) ( trailchar / pair ) ] ] leadchar = LUTF1 / UTFMB LUTF1 = %x01-1F / %x21 / %x24-2A / %x2D-3A / @@ -307,13 +313,9 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-12.txt 27 October 2003 %x3D / %x3F-5B / %x5D-7F pair = ESC ( ESC / special / hexpair ) - special = escaped / SPACE / SHARP / EQUALS - escaped = DQUOTE / PLUS / COMMA / SEMI / LANGLE / RANGLE - hexstring = SHARP 1*hexpair - hexpair = HEX HEX where the productions , , , , @@ -330,15 +332,15 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-12.txt 27 October 2003 appearing in the as follows: replace with ; replace with ; - replace with the octet indicated by the . - Zeilenga LDAP: Distinguished Names [Page 6] -INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-12.txt 27 October 2003 +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-13.txt 15 Febrary 2004 + + replace with the octet indicated by the . If in form, a BER representation can be obtained from converting each of the to the octet indicated by @@ -366,56 +368,53 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-12.txt 27 October 2003 DC domainComponent (0.9.2342.19200300.100.1.25) UID userId (0.9.2342.19200300.100.1.1) - Implementations MAY recognize other DN string representations - (such as that described in RFC 1779). However, as there is no - requirement that alternative DN string representations to be - recognized (and, if so, how), implementations SHOULD only generate - DN strings in accordance with Section 2 of this document. + Implementations MAY recognize other DN string representations (such as + that described in RFC 1779). However, as there is no requirement that + alternative DN string representations to be recognized (and, if so, + how), implementations SHOULD only generate DN strings in accordance + with Section 2 of this document. 4. Examples - This notation is designed to be convenient for common forms of - name. This section gives a few examples of distinguished names - written using this notation. First is a name containing three - relative distinguished names (RDNs): - - UID=jsmith,DC=example,DC=net + This notation is designed to be convenient for common forms of name. + This section gives a few examples of distinguished names written using + this notation. First is a name containing three relative + distinguished names (RDNs): - Here is an example name containing three RDNs, in which the first - RDN is multi-valued: + UID=jsmith,DC=example,DC=net - OU=Sales+CN=J. Smith,DC=example,DC=net + Here is an example name containing three RDNs, in which the first RDN + is multi-valued: - This example shows the method of escaping of a comma in a common + OU=Sales+CN=J. Smith,DC=example,DC=net Zeilenga LDAP: Distinguished Names [Page 7] -INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-12.txt 27 October 2003 +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-13.txt 15 Febrary 2004 - name: + This example shows the method of escaping of a comma in a common name: - CN=John Smith\, III,DC=example,DC=net + CN=John Smith\, III,DC=example,DC=net - An example name in which a value contains a carriage return - character: + An example name in which a value contains a carriage return character: - CN=Before\0dAfter,DC=example,DC=net + CN=Before\0dAfter,DC=example,DC=net - An example name in which an RDN was of an unrecognized type. The - value is the BER encoding of an OCTET STRING containing two octets - 0x48 and 0x69. + An example name in which an RDN was of an unrecognized type. The + value is the BER encoding of an OCTET STRING containing two octets + 0x48 and 0x69. - 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.0=#04024869,DC=example,DC=com + 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.0=#04024869,DC=example,DC=com - Finally, an example of an RDN commonName value consisting of 5 - letters: + Finally, an example of an RDN commonName value consisting of 5 + letters: - Unicode Letter Description UCS code UTF-8 Escaped - ------------------------------- -------- ------ -------- + Unicode Character Code UTF-8 Escaped + ------------------------------- ------ ------ -------- LATIN CAPITAL LETTER L U+004C 0x4C L LATIN SMALL LETTER U U+0075 0x75 u LATIN SMALL LETTER C WITH CARON U+010D 0xC48D \C4\8D @@ -444,15 +443,15 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-12.txt 27 October 2003 - the common name of the object (i.e. a person's full name) - an email or TCP/IP address + - its physical location (country, locality, city, street address) Zeilenga LDAP: Distinguished Names [Page 8] -INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-12.txt 27 October 2003 +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-13.txt 15 Febrary 2004 - - its physical location (country, locality, city, street address) - organizational attributes (such as department name or affiliation) Most countries have privacy laws regarding the publication of @@ -470,9 +469,9 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-12.txt 27 October 2003 For example, a distinguished name consisting of one RDN with one AVA, in which the type is commonName and the value is of the TeletexString choice with the letters 'Sam' would be represented in LDAP as the - string CN=Sam. Another distinguished name in which the value is still - 'Sam' but of the PrintableString choice would have the same - representation CN=Sam. + string . Another distinguished name in which the value is + still 'Sam' but of the PrintableString choice would have the same + representation . Applications which require the reconstruction of the DER form of the value SHOULD NOT use the string representation of attribute syntaxes @@ -500,15 +499,14 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-12.txt 27 October 2003 [X.501] International Telecommunication Union - Telecommunication Standardization Sector, "The Directory + -- Models," X.501(1993) (also ISO/IEC 9594-2:1994). Zeilenga LDAP: Distinguished Names [Page 9] -INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-12.txt 27 October 2003 - +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-13.txt 15 Febrary 2004 - -- Models," X.501(1993) (also ISO/IEC 9594-2:1994). [X.680] International Telecommunication Union - Telecommunication Standardization Sector, "Abstract @@ -521,9 +519,16 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-12.txt 27 October 2003 [RFC2234] Crocker, D. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax Specifications: ABNF", RFC 2234, November 1997. - [UTF-8] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO - 10646", draft-yergeau-rfc2279bis-xx.txt, a work in - progress. + [RFC3329] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO + 10646", RFC 3329 (also STD 64), November 2003. + + [Unicode] The Unicode Consortium, "The Unicode Standard, Version + 3.2.0" is defined by "The Unicode Standard, Version 3.0" + (Reading, MA, Addison-Wesley, 2000. ISBN 0-201-61633-5), + as amended by the "Unicode Standard Annex #27: Unicode + 3.1" (http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr27/) and by the + "Unicode Standard Annex #28: Unicode 3.2" + (http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr28/). [Models] Zeilenga, K. (editor), "LDAP: Directory Information Models", draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-xx.txt, a work in @@ -543,11 +548,6 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-12.txt 27 October 2003 draft-ietf-ldapbis-user-schema-xx.txt, a work in progress. - [ISO10646] International Organization for Standardization, - "Universal Multiple-Octet Coded Character Set (UCS) - - Architecture and Basic Multilingual Plane", ISO/IEC - 10646-1 : 1993. - [REGISTRY] IANA, Object Identifier Descriptors Registry, . @@ -561,7 +561,7 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-12.txt 27 October 2003 Zeilenga LDAP: Distinguished Names [Page 10] -INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-12.txt 27 October 2003 +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-13.txt 15 Febrary 2004 [X.500] International Telecommunication Union - @@ -582,6 +582,14 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-12.txt 27 October 2003 [BCP64bis] Zeilenga, K., "IANA Considerations for LDAP", draft- ietf-ldapbis-bcp64-xx.txt, a work in progress. + [CharModel] Whistler, K. and M. Davis, "Unicode Technical Report + #17, Character Encoding Model", UTR17, + , August + 2000. + + [Glossary] The Unicode Consortium, "Unicode Glossary", + . + Appendix A. Presentation Issues @@ -601,8 +609,16 @@ Appendix A. Presentation Issues to users. This section is not comprehensive, it does not discuss all presentation issues which implementors may face. - Not all user interfaces are capable of displaying the full set of UCS - characters. Some UCS characters are not displayable. + Not all user interfaces are capable of displaying the full set of + Unicode characters. Some Unicode characters are not displayable. + + + + +Zeilenga LDAP: Distinguished Names [Page 11] + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-13.txt 15 Febrary 2004 + It is recommended that human interfaces use the optional hex pair escaping mechanism (Section 2.3) to produce a string representation @@ -612,24 +628,16 @@ Appendix A. Presentation Issues demonstrated in the final example of Section 4). When a DN string is displayed in free form text, it is often necessary - - - -Zeilenga LDAP: Distinguished Names [Page 11] - -INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-12.txt 27 October 2003 - - to distinguish the DN string from surrounding text. While this is often done with white space (as demonstrated in Section 4), it is noted that DN strings may end with white space. Careful readers of - Section 3 will note that characters "<" (U+003C) and ">" (U+003E) may + Section 3 will note that characters '<' (U+003C) and '>' (U+003E) may only appear in the DN string if escaped. These characters are intended to be used in free form text to distinguish a DN string from surrounding text. For example, distinguished the string representation of the DN comprised of one RDN consisting of the AVA: - the commonName (CN) value "Sam " from the surrounding text. It should - be noted to the user that the wrapping "<" and ">" characters are not + the commonName (CN) value 'Sam ' from the surrounding text. It should + be noted to the user that the wrapping '<' and '>' characters are not part of the DN string. DN strings can be quite long. It is often desirable to line-wrap @@ -660,6 +668,14 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-12.txt 27 October 2003 objectClass: person + + + +Zeilenga LDAP: Distinguished Names [Page 12] + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-13.txt 15 Febrary 2004 + + Appendix B. Changes made since RFC 2253 This appendix is provided for informational purposes only, it is not a @@ -667,15 +683,8 @@ Appendix B. Changes made since RFC 2253 The following substantive changes were made to RFC 2253: - Removed IESG Note. The IESG Note has been addressed. + - Replaced all references to ISO 10646-1 with [Unicode]. - Clarified (in Section 1) that this document does not define a - - - -Zeilenga LDAP: Distinguished Names [Page 12] - -INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-12.txt 27 October 2003 - - canonical string representation. - Revised specification (in Section 2) to allow short names of any registered attribute type to appear in string representations of @@ -691,8 +700,8 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-12.txt 27 October 2003 - Updated Section 2.3 to indicate attribute type name strings are case insensitive. - Updated Section 2.4 to allow hex pair escaping of all characters - and clarified escaping for when multiple octet UTF-8 characters - are present. + and clarified escaping for when multiple octet UTF-8 echodings are + present. - Rewrote Section 3 to use ABNF as defined in RFC 2234. - Rewrote Section 3 ABNF to be consistent with 2.4. - Updated Section 3 to describe how to parse elements of the @@ -715,6 +724,14 @@ Intellectual Property Rights might not be available; neither does it represent that it has made any effort to identify any such rights. Information on the IETF's procedures with respect to rights in standards-track and + + + +Zeilenga LDAP: Distinguished Names [Page 13] + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-13.txt 15 Febrary 2004 + + standards-related documentation can be found in BCP-11. Copies of claims of rights made available for publication and any assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to @@ -724,14 +741,6 @@ Intellectual Property Rights The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary - - - -Zeilenga LDAP: Distinguished Names [Page 13] - -INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-12.txt 27 October 2003 - - rights which may cover technology that may be required to practice this standard. Please address the information to the IETF Executive Director. @@ -740,11 +749,11 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-dn-12.txt 27 October 2003 Full Copyright - Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003). All Rights Reserved. + Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). All Rights Reserved. This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it - or assist in its implmentation may be prepared, copied, published and + or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this @@ -765,15 +774,6 @@ Full Copyright - - - - - - - - - diff --git a/doc/drafts/draft-ietf-ldapbis-filter-xx.txt b/doc/drafts/draft-ietf-ldapbis-filter-xx.txt index 8ef1d3ed2a..a82828c4d3 100644 --- a/doc/drafts/draft-ietf-ldapbis-filter-xx.txt +++ b/doc/drafts/draft-ietf-ldapbis-filter-xx.txt @@ -1,18 +1,13 @@ - - - - - Network Working Group M. Smith, Editor -Request for Comments: DRAFT Netscape Communications Corp. +Request for Comments: DRAFT Pearl Crescent, LLC Obsoletes: RFC 2254 T. Howes -Expires: 25 April 2004 Opsware, Inc. - 25 October 2003 +Expires: 13 August 2004 Opsware, Inc. + 13 February 2004 LDAP: String Representation of Search Filters - + @@ -41,7 +36,7 @@ Expires: 25 April 2004 Opsware, Inc. Revision (ldapbis) Working Group mailing list . - Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003). All Rights Reserved. + Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). All Rights Reserved. 2. Abstract @@ -57,7 +52,7 @@ Expires: 25 April 2004 Opsware, Inc. Smith & Howes Intended Category: Standards Track [Page 1] -INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 25 October 2003 +INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 13 February 2004 3. Table of Contents @@ -74,9 +69,9 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 25 October 2003 10. Informative References.........................................8 11. Intellectual Property Rights...................................8 12. Acknowledgments................................................8 -13. Authors' Address...............................................8 +13. Authors' Addresses.............................................9 14. Full Copyright Statement.......................................9 -15. Appendix A: Changes Since RFC 2254.............................9 +15. Appendix A: Changes Since RFC 2254.............................10 15.1. Technical Changes...........................................10 15.2. Editorial Changes...........................................10 16. Appendix B: Changes Since Previous Document Revision...........11 @@ -113,12 +108,12 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 25 October 2003 Smith & Howes Intended Category: Standards Track [Page 2] -INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 25 October 2003 +INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 13 February 2004 Filter ::= CHOICE { - and [0] SET SIZE (1..MAX) OF Filter, - or [1] SET SIZE (1..MAX) OF Filter, + and [0] SET SIZE (1..MAX) OF filter Filter, + or [1] SET SIZE (1..MAX) OF filter Filter, not [2] Filter, equalityMatch [3] AttributeValueAssertion, substrings [4] SubstringFilter, @@ -130,9 +125,8 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 25 October 2003 SubstringFilter ::= SEQUENCE { type AttributeDescription, - -- at least one must be present, -- initial and final can occur at most once - substrings SEQUENCE OF CHOICE { + substrings SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF substring CHOICE { initial [0] AssertionValue, any [1] AssertionValue, final [2] AssertionValue } } @@ -148,7 +142,7 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 25 October 2003 dnAttributes [4] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE } AttributeDescription ::= LDAPString - -- Constrained to attributedescription + -- Constrained to -- [Models] AttributeValue ::= OCTET STRING @@ -158,32 +152,31 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 25 October 2003 AssertionValue ::= OCTET STRING LDAPString ::= OCTET STRING -- UTF-8 encoded, - -- ISO 10646 characters + -- [ISO10646] characters - where the LDAPString above is limited to the UTF-8 encoding [UTF-8] - of the ISO 10646 character set [ISO10646]. The AttributeDescription - is a string representation of the attribute description and is - defined in [Protocol]. The AttributeValue and AssertionValue OCTET + The AttributeDescription is a string representation of the attribute + description and is defined in [Protocol]. The AttributeValue and + AssertionValue OCTET STRING have the form defined in [Syntaxes]. The + Filter is encoded for transmission over a network using the Basic + Encoding Rules defined in [X.690], with simplifications described in Smith & Howes Intended Category: Standards Track [Page 3] -INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 25 October 2003 +INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 13 February 2004 - STRING have the form defined in [Syntaxes]. The Filter is encoded - for transmission over a network using the Basic Encoding Rules - defined in [ASN.1], with simplifications described in [Protocol]. + [Protocol]. 6. String Search Filter Definition The string representation of an LDAP search filter is a string of - UTF-8 encoded ISO 10646-1 characters that is defined by the following - grammar, following the ABNF notation defined in [RFC2234]. The - productions used that are not defined here are defined in section 1.3 - (Common ABNF Productions) of [Models] unless otherwise noted. The - filter format uses a prefix notation. + UTF-8[RFC3629] encoded ISO 10646-1 characters that is defined by the + following grammar, following the ABNF notation defined in [RFC2234]. + The productions used that are not defined here are defined in section + 1.4 (Common ABNF Productions) of [Models] unless otherwise noted. + The filter format uses a prefix notation. filter = LPAREN filtercomp RPAREN filtercomp = and / or / not / item @@ -220,16 +213,16 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 25 October 2003 UTF1SUBSET = %x01-27 / %x2B-5B / %x5D-7F ; UTF1SUBSET excludes 0x00 (NUL), LPAREN, ; RPAREN, ASTERISK, and ESC. + EXCLAMATION = %x21 ; exclamation mark ("!") + AMPERSAND = %x26 ; ampersand (or AND symbol) ("&") Smith & Howes Intended Category: Standards Track [Page 4] -INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 25 October 2003 +INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 13 February 2004 - EXCLAMATION = %x21 ; exclamation mark ("!") - AMPERSAND = %x26 ; ampersand (or AND symbol) ("&") ASTERISK = %x2A ; asterisk ("*") COLON = %x3A ; colon (":") VERTBAR = %x7C ; vertical bar (or pipe) ("|") @@ -264,9 +257,9 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 25 October 2003 As indicated by the valueencoding rule, implementations MUST escape all octets greater than 0x7F that are not part of a valid UTF-8 encoding sequence when they generate a string representation of a - search filter. Implementations SHOULD accept as input a string that - includes invalid UTF-8 octet sequences. This is necessary because RFC - 2254 did not clearly define the term "string representation" (and in + search filter. Implementations SHOULD accept as input strings that + are not valid UTF-8 strings. This is necessary because RFC 2254 did + not clearly define the term "string representation" (and in particular did not mention that the string representation of an LDAP search filter is a string of UTF-8 encoded ISO 10646-1 characters). @@ -276,16 +269,16 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 25 October 2003 this notation. (cn=Babs Jensen) + (!(cn=Tim Howes)) + (&(objectClass=Person)(|(sn=Jensen)(cn=Babs J*))) Smith & Howes Intended Category: Standards Track [Page 5] -INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 25 October 2003 +INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 13 February 2004 - (!(cn=Tim Howes)) - (&(objectClass=Person)(|(sn=Jensen)(cn=Babs J*))) (o=univ*of*mich*) (seeAlso=) @@ -303,10 +296,11 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 25 October 2003 The second example demonstrates use of a MatchingRuleAssertion form without a matchingRule. - The third example illustrates the use of the ":dn" notation to + The third example illustrates the use of the ":oid" notation to indicate that matching rule "2.4.6.8.10" should be used when making comparisons, and that the attributes of an entry's distinguished name - should be considered part of the entry when evaluating the match. + should be considered part of the entry when evaluating the match + (indicated by the use of ":dn"). The fourth example denotes an equality match, except that DN components should be considered part of the entry when doing the @@ -332,15 +326,15 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 25 October 2003 The first example shows the use of the escaping mechanism to represent parenthesis characters. The second shows how to represent a "*" in an assertion value, preventing it from being interpreted as a + substring indicator. The third illustrates the escaping of the Smith & Howes Intended Category: Standards Track [Page 6] -INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 25 October 2003 +INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 13 February 2004 - substring indicator. The third illustrates the escaping of the backslash character. The fourth example shows a filter searching for the four-byte value @@ -366,44 +360,46 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 25 October 2003 9. Normative References - [ASN.1] Specification of ASN.1 encoding rules: Basic, Canonical, and - Distinguished Encoding Rules, ITU-T Recommendation X.690, 1994. +[AuthMeth] Harrison, R. (editor), "LDAP: Authentication Methods and + Connection Level Security Mechanisms", draft-ietf-ldapbis- + authmeth-xx.txt, a work in progress. - [AuthMeth] Harrison, R. (editor), "LDAP: Authentication Methods and - Connection Level Security Mechanisms", draft-ietf-ldapbis-authmeth- - xx.txt, a work in progress. +[ISO10646] Universal Multiple-Octet Coded Character Set (UCS) - + Architecture and Basic Multilingual Plane, ISO/IEC 10646-1, + 1993. - [ISO10646] Universal Multiple-Octet Coded Character Set (UCS) - - Architecture and Basic Multilingual Plane, ISO/IEC 10646-1, 1993. +[Models] Zeilenga, K. (editor), "LDAP: Directory Information Models", + draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-xx.txt, a work in progress. - [Models] Zeilenga, K. (editor), "LDAP: Directory Information Models", - draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-xx.txt, a work in progress. +[Protocol] draft-ietf-ldapbis-protocol-xx.txt, a work in progress. - [Protocol] Sermersheim, J. (editor), "LDAP: The Protocol", draft- - ietf-ldapbis-protocol-xx.txt, a work in progress. +[RFC2119] S. Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate + Requirement Levels", BCP 14 (also RFC 2119), March 1997. - [RFC2119] S. Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate - Requirement Levels", BCP 14 (also RFC 2119), March 1997. +[RFC2234] Crocker, D., Overell, P., "Augmented BNF for Syntax + Specifications: ABNF", RFC 2234, November 1997. + +[RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646", + RFC 3629, November 2003. - [RFC2234] Crocker, D., Overell, P., "Augmented BNF for Syntax - Specifications: ABNF", RFC 2234, November 1997. Smith & Howes Intended Category: Standards Track [Page 7] -INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 25 October 2003 +INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 13 February 2004 - [Roadmap] Zeilenga, K. (editor), "LDAP: Technical Specification Road - Map", draft-ietf-ldapbis-roadmap-xx.txt, a work in progress. +[Roadmap] Zeilenga, K. (editor), "LDAP: Technical Specification Road + Map", draft-ietf-ldapbis-roadmap-xx.txt, a work in progress. - [Syntaxes] Dally, K. (editor), "LDAP: Syntaxes", draft-ietf-ldapbis- - syntaxes-xx.txt, a work in progress. +[Syntaxes] Dally, K. (editor), "LDAP: Syntaxes", draft-ietf-ldapbis- + syntaxes-xx.txt, a work in progress. - [UTF-8] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646", - draft-yergeau-rfc2279bis-xx.txt, a work in progress. +[X.690] Specification of ASN.1 encoding rules: Basic, Canonical, and + Distinguished Encoding Rules, ITU-T Recommendation X.690, + 1994. 10. Informative References @@ -441,23 +437,25 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 25 October 2003 acknowledged. -13. Authors' Address - Mark Smith, Editor + Smith & Howes Intended Category: Standards Track [Page 8] -INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 25 October 2003 +INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 13 February 2004 - Netscape Communications Corp. - 360 W. Caribbean Drive - Sunnyvale, CA 94089 +13. Authors' Addresses + + Mark Smith, Editor + Pearl Crescent, LLC + 447 Marlpool Dr. + Saline, MI 48176 USA - +1 650 937-3477 - MarkCSmithWork@aol.com + +1 734 944-2856 + mcs@pearlcrescent.com Tim Howes Opsware, Inc. @@ -469,7 +467,7 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 25 October 2003 14. Full Copyright Statement - Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003). All Rights Reserved. + Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). All Rights Reserved. This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it @@ -496,18 +494,17 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 25 October 2003 MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. -15. Appendix A: Changes Since RFC 2254 - - Smith & Howes Intended Category: Standards Track [Page 9] -INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 25 October 2003 +INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 13 February 2004 +15. Appendix A: Changes Since RFC 2254 + 15.1. Technical Changes The following technical changes were made to the contents of the @@ -554,16 +551,16 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 25 October 2003 "Abstract" section: separated from introductory material. - "Introduction" section: new section; separated from the Abstract. - Updated second paragraph to indicate that RFC 2254 is replaced by Smith & Howes Intended Category: Standards Track [Page 10] -INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 25 October 2003 +INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 13 February 2004 + "Introduction" section: new section; separated from the Abstract. + Updated second paragraph to indicate that RFC 2254 is replaced by this document (instead of RFC 1960). Added reference to the [Roadmap] document. @@ -579,8 +576,9 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 25 October 2003 "Examples" section: added four additional examples: (seeAlso=), (cn:=Betty Rubble), (:1.2.3:=Wilma Flintstone), and - (1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.0=\04\02\48\69). Replaced one occurrence of "a - value" with "an assertion value". + (1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.0=\04\02\48\69). Replaced one occurrence of "a + value" with "an assertion value". Corrected the description of this + example: (sn:dn:2.4.6.8.10:=Barney Rubble). "Security Considerations" section: added references to [Protocol] and [AuthMeth]. @@ -604,54 +602,51 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 25 October 2003 16. Appendix B: Changes Since Previous Document Revision This appendix lists all changes relative to the previously published - revision, draft-ietf-ldapbis-filter-04.txt. Note that when + revision, draft-ietf-ldapbis-filter-05.txt. Note that when appropriate these changes are also included in Appendix A, but are also included here for the benefit of the people who have already - reviewed draft-ietf-ldapbis-filter-04.txt. This section will be + reviewed draft-ietf-ldapbis-filter-05.txt. This section will be removed before this document is published as an RFC. - - - Smith & Howes Intended Category: Standards Track [Page 11] -INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 25 October 2003 +INTERNET-DRAFT LDAP: String Repres. of Search Filters 13 February 2004 16.1. Technical Changes - "Examples" section: Removed the (:=Fred Flintstone) example which is - not allowed by the protocol. + None. 16.2. Editorial Changes - "String Search Filter Definition" section: Revised the last two - sentences in this section to improve clarity (the updated text now - begins with the text "Implementations SHOULD accept as input a string - that includes...." - - Replaced all occurrences of "asterix" with the correctly spelled - "asterisk." - - "Normative References" section: changed UTF-8 reference to point to - the UTF-8 Internet Draft. - - "Intellectual Property Rights" section: added. - - Author's Addresses section: New email address for Mark Smith. + "LDAP Search Filter Definition" section: changed the LDAPv3 search + filter ABNF so it matches that used in the latest revision of + [Protocol] and removed the following redundant descriptive text: + "where the LDAPString above is limited to the UTF-8 encoding [UTF-8] + of the ISO 10646 character set [ISO10646]." - "Full Copyright Statement" section: updated text to match latest IETF - guidelines. + "String Search Filter Definition" section: Corrected section + reference to [Models] and replaced this sentence: "Implementations + SHOULD accept as input a string that includes invalid UTF-8 octet + sequences." with the following: "Implementations SHOULD accept as + input strings that are not valid UTF-8 strings." + "Examples" section: Corrected the description of this example: + (sn:dn:2.4.6.8.10:=Barney Rubble). -This Internet Draft expires on 25 April 2004. + "Normative References" section: changed UTF-8 reference to point to + RFC 3629, replaced [ASN.1] with [X.690] for consistency, and indented + the reference descriptions to enhance readability. + Authors' Addresses section: New contact information for Mark Smith. + Updated the copyright year to 2004. +This Internet Draft expires on 13 August 2004. @@ -673,3 +668,4 @@ This Internet Draft expires on 25 April 2004. Smith & Howes Intended Category: Standards Track [Page 12] + diff --git a/doc/drafts/draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-xx.txt b/doc/drafts/draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-xx.txt index 90b6048534..a6fb726a06 100644 --- a/doc/drafts/draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-xx.txt +++ b/doc/drafts/draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-xx.txt @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT Editor: Kurt D. Zeilenga Intended Category: Standard Track OpenLDAP Foundation -Expires in six months 27 October 2003 +Expires in six months 15 February 2004 Obsoletes: RFC 2251, RFC 2252, RFC 2256 LDAP: Directory Information Models - + @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ Status of this Memo Distribution of this memo is unlimited. Technical discussion of this document will take place on the IETF LDAP Revision Working Group mailing list . Please send editorial - comments directly to the author . + comments directly to the editor . Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ Status of this Memo Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at . - Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003). All Rights Reserved. + Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). All Rights Reserved. Please see the Full Copyright section near the end of this document for more information. @@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ Abstract Zeilenga LDAP Models [Page 1] -INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-09 27 October 2003 +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-10 15 February 2004 Table of Contents @@ -80,43 +80,40 @@ Table of Contents 3. Directory Administrative and Operational Information 17 3.1. Subtrees 3.2. Subentries - 3.3. The 'objectClass' attribute 18 - 3.4. Operational attributes + 3.3. The 'objectClass' attribute + 3.4. Operational attributes 18 4. Directory Schema 21 4.1. Schema Definitions 22 4.2. Subschema Subentries 31 - 4.3. 'extensibleObject' 34 - 4.4. Subschema Discovery 35 + 4.3. 'extensibleObject' 35 + 4.4. Subschema Discovery 5. DSA (Server) Informational Model 5.1. Server-specific Data Requirements 36 6. Other Considerations 39 6.1. Preservation of User Information - 6.2. Short Names - 6.3. Cache and Shadowing 40 + 6.2. Short Names 40 + 6.3. Cache and Shadowing 7. Implementation Guidelines 7.1. Server Guidelines 7.2. Client Guidelines 41 8. Security Considerations - 9. IANA Considerations - 10. Acknowledgments 42 - 11. Author's Address - 12. References 43 + 9. IANA Considerations 42 + 10. Acknowledgments 43 + 11. Editor's Address + 12. References 12.1. Normative References - 12.2. Informative References 44 + 12.2. Informative References 45 Appendix A. Changes - A.1 Changes to RFC 2251 44 - A.2 Changes to RFC 2252 46 - A.3 Changes to RFC 2256 48 - Intellectual Property Rights + Intellectual Property Rights 49 + Full Copyright -Zeilenga LDAP Models [Page 2] - -INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-09 27 October 2003 - Full Copyright 49 +Zeilenga LDAP Models [Page 2] + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-10 15 February 2004 1. Introduction @@ -150,10 +147,10 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-09 27 October 2003 Section 4 discusses the subschema information model and subschema discovery. Section 5 discusses the DSA (Server) Informational Model. - Other X.500 information models, such as access control, collective - attribute, distribution knowledge, and replication knowledge - information models, may be adapted for use in LDAP. Specification of - how these models apply to LDAP is left to future documents. + Other X.500 information models, such as access control distribution + knowledge, and replication knowledge information models, may be + adapted for use in LDAP. Specification of how these models apply to + LDAP is left to future documents. 1.1. Relationship to Other LDAP Specifications @@ -164,16 +161,16 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-09 27 October 2003 This document obsoletes RFC 2251 sections 3.2 and 3.4, as well as portions of sections 4 and 6. Appendix A.1 summaries changes to these + sections. The remainder of RFC 2251 is obsoleted by the [Protocol], + [AuthMeth], and [Roadmap] documents. + Zeilenga LDAP Models [Page 3] -INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-09 27 October 2003 - +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-10 15 February 2004 - sections. The remainder of RFC 2251 is obsoleted by the [Protocol], - [AuthMeth], and [Roadmap] documents. This document obsoletes RFC 2252 sections 4, 5 and 7. Appendix A.2 summaries changes to these sections. The remainder of RFC 2252 is @@ -186,7 +183,7 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-09 27 October 2003 1.2. Relationship to X.501 - This document includes material, with and without adaptation, from the + This document includes material, with and without adaptation, from [X.501]. The material in this document takes precedence over that in [X.501]. @@ -213,49 +210,46 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-09 27 October 2003 keystring = leadkeychar *keychar leadkeychar = ALPHA keychar = ALPHA / DIGIT / HYPHEN + number = DIGIT / ( LDIGIT 1*DIGIT ) - number = DIGIT / ( LDIGIT 1*DIGIT ) - - ALPHA = %x41-5A / %x61-7A ; "A"-"Z" / "a"-"z" - DIGIT = %x30 / LDIGIT ; "0"-"9" - LDIGIT = %x31-39 ; "1"-"9" + ALPHA = UALPHA / %x61-7A ; "A"-"Z" / "a"-"z" + UALPHA = %x41-5A ; "A"-"Z" + DIGIT = %x30 / LDIGIT ; "0"-"9" + LDIGIT = %x31-39 ; "1"-"9" + HEX = DIGIT / %x41-46 / %x61-66 ; "0"-"9" / "A"-"F" / "a"-"f" + SP = 1*SPACE ; one or more " " + WSP = 0*SPACE ; zero or more " " Zeilenga LDAP Models [Page 4] -INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-09 27 October 2003 - - - HEX = DIGIT / %x41-46 / %x61-66 ; 0-9 / A-F / a-f - - SP = 1*SPACE ; one or more " " - WSP = 0*SPACE ; zero or more " " - - NULL = %x00 ; null (0) - SPACE = %x20 ; space (" ") - DQUOTE = %x22 ; quote (""") - SHARP = %x23 ; octothorpe (or sharp sign) ("#") - DOLLAR = %x24 ; dollar sign ("$") - SQUOTE = %x27 ; single quote ("'") - LPAREN = %x28 ; left paren ("(") - RPAREN = %x29 ; right paren (")") - PLUS = %x2B ; plus sign ("+") - COMMA = %x2C ; comma (",") - HYPHEN = %x2D ; hyphen ("-") - DOT = %x2E ; period (".") - SEMI = %x3B ; semicolon (";") - LANGLE = %x3C ; left angle bracket ("<") - EQUALS = %x3D ; equals sign ("=") - RANGLE = %x3E ; right angle bracket (">") - X = %x58 ; uppercase x ("X") - ESC = %x5C ; backslash ("\") - USCORE = %x5F ; underscore ("_") - LCURLY = %x7B ; left curly brace "{" - RCURLY = %x7D ; right curly brace "}" - - ; Any UTF-8 character +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-10 15 February 2004 + + + NULL = %x00 ; null (0) + SPACE = %x20 ; space (" ") + DQUOTE = %x22 ; quote (""") + SHARP = %x23 ; octothorpe (or sharp sign) ("#") + DOLLAR = %x24 ; dollar sign ("$") + SQUOTE = %x27 ; single quote ("'") + LPAREN = %x28 ; left paren ("(") + RPAREN = %x29 ; right paren (")") + PLUS = %x2B ; plus sign ("+") + COMMA = %x2C ; comma (",") + HYPHEN = %x2D ; hyphen ("-") + DOT = %x2E ; period (".") + SEMI = %x3B ; semicolon (";") + LANGLE = %x3C ; left angle bracket ("<") + EQUALS = %x3D ; equals sign ("=") + RANGLE = %x3E ; right angle bracket (">") + ESC = %x5C ; backslash ("\") + USCORE = %x5F ; underscore ("_") + LCURLY = %x7B ; left curly brace "{" + RCURLY = %x7D ; right curly brace "}" + + ; Any UTF-8 [UTF-8] encoded UCS [ISO10646] character UTF8 = UTF1 / UTFMB UTFMB = UTF2 / UTF3 / UTF4 UTF0 = %x80-BF @@ -266,30 +260,29 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-09 27 October 2003 UTF4 = %xF0 %x90-BF 2(UTF0) / %xF1-F3 3(UTF0) / %xF4 %x80-8F 2(UTF0) - ; Any octet - OCTET = %x00-FF + OCTET = %x00-FF ; Any octet Object identifiers (OIDs) [X.680] are represented in LDAP using a dot- decimal format conforming to the ABNF: - numericoid = number *( DOT number ) + numericoid = number 1*( DOT number ) Short names, also known as descriptors, are used as more readable aliases for object identifiers. Short names are case insensitive and + conform to the ABNF: + descr = keystring + Where either an object identifier or a short name may be specified, + the following production is used: -Zeilenga LDAP Models [Page 5] - -INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-09 27 October 2003 - conform to the ABNF: - descr = keystring +Zeilenga LDAP Models [Page 5] + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-10 15 February 2004 - Where either an object identifier or a short name may be specified, - the following production is used: oid = descr / numericoid @@ -301,10 +294,8 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-09 27 October 2003 identify multiple kinds of objects or when an unambiguous short name (descriptor) is not available. - When the form is used, the representation SHALL be considered - invalid if the usage is not restricted as discussed above or the - implementation cannot determine unambiguously which object identifier - the refers to. + Implementations SHOULD treat short names (descriptors) used in an + unambiguous manner (as discussed above) as unrecognized. Short Names (descriptors) are discussed further in Section 6.2. @@ -333,13 +324,6 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-09 27 October 2003 provides alternative naming. A subentry holds administrative and/or operational information. - - -Zeilenga LDAP Models [Page 6] - -INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-09 27 October 2003 - - The set of entries representing the DIB are organized hierarchically in a tree structure known as the Directory Information Tree (DIT). @@ -348,6 +332,14 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-09 27 October 2003 Section 2.3 discusses the structure of entries. Section 2.4 discusses object classes. Section 2.5 discusses attribute descriptions. + + + +Zeilenga LDAP Models [Page 6] + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-10 15 February 2004 + + Section 2.6 discusses alias entries. @@ -389,19 +381,21 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-09 27 October 2003 immediate subordinates of the entry's immediate superior (i.e., all siblings). + The following are examples of string representations of RDNs [LDAPDN]: - -Zeilenga LDAP Models [Page 7] - -INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-09 27 October 2003 - - - The following are example string representations of RDNs [LDAPDN]: UID=12345 OU=Engineering CN=Kurt Zeilenga+L=Redwood Shores The last is an example of a multi-valued RDN. That is, an RDN + + + +Zeilenga LDAP Models [Page 7] + +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-10 15 February 2004 + + composed of multiple AVAs. @@ -410,7 +404,7 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-09 27 October 2003 An entry's fully qualified name, known as its Distinguished Name (DN) [X.501], is the concatenation of its RDN and its immediate superior's DN. A Distinguished Name unambiguously refers to an entry in the - tree. The following are example string representations of DNs + tree. The following are examples of string representations of DNs [LDAPDN]: UID=nobody@example.com,DC=example,DC=com @@ -427,7 +421,7 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-09 27 October 2003 2.3. Structure of an Entry An entry consists of a set of attributes which hold information about - the object which entry represents. Some attributes represent user + the object which the entry represents. Some attributes represent user information and are called user attributes. Other attributes represent operational and/or administrative information and are called operational attributes. @@ -445,21 +439,22 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-09 27 October 2003 subtypes and other functions. No two values of an attribute may be equivalent. + Two values are considered equivalent if they would match according to + the equality matching rule of the attribute type. If the attribute + type is defined with no equality matching rule, two values are + equivalent if and only if they are identical. + + Zeilenga LDAP Models [Page 8] -INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-09 27 October 2003 +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-10 15 February 2004 - Two values are considered equivalent if they would match according to - the equality matching rule of the attribute type. If the attribute - type is defined with no equality matching rule, two values are - equivalent if and only if they are identical. - - For example, the 'givenName' attribute can have can have more than one + For example, a 'givenName' attribute can have can have more than one value, they must be Directory Strings, and they are case insensitive. - The 'givenName' attribute cannot hold both "John" and "JOHN" as these + A 'givenName' attribute cannot hold both "John" and "JOHN" as these are equivalent values per the equality matching rule of the attribute type. @@ -500,19 +495,19 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-09 27 October 2003 Each object class identifies the set of attributes required to be present in entries belonging to the class and the set of attributes + allowed to be present in entries belonging to the class. As an entry + of a class must meet the requirements of each class it belongs to, it + can be said that an object class inherits the sets of allowed and + required attributes from its superclasses. A subclass can identify an + attribute allowed by its superclass as being required. If an Zeilenga LDAP Models [Page 9] -INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-09 27 October 2003 +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-10 15 February 2004 - allowed to be present in entries belonging to the class. As an entry - of a class must meet the requirements of each class it belongs to, it - can be said that an object class inherits the sets of allowed and - required attributes from its superclasses. A subclass can identify an - attribute allowed by its superclass as being required. If an attribute is a member of both sets, it is required to be present. Each object class is defined to be one of three kinds of object @@ -537,6 +532,9 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-09 27 October 2003 'top' abstract object class. Auxiliary object classes do not necessarily derive from 'top'. + The following is the object class definition (see Section 4.1.1) for + the 'top' object class: + ( 2.5.6.0 NAME 'top' ABSTRACT MUST objectClass ) All entries belong to the 'top' abstract object class. @@ -557,15 +555,15 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-09 27 October 2003 This structural object class is referred to as the structural object class of the entry. + Structural object classes are related to associated entries: + Zeilenga LDAP Models [Page 10] -INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-09 27 October 2003 +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-10 15 February 2004 - Structural object classes are related to associated entries: - - an entry conforming to a structural object class shall represent the real-world object constrained by the object class; @@ -586,21 +584,20 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-09 27 October 2003 Structural object classes cannot subclass auxiliary object classes. Each entry is said to belong to its structural object class as well as - all classes in its structural object class's superclass chain, which - always includes 'top'. + all classes in its structural object class's superclass chain. 2.4.3. Auxiliary Object Classes Auxiliary object classes are used augment the characteristics of entries. They are commonly used to augment the sets of attributes - required and allowed attributes to be present in an entry. They can - be used to describe entries or classes of entries. + required and allowed to be present in an entry. They can be used to + describe entries or classes of entries. Auxiliary object classes cannot subclass structural object classes. An entry can belong to any subset of the set of auxiliary object - classes allowed by the DIT content rule associated with structural + classes allowed by the DIT content rule associated with the structural object class of the entry. If no DIT content rule is associated with the structural object class of the entry, the entry cannot belong to any auxiliary object class. @@ -612,25 +609,22 @@ INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-09 27 October 2003 2.5. Attribute Descriptions An attribute description is composed of an attribute type (see Section + 2.5.1) and a set of zero or more attribute options (see Section + 2.5.2). + Zeilenga LDAP Models [Page 11] -INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-09 27 October 2003 - +INTERNET-DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapbis-models-10 15 February 2004 - 2.5.1) and a set of zero or more attribute options (see Section - 2.5.2). An attribute description is represented by the ABNF: attributedescription = attributetype options - attributetype = oid - options = *( SEMI option ) - option = 1*keychar where identifies the attribute type and each